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CONTEMPORARY VALUES AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COLLEGE

Jack F. Culley, Editor

Conference Series No. 5

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BUREAU OF LABOR AND MANAGEMENT
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FOREWORD

There is much honest difference of opinion among faculty members as to the influence that college can have, or should have, on the value systems of its students. There is also marked difference of opinion as to whether a faculty member has either the obligation or the right to concern himself with such matters. Despite these differences, it is common to find faculty members asking themselves whether something cannot be done to better equip the student to recognize the value implications of the many decisions that will be required of him during his career.

The reader of this publication will not find a clear-cut answer to the question of the college's responsibility for contemporary values. He will, however, discover that faculty members from such diverse academic disciplines as medicine, religion, business, psychology, political science, labor relations, and the law, while viewing the problem through different eyes, share a common concern about it and about the urgency of its solution.

The papers represented here were originally presented at a seminar for Iowa college and university teachers conducted by the Bureau of Labor and Management and the School of Religion at the State University of Iowa, Iowa City, on December 9, 1961. As a public service, the University's radio station recorded the presentations and later broadcast them in their entirety. Several of the papers also appeared in the February, 1962, issue of the *Iowa Alumni Review* magazine, and the March-April, 1962, issue of *The SUI Dad* magazine.

Chairmen for the various sessions of the seminar were Professor Harold Ennis of Cornell College, Reverend William O'Connor of St. Ambrose College, and Professor Harold Saunders and Dr. Robert Michaelsen of the host school. Mr. Milo Himes of the Bureau of Labor and Management served as liaison between the sponsors and the speakers. The writer served as general chairman and edited the papers and tape recordings for this publication.

Jack F. Culley, *Director*
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g: Publisher

THE INDIVIDUAL IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

Albert S. Norris
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This is an unusual seminar, and I deem myself very fortunate to be able to participate in it. I had hoped to present an objective "scientific" viewpoint, but I realize now that this is quite impossible, and I am not sure that it is even desirable. We are talking about values, and this is *my* point of view. We will probably not agree on too much today, except perhaps on the importance of discussing values.

In a perusal of the recent educational supplements of the *Saturday Review* and a recent college supplement in *Harpers*, I find that the problems of education appear to be: the search for excellence, the question of how much emphasis should be placed on what subjects, the techniques of teaching, and the role of the teaching machine. These are certainly important questions, and I do not depreciate them. They do represent what is possibly another revolution in teaching. They indicate a turning away from social adjustment *back* to academics. Dewey stated, "Apart from participation in social life, the school has no moral end or aim." Education has often been described as a preparation for life. Dewey accepted this challenge and interpreted the highest aim of life as social. The changes we see around us represent a disenchantment with this concept, and we are again returning to increased content and to intellectual excellence. Does this mean that the schools have no moral ends, have no responsibility in providing any ultimate aims or purposes in living?

We appear to be dissatisfied with the product of our schools. What is this product—remembering that he is the product not only of the schools but of the entire culture?

We live in an increasingly complex and "big" society. We have moved from the pioneer and the craftsman to the corporation, big government, and the big university. Only with bigness can society attain its goals of increased production to provide ever greater comfort and security for its members.

Any society requires a denial of some degree of individual expression for its very existence. Our own highly organized and complex one requires even more renunciation of individuality in order to obtain the high degree of cooperation necessary for its own functions.

How well has our individual been trained to fit into this system?

From childhood he has been exposed to togetherness and the importance of adjusting. This was learned at home and under "scientific" supervision at school. He has learned to work with the group in class projects, to obtain his gratification from the group, not to be a square. If he sticks out academically or even athletically, the group will be a little disturbed, as groups always are with differences. He learns to suppress these differences and is rewarded with whole-hearted acceptance. When he gets to college, he will join a fraternity. He has few questions; he knows where he is going. He will major in either some technique or administration. When he graduates, he will get a job in a corporation providing comfort and security and begin to live the good life.

And yet we are not happy with this product. It appears that he does not know enough to compete effectively with the Russians. There is also some suggestion that the individual himself is not entirely happy.

After a few years of the good life with its comfort and security, he finds himself experiencing a vague feeling of apprehension and discomfort—at times even anxiety and despair. He usually solves this with a tranquilizer and more hard work. But if he stops to look at himself, he will find a feeling of disappointment, an awareness of a void, a lack of purpose, a loss of direction.

Man is the only animal who has a consciousness of self and an awareness that he will die. With this awareness comes anxiety. Primitive man attempted to reassure himself by creating gods and a hereafter. He used all the time that was not devoted to survival in this world to survival in the next and a denial of death.

From here developed the great systematized religions of the middle ages with clearly prescribed ethics, goals, and rewards. There was no reason for anxiety and the only price was the loss of freedom.

Kierkegaard saw all history as progress toward freedom (which he equated with anxiety) and at the same time continued attempts to escape this freedom by political, religious, metaphysical, or utopian dependencies.

Freedom is lonely, isolated, unsure, and full of anxiety and it can only be tolerated if the individual has his own personal purpose and direction.

The serenity of the middle ages was shaken by the Renaissance, but faith was regained in reason which would provide the ultimate answers. The 19th Century saw the growth of capitalism and the Protestant Ethic. It was an optimistic faith. Its flavor is seen in this excerpt from a speech by a banker to a Harvard graduating class: "Anyone

may choose his own trade or profession, or, if he does not like it, he may change. He is free to work hard or not; he may make his own bargains and set his price upon the labor of his products. He is free to acquire property to any extent or to part with it. By dint of greater effort or superior skill or intelligence, if he can make better wages, he is free to live better, just as his neighbor is free to follow his example and to learn to excel him in turn." This speech was made to the class of 1908 and the age of which he spoke was almost dead.

Even by the middle of the 19th Century when capitalism was still to see its greatest growth, the system began to falter. Capitalism, which was to provide abundance for everyone who wanted it in a natural way, often produced misery, hunger, and poverty. There were unpredictable recessions and uncontrollable unemployment. The convincing and compelling power of the Protestant Ethic began to break down. Man began to lose faith in his own beliefs and ultimate goals. It didn't seem to be working. Reason did not provide all the answers, and there were more and more doubts about the Christian tradition. There was a man named Marx and, later, another called Freud who brought disturbing ideas to the scene, and people listened to them, and people began to act. By the end of the 19th Century even the individual began to lose his place. Business had begun to get big, and in a big organization there is room for only a few individuals. The rest must cooperate and they had not learned how to cooperate. Man's anxiety had been controlled by his ability to work toward a specific goal and his faith in his ultimate destiny, but now he was not sure. It was this growing uneasiness that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche saw and described as it was just beginning. When there are doubts about the ultimate ends, when there are doubts about the means to accomplish these, then anxiety becomes overwhelming, man begins to flounder.

There was relief in sight, however, and its name was pragmatism. Developed by William James, it arose rapidly in America. Rather than concern about ultimate ends, it used the practical consequences of ideas and beliefs to determine their value and truth. If it works, then it is true. Theories about reality are irrelevant. Religious truths are not absolute, they must be based on experience and constantly changed. John Dewey made pragmatism a firm part of our culture when he introduced his ideas into the progressive education movement. He did not start it, but he largely determined its direction.

In discussing moral principles in education he stated, "Ultimate moral forces and motives are nothing more or less than social intelligence—the power of observing and comprehending social situations."

According to Dewey, the individual and the social are intimately related. Morality includes everything affecting human living. Society must direct its energies to fundamental social change and recognize the need for cooperative social control and organized planning in the interest of human welfare. In cooperation and in the fulfillment of social and material needs would be found satisfaction and security. Although he stressed individual growth, pragmatism served the growing business world well. In emphasizing cooperation and collective action in social adjustment, it effectively provided material for the corporation. It was a tremendous relief not to be concerned with ultimate ends, to get away from the isolation and loneliness of individual effort, to find the answers in the here and now, to handle anxiety in terms of cooperation, divided responsibility, and conformity.

Well, we have learned to adjust. We have learned to cooperate. Society has grown bigger and more complex, and certainly we should compliment each other. But again there is evidence that all is not well. Juvenile delinquency is rising (we are no longer so naive as to believe that this is simply a result of economic impoverishment). Neuroses and mental illness of all types continue to climb. Has this come about because we have not succeeded in teaching well, or is there something fundamentally wrong in what we have been attempting to teach; in the way we have been attempting to live?

Groups encompass more and more of our society. We are so involved with groups and the interactions and conflicts of groups that it is almost impossible for any person to escape their pressures. Group morality has replaced individual morality. Since that which works is true, members of each group—religious, social or political—feel that what is good for their group is morally correct. The group member whose individual ideas may conflict with his own group does not dare disagree or does not care. Identification with the group provides security and protection. Ultimately the group's decisions are made by one or two individualists in the group, and the rest, frightened or apathetic, follow. This group, incidentally, may be a juvenile gang whose members, within the standards of their own group, are breaking no rules, but, of course, are in conflict with society as a whole. The conflict between groups and society is not confined to juvenile gangs, however. There is a tendency for groups to excuse and defend their own members against breaking society's rules as long as they maintain the group integrity. The group will defend its member from the moral expectations and punishments that society as a whole would demand. The successful group is a powerful one. The weak group strives for power and the strong one strives to keep it. Anyone or anything that

will weaken the group is dangerous and cannot be tolerated. We see clear examples of this in certain unions, but it occurs in every group in less obvious ways. The rising young executive must adapt to the mores of his company regardless of how different this may be from his own beliefs, that is, if he wishes to stay with them. The faculty member must compromise his own ideals in order to produce enough papers so that he can get the needed promotion. He learns quickly that quantity is much more important than quality.

In groups under stress, democratic procedures break down. This can happen at a national level, such as Germany in the 1930's, and it can happen even more easily in the smaller sub groups. Here it is even easier for a small fraction or an individual to gain control, to set the standards and the goals, and to ignore or frighten any who would dissent from his personal opinion which is accepted as that of the group. If this leader becomes threatened, he must do something about the threatened loss of power, so any deviation of the group cannot be tolerated. The result is increasing power at higher levels in all groups, increasing loss of democratic rule, and the rise of a new ruling class. In any group or society there will always be individuals, leaders, non-conformists. The question is, how many? In our society the more highly organized the groups, the fewer of these there are. The end result often is essentially a dictatorship.

During the time that pragmatism was growing in this country, there was another man, Sigmund Freud, who was also concerned about anxiety. His basic assumptions differ radically from the pragmatists. He felt that the child was born a bundle of instinctual desires looking for satisfaction. Socialization occurred only through frustration and coercion. How different from John Dewey who states, "The child is born with a natural desire to give out, to do, and to serve." Freud saw anxiety as an individual problem. He felt that the conflicts of man arise from his instincts in conflict with society and are inevitable. To Freud, the self is essentially individualistic, a self-contained entity, prior to society and requiring it for external reasons only. He felt that man would always defend his claim to individual freedom against the will of the multitude, resulting in a constant conflict, and the balance between the two providing civilization. He saw that the essential factor in the cohesion of the group is to be found in the projection by all of the members of the group of the super ego or conscience onto a single figure, the leader, and so alleviating the anxiety of the group members.

