EDWARD D TILLMAN,
Complainant,
and
IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION
v.
MONFORT OF COLORADO, INC., CON AGRA, and BRET GOKEN.
Respondents.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
I. AUTHORITY FOR AND PURPOSE OF CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
1. The authority requiring that conclusions of law be included in the proposed and final decisions in administrative contested case proceedings is set forth in the Iowa Administrative Procedures Act (IAPA). Iowa Code S 17A.16(1). The reason such conclusions are made is not solely to reiterate established law on which the agency relies, but also to make law with respect to legal questions raised in the case which have not been resolved by prior legislation, controlling appellate court decisions, agency rulemaking or agency adjudication. See B. Schwartz, Administrative Law 213-14 S 4.18 (1991). "In exercising adjudicatory power, an agency, like a court, must frequently decide cases on the basis of new doctrines not theretofore applied to the specific problem. If the agency decision becomes a precedent, it guides future conduct in much the same way as though it were a new rule promulgated under the rulemaking power." Id. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 354 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1969). Agencies are permitted, under the IAPA, to invoke their own prior decisions as legal authorities in subsequent cases provided those decisions are indexed by name and subject and made available to the public, as the Commission's decisions are. See Iowa Code S 17A.3(1)(d), (2).
2. "Administrative law's most fundamental tenet, codified in Iowa Code section 17A.19(8)(1991), is that administrative decisions are to be made by the agencies, not the courts." Leonard v. Iowa State Board of Education, 471 N.W.2d 815, 815 (Iowa 1991). It is implicit, under the structure of the IAPA, that agencies are generally required to rule on legal questions initially raised before them in contested cases. A court's review of agency action "is carefully confined to the correction of errors of law." Id. A court would hardly be able to determine whether the agency's decision was affected by error of law if the agency failed to address the legal issues raised before it.
3. With certain exceptions, such as challenges to the constitutional validity of a statute, Shell Oil Co. v. Blair, 417 N.W.2d 425, 429-30 (Iowa 1987), if a legal or factual issue is raised before the agency and not decided by it, and an appeal of the agency's action is based upon the issue, the appellate courts will remand the case back to the agency in order to have the question initially decided by the agency. See Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 453 N.W.2d 512, 527 (Iowa 1990).
4. This is why, in the Hy-Vee case, the Iowa Supreme Court remanded the question of whether the complaint had been timely filed back to the Commission before the Court would consider the issue. See id.; Hoa Thi Blood, 10 Iowa Civil Rights Commission Case Reports 30, 30 (1990). The Commission had not addressed that question, which involved unresolved factual and legal issues. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 453 N.W.2d at 527. After the Commission issued a decision resolving those questions, it was affirmed by the court which adopted the Commission's legal analysis and found that its findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 530.
II. PERSUASIVE VALUE OF OPINIONS FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS:
5. Federal court decisions applying Federal anti-discrimination laws are not controlling or governing authority in cases arising under the Iowa Civil Rights Act. E.g. Franklin Manufacturing Co. v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 270 N.W.2d 829, 831 (Iowa 1978). Nonetheless, they are often relied on as persuasive authority in these cases. E.g. Iowa State Fairgrounds Security v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 322 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 1982). Although even decisions of the United States Supreme Court are rejected as persuasive authority when their reasoning is inconsistent with the broad remedial purposes of the Act, Franklin Manufacturing Co. v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 270 N.W.2d at 831; Quaker Oats Company v. Cedar Rapids Human Rights Commission, 268 N.W.2d 862, 866-67 (Iowa 1978), its opinions are often entitled to great deference. Quaker Oats Company v. Cedar Rapids Human Rights Commission at 866.
6. In determining the persuasive value of any Federal decision, or decision of another state, or other legal authority, it must be borne in mind that the Act is a "manifestation of a massive national drive to right wrongs prevailing in our social and economic structures of our country," Iron Workers Local No. 67 v. Hart, 191 N.W.2d 758, 765 (Iowa 1971). Therefore, decisions from other jurisdictions are persuasive only when they are consistent with the controlling authority requiring liberal interpretation and construction of the Iowa Civil Rights Act. When determining the sense and meaning of the written text of a statute providing regulations conducive to public good or welfare, the statute is liberally interpreted. State ex. rel. Turner v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 624, 629 (Iowa 1971). When determining the legal effect of its provisions, the Iowa Civil Rights Act "shall be broadly construed to effectuate its purposes," Iowa Code S 216.18 (1995), and "liberally construed with a view to promote its objects and assist the parties in obtaining justice." Iowa Code S 4.2. "In construing a statute, the court must look to the object to be accomplished, the evils and mischief sought to be remedied, or the purpose to be subserved, and place on it a reasonable or liberal construction which will best effect its purpose rather than one which will defeat it." Monroe Community School District v. Marion County Board of Education, 251 Iowa 992, 998, 103 N.W.2d 746 (1960); Franklin Manufacturing Co. v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 270 N.W.2d 829, 832 (Iowa 1978). Therefore, constructions of the statute which "effectively defeat the remedial purpose of Chapter 601A [the Iowa Civil Rights Act]." should be rejected. See Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 318 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Iowa 1982).
III. OFFICIAL NOTICE:
7. Official notice may be taken of all facts of which judicial notice may be taken and of matters within the specialized knowledge of the agency. Iowa Code S 17A.14(4). Judicial notice may be taken of matters which are "common knowledge or capable of certain verification." In Re Tresnak, 297 N.W.2d 109, 112 (Iowa 1980). Judicial notice may be taken of all papers properly issued or filed or returned in the case then before the adjudicator. Slater v. Roche, 148 Iowa 413, 418, 126 N.W. 921, 927 (1910). See also C. McCormick, McCormick on Evidence 927 (2nd ed. 1984). See Findings of Fact Nos. 11, 28.