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*The University of Iowa*  
*Extension Bulletin*

Proceedings of the 1964

# Urban Policy Conference

Institute of Public Affairs

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# Urban Policy Conference

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## *Foreword*

The first annual Urban Policy Conference was held at The University of Iowa on September 25 and 26, 1964. Co-sponsored by the Institute of Public Affairs and the League of Iowa Municipalities, the conference focused on broad perspectives that help to explain the nature and consequences of urbanization. Descriptions of a municipal and a federal government response to urbanization provided excellent illustrations of these perspectives.

The Urban Policy Conferences were conceived as a means of assisting local policy makers in Iowa to explore the many dimensions of urbanization. Future conferences will explore related topics that help make up the broad fabric of urban change.

The sponsors are grateful for the interest shown in the first conference. We look forward to continuing the examination of urbanization at the 1965 conference.

Dean Zenor, Director  
Institute of Public Affairs

March, 1965

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# Public Policy and the Central Business District

RONALD R. BOYCE<sup>o</sup>

The nature, future place, and importance of the central business district, or CBD as it is commonly called, is a subject of extreme controversy. Some say it is no longer necessary—indeed, it is an anachronism. For example, Professor Edward Ullman, perhaps our most distinguished urban geographer, in his Presidential address to the Regional Science Association says, "If we were to apply private enterprise depreciation principles to the inner portions of cities we would write them off—just as machinery is scrapped—and throw them away, but where would we throw them?"

Others claim that the CBD is so vital an organism in the metropolitan anatomy that any city without a healthy CBD is dead or in danger of dying. They argue that the CBD should be restored to its former and rightful place as the heart of the metropolis—indeed, should surpass anything it was in the past. Charles Abrams, an eminent planner, recently claimed that "without the CBD the suburbs cannot exist" because they are not viable without it. In this light the CBD is looked upon as an opportunity to build a truly representative symbol of our urban civilization.

I think these two different conclusions result largely from two very diverse perceptions as to what the city is. The social scientist on the one hand views the city as a laboratory for analysis—as a phenomenon which primarily serves and reflects man's needs and technology. He sees the city as population clustered tightly together in order to serve better the assembly, production, service, and distributive needs of its inhabitants; he sees it as a tightly knit web of spatial, economic, and social interconnections. Melvin Webber, an eminent planner and former president of the American Institute of Planners, recently stated that "the history of city growth, in essence, is the story of man's eager search for ease of human interaction." Viewed in this light cities and the CBD are expected to change and to adjust to man's changing technology and needs.

This perspective of the city is vastly different from those who view

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the city as an artifact, or as an ideal expression of our civilization. Thus, the architect-designer is ever proposing utopian, or ideal, urban designs. In this context, the city must have order, beauty, harmony, and symbolic meaning as an entity. Each structure should complement all others in a vast symphony of concrete and pattern. The city is viewed as a single expression with finite boundaries and discernible internal subunits. Urban sprawl, therefore, is treated as a disease. This philosophy is perhaps best expressed by the architect-city planner Eliel Saarinen who says, "Just as any living organism can be healthy only when that organism is a product of nature's art in accordance with the basic principles of nature's architecture, exactly for the same reason town or city can be healthy—physically, spiritually, and culturally—only when it is developed into a product of man's art in accordance with the basic principles of man's architecture."

It is clear that two different cases can consequently be made for what the future CBD should be like and for what the public policy should be toward it. Despite the controversy about what should be done with the CBD, however, almost everyone is in complete agreement that the CBD is unsuited to present needs and, furthermore, has been rapidly losing its monopolistic and dominant position in the metropolis. This is demonstrated by the rapid and continuing decline in CBD retail sales, by the dilapidated and dysfunctional condition of many downtowns, and by the continual erosion and decentralization of activities to outlying locations.

Today, I would like to do three things: first, to look objectively at the major assets and deficits of the CBD in terms of the two perspectives above; second, to attempt to pose some reasons for the many problems and trends which are affecting the CBD; and finally, to present my conclusions as to the public policy which I think should be adopted for the American central business district. As an aside, however, I confess that my views are more with the social scientist than with the architect; even so, there is much room for controversy and pause as to the future nature of the urban core.

### *Assets of the CBD*

First, let's look at some of the major assets of the downtown area. The central business district is an outstanding asset for at least two reasons: first, because of the tremendous concentration of activities and employment which it contains, and the control over the urban fabric which it exerts; second, because of its symbolic, cultural, and historical value. The first asset is one perhaps most appreciated by the social scientist; the second one most appreciated by the architect-designer.

The concentration of activities and employment is demonstrated by the fact that well over one-half of all employment in most central cities occurs in, or very near, the central business district. About 80 per cent of all department store sales, and about 90 per cent of all banking occurs in the CBD of even the largest metropolises. The small sub-CBD nodes of Wall Street, LaSalle Street, and Market Street undoubtedly control the finances of much of the nation. The daytime population in downtown Chicago, for example, amounts to almost 300,000 persons daily—more than the total population of Greater Des Moines, Iowa. Such concentration is reflected in the value of land and buildings in the CBD which often amounts to upwards of 15 to 25 per cent of the physical value of the entire city. Over one million dollars an acre was recently paid merely for air rights in downtown Chicago. A price of \$10,000 a front foot is not unusually high for CBD land in our largest cities.

The cultural and historical value of downtown is equally impressive. It contains the major libraries, museums, and concert halls. It contains the great hotels, restaurants, night clubs, movie houses, and theaters. In addition it represents the initial beginnings of the city and contains the historical buildings and places. It is the area which most people associate with any given city. In short, it is the distinctive attribute of the metropolis. The subdivisions and industrial parks look much the same from city to city, but the downtown is different. It is most representative of the character and nature of any given city. Because of this distinctive quality and for other reasons, a business location in the CBD carries with it great prestige. By the same token, the viability of the downtown is often the only indication of a city's growth to the casual visitor.

#### *Deficits and Problems of the CBD*

If the assets of downtowns are impressive, the deficits are even more so and are surely the reason for paying so much attention to the CBD. The major difficulties, problems, or deficits of the CBD are primarily related to its inability to adjust to new needs. This inability is most clearly reflected in the problems of obsolescence. The buildings of most downtowns date back a half century—before the motor car—as do their streets and general physical layout. As a consequence such structures and blocks are not suitable for many of today's space needs.

One has only to observe the space now being used by outlying business and industry to note the disparity. Many industries occupy the equivalent of ten or twenty downtown blocks. The new Prudential office building in Houston alone occupies some twenty-eight



acres—yet many of our largest CBD's contain only about fifty acres. It is not unusual for a new regional shopping center to cover 100 acres.

The general appearance of downtown is also a severe handicap. Such dilapidated and unesthetic appearances are partly the result of the age of structures. They are also, however, the result of street furniture that is just plain ugly. In particular, there is a great lack of landscaping and general architectural style as well as a void in the physical coordination of structures. Most buildings have been placed with little regard as to how they would fit into the general scheme of things. Finally, many downtowns are characterized by a great deal of broken frontage where buildings have been torn down and used for parking lots, thus making great gaps in the business pattern. Little thought has been given to the best arrangement of functions inside the central business district and consequently many institutional establishments such as banks and insurance companies are located in such a way that a shopper must walk further to get between stores than would be necessary, say, in a shopping center, where conscious thought is given to the order and arrangement of functions.

The most talked about problems in the central business district are, of course, traffic and parking. Congestion has reached magnificent proportions in many downtown areas. There is a great lack of parking space, and many people visiting the downtowns have to walk considerable distances or pay very high prices for parking fees. Although high-rise parking ramps are being built, they are still highly inadequate to serve the need in most cities. Mass transit, of course, has been deteriorating continually in both service and quality while the price has been increasing, so that it is no longer anywhere near as convenient as formerly. Moreover, transit does not truly serve many of the outlying residential territories adequately.

Many of the problems in the central business districts are also the result of the extreme governmental fragmentation in our metropolises. The central city municipality, which often contains only about half the total metropolitan population, is greatly concerned about the viability of its central business district and, in fact, is undertaking various renewal and redevelopment schemes which ordinarily would not be undertaken if the metropolis were under one municipal government. This governmental fragmentation, of course, creates unnecessary taxes on the populace. It also causes the central city government to become gravely concerned about the decentralization and new placement of functions and activities which otherwise would be welcomed. The decentralization of retailing to outlying locations is in many regards a real asset and benefit to the consumer. The prob-

lem to the central city government is that such relocation generally occurs outside of its particular municipal boundaries.

A lack of progressiveness also is evident in most central business districts. This weakness is reflected in decor and general appearance, as well as the parking problems. Although many downtowns have now developed various "save downtown associations," most of these are far too chamber of commerce-like to be of significant value. Most are concerned with promotional and superficial schemes rather than with obtaining a solid base on which to make decisions.

### *Reasons for CBD Change*

But what are the major reasons for such central business district problems? Let's examine some of the changes which have been occurring in the central city—the municipality which contains the central business district. A metropolis, you will recall, includes the central city, the county in which it is located, and other surrounding counties which are highly connected to the central city. Metropolitan areas increased in population 26 per cent between 1950 and 1960, whereas the central city has barely held its own—increasing by only 1.5 per cent during this time. Many central cities of large metropolises have actually lost population between 1950 and 1960. Such population decline has had a major impact on the downtown area.

Moreover, population decline has not been offset by increases in nonresidential activities as was formerly the case. In fact, the population remaining has become far less affluent than that which preceded it. The zone immediately surrounding many downtowns is, in fact, urban renewal area often characterized by slum conditions. It is in this zone that most Negro emigrants to the north as well as other minority groups live.

The factors which have caused such central business district decline are reflections of the new mobility of the population as represented by the automobile, the increased leisure time, and the general technological advancements made in construction since World War II. Such changes are reflected most clearly in what is commonly termed suburbanization. Subdivisions, planned industrial parks, and planned shopping centers have been quick to augment the population decentralization. The great increase in the importance and territory occupied by municipal airports during the past decade have, in turn, sparked outlying residential, industrial, and commercial development. Development of freeways, although just beginning, is exerting tremendous decentralization pressures by providing outer circumferential highways and encouraging people to live even further from place of work.

As monopolistic effects have been broken, the end result is that the central business district has continued to become more off-center. Until the past decade, most cities occupied very small territories. Today, however, with large subdivisions and the generally more spacious use of land, the location of the central business district has become critical. Although it is still the focus of the major transit routes and even the interstate freeway system, distance has become a major factor as to whether people will patronize or work in this center. Generally, as a city grows the central business district tends to become more off-center inside the metropolitan complex. The importance of central business district location has been demonstrated by a recent study I made which showed that in metropolises of about the same population, the CBD's which were most centrally located inside the metropolis had a much higher dollar amount of retail sales than those which were off-center in the metropolises. As cities continue to expand into new rural territories, the location problem with regard to CBD's will surely become of even greater significance.

#### *Developing a Public Policy for the CBD*

Given these few facts, what should one conclude about the CBD? What, if anything, should be done by public intervention? One thing I think stands out abundantly clear, and that is that without major governmental intervention the CBD will never again regain its former high position of value, prestige, and general importance in the metropolis. All the signs point to a continuation of the rapid decline in the CBD and a continuation of rapid growth in most of the remaining parts of the urban complex. If current trends continue, the CBD will become but one of the many nodes of commercial activity in the metropolis—and perhaps not even the dominant node. It is also clear that the architectural thesis that the city is dead without a healthy CBD is unjustified. In fact, Los Angeles, that city in search of a CBD, is growing the most rapidly in the nation and now is second largest in the United States and the sixth largest metropolis in the world.

This kind of argument perhaps obscures the real policy questions, however. The first question is not really whether the metropolis *can* effectively operate without a CBD, but whether it should, or must. It clearly can. The second question is whether deliberate intervention is necessary in order for the city to operate effectively. The CBD is truly tied to other urban components and, if not operating effectively, can have a deleterious effect on the entire urban system.