In spite of these basic differences between Freud and John Dewey, Freud has been given credit, or blame, whichever you choose, for our

present society. Some have used the term Freudian ethic rather than social ethic to describe what we have today.

In fact, modern psychiatrists have been more influenced by pragmatism and the social ethic than the reverse. Current orthodox Freudians tend to support the status quo as a matter of course and blame the individual for departing from it. A rebel is looked on as a neurotic rather than someone making a valid protest. In the 1930's, there arose a cultural psychiatric movement in which man's problems and his solutions were seen to be in his relations with his environment. Eric Fromm believes that the imperfections of man are reflections of the corrupting effects of culture. In other words, the conflict is between good, healthy human nature on one side and a sick society on the other.

So psychiatry has aided in the loss of respect, and in the loss of faith of the individual in himself.

Gregory Zilboorg, in criticizing modern psychiatry, feels we have overestimated averages at the expense of the individual in our tendency to look on the source of human troubles as those of adaptation.

Only recently have the existentialists provided a way of looking at the patients which may give us insight and the ability to help those who are suffering, not from specific sexual or aggressive conflicts, but from a loss of awareness of themselves, a loss of purpose in existing as a person in one's self, not constantly depending on approval from others, and not constantly looking for and reacting to external stimuli. Obviously, however, psychotherapy is not going to correct the problems of a disturbed society.

We have to contend with individualism as a force, as a basic need of man, a need to be able to exist in terms of one's own identity and not just as part of a group. Individualism itself involves anxiety. It is loneliness and isolation, but it is also freedom. An anxiety which can be confronted can be a driving, motivating force, not towards groupism where it does not appear to get full satisfaction, but toward individual creative effort. There is no point in asking whether individualism is a useful way of living for the person or for society. The need for individual being and existence is basic and must have expression, and our denial of it is one reason for our present dilemma.

The group is an inevitable part of our complex society and we must learn to live with it. But society and the individual cannot have completely compatible interests. Cooperation is necessary, but I doubt that one must submerge the individual in order to accomplish our ends. We can probably withstand the structural or social forms that exist, regardless of what these may be, if we can resist the internal together-

ness and the internal conformity which so often go along with the external togetherness. The integrity of the individual must be maintained and encouraged.

We do have an obligation to the student. He is already superbly adjusted. We need to help him look inside himself, to examine his own thoughts and feelings, to help him to confront and not evade his own anxiety and loneliness, to treasure the idea, the hope that is his alone.

The development—not just the care and feeding of the individual—this should be the ultimate goal of a university, of a society, of each one of us.

THE CHANGING SOCIAL ORDER

George W. Forell
Professor of Religion
School of Religion

When such a vast topic as "the changing social order" was assigned to me, I wondered how I could find a diagnostic device which would enable me to say something neither too obvious nor too obscure in twenty minutes. As the diagnostic device, I now suggest the following: We should see the change in the social order in the light of the loss of a political or social myth, as this was defined in Plato's Republic. As you remember, Plato suggests that in order to have an operating society you have to have some basic and commonly accepted agreement. People have to be told, he claims, that there are men of gold and men of silver and men of brass. If they are told that, and if they believe it, then their society can operate successfully, but only if the men of gold and men of silver and men of brass willingly and confidently accept their position in society. This undergirding political myth Plato called, unflatteringly, the "royal lie" and, as you remember, he himself was not particularly successful in bringing this off. Yet, he had identified a basic component of all social order, the common faith, the universal acceptance of a hierarchy of values which undergirds the entire structure.

I would now suggest that there was for a long time in our Western culture a certain hierarchy of values which affected the entire social order. From the lowest to the highest, these values were labor, work, and action. Labor is defined here as the activity of producing for consumption. Work is defined as the activity of producing for use, and action is defined essentially as political, or public action. The highest person is the citizen who acts politically. The next highest is the worker who produces things that can be used, and this production is evaluated according to the length of the use of the product. The house that can be lived in for generations, the chair that can be used for a long time, the ship that can be sailed for long, these are all honest products of work. The lowest level in this hierarchy is labor. This is production for consumption. It is particularly the activity of women and slaves. A woman who prepares meals is the most obvious producer for consumption. As soon as the meal is prepared, it is also consumed. Doing dishes and all these activities of the house are typical

forms of labor which in Greek society were, of course, assigned to slaves. The hero is the Homeric Achilles, the doer of great deeds and the speaker of great words. The philosopher king of Plato belongs in the same class. And this was the basis for social order for centuries. Now we observe in modern times the complete transvaluation of these values. May I confess that, in view of the limited time at my disposal, I have omitted the Middle Ages and everything else in between, and have just tried to show how in modern times this social order has been completely reversed and the role which is the highest in classical society, namely the role of the man of action, the doer of great deeds and the speaker of great words, has actually become the lowest. "Politics is dirty," this is a common assumption. Politics is the servant of work and labor. It is only justified insofar as it supports work and labor. This is the famous night watchman state of Manchester liberalism where the only task of political action is seen as a police function, as the function of keeping the people who work and labor from running into each other. This is all that is demanded of the State. Now this further factor ought to be kept in mind, namely, that the abolition of work and the reduction of everything to labor is a peculiar characteristic of our time. The distinction between work and labor has been lost quite recently, and we produce for consumption, never for use. If we actually produced for use, the economic life would grind to an immediate halt. This fact is known to all and is the reason for "built-in obsolescence" and whatever is associated with it. We know that even houses are built to be consumed rather than to be used. Cars, furniture, everything that we purchase is equipped with built-in obsolescence. This may, indeed, be necessary since prosperity depends, strangely enough, not on production but on consumption, and one gets total prosperity when one has total consumption. This is the explanation, for example, for the total prosperity of West Germany. Since total war is total consumption, total war produces total prosperity. It enables production to a degree that has never been possible before. But this orientation towards consumption has brought about a complete change, a subtle change perhaps, in the public awareness of the basic hierarchy of values. It has changed the social order.

Add to this a further observation. The political myth of Western democracy can perhaps be summarized in the slogans of the French Revolution, "*Liberté, égalité, fraternité.*" These three slogans have, of course, theological roots. The notions of freedom, equality, and fraternity have an axiomatic character. They represent the political myth of our social order. Yet, these very notions have been hollowed out completely by observations of the science of our time. Freedom is a

ridiculous concept in an age in which the main argument is whether man is determined by heredity or environment. But this very argument is devastating from the point of view of freedom because whether you are determined by heredity or environment, in either case you are not free. Whether the tragedy of your life is to be blamed on your parents or your grandparents, or perhaps the over-toilet training of your youth; whether you are environmentally or hereditarily determined doesn't really make any difference as long as you are "determined" and what happens to you is not at all within your own realm of decision. The notion of freedom has, therefore, been hollowed out and lost all meaning except as a slogan, a slogan which is not being taken seriously by anyone. Similarly, the notion of equality has been completely emptied of meaning by our testing system, to give just one example. There isn't a testing device, an instrument which has been discovered, which does not show that everybody is different. Whether you measure intelligence or skills or personality, all of these tests show one thing—the fantastic range of differences. As Bertrand Russell has pointed out, the entire notion of evolution really, logically demands votes for oysters. There is really no basic difference, and the differences we assert between man and animals, and the equality we claim for man, simply are not justified by any method of scientific evaluation. And, of course, the notion of fraternity and brotherhood is a peculiarly ridiculous notion in view of the fact that it depends upon the belief that there is a common father before whom these people are brothers and sisters, a notion which, as a previous speaker has already indicated, lacks any plausibility to modern man. The collapse of these axiomatic assumptions, therefore, has totally undermined the political myth of Western democracy. The impossibility of a rational, naturalistic defense of equality, liberty, and fraternity is apparent, and Nietzsche's critical statement in his *Thus Spake Zarathustra* seems eminently justified. Here, when the common people say, "we are all equal," Zarathustra remarks, "yes, before God we are all equal, but haven't you heard, God is dead." The notion of equality died with the notion of God. As Erich Fromm put it very succinctly, in the nineteenth century, God died; in the twentieth century, man died. The abolition of God in the nineteenth century, chronicled by Nietzsche, was followed with absolute certainty by the abolition of man in the twentieth century. This has, of course, all sorts of immediate social consequences for our social order. These have been observed by many people. Perhaps the most widely read of them is Walter Lippmann who, in his *Public Philosophy*, has tried to indicate what all this means for us in our society. Perhaps we can note three or four things. First,

we are convinced of what one could call the incompetence of the majority to make the kind of decisions that have to be made in the kind of world in which we live. Increasingly, decisions are highly technical; they are, indeed, so technical that even nuclear physicists disagree about decisions in the realm of nuclear physics, as we know very well in this particular university. And, therefore, to assume that the "masses," the people who hardly read a newspaper, can make decisions about, let us say, how to protect oneself against nuclear fallout, in a democracy is demanding the impossible. The incompetence of majorities is so obvious that the notion of absolute democracy has become obsolete. Who would put into each kitchen, or into each living room, or wherever the television set happens to be, a red and a green button and flash the controversial question on the television screen and expect each voter to push the green button for "yes" and the red button for "no," so that some electronic device in Washington could tabulate it in a split second and we could decide the issue democratically? Nobody would take such a suggestion seriously. We realize that this type of democracy would mean absolute disaster. It has never been advocated in earnest, but to date it isn't even seriously considered, because all of us, even the elected representatives, even the people in Washington who are supposed to make decisions of this sort, are aware of the fact that they don't know enough to make the complex technical decisions which they are called upon to make. They know that they are the blind leading the blind. This has, indeed, changed the social order.

Now add to this the rise of rulers who are incognito, those rulers who are never elected, yet mold public opinion. Public opinion is shaped by forces that are not clearly defined and whose power is quite out of proportion to their responsibility. They are people who have never been elected to anything, but who have the instruments at their disposal to persuade, to influence the judgment of practically everybody. It seems to be generally agreed that we are largely determined in our decisions by people who have power without ever having been given this power by the democratic processes at our disposal, and whose power is completely out of proportion to their responsibility. This is another feature in the disintegration of what Lippmann calls the *Public Philosophy*. A third element is the development of the organization man, the essentially politically passive person who feels that, since "you can't beat city hall," participation in the political process is useless. He feels himself being manipulated, and is convinced that there is no way of doing anything about it. "They"—and this is an almost paranoid phrase that recurs all the time—want

this, they want the other. "They" is never defined. It is the great impersonal force over which we have no control, and the best thing to do is to just go along with everybody else. He is what Mr. Riesman has called the other-directed personality, the organization man who can be manipulated by polls and in various other ways by the techniques that are at "their" disposal. All this would indicate to me a final observation, namely, that we live in what Elton Trueblood has once called a cut-flower civilization. We live in a civilization and in a culture in which we still have certain flowers: the flowers of liberty, equality, and fraternity. We can make Fourth of July speeches about liberty, equality, and brotherhood, and we can have brotherhood organizations of all sorts, but the roots from which these flowers have grown have been cut off. The flowers have been severed from the soil that nourished them, and thus all the talk and all the speeches may still sound quite pretty and reasonable to people for perhaps another ten years, fifteen years, perhaps until 1984. But there is no indication that what they say has any internal validity, that it is supported by the real power structure, by the real value structure that undergirds our society. To recover social order one would have to recover the roots. To recover liberty, equality, and fraternity one would have to recover the faith that made these words plausible. Is there a possibility for recovering the roots? Well, this is not my question. The question that was assigned to me was "the changing social order." I hope I have indicated that I believe the social order has changed. Unless all signs deceive us, it will change a great deal more.

AN INTERPRETATION OF CONFLICTING VALUES IN MODERN LIFE

Harvey C. Bunke
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College of Business Administration

As the economist sees it, the world is a much simpler, much more comfortable place than the one depicted by our previous speakers. Basically, he sees man as an animal interested in creature comforts—a new car, a bigger house—in short, materialism. But even we Philistines need a philosophy. Now this philosophy we call economics.

But recently there has been a falling out among the Philistines. I believe this may best be illustrated by the classic disagreement between traditional thought and Keynesian economics. You are all familiar with this fight, for it rages all about us. Basically, of course, it involves the question of whether man should direct the economy through a central authority or whether the economy will operate best if left alone. Let us, therefore, look at the implications of this argument.

In December of 1933, John M. Keynes wrote an open letter to President Roosevelt recommending massive doses of public expenditures to be financed by funds largely obtained through the sale of government bonds. Money so secured and spent, he declared, whether it be for such make-work projects as leaf raking or such constructive improvements as dam and road building, could bring only good. For in return for leaf raking or construction work, employees receive and spend income, causing private business to hire and pay other workers who in turn, by satisfying their needs in the market, further stimulate business activity. Thus it was that the spiral which had blindly pulled the economy into a terrible state of depression was now to be deliberately reversed and directed by man as it pushed the nation at an ever accelerating pace along the road of material progress.

But if Keynesian economics was later accorded academic respectability and eventually became a potent, if not quite honorable, power on the banks of the Potomac, many honest, well-meaning, influential citizens throughout the land linked the Keynesian with the radical and the leftist. Indeed, the Keynesian, it was sometimes said, masquerading under the guise of public welfare, bored from within and was more to be feared than the self-admitted agents of communism.

By making man, rather than the machine, the master, Keynes had opened the door to a corridor at the end of which lay that terrifying philosophical conundrum: what is the meaning and purpose of life, a question which for almost two hundred years lay dormant.

Now as long as man works his own isolated plot, secure in the knowledge that the laws of nature unfailingly blend individual effort into a benevolent force pushing society ever forward at just the right speed, he lives in a simple and intellectually comfortable world which, in addition to conferring unprecedented personal freedom, imposes the most minimal kind of individual responsibility. Shatter this faith and life becomes almost unbearably complicated, as man, from the whole vast welter of disorganized and contenting daily experiences, must somehow draft a social blueprint which is right and proper and good. To demand this is to ask mortals to transcend mortality. And yet, this is exactly what the Keynesian conclusion implies. For if, as Keynes said, the economic machine is not geared to automatically exalt the lot of mankind, then nothing is fixed or sacred and whoever controls the economic machine has the power to guide it according to his wants and fancies. There is no help for it however, for alone, the machine is incorrigibly irresponsible and man must do his best, however inadequate that may be.

But alas, what is man's best? Is he running the machine too fast, too slow; is it set for optimum economic growth, for progress; should the secure, catered-to business executive earn more in a week than the grime-covered, physically-endangered coal miner is paid in a year; are honest job seekers without work while still other men are employed at menial tasks not equal to their talents and creative powers; should the federal government finance public housing, education, urban renewal, farm prices, free lunch programs, medical aid to the aged, electric power, flood control—and if so, to what extent? Just a few years earlier in theory, if not always in practice, the answers to such questions, indeed if they were asked at all, would have been the stock response: "all that shall be done shall be done by the infallible market." The great depression and Keynes made such a reply, if not ludicrous, then certainly irrelevant—and therein lay the tragedy.

At first, of course, the full implications of the new thinking in economics were not fully revealed. The spirited Keynesian placed his faith in science and expertise. Hire an expert, a competent economist of the right persuasion, and the seemingly intractable problems would become pliable, readily lending themselves to easy solution. Through fiscal and monetary policy, through governmental spending and taxing, through the easing and tightening of the money supply, the machine

could be managed nicely and the economy could go on functioning much as before, or so it seemed, at least at first, after which answers came less easily, and resolution more slowly. Spend, the new theory said, but for what? Surely not for foolish leaf raking; much better for something constructive. But for what? For public works? Yes, for public works which will not compete or interfere with private business. But how much should the government go in debt; how does one know when the economy is operating at full employment; and what is a satisfactory rate of growth? Besides, what twisted logic is it that restricts governmental activities to strictly public works, such as flood control and road building, when there is misery, poverty, ignorance, and sickness? Should these things be permitted to persist when they could be eliminated with no more effort than is required to flip a switch or turn a screw? The market is for man, not man for the market; therefore, let us employ it as the servant it was meant to be; let not one man be hungry or sick, or lack opportunity because of the superstitious notion that the market is some natural or holy force which is beyond the grasp of even the best of mortals.

Now of the people who concern themselves with such things, some found this all very fascinating and believed that man had finally found the means for realizing his worldly destiny. Others, puzzled and unsure, viewed the "goings on" with mixed emotions, while still others saw the whole proceedings suffused with a kind of universal and unconditional evil and cried "a plague on all your houses." The source of their rancor was a staggering blow dealt to orthodoxy. They spoke of freedom, of opportunity, and of efficiency. But these are abused, threadbare words that have been freely expropriated by tyrants of all ages to mask and justify the most vicious and inhumane crimes. And so these bitter men turned to logic, or at least to simple concepts which readily lend themselves to easy measurement. On the dangers of the unbalanced budget and inflation, they waxed eloquent; on the outrageous inefficiency and the immense and identifiable powers of government, they talked interminably. But these issues are at best pale reflectors of the sinister force that aroused their warrior instincts and caused them to view the new economics with fear and trembling. These were practical men, hard, seasoned professionals who buckled on the sword to defend something they had so often and so contemptuously boasted they knew or cared nothing about: a philosophy. The practical significance of the new theory they quickly grasped. That the government might need to spend to reverse the direction of the economy and that the standard price indexes overstated actual price rises, these men of quick wit and high position swiftly mastered. Any

school boy could see all this, but what the school boy did not, and could not, understand was that the new thought threatened to undermine the entire structure of American beliefs and values. All this these men knew intuitively and, almost as a devout Christian faced with a shocking denial of the atonement, they recoiled in horror and then rose up to do battle.

For some two hundred years America lived and prospered under philosophy of the Enlightenment. The creed was uncomplicated and optimistic. How wonderful it all was; in America there could be no formation and unleashing of the terrible forces that wracked Europe and the rest of the civilized world. Let man concern himself only with his own garden—particularly profit making—and all could be well. Think not of existing injustice, of the discrimination against the Negro, of the children born to brutally depraved parents, or of those who must bear the scourge of the city slums; think not of the maimed and crippled who must forget about such lofty thoughts as dignity and self-respect in their begging to satisfy their daily requirements; think not of the millions upon millions of hapless people in strange and remote lands who live and die in ignorance and poverty. Think not of these things, they are too unsettling, depressing, embarrassing. Evil has always existed in the world, there is nothing the individual can do to alleviate or erase it except through minding one's own affairs and letting nature resolve it in her own inscrutable way.

Certainly it would be better if the world were a place of flawless splendor! But who can make it so? Man has tried again and again, but each time he lays claim to infinite good and ultimate truth, it leads to zealous authoritarianism and then human degradation and wretchedness, out of which emerges savage destruction and senseless mass murder, all justified in the name of truth, beauty, and justice. Except for World War I, when we foolishly became intoxicated with heady wine of saving the world, and World War II, when we were compelled to defend our gardens, America has been largely spared the awful calamity of piety and hate that has plagued the rest of the world. And this wondrous peace and prosperity, this unequalled freedom and happiness, all flowed from a unique American social structure under which each family unit looked to its own interest and expected others to do the same. The lesson is unmistakable, the course of action decisively clear: Do with your life as you will, I shall neither trespass on your property nor violate the sanctity of your thoughts; in return I ask only the same of you. I hold no claim that I know the shape or dimension of perfection, for of these things I do not think. The

world is too vast, too complex, too contradictory for any petty, rationalist human mind to apprehend in its entirety. The only truth is that man cannot know ultimate truth. Believe only that the system is infallible and that if each man had the courage and the pride to make his own way, then surely mankind would march swift and true along the road to human perfection and secular progress.

This then is the creed of orthodoxy—a creed which flows from an uncompromising faith that the free market is geared to produce a state of human splendor. Now the unsophisticated economic determinist has a simple, ready-made explanation for the unbending tenacity of those who cling so desperately to this creed. Such orthodoxy, they declare, provides the apologetics for rationalizing disparity of income and position and is absolutely essential to the justification of the narrow and vested interests of the rich and powerful. Certainly no one can dispute that the inner logic of traditional capitalistic theory concludes that the rich are deserving and that the poor and unfortunate are, in one way or another, inherently inferior. But to limit orthodoxy to such an inconsequential role is to fall far short of the mark. For men of all walks of life—and particularly those in positions of leadership—need and demand social approval and, to an even greater degree, must be guided by some inner light that tells them that they are, in fact, fighting the good fight. Without this, men suffer a sense of guilt, making life a terrible ordeal. Thus it was that by giving purpose and meaning to life, traditional economic theory made its greatest contribution. It spelled out unmistakable goals, the achievement of which was easily measured. Fasten your power and skill upon economic endeavors, it preached, and to the extent that you succeed, you will be rewarded with personal riches and public glory. By following this course, not only will you find satisfaction through developing and expressing your own unique and sovereign personality, but you will confer benefit upon the whole human race. Here then was an easily understood, optimistic “eschatology” which, while liberating the individual to pursue vigorously his own destiny, freed him from any worry over the social consequences of his action on the theory that whatever he did would hasten man in his step by step travel along the route of human perfection.

Now Keynes, by teaching that the automaticity of the private enterprise system was nothing more than historical fiction, ridiculed this wonderfully happy perspective. This was heresy in its most base and disquieting form. For the faithful there was but one course of action: to deny the validity of these pernicious doctrines; to identify,

isolate, and condemn the evil that they were. Under no circumstances could they be accorded respectability; to do so would make the whole of life empty, meaningless, unbearable.

It could be no other way! Having ordered his life on the certainty that man was a selfish creature motivated by the self love of original sin and being confident that man was impotent to abstract and create a finite good from an inscrutable and infinite universe, he had no alternative but to fight any doctrine which implied that some form of central authority was necessary to direct the course of the economy and the nation. At best, authority was a barren artifact or an impediment which impaired the individual's capacity to contribute to community welfare; at worst, given man's compulsion to promote himself and the cause he championed, it was a rapacious force that would not be stilled until it had enslaved the human race by stamping out the last spark of individual originality and creativity.