My conclusion with regard to the first question is that, given existing conditions and investments in the CBD, most every metropolis should probably continue to have a CBD, but not to the present ex-

tent for any given sized city, and surely not an augmented and symbol-laden CBD as envisaged by many architect-designers. Although there now are many functions exclusively limited to the CBD, I can think of no single function, or activity, which of necessity must be located here in the future. While the CBD might be the best location, given the location of complementary activities for many functions, especially in smaller cities, there is no compelling reason why such functions should be encouraged and promoted here. The variety, pedestrian contacts, and other generally desirable urbane features can be created in outlying locations in perhaps better form than that possible by remodeling our central business districts. My conclusion with regard to the second question is that the CBD has indeed become a drag on the urban system, inasmuch as it is overbuilt, and requires a catalyst for change which will diminish its prominence. But what specifically should the CBD be like in the future, if one accepts these premises, and what specific catalytic actions and public policies are necessary in order to achieve this?

Now before any of you get pencil and paper in hand thinking I am going to untie the Gordian Knot, let me hastily assure you that I really do not know the answer. In fairness, however, but not without a great deal of doubt on my part, I will try. First, I will describe briefly the role and function of the CBD in the future metropolis, after which I will suggest some policy provisions which might achieve these ends.

I can partly substantiate my conclusions as well as describe the role of the future CBD by describing what I think should *not* be the nature of things in the future. First, I do not think that the city should be looked upon as an artifact of mankind for the simple reason that I think the city is far too important to be used as a monument or a museum. Nor do I think the future CBD should be the captive promotional device of special interest territories or groups such as the central city municipality or various "save downtown" groups. It is necessary that goods and services be distributed throughout the metropolis in a way which best serves the total metropolitan citizenry, not just a selected few. Many downtown functions might best be decentralized within closer range of the consuming agents as soon as possible. Finally, I do not think plans for downtown or the central city should be made independently of the entire urban complex, and perhaps even the composite urban interests of the nation. This, in simple terms, means that most city planning departments that serve only the central city government are obsolete.

This, in turn, leads to a major public policy statement, namely, that planning should be done on a super-metropolitan basis. This necessitates metropolitan government or some such alternative. De-

spite the many pitfalls and bitter experiences evident by metropolitan government attempts, this policy must be continued with renewed energy. Indeed, one might argue that the metropolitan unit is already far too restrictive a concept for today's, and especially tomorrow's, urban residential patterns.

Second, the U.S. government should establish a more comprehensive department of urban affairs than that currently envisaged so that major and comparative research on the city complex can be undertaken. It is a national shame that there is probably as much information available on the swamplands of Florida as is available on the cities of the United States. For example, it is not even known within thousands of acres the amount of land now occupied by urban residents in the United States. Almost nothing specifically is known on a comparative basis about the location and extent of many major components of the metropolis. Until more information is available, and more comprehensive studies are made, we must continue to operate partly in a vacuum. We must continue to operate much as I have done today. Thank you.

# Urban Renewal: A Case Study

EARL E. STEWART\*

One of the most successful federally aided urban renewal projects in the United States has been carried out in Fargo, North Dakota. Fargo's success is the result of a series of planning decisions and great local effort. It is interesting to review the sequence of events and actions leading to the renewal program.

It all started back in 1949 when the city authorized the preparation of a master plan for future community development. The master plan, completed and adopted in 1952, contained a civic center plan for the location of future city hall, civic auditorium, and public library facilities. The plan recommended that the future civic center be located adjacent to the central business district in an area containing a high percentage of physically blighted and deteriorated buildings.

The first step toward the realization of the Fargo civic center was taken during the spring of 1953 when a group of citizens and city officials appeared before the state legislature requesting the passage of an enabling act. This particular act, approved by the legislature, authorized the city of Fargo to levy up to two mills in taxes for a period not to exceed twelve years for obtaining funds to purchase sites for future public buildings. However, soon after the passage of the act it became apparent that this source of funds would not be adequate to meet the cost of purchasing the proposed civic center site. The city then decided to look into the possibility of obtaining the desired site through the federally aided urban renewal program.

A group of local officials and citizens again appeared before the state legislature during the spring of 1955, and were successful in obtaining the passage of a state urban renewal law that is prerequisite to city participation in the federal program. After the passage of this law a preliminary survey was made of the proposed renewal project area encompassing the civic center site, and it was determined to be sufficiently blighted and deteriorated for assistance under the federal program. The planning commission then authorized and directed the preparation of an application to the Housing and Home Finance

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Agency for funds to plan the proposed project. Funds for planning were obtained from the federal government during March of 1956, and the planning for the project was carried out during a period of approximately two years. During the month of February, 1958, the planning was approved and the project entered the execution stage. The local public agency immediately thereafter began making offers to purchase property.

The renewal project, now effectively completed, has proved to be a major asset to the city. In addition to realizing over \$7,000,000 in new building construction within the project boundary, the project has stimulated numerous private building construction adjacent to the project area. The renewal program has provided the city of Fargo an excellent integrated four-block civic center site including land area to accommodate off-street parking for approximately 500 automobiles and has drastically changed the appearance of the once blighted and deteriorated area. Total expenditures for property purchases and new construction have exceeded \$9,000,000.

The annual real estate tax receipts from the area prior to renewal were approximately \$39,000. With the completion of new building construction within the project area, the tax receipts will exceed \$90,000 per year, amounting to an annual increase of approximately \$50,000. This improvement in the city's tax structure is particularly significant in view of the fact that about 70 per cent of the project area was redeveloped for public purposes and only 30 per cent was redeveloped for private purposes. Prior to renewal, the project area contained eighty-one residential buildings, twenty-four one-family houses, and fifty-seven additional buildings containing numerous apartments with light housekeeping or sleeping rooms.

Prior to renewal, approximately 100 families resided within the project boundary. Of these families, twenty-one were deemed to have low incomes insufficient for them to obtain decent, safe, and sanitary housing facilities within their ability to pay. In considering the relocation needs of the low-income families, the city approached private enterprise for a solution. After numerous meetings with local organizations, a local real estate firm with offers of assistance from the Fargo board of retailers and various local lending institutions agreed to assume the responsibility for relocating the twenty-one low-income families. A legally binding agreement between the local real estate firm and the city was executed with the commitment that all twenty-one low-income families to be displaced in carrying out the project would be relocated in decent, safe, and sanitary housing facilities within their ability to pay.

It was further agreed that a family should not be required to pay

more than 20 per cent of its gross income for housing, including the cost of rent, heat, and electricity. The local real estate firm with pledges of support from the lending institutions agreed to subsidize the rents of the low-income families for a period of five years from the date of execution of a loan and grant contract for the project should this be necessary. A cash subsidy fund was established and rental assistance was paid to a number of families from this source.

As a result of this unique relocation program under which private enterprise assumed the responsibility for relocation, all twenty-one low-income project families were satisfactorily relocated in decent, safe, and sanitary housing facilities within their ability to pay. A recent interview with the affected families reveals that they have been dispersed throughout the community, that they have been accepted by their neighbors, and that they are pleased with their move.

Fargo's success was to a great extent due to the strength of local leadership, particularly that provided by the city's mayor. It was also partly due to the fact that a well-informed public, through active citizen participation, gave its support to the program.



# Urbanization and Governmental Services in Middle-Sized Cities

CHARLES R. ADRIAN<sup>\*</sup>

We're going to talk about urban services today. When I talk about urban services, I usually try to deal with several things. One is trends. It's nice, when you're away from home, to make some predictions in the way of extrapolation of trends because by the time anybody has a chance to check you out, you have long since disappeared from the scene. I also like to talk about the cultural environment in which these decisions must be made. It seems to me that all of you know, whether you've ever studied sociology in college or not, and even if you have been on a council for only a few months, that every political decision must take place within the environment in which the decision must be applied. So I'm going to talk about three things. First, I'm going to talk about the kind of environment in which we find community politics and decision-making. Secondly, I'm going to talk about some trends in demand, and, thirdly, I'm going to talk about some of the future patterns of decision-making that I see as relevant to the urban scene.

As to the environment in which we operate, I think that we have a great deal of difficulty in trying to see what things are going to be like five, ten, or twenty years down the road because of a number of inhibiting factors that stem from the basic American ideology. I used to, in talking about this, call it the mainstream of American ideology. Unfortunately during this election campaign, the expression doesn't seem so original. Somehow or another, this has become an issue in the current campaign. Nonetheless, there is a mainstream of American ideology that is appropriate to the urbanizing trend in our society. Let me talk about it somewhat.

For one thing, in this principal context we find that Americans are, by long-standing tradition, anti-urban. We have the peculiar combination in this country of a romantic view of our agrarian past which produces a nostalgia, which we try to combine with progress so that we get a combination of nostalgia and ambition. We want bigger and better cities, but somehow or another they are not supposed to vary

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from the pattern of the county seat town in Grandpa's day. The result is that we are never really dealing with the world in the simplest rationalistic terms that would be possible if we didn't have this inhibition. Furthermore, out of a number of American traditions we have tended to emphasize the desire for consensus at the local level in a period when by the nature of the urbanization pattern, we are going to have increasing conflict. Thus we are faced with increasing conflict-ridden situations about decisions relative to services of local government. We want to get rid of having conflict. We try to avoid the conflict; we try to duck the responsibility. A friend of mine, Robert Wood, who teaches at MIT, has said that what Americans want is not democracy but fraternity, at least at the local level, so they try to find ways of isolating themselves from other people who do not share their identical social values. You are, of course, acquainted with this situation in the conflict among ethnic groups throughout American history. It is the kind of conflict that does not particularly sit well with the American middle-class of today. Yet the nature of the pattern is such as to increase the amount of conflict.

Another characteristic of our environment is that we are becoming increasingly a mobile urban society; yet we would prefer, because we want to avoid conflict, to draw from only our own immediate hinterland and those persons who have shared our life experiences and therefore probably our own set of values. I think one of the first things that any community that wants to grow is going to have to recognize is that after it grows beyond a certain point, there will develop all kinds of intra-community conflicts related to differences in cultural values, because in time the community will be drawing a working force that doesn't come from the hinterland, or at least this is always a possibility, and it will draw a managerial force from all over the country because of the pattern of economic organization of today.

Some of these patterns, I think, begin quite slowly in a small town. If you're talking about Zilchville, which has 2,127 people according to the census, but 3,000 according to you, you'll probably have no problem drawing surplus agricultural workers and they probably won't show much ideological conflict with earlier residents of the community. What happens, of course, is that as the community grows a little bit and its businesses expand and begin to prosper, they are sold to national firms, and soon the firms send in some fellow to manage the local firm who comes from Philadelphia and has never seen an Iowa county seat town in his life. These kinds of mobility factors are going to make our urban areas less homogeneous in the future.

We have a tradition in America, revitalized as a result of our leisure

time, of becoming a collection of do-it-yourself addicts. This is still the age of do-it-yourself. But above everything else, it is the age of the expert, and much of the decision-making in the future is going to have to be done in the context in which there will be increasing conflicts between the do-it-yourself fans and the experts. Of course, the problem psychologically is that the expert is the man who is envied, who is distrusted in considerable extent because one cannot as a layman evaluate his ability or his advice. This is one of the most frustrating things that congressmen run into, and congressmen can afford staff members. What happens to the city council? If you bring in some expert and ask him "What's the trouble?" concerning some particular problem in your community, and he says, "The renefrenus is on the quoffendorf," who is to say whether he's right or that's bad or good? You must trust him, and the very fact that you must trust him will lead to greater conflict and possibly a tendency to want to keep the old way of doing things by amateurs without reliance on the professional.