Paralyzed by this awesome spectacle, the true believer steadfastly thinks only of the wonders and virtues of the natural law of the market. As for objective reality, this he quotes, refutes, or distorts according to what is essential to peace of mind. In retrospect, the great depression becomes a much needed restorative, a kind of health-inducing cathartic. Identifying and crushing inefficiency, it cleansed the system of creeping decadence and substituted a stern but necessary discipline, enabling America to preserve her heritage and move forward in the realization of her manifest destiny. When confronted with immediate and obvious examples of malfunction, the true disciple stands ready with a whole battery of standard replies: "A good man can always get a job and the superior one cannot be held down." If there be fault, it comes from power—power exercised by the labor unions and the government, both of which foolishly tamper with and impede the workings of the market." "As for a General Motors and U.S. Steel, these engines of progress are precluded from abusing power by competition and Anti-Trust legislation, which makes impossible or illegal the holding and exercising of business power."

In one breath governmental expenditures are excoriated for overstimulating the economy and fostering rampant inflation, while in the next breath they are chastised for undermining business confidence and inducing a depression. Foreign aid is soundly condemned for its futility and waste, but even more so because governmental expenditures are as equally disruptive on an international scale as they are injurious to the free enterprise system on the domestic scene. "Except for expenditures in defense of our gardens against alien aggression,

the ultimate hope for world peace and prosperity resides in the operations of an internationally free market."

Such is the picture! It depicts an imperfect society which revels in a false, sinful prosperity, a community racing headlong toward its own destruction. Yet all is not lost, there is still hope, but we must mend our ways and time grows short. And what shall be done? Direct action, of the sort for which America is renowned? A frontal assault on the problem? Yes, of course, but before action must come contemplation through which will be found the good life of True Reality. Only in this way can man begin to realize that the waxing and waning, the endless waste and repair—which so preoccupies and offends the mundane senses—are merely transitory and insignificant aberrations unworthy of man's attentions or energies. Only when the purity and splendor of the free market system is religiously perceived and becomes the moving force determining the course of life is there hope for reversing the tide and achieving the good society. When this is fully appreciated—as surely it must be—then the world will return once more to Golden Age, wherein lies truth, beauty, and justice.

THE FORCES THAT SHAPE STUDENT VALUES

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We have heard some very provocative discussion on changing value systems and their impact on modern life, and the difficulties that exist in determining the values by which to govern our behavior. We now come to what I believe is the focal point of the seminar: What is the impact of college on these problems? What do colleges do to help shape the values of students?

While my general topic is, "The Forces that Shape Student Values," I think the question really implicit in the topic is, "What impact does college have?" Or, perhaps, "Is college a force that shapes student values?" In casting about for an example of a point of view on this problem, I read an Associated Press report which suggests that colleges have a very substantial effect on student values.¹ The headline was, "Three Young Conservatives Critical of U.S. Colleges." The article went on to say, "Three young conservatives today variously described the American college as a 'hothouse for liberals,' 'a left-wing brain laundry,' and 'lacking in patriotism.'" These remarks were made at the National Association of Manufacturers' Sixty-Sixth Annual Convention. One speaker told the businessmen that they were not active enough in fighting, through the colleges, to save the free enterprise system. He said, "The fact is, gentlemen, that you are being duped into financing your own demise. American colleges and universities are fast becoming eclectic hothouses in which liberals are bent not upon education but upon indoctrination." Urging the industrialists to "get in the battle," the speaker continued, "What texts are being used in your schools? How many of these do you know? How many of you care? How long since you sat down with someone of college age, even your own sons and daughters, and talked seriously about our system? Young conservatives now through their conservative clubs dare to say 'No,' and you can help. Stop financing your enemies and help us." There is an increase, according to the second speaker, in the conservative college press. This increase, he noted, demonstrates that we are not merely reacting to our newly discovered presence in

¹ Iowa City *Press-Citizen*, Friday, December 8, 1961

the left-wing brain laundry but are eager to explore the richness of the conservative philosophy and once having conquered it, pass it along to our heretofore indoctrinated fellow colleagues. The final speaker, according to the report, noted that the American educational system has failed in teaching patriotism, producing more extreme left-ist thinkers than any other nation in the world, save Russia.

I really wish that college were more influential, but the evidence based upon a psychologist's analysis of careful, research-oriented studies of student values, shows rather clearly that college has little or no effect in shaping student values. If going to college has any effect at all on students, it is to make them more middle-class, more conservative, more content with the contemporary system of values of middle-class America, than when they came.

While there is little agreement among psychologists about what kinds of values we ought to be changing, and about which direction the values ought to be changed toward, there is little question but that the effect of college experience is to leave the students pretty much the way they came, only more so.

Now why is this? Well, first of all, if you read the textbooks on higher education or if you hear some speakers in seminars of this sort, the impression that one gathers is that the typical college student comes to the college or university without any values, and the faculty and administration can now mold this vacuous lump of clay in any direction they choose. The newspaper report just cited would involve much the same assumption. On the other hand, if you read the more theoretically-oriented propositions on how values are developed, you find that college as an experience in shaping values is hardly ever mentioned. Almost any standard conception of the development of values, personality, attitudes, etc., tends to emphasize not collegiate experience, but early factors, background factors, those generally called the psychological and sociological determinants of values; such factors as childhood experiences, the socio-economic status of one's parents, the religion of one's parents. For example, it is not happenstance that Lutheranism tends to run in families, as does Catholicism, and that such choices are made early in life. One can question to what extent any later experience can counteract these important background factors. A youngster is reared in such a family and social background for some seventeen or eighteen years before any college has a chance to directly exert its influence.

Then, of course, we would also point out that some of the strongest theoretical propositions from the psychoanalytic camp suggest that the very early childhood experiences are far more crucial in determin-

ing values than anything else. It is argued that values are determined more by such factors as toilet training than by anything the college professor can possibly do. Certainly we would argue this proposition without prejudice about the psychoanalytic position. There are some very specific training experiences in the early formative years—the attitudes toward sex and aggression and how one handles his hostility—that shape values in a very important and relatively fixated way. If there is a contribution of the psychoanalytic position, it is that the development of such values are firmly imbedded in the early formative years of life. Indeed, the culture could not survive if anything else were true.

We could further point out that there are a number of other experiences or determinants of values in later childhood. After all, if we were not a group of college administrators, but rather secondary or elementary school administrators, we would be concerned with exactly the same issue. How can the elementary school, how can the secondary school, shape values and attitudes? Similarly, consider all the group and other social living experiences that the average youngster has which influence values, at least in the judgment of the people involved in these activities; for example, Boy and Girl Scouts, and the YMCA. Read the credos of these organizations to learn their purpose and evaluate to what extent they are attempting to shape values. If they have even limited success, it suggests that youngsters who come to college and have had such experiences have already developed some attitudes as a function of the experiences.

The important point is that when we consider the impact of college experience on values, we must recognize the fact that we are working with individuals who have already had many of their values shaped and all a college can do is to continue this influence or attempt to modify it. We are not really in a position to reshape dramatically or to begin anew. We must, in a sense, work with what has already gone before. To a very large extent, we have not been sufficiently aware of these other, probably more important, influences.

About seven years ago, Phillip Jacob's book, *Changing Values of the American College Student*, very clearly indicated that if you take college experience and broad social values, such as conservatism, liberalism, and belief in God, and if you look at the impact of all colleges, on all students, on these broad social attitudes, there is *no* demonstrable effect. If there is any effect on these broad social attitudes, it is simply to enhance the values that the student entered with. Yet, many collegiate administrators and faculty people have become terribly concerned and are asking the question, "How has the

American college failed in its mission of transmitting or changing good social attitudes?"

I should like to note that the question, "Does collegiate experience change student values?" is an impossible one to answer. In its place, I will examine several more specific questions more carefully, and consider whether there is an area that the colleges can carve out for themselves in value transmittal.

First, all colleges are not equally prepared to change values. Second, all values are not equally ready to be changed, and third, all students are not equally ready to have their values changed. Nevertheless, I think *some* colleges can change *some* values of *some* students. If we consider this analysis more carefully, there may be hope for value change as a function of collegiate experience.

Before we do this, let me raise the question of why college experience is not important in changing values. First, let me say that I think that the issue is not quite as clear-cut as Jacob believes. Jacob's findings should not be considered definitive. There are many limitations in control and experimental procedures that raise some very serious questions which time doesn't permit us to explore fully, except to point out that much more needs to be done in this area.

I am not convinced, however, that Jacob's point is essentially an incorrect one. The notion that college has an important effect on students ignores the reality of the typical college experience. When we discuss the influence of college on values, what are we really talking about? We're really talking about the self-defined attitude of the college, and the direction that the faculty, and to a much larger extent, the administration, have decided to head. To what extent is there a mechanism for this value change in contemporary higher educational procedures? Consider the life of the average undergraduate—he comes to college, as I have already indicated, with some fairly well defined and shaped attitudes and values. He shares a room with a roommate whom he typically has selected on the basis of a common sharing of these very values and attitudes. He fraternizes with a peer group which he has selected on the basis of the common sharing of his already-defined attitudes and values. He spends perhaps four or five hours going to class, where he is occasionally exposed to an idea that might challenge his already-existing values. But he can quickly allay his fears and anxieties by discussing it with his roommate, who assures him that this is just a crackpot notion held by one of the egg-heads on the faculty. The effects of formal tutelage, such as classroom instruction, seminars, and lectures—the formal collegiate influences for shaping values—are infinitesimal in their impact on the value system

as compared to the day-to-day living experience with the peer group.

One of the really interesting experiments that I know about is an attempt at the University of Michigan by Ted Newcomb, a social psychologist of some note, who is selecting roommates for students on the basis of personality test scores. He anticipates that individuals of dissimilar values and attitudes who are put in a forced living situation will have some kind of catalytic effect on each other's value systems.

Consider in contrast the normal selection procedure practiced by many of our colleges. Lutheran colleges recruit Lutheran students and Catholic colleges recruit Catholic students. To what extent do such schools confront students with the basis of their religious convictions; to what extent are they subjected to influences which cause them to examine their religious values? If all of their peers are of essentially the same value and attitude, such questioning rarely occurs.

Why isn't tutelage more important? First, I think that in comparison with the ordinary impact of social intercourse in the peer group it can never be primarily important. Secondly, it is not important because, by and large, faculty people could not care less about the values of their students. Take the typical chemistry professor. To what extent is he concerned with transmitting a value system to the student? He is much more concerned, generally speaking, with having the student learn the periodic table of the atoms. Whether they become more liberal or more conservative, whether they become John Birchers or Young Communists is only of casual interest, and he does not consider it to be part of his role to do anything about it in his classroom instruction. Further, his participation in the ongoing life of the student is virtually nonexistent in most colleges.

My impression of faculty attitudes toward students is that they are often regarded as a necessary price to pay for the leisure, ease, and self-dedication of faculty life. Indeed, at most universities with which I have had experience, the professor who avowedly is interested in changing the values of his students is regarded with some suspicion not only by his colleagues but, indeed, by the administration.

An interesting little experiment that some of you might try along these lines is to read the description of the college's goal in your college catalogue. Almost all colleges have such a verbalized description of their goals. It usually appears on the page opposite the most idyllic picture of the campus. Then ask your colleagues whether they have read this description and whether they have ever seriously considered to what extent they subscribe to it. Most of them, I suspect, won't know what you are talking about, and couldn't care less. In

these terms, the conclusion that the college has little impact on values and attitudes should not come as a surprise. The psychology of the process indicates that it could not be otherwise. Why should narrow subject-matter specialists care about changing students' values? Indeed, this is what most faculty people must be, because the reward system of most university and college administrations requires such a dedication, at least for academic advancement in the normal way. This system simply does not permit the faculty person to devote much of his time and energy to such goals. My impression of most administrators is that they are more interested in discussing how to do such things than in actually doing them.