The whole pattern of urbanization implies economic interdependence, and that implies professional specialization. This conflict, of course, is epitomized in the potential conflict between the department heads, the manager, and the consulting firms on the one hand and the council members on the other. As a result of this kind of environmental circumstances, this kind of an ideology, there is also a desire, I think, for us to try to preserve independent local self-government. At the same time we want to have a high level of governmental services, we want to have the amenities of life, but we are not sure that we want to pay the cost that is involved. Ideally we would like to have some other level of government, the state or federal government, pay for the costs, but somehow or another they shouldn't insist that they have any say in how it is done.

These desires, these hopes of an ideology, these characteristic conflicts within the ideology represent the kind of context in which the decisions are going to have to be made in the future. Let me emphasize that at the local level in most cities in the United States, the middle-class businessman has tended to dominate the policy-making process, and I think that the middle-class will continue to dominate it. But within the middle-class there is an increasingly sharp conflict between the small businessman and what Whyte has called the "organization" man. The organization man is a very different person from the small businessman. Characteristically, he is accustomed to working in a large bureaucracy. He is himself a bureaucrat; that is to say, he is performing a specialized function in a large fairly impersonal firm. He receives a salary. He may get some bonuses, but

fundamentally he relies on a salary. He is well educated; most organization men are college graduates and many have advanced degrees. He is quite mobile because the Boeing Company doesn't care where he wants to work. If he wants to work for it, he goes where it needs him. This is the pattern we will see more and more often in the future—the organization man moving into the community where he's going to want to get involved in community action. Although he doesn't know how long he will be there and doesn't have any real roots in the community, he feels that if his children are going to be educated there, he should be concerned about what goes on. The result will be that he will step on the toes of the local merchant in many cases.

The small businessman is still the private entrepreneur, with no guaranteed income and with little prospects of an expanding income in most cases, although he always hopes that if we attract industry somehow magically the receipts of the store will double. By and large he sees increases in taxes as a decrease in his take-home pay. This is not the psychological attitude of the organization man who by and large assumes that his pay is going to continue to increase, and that many of the costs of business are no concern of his. They are the concern only of the portion of the corporation bureaucracy that takes care of state and local taxes. The organization man has an ideal model of local community in his mind, generally. He tries to carry it from one place to another as he gets transferred along the line in his move up the organizational ladder.

What he seems to want is what I sometimes call the suburban ideology, although it will be found in middle-sized cities too, and not just in the suburbs of them. A desire to take the politics out of politics, a desire for blandness in politics seems to be the American goal. Just how we can operate democracy without politics escapes political scientists, but it apparently doesn't bother the typical citizen. He still strives for that goal. He has much more of a trust of the expert than does the typical small-town businessman, because the small-town businessman is a do-it-yourself type and the organization man, as a good bureaucrat, is accustomed to turning the problems in the corporation over to the expert who can best handle them. This means that he tends to have more confidence in professionals in every area of activity, including government, and I think that helps to account for the reason that practically all suburbs, where the state law permits it, incorporated in the postwar period, have been council-manager cities.

The organization man wants to have planning in the community because that is something characteristic of the corporation, and again it is something that should be turned over to the professional. What

should this town be like? The small-town businessman whose grandfather may have operated the store before him is likely to assume that the town ought to be in the future what it was in the past. This is not likely to be the point of view of the organization man, who will say, "Let's bring in the expert planner; let's get an effective planning organization and a new zoning ordinance."

This goal of taking the politics out of politics, of course, contrasts with what is actually going to be happening in the next decade or so. Not only is the organization man moving into town to stir up a fuss, but so is the working force that is necessary in a community. In every community I've ever known, people want to have some industry to strengthen the backbone of the tax base so that the homeowners don't have to pay such high taxes. But, somehow or another, much of the time they seem to think that their town should attract industry that doesn't make noise, smoke, dust, or bring in Negroes. I am putting it a little more bluntly than necessary, maybe. The point is that the ideal is to get the industries without accepting the social costs of attracting industries. But inevitably conflicts will result from an influx of working-class people into small towns as they become middle-sized cities. This is going to mean, as I see it, that we'll have struggles in local communities over such things as open-covenant housing ordinances and F.E.P.C. ordinances. Even in small communities of 10,000 this has happened in many parts of the country, and it will happen in many other areas in the next few years. We are going to find that as industrial communities grow there will be a large number of issues that center around the question of unemployment and the anomaly of having a great deal of poverty side by side with an affluent society. This situation has been pointed out by some people as being an anomaly, but it isn't really that. So far as I know it has existed in every civilization as a result of the accumulation of wealth. What we will find, of course, is that many of the federal poverty programs, which I suspect will grow over the years because the idea is not only politically attractive but the problem is chronic in character, are going to involve all kinds of decisions by local residents, local officials, managers, mayors, and councilmen.

Another characteristic of organization that is going to involve much local decision-making will center in the area of mental health. I think this is true for at least two reasons. One is that we are more aware today of the nature of mental health and the possibilities of treatment of the mentally ill; and the other is that there is at least some evidence, although it is by no means conclusive, that an urban society, particularly one that emphasizes achievement, is likely to produce mental illnesses, major and minor. My guess is that in the future

there is going to be increasing demand for local action in this area. People have a tendency to think of problems increasingly moving up to the state and federal levels, but in a number of areas the problems are also being pushed down into the local area. Both the Federal Bureau of Public Roads and the State Highway Departments, for example, are all too eager to force onto local city councils some of the tougher decisions that must be made in determining a routing of a highway. The same thing is true of something as costly and complex as the treatment of the mentally ill.

Urbanization is going to create a series of problems that we have been talking about for many years but haven't been doing very much about. Many local people who defend the importance of local self-government are hoping that the state or federal government will solve some of these tougher problems. Obviously, one of our greatest problems of the future is going to be in the preservation and the development of safe water resources. The problem of water sources is going to be a very considerable one in almost every part of the country. I think that many local leaders are talking today in terms of leaving this for someone else to handle. We can't really meet it at the local level. Now I'm not suggesting, of course, that Zilchville, even with the cooperation of The University of Iowa, is going to be able to solve the problem of an inexpensive way of converting salt water for city use, a problem that doesn't happen to be a great one in Iowa. I don't suppose local communities are worrying very much about the fact that eventually we will probably have to turn around the waters of the rivers flowing into Hudson Bay in order to maintain the water level of the Great Lakes, again not an immediate problem here, but certainly a great one in my state.

For the most part, I think, these long-range problems are going to have to be met at the state, national, and sometimes even international level. The question is, though, "Whose responsibility is it to look at the social cost of urbanization?" In particular, I think, one of the questions is, "Whose responsibility is it to serve, to innovate, to think up new social and technological ways of doing things?" I think the innovation is not the job of the councilmen or the mayor, by and large, but finding out ways to effectuate new approaches certainly must be theirs.

There are all kinds of other problems, some of which were discussed this morning, relevant to the allure of the suburbs and what to do with the core of the city. One of the ironies, of course, of the core of the city is the fact that the faster the city grows, the greater becomes the obsolescence rate of the core. Also you get the strange situation that in a very rapidly growing city, there is little economic incentive

to maintain the areas that are relatively adjacent to the core of the city. The central business district may be surrounded by decent housing by your standards in the areas where you live; but if, in the future, Iowa begins to urbanize at a faster rate, these areas will tend to deteriorate at a much faster rate than they are deteriorating today. You may be able to take advantage of some of the mistakes and failures of other communities in the country in looking at these problems, but if you are a typical, red-blooded American you probably won't. You'll probably wait until you suddenly discover what has happened to your community and then you will wonder what you ought to do about it.

Consideration of this problem raises the fact, of course, that many of the questions that will have to be decided by councilmen and mayors and managers in future years are going to be essentially non-economic questions. Or to state it more accurately, they are going to be questions that cannot be decided entirely on economic grounds. If we in this country had not been so tied to the assumption of settling all major issues of public policy on the basis of economics, the core of the city probably would not have deteriorated to the extent that it has. Other nations that have urbanized rapidly and that are less wealthy than we are have not permitted this deterioration to happen. Whether it happens or not is essentially a question of ideology and not one of economics alone.

Now let me comment a little on the kinds of issues that I see as being important in the future. Many of them are issues that your towns haven't had to do too much about yet, but certainly will have to if we get anything like the population growth that is expected in the next thirty or forty years. I'd like to go back to my discussion of ideology for a moment to tell you what kinds of political situations I think you can generally expect to find in the future as your communities urbanize, or rather as they become larger urban areas. I think that some of these ideologies will support the views of managers and professional department heads and some sets of values, which is what an ideology is—a collection of social values. Some will not. Some will work against us. Let's look at those for a moment.

First of all we will find in many of the cities that grow the fastest a heavy emphasis on a set of ideas that I call the image of boosterism. Generally speaking, if a community becomes committed to this image, or if many of the community leaders become committed to it, what they get interested in is attracting industries to the community, trying to grow in terms of size; and it will probably be a long time, given our present population growth rates, before Americans will get over the notion that there is a high correlation between size and good-

ness. But we, at the same time, believe there isn't. There's an inverse correlation, of course; the small town is the ideal. By and large when the boosters take over the community—and you know what their principal values are because you find them in your local Chamber of Commerce—when the boosters take over the community, there are certain policy implications. One of the essential assumptions is that we have to do anything that is necessary to attract industry. Remember, of course, that it must be noiseless, smokeless, dustless, and white industry. You will have community issues over the subsidizing of the expansion of utilities, particularly of water and sewerage, and perhaps the sewage-disposal plant, because those nasty bureaucrats in Des Moines will say that if you grow any more you can't dump your raw sewage into the Skunk River.

For another thing they're going to insist on zoning that is advantageous to industry, and almost any kind of zoning designed as an advantage to industry is going to be a disadvantage to homeowners and to some realtors, mainly those that don't happen to have good connections with industrial firms and the possibility of selling land to them. But it is essential, absolutely essential, that if you're going to build industrially you must set aside land that is suitable for modern industrial purposes. This means large blocs of land somehow must be held off the market. You can't allow other things to infringe upon that area or you might as well forget about attracting the latest expansion of General Motors or the Boeing Company because they aren't going to be interested. If the boosters really get going, of course, it implies some radical changes in the type of population and the source of labor for the community.

Contrasted with this picture, although usually accompanying it, is the image of the city as the protector or provider of amenities. Americans are interested in the good life, and while the good life may be provided by industry, it is enjoyed in good solid middle-class neighborhoods with detached houses and backyards and barbecue pits. Now if this is the kind of society that is dominant, then people are going to say, "Yes we should have industry, but it ought to be located out on the fringe in an area that is zoned for industrial use only. And, of course, if they have to bring in workers they ought to live somewhere outside of the areas that we have already staked out for ourselves." They'll get interested in all kinds of "city beautiful" activities, putting electric wires underground and installing decorative lamp-posts. They will want to have lots of industry around, but it mustn't create any annoyance. They'll want government that is fair to all, but somehow it should be government that doesn't involve conflict. They will want careful planning and zoning, with residential considerations



as the most important. They will want good schools, maybe even fancy schools. And, of course, they will want modern highways but no traffic, certainly not in their subdivisions.

Now these two are both growth-oriented value systems and growth-oriented approaches to problems. People who support each of these views when they are leaders in the community are willing to expend dollars, although not necessarily for the same purposes. They are willing to use professional people because they are oriented toward dependence on the experts, and they have quite a bit of confidence in them. But they will find there will be at least two other groups in the community that will be competing for votes in elections, and competing for domination in community policies. One of these groups I call the supporters of the image of the city as a broker. This is not characteristic in a small town, but in the larger cities of America some people always have viewed the city government as essentially a system for the settlement of conflict. While I have said this belief isn't in the mainstream, it is certainly a traditional one. The big city machines were organized on the assumption that they were to ameliorate conflicts—conflicts between classes and among ethnic groups in particular. Generally speaking, as the conflict level in a community decision-making pattern expands and increases in the future, we may go back, out of a sense of necessity, to this notion; but basically Americans don't like it. We don't really expect the council to be a place where issues are threshed out in public. That may be necessary in Congress and maybe in the state legislature, but not in our city council. Yet I think that we may find more people in the future who accept the notion that the government is a broker, or arbiter, which seeks to iron out differences. One of the problems, incidentally, for city managers is the fact that in a community where there is no dominant value system, there is no consensus on boosterism or on life's amenities. Then where you have the broker image you find that very often the manager has rough going. The broker image of the city doesn't seem to be particularly compatible with the manager plan. Generally speaking, cities that have had a good deal of conflict have tended to center on the strong mayor system.