The question I think we can now legitimately ask ourselves is, "What values can be changed?" I, frankly, don't believe the newspaper clipping I have quoted, because I don't think the college can actively oppose the culture completely. I don't think we could make wild-eyed, left-wing radicals out of most of our students, even if we so desired. On the other hand, I think we can have some impact on some of their values. We can play a role in at least challenging some of their preconceptions about the world as it now exists. For example, we can pose certain values, such as the importance of the scientific method as a way of solving problems. We can, as Professor Bunke did this morning, at least raise some concern about the role of the two approaches to contemporary economics, and alert them to some of the problems of these two approaches.

Secondly, we can choose students, if this is our goal, who are susceptible to change. The work of the research group at the Center for the Study of Higher Education at the University of California at Berkeley suggests very clearly that on the basis of psychological tests, one can, at the time of their application to college, identify the individuals who are searching for values and who are striving to find a personal sense of identity. If colleges were to select such individuals because they want to help students find values, I think they ought to do it systematically, rather than happenstancially. In other words, we can select people on the basis of something more than academic performance in the secondary school. It seems to me that if you are serious about changing values, you should select students whose values are capable of being changed.

Lastly, some of us ought to recognize that we are simply not in the business of value changing, and we never will be; I am thinking particularly of the role of the large and highly organized group of departments and colleges which constitute the modern American university. It would seem to me that the small liberal arts college might

be able to do something—and if they cannot do this job, nobody can.

In summary, if we select students whose values can be changed, or who are searching for values and for a personal sense of identity, we can send them to colleges that are seriously concerned about value change and that are willing to move along these lines. If we are to try to change values which are capable of being changed, we must be certain that our selection, placement, and specific tutelage techniques are all operating in the same direction. Otherwise, we are face to face with Phillip Jacob's conclusion that college experience has little or no effect upon student values.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CERTAIN POWER STRUGGLES "Struggle, Values, and the Political System"

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I intend to talk about a problem that often goes unobserved in our discussion of values: The relationship between the existence of a particular social system and the kinds of values that emerge in a society.

May I begin by pointing out the obvious—that a social community is, among other things, a conflict community. In other words, one way of talking about social communities is in terms of the conflicts which characterize them. In classifying, we must pick the important conflicts since there are a wide range of conflicts that go on in any society. One cannot begin to name them or to describe them, so great is the multitude, but we can distinguish between "private" conflicts and "public" conflicts. This distinction most often is made on the basis of a number of ideas we hold about what is private and what is public, or what *ought* to be private and what *ought* to be public. I have no hard and fast way of pointing out to you, on the basis of the characteristics of the values themselves, what is a public value or what is a private value. All that can be asserted is that there are certain values which tend to end up in public discussion; which in turn may result in some kind of public, or organized, political action. Values emerge and are discussed when there is a conflict, and probably only when there is a conflict.

To make this distinction between public and private clear, I will use the illustration of two boys engaged in a fist fight behind the barn. They are engaged in what is essentially a private conflict. I introduce the barn here not as just another symbol, but because it is an important ingredient of the private nature of that conflict. One of the first characteristics we notice about conflicts is that they are highly contagious. The barn represents a shield of privacy that plays a large role in restricting the conflict to the two boys. Should the parents see the conflict, it will immediately spread and change its character. E. E. Schattschneider has pointed out this contagious nature of conflict.¹

¹ E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People* (N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, Inc., 1961).

Conflicts are contagious because we are not isolated but live in a society that is held together by a great many invisible threads which link us one to another. The child is linked to his parents, his parents are linked to other primary groups in the community, and through various complex organizations all are linked together into society as a whole. A conflict which begins in one place can be transferred to a wider arena by traveling along these threads of social relationships.

Let us go back to the boys behind the barn. Their fight, as is usually the case, is over something relatively trivial. The resolution of this fight, if it stays private, will come either when both boys are lying in the dust or when one is standing over the other as victor. This will, more or less, be the end of the conflict.

Let us next assume that there is parental intervention. Someone sees the boys fighting behind the barn. He tells on them, and the parents get involved. Not only are more people involved in the conflict, but quite obviously the nature of the conflict has changed. Interests of the parents in the fight are not identical with those of the children. If this conflict should be continued and transferred to the feud level, where the "clans" become involved, a wholly different conflict would take place. The second cousin does not have the same interest in the original conflict as does the parent or the child. And so one characteristic of conflict as it spreads throughout our society is that it tends to change its form as it changes its memberships. It tends to change so radically, in fact, that often the original source of conflict is no longer identifiable. Going back to the children behind the barn, the fight may have been over ownership of a jackknife. This was the original conflict. But if both sets of parents become involved, it becomes a feud between the families. The jackknife plays absolutely no role in the conflict at this point. It simply is no longer a fight over a jackknife, but has become a fight for family honor and prestige.

Something similar to what happens in this microcosm happens in political life. As conflicts radiate throughout our society they tend to change their character. The character of the conflict is going to be fairly well determined by the institutions that participate in it, how they relate to each other and by what means they tend to participate in conflict. A community or family fight takes one form; a struggle among economic groups, another; a struggle among political parties, still another; a struggle within or among religious groups, yet another form. All social institutions participate in social conflict, and our political institutions are no exception. As a matter of fact, if there is such a thing as an institution designed for conflict, our political institutions appear to be it. There is obviously no such thing as a neutral institu-

tion which participates in all conflicts, or channels all conflicts, or operates to encourage or discourage all conflicts. Our political institutions, therefore, are not neutral. There is a selective process taking place within our political institutions, encouraging some conflicts, resolving others, and ignoring still a larger group.

A second part of my thesis is that even when we recognize that politics is essentially a conflict situation in which political institutions tend to carry particular kinds of conflicts, we do not equally recognize that certain types of political institutions tend to discourage conflict. That is, not only do political institutions actually develop and encourage conflicts, but the same set of institutions can discourage conflicts by blocking channels of communications. It is probably the greatest single function of a political institution to play this negative role. A society can handle only so many conflicts at once. We can question only so many values at a given time. When a conflict so deeply divides us that it tends to realign all of our sets of values—as did the World War in Russia, or the Revolutionary War in France—the result is a general breakdown in the political system, a breakdown that has its corollaries in contemporary French and Russian politics today. An operating political system tends to keep outside of the political system certain kinds of conflicts. Its role in keeping these conflicts from emerging is a prerequisite for the maintenance of the society.

Let me move to my next point. Democracy is a form of government designed to maximize the areas of conflict, just as it might be said that authoritarian government of any sort is a system designed primarily to suppress conflicts. Democracy is a system designed to maximize at least certain kinds of conflicts, to encourage conflicts by providing "easy" access to political institutions, and the conditions necessary for the communications of conflict through the whole of society—freedom of speech, assembly, and the press, the guarantees of suffrage rights, and the right to petition the government. How does a democracy maximize conflicts? It does so by making as open as possible the forms by which the contagion of conflict may operate. The one single phenomena that most encourages conflicts is the free communication system. A free communication system is open to almost any kinds, any pieces, of information. If you wish to discourage conflict you tend to close down or limit your information systems.

The political party system is a communication system which is designed to translate from the local level to the state and the national level certain kinds of conflicts; pressure groups also serve this function, as do our representative institutions. What kinds of conflict does our particular democracy translate? First, it can be said that the kinds

of conflicts which develop in our national political system tend to be those which have a national base. If the problem exists across the entire country, in some degree, the chances of it being brought to national attention are much greater since pressure can be applied from many areas along many lines of influence. For example, problems of economics have traditionally tended to dominate our political scene, though problems of international relations and of foreign policy have become more dominant in recent years.

Problems of political behavior and of access to the democratic machinery, for most classes in society, are equally broad and cut across the multitude of social systems.

The kinds of conflict that it tends to discourage are those which have their origins in one of two conditions: those that are particularly local, or those that cannot easily be organized to exert pressure. For many years the Negroes' civil rights was a local problem. It became national only when Negroes moved out of the South and organized. Where the problem has remained local—in the rural South—it has remained out of local politics, in the sense that the Negro has been denied access to the institutions of politics.

The ability to organize is also an essential feature of politics. Some conflicts have a large number of people interested in them throughout the society, but there is no way in which these people can effectively put themselves into the channels of politics. The great American consumer is an example of an unorganized conflict participant.

What then of democracy and the struggle over values? First of all, our political system has been quite a success in dealing with the conflicts in our society. The two speakers who follow me may tend to disagree, but I believe that in the area of economics we have done a remarkable job within a relatively short period of time in developing a national consensus out of what was potentially one of the most dangerous conflict situations this nation has ever faced—we have reached agreement on the broad question of how our society is to be organized for production. This agreement has led a number of political scientists and intellectual historians to suggest that we have reached the end of ideology in this country. No longer, they say, do we really argue, with a great deal of meaning, the old ideological problems of equality and opportunity, the problems of the *haves* and the *have-nots* in our society. The compromises have been made—and let me emphasize that these have been political compromises. (Which is why the economists have never been able to make sense out of them.) These compromises have been made, they have been reached. They are as

final in form as political consensus can make them. It doesn't matter whether Barry Goldwater becomes President of the United States. With all the power of the presidency behind him, he cannot seriously jeopardize this consensus. In these areas we have been successful both in encouraging and in resolving the major conflicts.

As I suggested, a good many people really think we've reached a consensus on everything because we've reached a consensus on those problems which have occupied us in the past. But there are some areas in which we have not been so successful. Our failures are perhaps not as visible as our successes, but we do have our failures. For example, about forty per cent of our electorate, that is, of our adult population, does not participate in our political process even to the extent of voting once every four years. When forty per cent of our adult population fails to participate in our political process at its most visible point, the presidential election, I suggest that we have a problem whose magnitude we cannot understand. We cannot comprehend it because we do not know why these people are alienated. We are seeing a consequence of this alienation in the reassertion of a radicalism of the right. I would suggest that it is the result of the fact that some major social conflicts have not been translated into our political system.

Another area of failure in our system is our current struggle over race relations. Professor Charles Hyneman has suggested that the Supreme Court's decision in the case of *Brown vs. the Board of Education*, the famous desegregation case, was in a sense a reversal of our democratic process because we allowed nine men, who are supposed to be as far removed from the center of our democratic process as any political institution can be, to make our policy decisions for us on the question of race relations. He did not suggest that the decision itself was bad, but rather that if we believe that this was a good decision, we must also believe that our democratic institutions have failed. As I suggested earlier, the Negro has failed to achieve his just place in our society because of lack of organization and the lack of national distribution. But have you noticed that the bulk of Negro political and social action is to be found today in extra-political organizations and institutions; such as the sit-downs and sit-ins? In other words, the Negro has bypassed political action in favor of direct action. No longer are Negroes really attempting to force their principles through the political process, because the political process has not been responding to them the way they want. This is a form of alienation, different in kind from the radicalism of the right, but still an alienation

from the political process resulting from our failure to organize our political institutions in such a manner that they adequately reflect our basic social conflicts.

The conclusions which might be drawn from this discussion are many. I should like to concentrate upon two that are directly involved in our discussion of the role of higher education in the creation, change, and dissemination of values. The first is that college can affect the values of the student if it concentrates upon those values that have a *social vitality*. Values with *social vitality* are those which have a meaning for social and political life. They are values which are involved in social conflict, which serve as a guide for behavior and a standard for judging in the realms of life which are important. This means, among other things, that a college and its staff, to be effective, must be controversial. It must excite and stimulate. It must force the students to integrate their values and build their standards for themselves. We are quite right in assuming that, by and large, we can not *give* values to students. It does not necessarily follow, however, that we cannot act as an agent for the catharsis of these values, purging them of their morbid qualities, and forcing them to be ordered. To do this, however, we must direct our intellectual queries toward those matters which count.

The second conclusion, and one which is most directly pointed at the social scientist, though its obligation falls on all who teach, is that we must prepare our students to use the social devices which we feel are legitimate for the working out of social conflicts. If there is one thing that is more disturbing than anything else about the radical right (as distinguished from the conservative right) today, it is the large number of educated, "respectable" people who participate in it. These are the ones we would reasonably expect to find caught up in our normal political process. We, in this case the institutions of higher education, have failed in our obligations to these people. We have failed to show them the ways in which our institutions can be used to express the conflicts which they feel can only be resolved by theorizing out many of our cherished ways of doing things. We have failed, in all probability, because we have never adequately understood these processes ourselves. We have taught civics where we should have taught politics; we have taught capitalism where we should have taught economics; we have taught theology where we should have taught religion.

UNIONS AND UNION MEMBERS: A REAPPRAISAL OF THE FREEDOM-SECURITY QUESTION

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It is my purpose to discuss the problem of power within the trade union movement. In order to do so, it will be necessary to discuss first the problem of power relationships between labor and management.

As a young worker in the shop, I had a very narrow view of the union. It consisted essentially of "What can the union do for me and what should I do for it?" I was concerned about two things: "How much are we going to get on the next contract negotiation?" and "Are we going to have to strike?" I went to union meetings only when there was a strike vote, or a vote on a constitution, or if somebody dared to propose a dues increase. Later, as a shop steward, my views of the union, of my role in it, and of what it should do, began to widen a bit. I began to think in terms of my department, the guys who ran the lathes, what we were going to get out of the union for guys in the department. I was alert to any efforts by other departments to get the better part of the deal if there was some sort of differential increase proposed. As shop chairman, I got a still wider view. I began to look at the union in terms of the shop as a whole. I wanted to please the guys in the next department so that when an election came up, I would still be shop chairman.

Eventually, I became an organizer for the International Union and I began to have a quite different view of the collective bargaining process and of the union and its function. I began to think not only in terms of the immediate negotiations, but of negotiations in the years ahead. In the shop, you believe your employer is too cheap to give the wages you really deserve. But as you assume responsibilities for negotiating not only this contract, but the next contract and the next after that, you begin to get a broader conception of the function of the union.

I have painted a broad picture of the changing concept of the individual leader's conception of his role in the trade union movement. I'd like next to paint a picture of the transition that has been occurring within the trade union movement in this century. I believe that

virtually all of the movements for social change or social reform have emphasized bread and freedom, with the greatest emphasis on bread. Even those movements which ultimately proved to be dictatorial movements of the right or of the left adopted "bread with freedom" as their slogan. In those situations where economic action did not seem feasible, as in many European trade unions, bread and freedom were sought through strong political action. The demand for social reforms had its reflection in the social gospel movement in the church. Men of good will were intrigued with the thought of Christianizing the social order and bringing about the Kingdom of God on earth. Also involved here is the idea of moral man and immoral society, that somehow or other people were all right but the social order needed adjustment.

The trade union movement within the United States has traditionally emphasized "bread-and-butter" unionism. Its principal advocate was Samuel Gompers, first and long-time president of the American Federation of Labor. He stressed improved wages, hours, and working conditions as the way to build a better economic position for the workers. In the early days there was great resistance to organizing, and every type of device was used by employers to prevent growth of the movement. This meant that most of the labor leaders who survived these times had been through a great deal of difficulty. They had been blacklisted, thrown in jail, and beaten up. Some were influenced by the socialism of Debs and later of Norman Thomas; others were attracted to the communist experiment and, before disillusionment set in, believed this was to be the solution and the trade union was to be the mechanism. So it was that you had a kind of dedication born of adversity which was very strong.

Though the great depression of the 1930's remains a powerful force in the back of the minds of most of today's labor leaders, the coming of age of the trade union movement has brought about an increasing accommodation between unions, and between unions and employers. To achieve this accommodation, something has happened to the power structure of the trade union. If you look at the constitution of most trade unions, you will see an almost ideal instrument. It presents a beautiful picture of a mass-based union in which the locals elect their own officers and their own district representative. The district council in turn elects the business agent who carries out policy in the district. The union constitution also provides for the election of delegates to the national convention, where discussion and debate determine policy and where the International officers are elected to carry out the mandate of the membership.

The situation is less than ideal, however, when you look at the contemporary power structure of the union. You find that one of the chief power points is the local business agent. Others are the International Executive Board, the president, and the vice-presidents in charge of particular territories. There is also a situation in which power lies not so much in the local union as in the shop society. Here we find that the union meeting is the place where certain formal decisions are made, but the really important decisions are made at informal meetings of the little group of people who control the shop society. This shift in the power structure of unions has come about for at least two important reasons: First, because the nature of collective bargaining requires strong union leadership to meet the unified position of management and, second, because responsible unionism requires a tight discipline over the membership; a membership made apathetic by the very success of the labor movement.

It is difficult to draw a line between corruption and accommodation. Let me give an illustration. It is rather common practice when negotiations are about to break down, to arrange an informal meeting at which top negotiators of the company and the union meet privately to decide what can be done, then go back to the formal negotiations and carry out the act. Where you have this type of informal cooperation to settle differences on an equitable basis, there is always the possibility of a "sell-out." The only thing that controls the representatives in that particular negotiation is individual character.

There is considerable concern about this development within the trade union movement. You would be surprised to know the number of people who privately, as trade unionists, discuss this problem of the professionalization that is going on—the growing separation between the top leadership and the membership. A number of books and articles have been written about this crisis. One trade unionist has written a book, *The Crisis in the Labor Movement*. Kermit Eby writes *They Don't Sing Anymore*. A research director for one of our major unions has come out with a pamphlet on *The Decline of Unionism*, in which he tries to analyze what has happened to the spirit, the life, the drive of labor. What has happened is the development of this accommodation, which has focused national attention on the problems of the individual union member in the mass union run by professional technicians.

It seems to me that the major issue has now become one of determining what are the rights of the individual. I am not talking about right-to-work laws or any of the other devices which historically have been used to undercut the union. I am talking about the rights of the union member to express criticism, to sound off, to differ with the hierarchy

and not be thrown out of the union. The trade union movement must devise some method for voluntarily working out these problems, and I think it can be done because of the latent idealism to be found within many trade unionists.

LAISSEZ FAIRE: SOCIETY, BUSINESS, AND THE LAW

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Laissez Faire: "Let people do as they choose." This slogan represents the understandable desire of businesses and individuals to pursue their private goals unfettered by governmental regulation and interference. At times this desire is frustrated and conflict develops. This conflict has been most apparent and most sharp in the two centuries that now have passed since the industrial revolution stirred to birth. Such conflict is present today at all levels of national and state affairs.

What is the present status of this conflict? What sort of balance has been struck between the forces of laissez faire and those of a planned society?

The extent and the direction of the pendulum's swing is perhaps best epitomized by the history of the treatment of industrial accidents. In the second half of the 18th and through the 19th centuries, factories emerged as the chief units of production. Great numbers of workers and many powerful machines were brought together in these factories. Among the by-products of these wonderfully efficient manufacturing units were injury and death. Along with the new methods of production, the industrial accident had appeared. Under what circumstances were injured workers and their families to receive compensation? The social philosophy of the times, or at least that of the entrepreneur class, was extreme laissez faire. Men should be encouraged to be independent and self-reliant. They should not be coddled. No one forced a worker to take any particular job. If a worker took a job requiring the use of obviously dangerous and improperly guarded machinery, he could not rightfully complain if he were injured by realization of the risk he had voluntarily assumed. If the injury were due to the negligence of a fellow worker, the injured party should look for compensation to the fellow worker, not to the employer. After all, if the fellow worker were habitually careless and a threat to those who worked with him, the injured worker should have complained to his employer. If the employer failed to correct the situation, the complaining worker was free to leave. Again, if the injury were due in any degree to the carelessness of the injured worker himself, he should not receive compensation. If a man does not watch out for himself, he should not expect others to worry about him.

This social philosophy was mirrored in the legal rules which governed a suit by an injured worker against his employer. The three formid-

able defenses of assumption of the risk, no responsibility for injury caused by a fellow worker, and no recovery if the worker's own carelessness contributed in any degree to his injury—these defenses all but eliminated the possibility of recovery in such an action. The full burden of industrial accidents was borne by the injured worker and his family. Poverty pressed upon them, and perhaps most significantly, was a heavy weight that the children would have to throw off before they could rise above the status thus visited upon them.

Eventually, the philosophy which buttressed such law began to be questioned. In the latter part of the 19th century, state legislatures began to pass "employers' liability" acts. These statutes took away from the employer the defense of assumption of the risk, and removed the insulation of the fellow servant rule. A few statutes even mitigated or eliminated the doctrine that any carelessness of the worker, no matter how slight, which contributed to his injury, would bar recovery. Under these employers' liability acts, however, the worker still had to prove, as the basis for recovery, that his injury was the result of some specific act of negligence which could be attributed to the employer. Recovery was through the usual process of litigation and litigation took time and money, two commodities not likely to be available in a household which had no source of income, which needed compensation for the necessities of daily life. Finally, during the first decade of this century, Workmen's Compensation Acts began to appear. Today, every state has such an act. Although these acts differ greatly in both large and small matters, they all have certain things in common. Recovery is not based on the fault of the employer. All that is necessary for recovery is that the worker be injured in the course of employment in an industry covered by the applicable statute. The defense of injury by fellow servant assumption of risk, and even, except in extreme cases, contributory negligence of the worker, are eliminated from consideration. The amount of compensation is limited and definite, based on compensation tables and keyed to the seriousness of the injury. Premiums for employers' insurance under workmen's compensation are kept within reasonable limits by the limited and definite nature of the liability and by reliable statistics on industrial injury collected as part of the workmen's compensation program. Employers can now concentrate on the scientific elimination of the causes of accidents rather than on avoiding blame for accidents which have occurred. Industrial accidents are recognized as a cost of doing business which, like other business costs, is to be absorbed or passed on by the business.