The other competing group has an image of a city that I call the image of the city as caretaker. This is the most conservative view of what city government ought to be like in the future. The caretaker ideology calls for city governments to make the fewest decisions necessary and for these decisions to be made only in the traditional areas of local activities. I suspect that in future years in your communities you're going to have some difficulties with persons committed to the caretaker ideology. There may even be people who are

committed to expanding boosterism at the same time that they are committed to the caretaker ideology. This I think is one of the characteristics of a group that's awfully hard to talk about today but that political scientists find particularly fascinating. I think we have to face up to this group—the political far right. If your city is growing at a fairly rapid pace you may find these people of the far right becoming very active politically. I suspect you'll find pretty much what has been found in a study of some of the far right groups in Texas by Murray Havens, a political scientist there. He discovered that the people who tended to be on the far right also tended to be people who had the least confidence in managers, in professional administrators, in professional experts generally. Many of these people seemed to have a desire simultaneously to have the cities grow, to have their wealth increase, but they were attached emotionally to the small-town idea. The faster the rate of growth of Texas cities, Havens discovered, the louder and larger was the far right movement in the community. Generally speaking, it seems to me that this is really one of the forms of expression of a desire to keep the small town while gaining the advantage of the industrial urban cities. The right groups, I think, if a city grows rapidly, can be expected to reflect this anti-expert, anti-bureaucrat, anti-urban point of view. I will say frankly that while I can't evaluate what the long-term effectiveness may be on local government, one of the things that I think this influence may cause us to do, by urging us to reject the expert and the methods that we have tried to use to approach the problems of urbanization, is to repeat many of the same mistakes we have made in the first couple of rounds of urbanization in this country. Because, you see, this philosophy tends to be coupled not only with opposition to the manager plan (which is certainly no cure-all but is strongly committed to professionalization and I'm assuming that's a necessity) but is also opposed to such governmental activities as planning and zoning. So far as I can see, there is no substitute for effective planning and zoning at the local level, and yet if they are seen as essentially a form of socialism or un-American, we are almost guaranteeing that we will run into the same kinds of problems in the next wave of urbanization that we had in the recent one.

Finally, let me comment just a little bit on a couple of things that I think we will find involving future decision-making beyond the immediate municipality. This morning Professor Boyce suggested the need for metropolitan-wide government in many cases. Well, I can certainly see the need for it. But, it doesn't really fit, as I'm sure most of you would agree, with the American traditions of local government. It seems to me that above all it lacks what the political

scientist calls legitimacy. That is, there really are no institutions for metropolitan-wide government in the United States, and we can't simply graft them on. I think what we will find in the future are these things: first, an increasing use of the county, with some reorganization of the county to fit its use as a metropolitan unit of government, although I don't think this movement is going to be extremely widespread; and second, increased uses of the special district, because the special district has a great advantage to the typical citizen.

The special district symbolizes taking local government out of politics, and it symbolizes turning it over to the expert. But the special districts are not going to solve all of the issues by any means. I think, though, that especially with reapportionment of our state legislatures now almost a certainty, we will see the state government increasingly performing the function of metropolitan government. After all, a metropolitan government psychologically is not a local unit of government anyway; and the state, possessing legitimacy, is probably going to be more believable than a new, artificially created unit of government at that level. My guess is that this tendency will be supported not only by reapportionment but by the fact, the simple economic fact, that state government can raise money with less effort than can local government, and this is going to continue to be the fact in the future. That is to say, in the economist's terms, the marginal sacrifice involved is less. Or to put it in popular terms, we tend to get tax money wherever the screams are least. And that, of course, implies also that the federal government will become even more involved in the future in local financing. This involvement will come not so much because the federal bureaucrat is interested in grabbing control of local decisions, although it is true that he often is interested in establishing and preserving professional standards at the local level, but by and large simply because the money can be raised there the most easily.

My guess, then, is that what we will find in the future is an emerging pattern and a continuing pattern as far into the future as I can see. Maybe that isn't very far, but I think we can look, first, for an increasing conflict in decisions at the local level, and second, for decision-making increasingly to be the shared action of all three levels of government. The decisions increasingly will rely upon the expert, they will be increasingly more conflict-ridden, and they will take longer to make. Not only does conflict slow down decision-making, but of course joining all three levels of government together slows down decision-making not only because of red tape but just by the fact that there are so many people involved, so many veto groups.

You see, when you involve more people in a decision, you're really establishing an increased number of veto groups, any one of which can stop a proposal. In the face of this kind of a complex situation, we're going to have to make policy for increasingly complex services.

Now, for my money, the way to meet this problem is to face up to it. There is a tendency to run away from it and say, "Why can't we go back to the good, simple old days?" which would probably be neither simple nor good if we didn't remember them nostalgically.

I don't think any of these problems are going to be insurmountable. The characteristic thing about the human being is that he always thinks that he's living in an age when the problems are too complex, and he can't really understand what's happening to him. I am sure that an African tribesman of today is far more keenly aware of this sense than you people are. If, however, you decide you don't want to join the urbanization trend, I think now is the time to prevent industry from coming into your community. Now is the time to decide that you don't care if your standard of living is a little lower than it is on the other side of the Skunk River. Now is the time to decide not to join in, but the time will not be ten or twenty years from now when most of the economic trends have been permitted to move toward your community. My guess is that you are not going to reject the trend because Americans by and large prefer the increasing prosperity that we call progress to the romantic small-town democratic ideal that we like to talk about. We have the leisure that has resulted from that progress, and I suspect you and your fellow townspeople will want to continue to enjoy leisure and plenty.

# Political and Social Implications of Urbanization

DENNIS McELRATH<sup>o</sup>

Most of the cities of the western United States are currently producing a new urban form. To gain a broad perspective of what this new urbanization might be like and how it might evolve, I decided to follow a wide-ranging approach, one which would not only encompass the United States, but also the trend of the new urbanization all over the world.

What is the pattern of this new growth? It is producing a kind of city and a type of metropolitan area which differ from the old city of the eastern seaboard or from Chicago—which have been the usual models for urban expansion. The emerging products of this new urbanization raise some unique problems and policy decisions which are yet to be resolved. To illustrate this point, I shall wander over the world for examples and then return to the Midwest and then, more definitely to the Far West.

Some years ago when the first postwar population censuses began to trickle in from all over the world, it became evident that the fastest rates of urbanization were appearing in the developing and new nations. While these countries as a whole were experiencing a rapid population growth, their cities were growing at an even more rapid pace. Urban populations in many instances were more than doubling and tripling within a single decade. The next round of censuses, taken in 1960, whose findings are now coming in to us, reveal with even greater accuracy that this pattern of rapid urbanization is continuing. This is dramatic new urbanization; and it is affecting the lives of millions of people throughout the world. The affect is not only upon the lives of the people, but also upon the economics and the politics of nations.

In both America and Europe a new kind of urbanization is taking place as well. In those nations where the city matures, we began to review new books like *The Emerging City*, *The City and the Highway*, *Megalopolis*, and *The Exploding Metropolis*. The city did not settle down in middle age. Indeed, it has grown fat and sprawling,

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and spawned new metropolitan centers from small cities in the Middle West and crossroads in the desert.

What is the impact of these two new kinds of urbanization? One kind is reflected in the sprawling bidonville and shack towns that surround the capitol city of a new nation; the other in the meandering conurbations of Europe or England or most distinctly, the post-automobile, mid-twentieth century city of America, particularly on the Pacific Coast and in the Midwest.

The new urbanization in new nations is unlike the historic pattern of city growth in Western Europe. In Europe, as Pirenne points out, the prototype of the modern city developed along the trade route; it was a walled fortified outpost of trade and commerce. The industrial revolution merely intensified this pattern and greatly expanded it. Urbanization in these areas of the Western industrial countries, then, developed with commerce, with trade, and especially with manufacturing, as seen in the industrial cities of our East Coast and the industrial cities of Europe. These cities had an economic underpinning, a foundation in industry and in commerce. The new cities in the new nations are not like these earlier developments. They have grown rapidly and swelled with population, but their economic base has not expanded in a parallel manner. Unemployment in these new cities is substantial. And even more important, much of the employed population is underemployed or redundant labor. It may be seen, then, that in these new cities what occurred was a division in terms of wealth; and a fantastic gap between the very wealthy and a large pool of redundant, underemployed poor.

There are only two ways in which a city can grow: either through migration or from natural increase. No other way is possible. In America our cities and countryside grew primarily from migration. At first, migrants came largely from northern Europe or southern Europe, then from southern and eastern Europe. Then, for the most part, foreign immigration was cut off. The growth of our American cities reflects this pattern. Our urbanization reached its peak rate before 1870 when the increase was at the rate of almost 30 per cent per decade. Since 1900 the rate of urban growth, the rate of urbanization in the United States, has been decelerated. This growth has at present achieved a constant rate of about 9 per cent increase per decade, but eventually it is going to level off.

The new nations are now undergoing something similar to our experience of 100 years ago. Their current rapid growth is largely the product of mass migration to the cities. There are some important and strategic differences, however. In the first place, urban migration in new nations tends to be from a fairly limited narrow hinterland. The

points of origin are not widely dispersed. In addition, though the paths that lead to the cities are short, they are heavily trafficked in both directions. Urban migrants do not have far to travel before they are back in the rural peasant village, which is largely untouched by urban industrial society. They go home often. This is especially true of the women, who generally come from a narrower hinterland. This means that in a very real sense, many of these migrants are perpetual newcomers to the cities. They come to the city, but they are not part of it, for they can and do go home again and again.

These cities, then, are made up of migrants who are only partly involved in the urban way of life. They are not only marginally employed in the city, but they are also marginal members of a new urban community. They are not yet urban men. The "not yet urban men" for a long time to come will be oriented away from the cities, sometimes to a tribal village, often to a rural community which no longer exists, to a way of life which is being displaced by industrializing agriculture. They will see the city with peasant eyes, unaware of the requirements of time, money, and a thousand skills; of compromises, of accommodation, and organization which the urban man knows so well that it is like the air he breathes; he can't even list them for you: they are internalized to a point where he is almost unaware of them.

There is one final aspect to this new urbanization in new nations throughout the world. It concerns the ethnic and racial composition of these cities. The American experience in this area may be particularly informative. Our cities were filled with people drawn from halfway around the world. They differed greatly in language, custom, religion, and cultural experience. This diversity presented a continuing challenge to the melting pot ideology of the American city. Some of these differences still distinguish the neighborhoods and practices of cities. However, the new cities in Africa, Latin America, Asia, and southwest Asia, do not draw their populations from a far-flung arena, but the ethnic and racial differences still are often great. Several factors sponsor this. First, some of the population of these new cities is the product of a fairly long period of Europeanization. These are hinge-people who man the outposts of an empire; they are workers in a colonial bureaucracy, the children of merchants and tribal chiefs, occasionally schooled in Europe, but who have at least experienced a long and sustained exposure to large-scale enterprise, to export agriculture, and export commerce, or to colonial administration. Frequently these people form the core of a new independent government. They form a Europeanized or at least industrialized elite, sharing the skills of an urban world. Secondly, diversity is sponsored by the relative

isolation of the little communities which make up the hinterland of these new cities. While the area which contributes migrants is narrow, it is nevertheless highly heterogeneous. It is made up of a jigsaw puzzle of tribal or community boundaries, the members of each possessing a fairly distinctive cultural tradition.

These new cities, then, share many problems we faced a hundred years ago and some which are absolutely new to human experience. These problems arise not only from the economics of development and underdevelopment; they are the problems which stem directly from the tumult of urbanization, for urbanization has brought together new combinations and divisions of people. People of the new cities are divided by work experience and by wealth, ranging from the very wealthy to a large pool of unskilled and redundant labor. They are divided into newcomers and old residents, with the new lacking urban skills and focused on the traditions of the little communities. They are divided by ethnic and occasionally racial differences; but they are now thrown together. Their differences are clearly visible, for all among them to see.

The consequences of this situation, which is being experienced in country after country, are many. Perhaps the most relevant for us is the difficulty of molding a community and a nation out of these potentially divisive fissures and under the pounding twin pressures of population and poverty. For here are the differences among people which are real, which are visible. They may be seized upon to promote a program, elevate a charism, or fell a government. The situation is volatile. The potential for violence in these new cities is great. Even without revolution, we know there is a strong thrust for rapid social change, made all the more difficult and disorderly by the inherent divisions produced by this new urbanization.

The new urbanization in old nations like the United States is not of this explosive sort, and yet it shares many features which are common to those of the new nation. It is a quiet change muffled by the exhaust fumes of cars and heralded only by the horn of the car behind you. Basically, it involves three things: the decompression of an urban population, the creation of a horizontal city, and the development of a new style of life. Each of these changes which we are now experiencing has important implications for all of us.

The industrial countries started out to develop densely settled communities. These began in Europe and were repeated in the port and rail cities of America. This walking-city pattern, as it is called, of high concentration, continued even after the advent of the electric streetcar, the subway, and the elevated railroad. The commuter railroad lines changed it slightly, but basically the city remained the



same: a hard core of commercial activity; a cell, surrounded by close-packed areas of transportation, industry, and residences. This map was changed only after the automobile, and then it was changed radically. And perhaps even more important than the automobile, though we usually ignore it, is the truck.

Around 1920 the mass marketing of the automobile was responsible for the city's beginning to lose its dense, close-packed circular form, and to take on a star shape, radiating out along the highways. Most of the new settlements were residential. These areas were labeled the dormitory or bedroom cities because they were filled with the weary commuters every night. But before long the widespread adoption of the truck permitted industry and commerce to locate on cheap peripheral property. Frequently they were able to find tax hideouts in new industrial suburbs, a move which often gave their owners an advantage over competitors who had been entrapped in the central city. Thus both the truck and the car spread out the concentrations of people; and they also spread employment opportunities greatly, so much so that today less than a third of all people who live in the suburbs in most of our major areas, work in the central city. Most suburbanites now work in suburban or peripheral areas.

Thus the traditional picture of the dormitory suburb contributing to sending people downtown to the core no longer obtains for most of the workers of the United States, most of the suburbanites. The majority of them work elsewhere in the suburbs. With the growth of industrial tracts and the mass production of suburban housing there began what is popularly called the exploding metropolis. As is well known, between 1940 and 1950 suburban America grew more than twice as fast as the central cities, in which the growth was just a trickle. By comparison, in the decade between 1950-1960, the suburbs grew forty times faster than the central cities; and in this decade almost a fourth of the major central cities actually lost population in their core.

Suburban growth is fed by two streams of population. The first has always been with us: this is the long-term drift of rural people into urban America, people leaving the farm. The second is the flight from the central city by those who can and want to escape. These streams are fed by the native sons and daughters of the golden suburbs; and these natives grow like Topsy. Of the 64,000,000 new citizens expected in the United States by 1980, more than 80 per cent will be suburbanites, most of them born in those fertile valleys.

This image of a leveling core surrounded by expanding suburbs does not truly present the picture of the new city discussed here. The new urbanization, the really new urbanization, is now being

written off as an exception to this pattern. Of the five cities in the million class in the United States, that is, New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and Detroit, all except Los Angeles lost population in the 1950-1960 decade. This means that while the central cities lost population, the city of Los Angeles gained 27 per cent in this period. The point is that Los Angeles is not really a core city at all. It never was a densely-settled urban industrial city, an industrial core. It epitomizes the post-automobile—I hate to use a word like polynucleated, or even nonnucleated—city. It is a region; some say a frame of mind. In any event, such cities as Los Angeles, Phoenix, San Diego, Tucson, all experienced their major growth after the automobile, and especially since 1940. They are perhaps the tracers to the newest kind of urbanization.

What is this new urbanization to be, when you examine these cities and begin to think about them? Is it to be a metropolitan region without a metropolis, a core barely distinguished from the rest of the terrain, an endless forest of TV antennae, broken only by a clearing for a parking lot for the shopping center and perhaps an occasional freeway interchange? I think so, but not quite. For example, what do we do about Wilshire Boulevard? When you think about Los Angeles, one of the first things that comes to mind is Wilshire Boulevard, with its almost twenty miles of main street, extending down to the sea. Or think of the highways between Tucson and Phoenix, Santa Barbara and Los Angeles, Long Beach and San Diego. What are we developing in these newest cities, these post-automobile cities? Are we developing ribbons of density and commerce, perhaps to be served by a single monorail, a main street which is 100 miles long? Why not? I think that's precisely where we're heading in these areas.

But let's return to today, to the cities that are themselves something like suburbs. What are the political and social implications of their development? Several readily come to mind. First there is the metropolitan problem. The horizontal growth of these new cities as they spread the old cities out into the suburbs, has never been fenced by any meaningful political boundaries.

Fourteen hundred governments serve the New York metropolitan region, as is well known. Yet every sociologist and political scientist knows that the people of this region are highly interdependent, and in many respects they share a common fate, and many common facilities. They form a community, but not a polity. The metropolity has been Balkanized by this spreading suburban style. Attempts to form a metropolitan government usually fail. Where they have been formed, they are extremely weak and their powers are limited. Local sovereignty has prevailed.

Faced with a need for planning, some kind of planning in concert, common services, and widespread interdependence, the people of the metropolis have established informal arrangements between departments which cut across community lines. Or, they have created special district governments to handle special problems, or in desperation, and I suspect occasionally in greed, they have turned to the larger governmental units. They buy their services from the county under the Lakewood Plan in California, or they turn to the state or federal government to handle a widening array of problems: air and water pollution, urban renewal, public assistance, education, hospitals, and so on. All of these turnings to other units, and other compromises, are made in the name of preserving the Jeffersonian ideal of local sovereignty.

Closely related to the metropolitan problem, and a direct consequence of the flight to the suburbs, is the shrinking tax base of the old core cities and the creation of expanding urban ghettos. Industry and often commerce flee the central city on the fleet wheels of teamster-driven trucks. Along with them goes the affluent labor force. Both take tax revenues with them. Both go out to the suburbs. The old core cities are rapidly becoming the only home of the metropolitan poor, often migrant, often Negro.

The poor have always come to the city. Today the city maintains its population only to the extent that it does attract the poor to replace the fleeing middle class. Usually, the poor who came to the cities found work, and if they didn't prosper, their children did. But always along the way there were those who did not succeed. These have been fairly small in percentage, small in some people's percentages, but they are certainly large in absolute numbers. Over time the central city has accumulated this core of those who have not moved on, those who could not join the exodus of the middle-income family to the suburbs. Their number is increasing by the constant influx of the incoming poor, the new poor. In recent years, especially since 1940, and especially in northern and western cities, Negroes have constituted a substantial proportion of these arriving low-income families.

The central city, then, is fast becoming filled with the accumulated poor, the newly arrived poor, the Negro and white; and also the better-off Negroes and other minorities who cannot move because of the straitjacket of discrimination. The consequences of this situation are clear: first, there is a heightened need for municipal services—schools, welfare assistance, policing protection; second, there is a drain of municipal finances as the tax base goes; and third, there is a constant source of racial friction.

Needless to say, some efforts have been made to solve these problems. Occasionally there have been apparent local successes in urban redevelopment in attracting middle-income families back into the central city. The real trends, however, show the middle-income families and, increasingly, those of even more moderate means fleeing the city along with enterprise. But is it solely flight, or is it that they are also moving toward something that they see in the suburbs?

Ring a random sample of doorbells out in the suburbs. Ask a random sample of housewives why they are there, and overwhelmingly your response will be: the children. You would think that these fertile valleys were one big playpen from the responses of such a sample. They like their yards, the outdoors, their quality schools, the clean new home, and even their neighbors and the neighbors' children. All good, clean, well-scrubbed, middle-class children; not poor, not black, but white like us.

Undoubtedly part of this thing that is sought away from the center of the city, out in the suburbs, revolves around the children. But there is more: Nisbet termed it a "quest for community," a desire to belong. The suburban experiment, and it is an experiment, for man has never settled in this way before, appears to be an attempt to develop some kind of meaningful local community, a community bounded by the local area, the neighborhood. It is focused not on the common histories, the common conditions of existence; for these are not the neighborhoods or tenements of immigrants, but of people from all over, mobile people with very different backgrounds coming and settling. They form a community focused on the children and on the consumption of leisure—building a patio, harvesting the crabgrass.

The suburban experiment, then, is an attempt to create a new style of life which is responsive to the new conditions of urban existence. It has introduced a new dimension along which people of America are arrayed, a dimension of life's style. The differences between the poles of this continuum show the way in which we can array the population of America. The differences between the two ends of the pole are tremendous. On the one hand we have the continuing urban life style, typical of the apartment house area of the central cities, a style of life mainly revolving around careers. Families are small; generally both husband and wife work. They live in apartments; they spend their money on the pursuit of career and happiness. They are, some have claimed, hasty hedonists, but career-oriented. I don't know whether that is true. On the other extreme we have the new suburbanites, with larger families, living in their detached houses, with the wife at home neighboring and providing intensive child care. The

differences here are predictive of many forms of behavior, including voting and other kinds of community action. They predict as well as social class, race, minority status, or migrancy.

The new urbanization in America has added a new dimension to society, a new way in which some people are sorting themselves out from others. But the old divisions, the divisions which we saw in the new cities of Africa and Asia, which today divide the city dwellers of new nations, are still with us. We, too, are still separated in our neighborhoods, our schools, and in our daily rounds by class, by race, by migrancy. But here the differences are not so glaring. Our poor are hidden: the Negro is invisible; the Puerto Rican and Mexican continue to be confined to their ghettos along with the migrant, along with the poor; and so on. And to these old, traditional, classic divisions that we see occurring again in the new nations of the world, we have added a new division, a separation of people in terms of life style, suburban familism and lingering urbanism. All of this is brought about by the enduring changing process of urbanization. These are the consequences, the constant consequences of an urban development.

# The Impact of Federal Urban Development Programs on Local Government Organization and Planning

WM. G. COLMAN\*

I will take a few minutes this morning to give a bit of the background of the Advisory Commission. After the Kestnbaum Commission rendered its report to the President and the Congress in 1955 and went out of business, the Congress then directed its attention to what should be the follow-up, if any. Hearings were held over the United States, and there seemed to be a general consensus on the part of governors, mayors, city managers, and public officials of most all kinds that there should be some small permanent, continuing body that would sort of monitor, if you will, the progress of relationships among the federal, state, and local governments and make recommendations to those appropriate bodies for removal of friction points in the American federal system. Following those hearings, the Congress did enact a law creating the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations as a permanent bipartisan body to be charged with these things.

The commission is given seven functions under the Act, and I will read those. They are pretty brief. First, to bring together the representatives of the federal, state, and local governments for the consideration of common problems. Second, to provide a forum for discussing the administration and coordination of federal grant and other programs requiring intergovernmental cooperation. Three, to give critical attention to the conditions and controls involved in the administration of federal grant programs. Four, to make available technical assistance to the executive and legislative branches of the federal government in the review of proposed legislation to determine its overall effect on the federal system. Five, to encourage discussion and study in an early stage of emerging public problems that are likely to require intergovernmental cooperation. Six, to recommend within the framework of the constitution the most desirable allocation of governmental functions, responsibilities, and revenues among the several levels of government. And finally, to recommend methods of coordinating and simplifying tax laws and administrative practices to

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achieve a more orderly and less competitive fiscal relationship between the levels of government and to reduce the burden of compliance on taxpayers. So you can see, we have a fairly broad charter to study the federal system and to make recommendations.