This same trend toward protection of the party in the inferior bargaining position, toward distribution rather than concentration of losses

due to accident, is apparent throughout the law. In the area of torts, that portion of the law dealing with recovery for injury to person or property, the question is becoming more and more not "who is at fault?" but "who is the more efficient loss-distributor?" The number of torts for which there is liability without fault is steadily increasing. In automobile accident cases, which account for most tort litigation, the law is still nominally based on fault. There is growing pressure within the legal profession, however, to remove the vast load of automobile litigation from the courts, to get off the treadmill of claim and counterclaim and contingent fee, and to deal with the automobile accident in much the same way that workmen's compensation statutes now deal with the industrial accident. Under such a system the emphasis would be on compensation, rather than on negligence and contributory negligence. Moreover, there are many indications that lay juries, with their knowledge of the ubiquitousness of liability insurance and the real impact of their verdicts, are fast approaching this result despite the fault-centered instructions given to them by judges.

In another area, contract law is continually providing more protection for the party in the inferior bargaining position. Typical are recent cases involving the liability of an automobile manufacturer for damage caused by defective parts. If, when you last purchased a new automobile, you took time to read all the fine print in the contract of sale and the warranty certificate, you found that the liability of any American manufacturer for damage caused by defective parts is expressly limited to replacement of the defective parts. Suppose that while a person who has recently purchased a new automobile under such an agreement is driving the automobile, a defective tie rod in the steering mechanism snaps and the vehicle lurches off the road. Great damage to the person and property of the owner result. Is the manufacturer's liability really limited to replacing the defective tie rod? Why not? After all, the injured person agreed to this limitation when he purchased the automobile. In the past few years, however, courts faced with this problem have refused to enforce such an agreement. They have ruled that it is too harsh a provision to enforce between parties of so markedly unequal bargaining positions.

Turning briefly to still other areas, the income and inheritance tax structure is such that the transfer of great wealth and its concomitant power from one generation to the next is becoming increasingly difficult. Aggressive enforcement of antitrust laws makes it unlikely that in this country a business or a small group of businesses will acquire the overwhelming economic power formerly associated with the European cartels. The desegregation decisions of the Supreme Court of the

United States and state statutes relating to employment and access to public places and services are making it less likely that an individual's rise in economic and social status will be precluded solely because of his race or religion. And so on through the entire fabric of the law. The net effect is vast and pervasive control of economic and political power.

Is it right that there should be such control? Has the pendulum been permitted to swing too far or has it swung too slowly and too short a distance? This is one of the fundamental questions of our time. Any answer to it must begin with the realization that the legal institution should advance the purposes and reflect the mores of the society of which it is a part. This does not mean that the law cannot point the way, cannot appeal, in Lincoln's phrase, to "the better angels of our nature." At times the legal institution may properly lead the parade, but it should never march alone to the beat of phantom drums.

Recently there have been charges that courts and judges have thus wandered astray, that courts have been making political decisions and that such decisions should be made only by popularly elected officials. Such charges lose sight of the fact that every judicial opinion is to some extent a political decision in that it will have an impact upon the affairs and the lives of many persons. Keeping an old rule intact is as much a decision, political or otherwise, as changing the rule. The question that should be asked is not whether courts are deciding "political" questions, the word "political" being used as an epithet, but whether they are deciding questions susceptible to adjudication under the rules and standards of the legal institution. The question of whether a particular electric power project should be publicly or privately owned, for example, is not susceptible to such adjudication. On the other hand, it is submitted that the question of whether or not particular state action is consistent with a "scheme of ordered liberty"¹ or whether it is a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, such a question is one better entrusted to judges following in the tradition of Holmes and Brandeis and Cardozo than to any legislative body, any administrative agency, or any popular referendum. The decision of such a question requires a sense of history, an ability to rise above the passions of the moment, and, above all, brilliant and penetrating insights into the nature of the legal process and into the purposes and policies of constitutional interpretation. These are the traditional qualities of a great judge. The answer to current criticism is not the restriction of judicial power, but increased efforts to ensure that those selected for the judiciary will possess such qualities.

¹ *Palko v. Connecticut*, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).

DOES THE COLLEGE HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY FOR STUDENT VALUES?

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Giving advanced age its due, let me muse for a moment. An early memory is of the tall, benign figure of headmaster Horace D. Taft rising for the first evening vesper talk. We, new boys and old, waited in reasonably hushed silence for a wisdom that both sides of the rostrum respectfully assumed absolute. Mr. Taft, called "the King," earnestly assured us that the days of what he and we then chose to call Bolshevism were duly numbered. The thundering fall of this anti-Christ could be expected before any of us reached maturity.

The King may have been literally correct. I am not sure either I or my classmates have or will reach maturity. In any event, this eminent and really wonderful man's logic, complicated in its detail, was simple in essence. Truth triumphs over falsehood. Good triumphs over evil. Progress is inevitable and we are a people blessed by numen and chosen as its vestal custodians.

I have other memories. I remember, in the early 1930's swearing allegiance to eternal pacificism. Then I remember reading *Mein Kampf*. I remember when some young Communists who had infiltrated the New York Young Democratic Committee raised a storm against La Guardia's program of free milk for school children.

I remember when my classmate, valedictorian, first law secretary to Mr. Justice Frankfurter, and special counsel to Secretary Burns, had the distinction of being indicted and convicted for the Federal felony of tampering with election returns in order to assure the results of a gambling scheme.

I have seen wars, depression, and television, and I am affected both with Mr. Justice Holmes' skepticism regarding fighting faiths and by Mr. Vergil's comment, "Sunt lacrimar rerum, et mentem mortalita tangunt." "These are the tears of things, and mortality touches the mind."

Therefore, in the overall, it would seem from the experience of the last third of a century that the college, or any other human institution that is arrogant enough to reach toward paternalism, had best keep

in mind the human frailty that intertwines with every statement of values and value systems, expressed or implicit.

Even more bitter, however, is the academic system's explanation of its petty products: its Ed Pritchard or Carl Van Doren, valedictorians in striped pajamas; or its most massive and colossal failure, the incorporation of the German academic world into the Nazi state. Can the university escape from playing Prometheus, risking its liver in the attempt?

Now, we can turn from this damned if you do, and triple damned if you don't dilemma, to some particular features of the problem.

It seems well to lay on the table certain questions regarding what the university is and what role it is expected to play. Is the primary purpose of the university to create an environment for an elite engaged in searching for, grubbing for, or quibbling about the truth?

There are those who so argue.

Is the primary purpose of a university the creation of a community of scholars?

Many so insist.

Is a university primarily the great workroom in which the next generation serves its apprenticeship, is matured and refined, acquainted with skills and given knowledge which relates it to the society of the past, present, and future?

Commencement speeches so assert.

Is the university the battleground for civilization itself, where the values of the future are being forged on anvils of one type or another?

Since scholars were responsible for the atomic bomb, the metaphor is somewhat unpleasant.

As a matter of plain fact, apart from cant and rhetoric, the whole subject of the college's responsibility for student values is extremely disturbing.

The first two questions involve the nature of the faculty as such, and among other things, the degree of individual privilege, as compared with group dedication, that a university presupposes. I think the answers given by the English and Physics departments might be interestingly different in this regard.

The third question involves a number of quite different relationships. It involves the relationship of the faculty toward those who propose to take the bows, those who expect to, or who are, engaged in graduate work. It involves the relationship between faculty and undergraduates preparing for a very different environment. And it involves the relation of the administration to the other university com-

ponents. Generalizations, in other words, can obscure the nature of the precise relationships one is talking about.

The shimmering history of the university as a changing institution in society intertwines with these questions which relate to what a faculty is, in fact and in ideal. We remember Abelard howling at the young clerics gathered by nations in the Pre St. Germain, and what this meant; or Bologna, resisting the intrusion of Arabic heresies; or the early American universities preparing governors and priests for the rule of freedom, in accordance with the laws of nature and natures of God; or more recent tableaux of Sinclair's *The Goose-Step* or Dewey, or Wilson, or Butler, or Hutchins, and earliest of all, the university of Socrates. Each of these historic pictures of the university implied its own answer to the prime question before us.

The third question involves the university as an apprenticeship. This is, perhaps, the core of the prime question. What is the college, as administration's responsibility to the apprentice? What is the faculty's? In this regard, I think we should be warned against hubris. The university is not a corporation of the whole life. It is a corporation of the partial life. We may delude ourselves with regard to the degree to which our apprentices identify themselves with us. They are involved in other societies, and frequently more involved in other societies. That ghastly word, the "peer" group, predominates. The affirmative or negative involvement with the family continues, and the affirmative involvement with the social group the apprentice most admires in his community may have an even stronger magnetism. Do you have any substantial doubts regarding the source of the major value patterns in our fraternities and sororities? The economic community is not reluctant to assert its value pattern, and the apprentice hears the call. The young professional group in whose ranks the apprentice soon hopes to stand has its own value pattern, and the apprentice is more likely to be drawn toward it than toward the alien corn among which he temporarily resides. But I shall return to this matter.

First, I want to explore the university as battleground for civilization. The idea that knowledge is truth and truth is civilization and that the university, as custodian of knowledge, was thus custodian of and warrior for civilization is a very old idea indeed. It was an idea that was easier to handle in the ages before the Renaissance that believed that society was fundamentally changeless, and that truths were absolute; and during the six centuries following the shattering of the harmony of the spheres, in which there was a belief in one form or another of inevitable progress.

Furthermore, we have begun, quite rightly, to acquire a new perspective with regard to what formerly was considered objective facts. We are less certain of the relationship between fact and opinion and value, and so we are inclined to be very scrupulous indeed. On the other hand, in contradiction, we are inclined to see and assert interconnections that were obscured within the verbiage of objectivity. There are, therefore, two tendencies within universities as battlegrounds-for-civilization. Each is justified.

One is, in essence, withdrawal. This, of course, has many aspects. It fits neatly into certain university traditions and concepts. It may involve the romantic, non-involved suffering of Hemingway. It may involve nirvanesque dehumanization of art. In any event, it involves a severance from the world. Hence, it involves both a value judgment and a severance from the clerk-apprentices who are going into, and who will be, the world. In brutal terms, it is *not* unreasonable to have a deep distaste for any probable prognosis of the world of tomorrow and to reject all but minimal contracts with it. The beard is not the only symbol of such rejection.

The other is, at best, a humble and, at worst, an arrogant assertion of the universities' involvement in the values of the contemporary and the emerging world. This position is, of course, partly based on glands, genes, and chromosomes. But it is also based on the defensible argument that a person and a group are responsible for the consequences of their actions. If the action is the assertion of a fact which is more or less than a fact, the person or group is responsible. An atom is an atom, but it is more than an atom. And an atom bomb is more than an atom bomb. And history is always opinion. And a contract is more than a contract. A contract may be the sin that forever condemns you. It may be the tool that releases you from the static bondage of centuries, as it was in the 1600's. It may be the medium which releases the scope of personality by fettering the leonine beast of government, as it was in the 1700's. It may be the carpet that man spreads around himself, increasing his substance and hence enlarging the orbit of that which makes him man, his will. And what it is in the 20th century, God only knows. But a contract is not a fact, it is a value and a value judgment. And so is the atom bomb.

Last night I read two long letters from my brother-in-law who is spending the year with his family at the University of Moscow. That university is largely, although not wholly, dominated by value judgments. Society, or what pleases itself to usurp that name, dominates the university—the influence is not from the university outward. Among other things, my brother-in-law is teaching as an exchange professor

from the Harvard Law School in a law school that proposes to abolish itself in forty years because the dogma calls for the accomplishment of socialism, if not communism, within that period and the dogma asserts that the law and the state will wither away within that period. I hope that latter prognosis is correct.