Now the commission is made up of twenty-six members, and they are appointed in different ways. Of the twenty-six; twenty are elected political leaders. Six are not elected; of those, three are designees of the cabinet or elsewhere in the executive branch.

Another breakdown of the numbers is that of the twenty-six members, fourteen come from state and local governments, only nine come from the national level, and three from the general public. And of the nine from the national level, six come from the Congress and only three from the executive. So you can see that this commission is not under the thumb of the White House, although the President designates the Chairman and Vice-Chairman. It is not a creature of any one level of government, but rather it is a national body that is responsible and responsive to all levels of government.

Actually, state and local governments have the majority vote on the commission. And that perhaps accounts partially for the fact that a majority of the commission's work so far has been directed not to a relationship between federal and state governments and the issues of states rights and so on, but rather to the very tender relations (and you can interpret tender in two different meanings here) between the state government and the local government. It's the commission's view that the most critical problem in our federal system today is not federal-state relations, but it is the unshackling of local government and the gearing up of both state and local government to fulfill a more important role in the federal system; and if you do that you'll have less inclination on the part of local government officials, big-city majors particularly, to use their political alliances and chase down to Washington for federal help all the time.

The commission is a bipartisan body, and it is very coincidental that so far the fifty-eight people who have served on the commission have come from thirty-four states and have comprised twenty-nine Republicans and twenty-nine Democrats. At the present time the party ratio on the commission is about sixteen Democrats and ten Republicans, but the ratio has shifted back and forth depending upon the party in power in the White House and the party in control of the Congress.

There are four governors on the commission, and they are split two and two party-wise. I'll mention the state and local officials by name so that you can get an impression of the broad political and

geographic structure that the commission covers. Of the four governors, the two Republican governors are John Anderson of Kansas and Bob Smylie of Idaho, and the two Democratic governors are Carl Sanders of Georgia and John Dempsey of Connecticut.

There are four mayors on the commission: Democrats Art Naftalin of Minneapolis and Ray Tucker of St. Louis, and Republicans Neal Blaisdell of Honolulu and Herman Goldner of St. Petersburg, Florida.

There are three elective county officials on the commission. At the present time those people are two Democrats and one Republican: Mrs. Barbara Wilcox, a commissioner of Washington County, which is part of the metropolitan area of Portland, Oregon; Ed Connor, who sits as a member of the Board of Supervisors of Wayne County in Michigan; and Clair Donnenwirth, the supervisor of a small rural county in California.

The three state legislative members on the commission are Graham Newell, a Republican leader in the Senate of Vermont; Marion Crank, Speaker of the House of Representatives in Arkansas; and Charles R. Weiner, Democratic leader in the Pennsylvania State Senate. Actually, Senator Newell has recently retired from the commission to make an unsuccessful race for lieutenant governor of his state, and so there is a vacancy in that spot on the commission.

The general philosophy of the commission, as I have mentioned before, is that in the days and years ahead due to technological advance and population growth, government at all levels in these United States is going to be called upon to do more and more things. In order not to have a completely top-heavy set-up and negate the ideas of the founding fathers in a distribution of the balance of power, it is necessary that state and local governments be strengthened so they can do their full share in meeting these problems that lie ahead in the next year, the next decade, and the decades after that.

Now I have been asked to talk this morning specifically about the impact of federal programs upon urban development and to discuss the problems and opportunities that these programs of the federal government offer to officials of municipalities. My point of departure is a report by the commission on the impact of federal urban development programs on local government organization and planning. The first point that I would like to mention, and it is a rather surprising fact, is that there are about forty-three programs in which the federal government, as of the time of this report, affected urban areas and the organization of municipal government and the planning activities of municipal government. There are even more such programs now because since this report was written, the mass transit bill has



been enacted, and also the so-called poverty bill, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, and both of these alone contain several new additional grants that are available to municipalities.

Let me just read a list of these programs. There are low-income housing demonstrations as contrasted to public housing as such; mass transportation loans; mass transportation demonstration grants; public housing, with which you are familiar; urban planning assistance—that's the so-called 701 that a lot of you have worked with; open-space land acquisition; urban renewal projects; urban renewal demonstrations; community renewal programs; F.H.A. mortgage insurance, college and hospital housing loans, senior citizens' housing loans; public facility loans; advances for public works planning; loans to veterans; hospital and medical facilities construction—that's the Hill-Burton program; waste treatment works; school construction in federally impacted areas; highways; area redevelopment; public works acceleration; small business loans; airport grants; grants for the construction of nuclear reactors; grants for the construction of National Guard facilities; civil works projects of the Army Engineers; civil defense emergency operating centers; disaster relief; surplus land disposal; land grants for recreation and public purposes; grants and loans for reclamation; grants for fish and wildlife restoration; grants for small watershed protection; farm storage facility loans; construction of farm storage facilities; land conservation and utilization grants; rural electrification and telephone loans; grants for the furnishing of tree planting stock; loans for housing for farm labor and senior citizens; rural housing loans; farm ownership and development loans; loans to associations for water development, soil conservation, and shifts in land use.

Now all those problems directly affect urban areas. You notice a goodly number in there for the Department of Agriculture. You may ask, "Well, why did you bring all those in?" Well, the Farmers Home Administration, for example, of the U.S.D.A. has a bunch of grants available and loans for people to establish water districts, put in water systems. I don't know whether this is a problem in Iowa or not, but in many parts of the country these water districts are being formed right outside the municipal boundaries. They are tending to encourage dense settlement, and in some places you are having what one might call rural slums develop through the spawning of these special water districts. So that is an example of an agricultural program designed to furnish water for farms which is really being used to foster urban development. Many people think that it is the wrong kind of urban development, but that's irrelevant.

Now the commission examined all these programs in detail, and in this report, over in the Appendix, you will see each one described, its statutory authority, the way in which it's run, the criteria for the rendering of financial assistance, and so on. Out of this welter of programs, the commission had several recommendations to make, and I might pause at this point to observe that we don't stop when we just make a recommendation; we spend at least half of our time following up our recommendations in the Congress and with the state legislatures, with groups like yourselves, with state legislative service directors, with leagues of counties, and with Leagues of Women Voters, AFL-CIO, Chambers of Commerce. We reach all of these different groups to try to promote and encourage the political acceptance and legislative adoption of the proposals that we have made, and as I go over each of these recommendations I will indicate the extent to which as of this time we have made any progress toward political implementation of the recommendation.

First, the commission recommends that the Congress and appropriate executive agencies take legislative and administrative action to remove from federal aid programs for urban development all organizational limitations which require or promote special purpose units of government to the disadvantage of general purpose units of government—that is municipalities, towns, and counties. Other factors being equal, general purpose units of government should be favored as federal aid recipients. Special purpose recipients should be required to coordinate their aided activities with general purpose governments.

Now I mentioned the Farmers Home Administration and its encouragement of the special water districts. There are many federal programs that encourage special districts in opposition to or in contrast to the regular cities and counties. Another one is the recently enacted poverty program, and we worked hard against that particular provision when it was in the draft stage within the executive branch of the federal government. It provides for community action programs which can be brought up by special public agencies or even by nongovernmental agencies for federal assistance. Many mayors are unhappy about this because it constitutes an end run around responsible elected political leaders in the cities and counties.

Now we have developed some draft legislative language that would implement this particular provision across the board in the federal government and would have the effect of modifying the already existing laws in a number of areas. That bill is in draft form and is being worked on with the budget bureau and others. One of the commission members will want to introduce that bill early in the forth-

coming Congress, and this would have the effect of saying that federal grants-in-aid to urban areas, regardless of provisions of existing law, would be available not only to special units of government but to general units of government and would require that where special units get federal aid, they keep their general units informed and fully coordinated with the activity.

The commission's second recommendation is that the Congress and appropriate executive agencies of the federal government authorize and encourage responsible joint participation by local governmental units having common program objectives affecting the development of an urban area overlapping existing political boundaries. The reason for this particular recommendation is that some programs place a penalty on cooperation. The sewage treatment grants, for example, are geared in such a way that it is possible for smaller political subdivisions to get a grant, but if they join together and try to have a regional sewage treatment facility, and if the population served by that facility exceeds 50,000, the region immediately becomes ineligible because of provisions in the law. In other words, the act encourages separatism rather than cooperation. Here again we have language developed to suggest the enunciation of this by the Congress as a legislative policy, and it will be a part of the same bill that we will present to the forthcoming Congress, the same bill as I described in connection with recommendation number one.

There is a comparable recommendation to the states. The commission recommends that the states enact legislation to encourage joint undertaking by political subdivisions having common program objectives affecting the development of an urban area overlapping existing political boundaries. We have had out for consideration by the states for the last couple of years a draft of a local cooperation act. I think several of you are familiar with the provisions of that draft bill. We hope that you will see fit here in Iowa to push for such a bill at the forthcoming session of your legislature. A number of states have adopted this draft bill of the commission's after appropriate modification, of course, to fit the needs in the individual states. New Mexico, your neighboring state of Nebraska, Georgia, Montana, Colorado, Kentucky—at least eight or ten states—have already adopted this particular proposal and in effect have authorized their cities and counties and other units of local government to contract with each other in carrying out services. It doesn't force anything down anybody's throat; it doesn't cost the taxpayers an additional thin dime. In fact, in a great many instances having this authorization on the books will enable the saving of some taxpayer dollars; it doesn't force anybody to contract, because it takes two parties to make a contract, and if

nobody wants one, the result is you don't have a contract. So the implementation of that particular recommendation is already well under way in a goodly number of states, and let me repeat again I do think that in all deference—I know it's dangerous to come into a state and say what one thinks would be good, but from what I've read in the newspapers in Iowa and from what I've read in your League journals and so on—this is something that a lot of you municipal officials have expressed a desire for in the past.

The next recommendation that the commission made is that the states assume their proper responsibility for assisting and facilitating urban development. To this end it is recommended that federal grants-in-aid to local government for urban development be channeled through states in cases where, underline the where, (A) a state provides appropriate administrative machinery to carry out the responsibilities and (B), this is very important, a state provides significant financial contributions and, when appropriate, technical assistance to the local governments concerned. This is one of the most controversial recommendations the commission has ever made. We have had only two close votes in our commission since its start, and it has made about a hundred recommendations, most of them unanimous. This vote was very close, and the vote also was very close when we took up the very controversial subject of apportionment of state legislatures and by a narrow margin the commission voted a recommendation to base both houses on population. It recommended in 1962 what the Supreme Court said in 1964, and of course the country hasn't heard the last of that yet. On that first go-round on apportionment you might say that the city boys won out. On this particular recommendation the city boys lost by a narrow vote.

The recommendation here is that states try to get into the driver's seat with regard to a lot of these urban problems and with regard to a lot of these relationships that proceed directly between a federal agency and municipalities and other local governments. But, there is a great big proviso in the recommendation, and that is that if the state puts up or buys into the program to the extent of contributing half of the nonfederal share, then it ought to be able to exercise a policy voice and have all relations channeled through the state with regard to that particular program. In other words, it's just like buying chips at a poker table. Here, we have encouraged the states to buy into the federal urban programs and again to exercise state responsibilities as well as talking about states' rights.

The next recommendation of the commission is that the Congress and appropriate executive agencies should require and promote effective planning at the local levels to the extent appropriate for all

federal aid programs significantly affecting urban development. The commission also recommends that the eligibility requirements for federal urban planning assistance under Section 701 of the Housing Act of 1954 be broadened to include all municipalities and counties over 50,000 population which are undergoing rapid urbanization.

The second part regarding the broadening of eligibility for 701 planning assistance, I'm happy to report, has been implemented. The National Association of Counties and ourselves pushed hard for this a couple of months ago when the housing bill was up for consideration in the Congress, and this second part got incorporated in the housing bill since signed by the President, so that's a problem that is no longer with us, at least so far as the legal aspect is concerned. Counties are now eligible to receive 701 planning grants providing the county is in a rapidly urbanizing situation.

Now the first part of this says that the federal government ought to put planning strings on the grants that it makes for urban development. Rather than having the catch-as-catch-can thing that I mentioned as happening in the Department of Agriculture with the water districts, with the right hand seldom knowing what the left hand is doing, one of these agencies going in and encouraging one thing and another encouraging something else, we have suggested that a planning requirement be hooked on to most of these programs to require the gearing in of the program and the grant to the particular municipality with a municipal plan or an area plan or a county plan, whatever the situation happens to be. This is fairly strong medicine in some cases, but if the federal taxpayers are to be protected and if federal funds are to be protected, this kind of requirement is a must, because some awful waste can occur if these things go on in an uncoordinated manner and federal money is spent at cross-purposes in any given situation.

Now, this is comparable to the planning requirement in the highway act that's causing some concern these days. I might observe in this connection that I don't know whether you folks in Iowa are having any problems with the Bureau of Public Roads or not on this planning, but if you are, you don't know how lucky you are compared with many parts of the country, because you've got pretty good annexation laws here, and you don't have the welter of a lot of different units of government in your urban areas. It is pretty much a matter of a city plan and of getting a highway component cranked into your city planning setup. In a lot of places there are counties, there are special districts, there are competing cities and regional planning commissions, and all kinds of complicating factors that make it fairly difficult to make plans that will meet the requirement.

But, the point is, painful as this process may be, once you have gone through it and once you have complied, both you and the federal taxpayers from all over the nation who furnish the moneys that go into federal programs will be much better off because you will have some coordination and some proper relationships worked out between and among the different programs.

The next recommendation is that, first, the Congress enact legislation to establish the principle of federal interagency coordination in the full range of programs affecting urban development, and that, second, the executive branch of the federal government implement this congressionally stated principle by preparing and adopting a uniform urban development policy establishing coordinating procedures. This is a long way of saying that there is an awful lot of tidying up needed at the federal level in connection with the relationships among all of these programs.

We have long-range planning and coordination in other aspects of federal endeavor. You've got it in the Employment Act of '46, for example. You've got a Council of Economic Advisers. Whether you agree or disagree with this administration's economic policies or whether you agreed or disagreed with the Eisenhower economic policies, the fact is that there has been machinery in the executive branch for a long time to provide a coordinated economic policy, and we don't have any such thing as yet for the federal government's policy with regard to urban development, and two-thirds of the nation's population lives in metropolitan areas now and the percentage is going up all the time.

So, what is recommended here is that the Congress enact a piece of legislation that would require the coordination of these urban programs, one with the other, and we have developed such a piece of draft legislation which may be introduced in the next few days in the Congress, or it may lay over until January. Actually if it is introduced, it will be only for the purpose of the record because the Congress is about ready to wind up.

How you organize within the federal government precisely to carry out the coordination, that's an organizational problem for the President and for the Congress. The important thing is that there be coordination; and if they don't want a Department of Urban Affairs, and I think there are a number of arguments against the department, and personally I'm not a crusader for a Department of Urban Affairs, at least they ought to have a special assistant to the President or some focal point in the White House that could ride herd on these forty-odd programs and try to make sure that the federal government does

not encourage the waste of funds and the working at cross-purposes at the local level.

So in sum, we have recommended with regard to this big welter of programs that there be action at the state level, that there be action at the local level, and that there be action at the federal level. I can pursue whatever aspects of this or related activities of the commission you'd like to ask about. I'll be glad to try to defend any of these recommendations that I've read, and I'm sure that some of the recommendations will find less than unanimous consent and unanimous vote in this room. If everything were unanimous and everything were non-controversial, it would be nice in one respect, but you would have a bowl of pabulum rather than a dish of meat and potatoes.

# U.S. Foreign Policy Goals and the U.S. Foreign Service

DAVID M. BANE\*

I. I am honored and pleased that you should have asked me to speak to you this evening. I would like to tell you a little about why I am here in Iowa City, and something about the Foreign Service and what we are trying to accomplish in the foreign affairs field. You were unaware of it when you asked me to speak, but you should know that you are participating with me this evening in the initiation of an experimental program—a program in which high-level legislative and executive interest in Washington has been manifested—a program designed to bring the American people and the members of the Foreign Service closer together. A principal reason for, and an important purpose of, my presence here in Iowa City is to become better acquainted with the American scene and to obtain a better understanding of attitudes and opinions on foreign affairs matters in the Middle West. I am fortunate, indeed, to have The University of Iowa and Iowa City as a vantage-point from which to do this, and I am equally fortunate to meet with a distinguished gathering of Iowa community leaders such as yourselves at the outset of my stay here.

The nature of my profession, the Foreign Service, is such that we spend our careers for the most part abroad or in Washington. As a consequence, it is not possible for us to maintain extensive personal contact with the American scene. Congressman Schwengel of this district of Iowa has, you will be interested to know, proposed legislation in Congress which focuses on this problem of how to bring about a closer relationship between those of us who work in the field of foreign affairs and you the people of the United States. I would like to read several paragraphs from Congressman Schwengel's testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in support of his proposed bill, since it is relevant to this point. And I quote:

Our foreign policy-makers and our diplomats abroad need to understand our people, need to get close to them, need to see what is embraced in their hopes and anxieties for America. They need to know the American people at first hand, not in Washington,

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which is a tight little world of its own, where they circulate among their own kind when brought home on leave, but where the people live, in the cities, on the farms, in the suburbs and small towns of America. By the same token, Americans in all walks of life could benefit immensely by first-hand contact with America's representatives overseas. Such contact would give most people their first direct insight into the problems of the Foreign Service, and into the types of decisions that go to make a foreign policy. It would certainly go a long way toward eradicating the tired clichés about 'cookie-pushers,' and 'striped-pants boys,' that clutter up rational discourse on our nation's foreign problems. It would bring greater understanding and appreciation of the difficulties of formulating and administering our country's foreign policy. The problem, then, is to bring the public and the Foreign Service people together. . . . What I have in mind is simply the adaptation of the sabbatical system so widely practiced in American education, to the American Foreign Service. . . . Instead of simply improving his knowledge of his subject, he would be required to improve his knowledge of the American people, by getting out and living among them. After a year at the grass roots the Foreign Service Officer could resume his career abroad with his lines of reference to American opinion and American values strong and clear, and his own American roots nourished and renewed.

I particularly wanted to bring this to your attention because my presence here in Iowa City is in partial response to the sentiment reflected in Congressman Schwengel's proposed bill. Moreover, if I am to accomplish in some small way this purpose of my stay in Iowa, I must look to community leaders such as yourselves to help me obtain a better understanding of how the people of Iowa and the Middle West feel about foreign affairs matters and why they feel the way they do. To the extent that I can in some small way through meetings of this kind give a better insight into the problems of the Foreign Service and our work, I shall endeavor to do so to the best of my ability.

II. We in the Foreign Service realize and recognize the need for closer contact between the American public and ourselves. Why? First of all, I hardly need say to a group such as this that foreign policy is a matter of vital concern to every man, woman, and child in the United States. Secretary Rusk recently put it in these words: "How we dispose of our affairs at home can decide elections; but how we dispose of our relations abroad can decide the survival of mankind."

Not only is foreign policy a matter of vital concern to each Ameri-

can citizen, but you, as taxpayers, as voters, as leaders in public opinion in Iowa, for example, can and do wield an important and growing influence over the making and execution of foreign policy. One encouraging development in the aftermath of World War II has been the growing interest taken by our citizens in international affairs as manifested not only by their close attention to press, radio, and TV accounts, but also by their active participation in organizations devoted to foreign policy matters, by their extensive travel abroad and to all parts of the world, and through hospitality extended to foreign visitors and students in their communities and homes such as you have done so well here in Iowa. I have been in Iowa less than two weeks, but I have been struck by the keen interest in international affairs that I have encountered here. It doesn't fit at all the characterization of the Middle West as an area generally disinterested in foreign affairs that one used to hear years ago, and which no longer, I am sure, has any validity. Heightened citizen interest makes governments more and more responsive to public opinion and, in the process, broadens the base of our foreign policies. As far as we in the Foreign Service are concerned, the more interest you manifest in foreign affairs, the more you travel, the more you see of foreign visitors and students, the better.

There should be a closer relationship between us because we in the Department of State are, after all, working for you, and we are your representatives in the field of American relations with the rest of the world. We owe to you and to the citizens of the United States an accounting of what we are doing and what we are trying to do. And you as citizens have every right to consider on a continuing basis whether we are on the right track and are entitled to your support.

Finally, we need your support. We could not carry out our foreign policies if we did not have the broad and widespread support of the American people. I would like to take this occasion to say, and I fear this has not been said often enough to you, that the record and attitude of the American people toward foreign affairs matters since World War II is truly extraordinary, beginning with the decision in 1945 to work toward the kind of a world outlined in the United Nations charter, the willingness to come up with more than \$100,000,000,000 of aid to rebuild a war-torn world and to build a peaceful world, and readiness to have nearly 1,000,000 men stationed outside the United States. In brief, without the overwhelming support of you, the American people, we could not have done or accomplished what we have or do what we hope to do in the future.

III. I would now like to turn to the Foreign Service. To those of us

who are practitioners of the art of diplomacy in the space age, we find that the problems that confront and concern us daily are primarily those of inner rather than outer space—how to bring about better understanding between peoples, how to devise surer and more effective means to enable the men who make up governments to reach mutually acceptable solutions. With every passing day technological developments increase the interdependence of peoples and nations and make more imperative the need for us to get along one with the other and to resolve our differences by peaceful means. Unfortunately, however, progress in the field of human relations has lagged behind and not kept pace with technological developments. As we know, wars and conflicts are conceived in men's minds, in ignorance, in prejudice, in overweening pride. The cartoon on the front page of the *Des Moines Sunday Register* of September 20, entitled "Misunderstanding may be the Ultimate Weapon," perhaps best illustrates this point. Certainly it is true that our ultimate security lies in the minds of men, and it is to this area that we need to devote more attention. This is why education has increasingly become a more critical concern and why it is frequently said that in education lies mankind's best hope of peace on earth. Education encourages informed and objective attitudes and opinions in place of horseback opinions and glib generalizations and answers. It is, therefore, to the educator and related educational exchange programs, as well as to all citizen organizations dedicated to greater mutual understanding and tolerance, that we must look for help in this critical area. It is particularly appropriate, I think, to stress the critical importance of education in relation to foreign affairs, placed as I presently am in this great Midwestern center of learning. The University of Iowa and its sister institutions in Iowa, I am sure, share this appreciation, as do you, the community leaders.

IV. I would now like to talk a little about what we who are engaged in the field of foreign affairs are trying to do. What does our foreign policy seek to accomplish? The central purpose of our foreign policy, as I am sure you have heard said many times, is to secure to ourselves and to our posterity the blessings of freedom. No one seriously questions the fact today that we cannot find security in isolation—our total environment must be safe if we are to be safe. Translated into political terms, we seek a peaceful world of independent nations free to choose their own institutions so long as they do not threaten the freedom of others, independent countries free to cooperate in their common interests and the welfare of mankind. The tasks of our diplomacy in seeking to achieve such a world order based on coopera-

tion and law are, I believe, clearly defined and generally agreed upon. They are, however, difficult to realize in concrete detail.

Broadly speaking these tasks are five in number. First, in the interest of our own security and the security of those nations whose freedom and well-being are vital to us, we must maintain sufficient military strength, together with our Free World allies, to deter aggression, whether it be thermonuclear, conventional, or guerrilla in nature as in Vietnam. While there may be differences at times as to what is sufficient in each of these categories, there is no disagreement on the need to maintain a position that enables us to deal with aggression regardless of its character and nature, and to negotiate with our adversaries from a position of strength, not weakness.

Second, we seek to strengthen as well as defend the Free World and to employ our resources to the extent that we are able to this end. In the aftermath of World War II we sought through our economic aid to rebuild a war-torn Europe as well as the economies of our war-time enemies, Germany and Japan. The results of these efforts are a matter of history and, I believe, are impressive. In more recent years, the primary focus of our aid effort has shifted to the less developed countries. As the economies of our allies in Western Europe and Japan have gained strength, and the need for our economic assistance diminished, we have sought to develop a partnership association with these highly-developed industrialized countries in order to marshal our collective strength and to ensure progress toward the peaceful world order we all seek. We have sought in the Atlantic Alliance and in our relations with Japan to develop a true partnership relation and one that would permit political and economic as well as military cooperation; and we have sought in this process to avoid the mistakes that were made between the two World Wars.

You might be interested in the Japanese example. I was concerned with the development of the U.S.-Japanese partnership association while holding the post of Director of Office of Northeast Asian Affairs several years ago in the Department of State. Our purpose was then, and is now, to develop a durable relationship with Japan, one the maintenance of which would be compelling to both countries in the years to come. For one, we worked out in the course of long hard negotiations a new complex of security arrangements designed to place our military relationships and our military establishment in Japan on a footing comparable to our situation elsewhere in the world and in keeping with Japan's sovereignty. This goal was accomplished successfully, although I am sorry to say that the culmination of this important development was clouded by the cancellation

of President Eisenhower's visit to Japan as the result of the opposition mounted by the Japanese left-wing which sought to prevent Japan's voluntary entry into a long-term security relationship with the United States.

Since trade is the main thread of our relationship with Japan, we have worked hard in both countries to maintain and develop on a mutually acceptable and advantageous basis this tie which is so important to both countries. Close to a billion and one-half dollars in trade flows each way each year. The U.S. market, which is Japan's largest and takes at least 30 per cent of Japan's exports each year, is essential to Japan's survival. The kinds of things that Japan produces in the post-World War II period must be sold in large part in the highly developed sophisticated markets of the West. Japan must trade to live, and it is to the United States and the West principally that Japan must look for its economic survival, and not to Communist China or the underdeveloped areas. It is of the utmost importance, therefore, that western markets not be closed to Japan. Trade is, of course, a two-way street. Japan tends in recent years to average about our third largest market and an important one for certain of our agricultural products. We need the Japanese market too. One of our jobs is to try and see that this mutually advantageous trade grows and that it is conducted in such a way that it does not pose a serious threat to any phase of our industry. This has been achieved, I believe, to a remarkable degree. We have also developed a pattern of periodic high-level political consultation with key Japanese leaders which has contributed importantly to the forging of our partnership association.

A third and related task of our diplomacy has been to assist, together with our allies, particularly the industrialized countries of the Free World, the less developed countries. I would like to stress that our foreign aid program has been a principal instrument in seeking to accomplish the tasks that I have just touched on in helping to rebuild a war-torn world, to build a peaceful world, and to assist the lesser developed countries. I know that some have seen fit to criticize the aid program at various times; but we could not have done without it, and I think that we would be living in a far different world today if you the American taxpayer had not been willing to provide the kind of support required to carry out our foreign aid programs. I've heard the aid program criticized as a "give-away" program since my return to the United States this summer. This is a totally unfounded criticism. More than half the moneys now involved are extended as loans; and about 80 per cent of the funds are now expended in the United States for equipment and services. We have found that

our aid does stimulate our commercial trade, that our aid programs have helped us deal with our agricultural surpluses, and that our financial participation in important international projects such as the Indus Basin Development Plan has not meant that American interests might not benefit. An American firm, for example, won the contract for building the gigantic Mangla Dam on the Jhelum River in Pakistan, near Lahore, where I have just served these past three years. The foreign aid program has also been criticized because some of the recipient countries have disagreed with us or criticized us at times. We are not, however, trying to buy countries, and we couldn't if we wanted to, as you know. We want independent countries.

Fourthly, in seeking to develop a world community based on law and cooperation, we seek to develop and strengthen international organizations such as the United Nations which enables nations to cooperate more effectively. The importance of this purpose needs little stress, I know, here in Iowa. I have been struck by the interest shown in the United Nations here in Iowa. You would agree, I know, that if we are ever to have a secure system of world order—of the kind we seek—it will grow from a surer system of settling more and more kinds of disputes in more and more parts of the world, without recourse to arms. This is the purpose of the United Nations.

Finally, we seek to narrow the differences and to search for areas of common interest with our adversaries, and for measures to reduce the danger of a great war. This is the area in which we perhaps need greatest understanding and support from the American public. Any step, however small, taken in this direction can be characterized by critics of our policies as a sign of weakness. I have been asked since my return, "Why are we following a soft line?" I hope that I was able to satisfy my questioner that this is most certainly not the case. We have made limited but significant steps in lessening tension with the Soviet bloc. But these steps do not constitute a detente. The Soviets have not abandoned their aim of world domination, nor has Peiping. We would all agree, I'm sure, that there can be no detente without a settlement of the dangerous political issues which divide us and effective measures taken to control armaments.

The situation confronting us in the world today is a somewhat different one from that facing us a decade ago, and one that perhaps can give rise to greater hope and yet possesses greater dangers. A decade ago we were preoccupied almost exclusively with how to meet the threat of world Communism. The threat is still with us, make no mistake on that score, but the character of the bipolar world of a decade ago has changed. Alliances have become more flexible and many countries, including some of our allies, are operating more in-

dependently and do not always see their national interests served in exactly the same way as our own. It is true that the forces of nationalism and humanism are on the rise within the Communist world at a time when it is being subjected to the strains of the Sino-Soviet split. This hopeful historical movement poses for all of us searching questions and responsibilities. How far do we go, for example, in encouraging these trends in the Soviet orbit, recognizing that our capability to do so is extremely limited? How do we move peacefully toward the application of the principle of self-determination in Germany? How do we deal, for that matter, with the Soviet Union?

V. I want to conclude my remarks this evening with a few words about the nature and organization of the Foreign Service and what we do. First, a word on organization. The Foreign Service is an integral part of the Department of State. There are approximately 9,000 people in the Foreign Service. Of this number, about 3,700 fall in the Foreign Service Officer category, approximately one-third of whom are on duty in Washington and two-thirds abroad at any given time. The Foreign Service Officer is concerned with the main threads of our work in the foreign relations field. There are also some 1,300 Foreign Service Reserve Officers who do similar work, generally in specialized areas, but for temporary periods. The remaining 4,000 members of the Foreign Service Staff Corps are primarily concerned with certain administrative, technical, and secretarial activities.

Foreign Service Officers are selected on the basis of examinations and are members of a career service with a promotion system based on merit. They are not affected by political changes in the administration in Washington as regards their tenure and status. They come from every state of the union and represent, I believe, fairly accurately our country socially, culturally, educationally, ethnically, and economically. A recent study indicated that 205 colleges and universities supplied the Foreign Service Officers selected during the period from 1957 to 1962. Michigan and Minnesota, incidentally, were among the ten institutions providing the largest numbers of Officers. I mention this because oftentimes one hears the comment that Foreign Service Officers come primarily from the coastal regions, particularly the East Coast, and are graduates primarily of Ivy League institutions. I might add that the State Department, including the Foreign Service, has the highest number of women in top grades of any agency of the government, several of whom currently hold the rank of ambassador. The men and women who serve you around the world in our Foreign Service are the best that we can attract and that our selection system can produce. This past year we took 200 out of 8,000 applicants. Whatever you may have heard about these people, I can

tell you from my own experience that they are an unusually dedicated hard-working group who do place national interest ahead of self-interest. I can assure you that, for the most part, the kind of work we do in Washington and abroad does not fit the traditional caricature of the diplomat in striped pants who devotes himself primarily to social pursuits. We sometimes wish that we could come a little closer to that characterization than we do!

As members of the Foreign Service, we are available for service anywhere at any time both at home and abroad. This is essential and we understand and accept this principle on entry into the Service. The distinction between consular and diplomatic assignments was abolished in 1924, and the work at a consular establishment abroad today parallels, in the main, that performed in an embassy. In 1955, Department of State personnel whose jobs related to foreign relations work were brought into the Foreign Service, thus achieving an essential and long-overdue unity between the home and the foreign services. This has meant that those of us serving in the Foreign Service can look forward to more frequent assignments to Washington than was true in the past.

For the most part, our duties are operational in nature, and whether in Washington or in the field, we find ourselves working with cables and against deadlines. There are times when we wish that we had not made the strides that we have in the field of communications! For example, the State Department receives about 1,300 cables every working day of the year and sends out about 1,000. In Washington, we seek to obtain daily the best possible judgments and decisions at the appropriate levels and on the widest possible basis as to what we do about a given problem or situation within the inevitable deadlines imposed upon us. Every decision must be fully cleared and coordinated at the level indicated by the nature and importance of the problem both within the State Department and with other interested agencies of the government. Full opportunity is afforded for interested persons, areas, and agencies within the government to make their views known. The pros and cons of all courses of action proposed in a given situation are fully explored and presented in arriving at a final decision. It is, in brief, a system designed to obtain the best possible judgment and the widest possible area of agreement within the time factor involved. Congressional and public opinion factors are carefully considered and weighed in the formulation of high-level and major policy decisions.

Our communication system is such today that our ambassadors abroad, together with their staffs, participate in this decision-making process in Washington in a more intimate and direct way than in



the past, as well as provide the essential raw material in the form of assessments and recommendations which must be taken into account in arriving at a specific decision. Actually, communications today have tended to make the State Department and its field offices as one. In addition, while in the field we are charged with the very important task of the protection and promotion of American interests, official representation, and negotiations with the host countries.

I cannot stress too strongly that there are no black and white, simple, easy, quick solutions to the major problems which confront us in the world today. Ideal solutions can be devised rather quickly in ivory towers, but can you get the parties to a dispute to agree to them? Diplomacy consists of tough day-by-day decisions designed frequently to keep situations from getting out of hand, or from getting worse, and it is a process which involves debate, negotiation, and compromise. A decision to take no action involves the same process as the decision to take some action. Kashmir is an example of a question that has been with us since 1947. We would like to see it settled so we can put our relations with Pakistan and India on a more solid and intimate basis of complete friendship. But problems like this just don't yield that easily. Some of them have a thousand years of history behind them.

We must remember that in our foreign relations we are dealing with a world that we can only influence and not control, and the means at our disposal to influence given situations is not always as extensive as one might assume or wish. Other countries are inevitably guided by their own conception of their national interests and how best to serve them. Moreover, major events occur that we cannot shape or determine. Speaking generally, we must conduct our foreign relations in a world in which traditional military and economic pressure gambits are no longer valid as in the past, and we must rely on ideas, vision, negotiating ability, patient day-to-day hard work and dedication, and the cooperation of our allies to accomplish our ends. To do this, we must maintain our military strength at such a level and of a character that we cannot be threatened or subjected to blackmail and one that permits us to negotiate from a position of strength under the thermonuclear umbrella. Foreign aid is an essential and principal instrument of our foreign policy, and we must continue it if we would succeed; but we must remember that we cannot buy countries or their support through this means. In brief, the path to a peaceful world is a toilsome and difficult one. There are forces in the world which could plunge us from a precarious peace into chaos. But there are also forces which could take us toward peace and stability in the generation ahead. It is not outside of our capabilities,

and I am sure that you, the American people, neither wish us to withdraw from the world scene or engage in military adventures, but to make every effort to work in a positive way toward a more peaceful and better world.