The lesson is not entirely clear. If one accepts the fact that a university shall take affirmative attitudes toward value systems, there is the grave problem of whether such systems will be generated from within or adopted, if not imposed, from without.

And so I come to my personal judgments with regard to matters which I find unrelentingly difficult. When I posed this question to my father this morning he, being an old warhorse from what, in due fact, was a happier generation, said this:

He believes that a university and its faculty have three rights, if not duties, in relation to student values. *First*, to strip away falsehoods entangling human relationship; *second*, to construct models of improved and more truthful relationships; and *third*, to urge action implementing these. I submit that these assertions raise almost as many semantic problems as they solve, but I have a good deal of sympathy for them or I should not have mentioned them.

My own little trinity of tentative beliefs are these:

1. I believe, although I cannot prove, that a university is or should be more of a community than is frequently the case. In this regard, I believe, among other things, that the responsibility of the faculty to the university community neither begins nor ends with entry into and exit from the office. I have never believed, for instance, that the sole test of a Communist professor's suitability was what he did in the classroom. This, incidentally, does not mean that I might not be willing to hire an acknowledged Communist. It does mean that I have a certain sense of shame at having had my hair cut yesterday, and last month, and the month before, in a barber shop that will refuse to cut the hair of certain members of my university community. I hold in high regard Mr. Michaelsen and Mr. Costantino and other members of the university community, for accepting young Negro high school students as members of their families.

I also believe that the concept of community involves continuous and active assertion of opportunity for contact with our clerk-apprentices, the body of the undergraduate body. The loss of communication between the average undergraduate and faculty is ironical. I do not think this is easy. I think it is important in working toward what a university should be.

2. I believe that the university world should be infinitely more ex-

perimental than it is. It is a world which, like all organizational worlds, is hypnotically drawn towards norms, if not stereotypes. It is not even as experimental as it was when Antioch, Reed, Carleton, Bennington, Swarthmore, Princeton, St. Johns, and Hutchins' University of Chicago were really competing with the older models and inevitably affecting the whole picture of and understanding of the relationship of the college and the development of values. We should have more of the type of experiment symbolized by the values course developed by Mr. Michaelsen, which involves inter-departmental as well as graduate and undergraduate participation.

3. I opt for the second position in the battleground of civilization controversy. Partly, because I am a lawyer. I have an attachment to the case or controversy rule. I believe that objectivity is frequently the poorest climate in which to decide matters of judgment; that the true temper of a situation is often best developed in the presence of those who are passionately attached to viewpoints.

I am a product of the Harvard Law School. I have an admiration for Dean Griswold who, when told by the Boston press that the president of the Massachusetts Bar Association had asserted that two Harvard law professors did not meet the standards of the Massachusetts Bar Association, thundered his reply: "The Massachusetts Bar Association does not establish the standards of the Harvard Law School, the Harvard Law School establishes the standards of the Massachusetts Bar Association." And the remarkable fact is, that the Harvard alumni throughout the country rose and applauded.

I would opt for asserting a certain greater involvement in developing the maturity of the students through a serious attempt to supplant proctored exams. Honesty is certainly one area in which we can find agreement.

I would opt for asserting a greater involvement in preventing the intrusion of outside values that fragment the unity of the university community.

HOW MAY QUESTIONS OF VALUE BE PRESENTED TO THE STUDENT?

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In terms of the title which has been given me, it appears that I am precommitted to the proposition that values *can* be presented in an academic community of college or university level and *ought* to be presented. Some of you have raised questions with regard to both facets of the matter—and I shall have my own questions to raise also. However, by the title given me for this discussion, I am obliged tentatively to assume both the possibility and propriety of the enterprise.

The title might be rephrased as follows: The Art of Institutional Valuemanship. That is, *how* does one go about it? But I wish to raise, first, a basic question for this whole area. *Which* values are we talking about when we discuss "the presentation of values?" Even with all the current disturbance of traditional value structures, the fading away of old value systems and the tentative birth of new value systems or value chaoses, there still seems to be a plethora of values about. And perhaps this is our problem. There are so many values of different sorts and kinds that the question of the relativity of all values is the one that disturbs us more than anything else. For we do not live in a value-vacuum, even though we often try to. Indeed the very effort not to take a position on values involves us in a certain type of value judgment.

However, when we talk about institutional valuemanship, the presentation of values to students, the implication is that of *effective* presentation, and this does raise the question of our underlying assumptions. It seems to be implied that there are certain specific values that we value above other values. For if one is to present values it is almost impossible to think that he means *values-in-general*. Perhaps values-in-general never appear anywhere, in any case. It is even doubtful that "value presentation" is a value-in-general.

Therefore, in this present discussion we are suggesting that in our contemporary educational enterprises, and in our educational structures, certain values which we would wish to see there are not present. Or, if they are present, that they are not being fully and effectively articulated. Or that they are being threatened. Now if this is the case and we do wish—and I am not sure in view of previous statements whether this

group will agree that we do—to make some specific values prevail over others, or to displace them, or that certain values be resurrected from latency and from their implicit status and be projected into explicit and creative form, then it seems to me that the above-suggested consideration is necessary. That is: What values are we talking about? Do we have in mind specific sets which we wish to make prevail at our particular institution? For example, when we say “values” do we think of the special “academic” values of selfless, disciplined scholarship, of the attempt to spark ideational creativity, of trying to achieve dialectical dexterity on the part of our students? Or is it a kind of taken-for-granted affirmation of what has been called the values of the “American way of life?”

You are no doubt familiar with the way in which Will Herberg in his book, *Protestant-Catholic-Jew*, defines the American way of life: “The American way of life is individualistic, dynamic, pragmatic. It affirms the supreme value and dignity of the individual. It stresses incessant activity on his part, for he is never to rest but is always striving to get ahead. It defines an ethic of self-reliance, merit and character, and judges by achievement; ‘deeds not creeds’ are what count. The American way of life is humanitarian, ‘forward looking,’ optimistic In brief, the American way of life is an idealized, middle-class ethos.”¹ Is *this* what many of our institutions somewhat instinctively assume to be the sort of values they wish somehow or other to present? Or there are perhaps, in the eyes of some, the “democratic” values of political responsibility, of community participation, informed national and international concern. And there are also those in certain educational institutions who feel that they are a very specific enterprise in the presentation of the Judeo-Christian moral and religious values. It appears that unless and until we decide which values we wish to make prevail in our own particular context, we are talking largely and vaguely in a complete fog.

Let us note a second thing in this same connection. I would suggest in all discussion of value-presentation we need to take into account the specific institutional context in which we work and try to make our *institutional value-stance*. This value-stance of the institution is often implicit or taken for granted rather than explicit. It is not always found even in the official statement of institutional values which, as a former speaker has said, oftentimes has not been read by any of the faculty or the administration for a *very* long time, if at all. But is there not, nevertheless, in any given institutional structure, of whatever sort,

¹ Herberg, Will, *Protestant-Catholic-Jew*, Doubleday and Company, 1956, pp. 92-94.

a certain value-stance which this institution itself presumes by the specific nature of its very existence?

Notice, for example, the structure of the *academic* institution in these terms. We might speak, as above, of its publicly conceptualized purpose, which may or may not have relevance. Or we might ask questions about the criteria by which its trustees and officials are chosen. Are they chosen because they have a particular religious allegiance? Or are they chosen because they are men of wealth who are known to be generous, and as trustees can be tapped for a considerable amount of money for this particular institution? What are the courses which are offered in the institution, their nature, their character, their proportion to each other? What is their content and what is the nature of their staffing? How are the professors who teach these courses recruited, and on what grounds are they chosen? What religious activities or special value-centered activities, effective or ineffective, are allowed on the campus, provided for by the institution, or left entirely out of the picture? Now, all this is a kind of implicit value-stance that may largely condition anything of any sort that we attempt in our own institution in terms of basically affecting the students.

In this connection we may distinguish four types of institutional value-stances which materially affect what the professor attempts to do in the value area. There are first those that are *hostile* to specific value-teaching, or value-teaching of certain specific types, especially those of the religious or sectarian sort. I am thinking of the attitude taken by some state universities in which all religious groups must undertake all their efforts off-campus; not even a notice of a single religious activity may appear on a bulletin board on the campus itself. All religious activity has to be off at the side, crouching as near as it legally can to the campus and hoping to draw somebody over the line by the process of osmotic attraction. But the campus itself is strictly off-limits. Is this the affirmation of a set of values; or is it the non-affirmation of any value whatsoever? Or is it an attempt to affirm that the academic discipline is a value in its own right without regard to these other specific religious value affirmations? Or isn't one of these indigenous American patterns of values which we more or less take for granted, and which perhaps continue on unquestioned through a great deal of university training? Is there here the implication that these academic, or those taken-for-granted values that more or less form the rationale of our American middle-class life are the ones that *should* be supported by the university? A most tremendous value judgment in itself!

There are others that might be called *value-neutral* or *impartial*. I

do not know whether you think of the university here in Iowa City as that sort or not. There is a School of Religion upon your campus which has some variety within it. Does this suggest that the university in this case looks upon itself as a kind of referee or umpire so that the theological infighting doesn't get too dirty or go to undue lengths, and must be confined to a few chosen religious persuasions? Or some may take a viewpoint, as I believe the University of Pennsylvania does, that one cannot propagate religion, but that he can study "religious thought" on the campus. This rubric ostensibly removes any onus of proselytizing or any suggestion that any one *particular* value position can be forwarded or propagated. What then *is* the value-stance of an institution like this? That religion in general is good, but must not get too particular or too specific? That to have three religions discussed in general is better than to have one religion *expressed* in particular? That in discussions about them, this thing called "religious value" gets an airing, which in itself is valuable? Or somewhat more generously to say: We need values and some sort of religious stance; therefore, here on the basis of our discussion, is a chance to pick one out which you like, in a purely private way? That discussion of religion by non-religious "objectivists" is good, but that propagation of religious faith by confirmed believers is bad?

Third, there are those institutions that say, perhaps, that the "Judeo-Christian value-affirmations" are good, but would not call themselves Christian as such. And into this class it seems to me, many of the church-related colleges fall. Frequently a church-related college is one where the relation to the church has become more and more distant until the institution is now but a kind of a "kissing cousin" to the church that it is supposedly related to. (But kisses are actually exchanged only when the going for the college gets tough or some church board needs to justify its existence.) Here would be a general adherence to Judeo-Christian moral and religious values, but not a willingness on the part of the institution to say: We specifically espouse these and will attempt to indoctrinate students with them and choose our professors on the basis of this kind of an affiliation or affirmation, rather we affirm only a *general* friendliness to such values.

Then there is finally the *church-college*, which is a direct attempt to have an explicit, organized, and even compulsory affirmation of certain values, primarily Christian values. Perhaps we have here a concrete attempt to achieve that kind of wholeness of experience of which we have been talking; to make the college a real living community of faith or common search for certain values, which is participated in at many levels and in different situations.

Having noted these types of institutional value-stance, I would reiterate my point that unless we discuss value presentation in specific contexts of this sort, such discussion has very little worth. It remains a completely generalized affair.

Finally, I will speak somewhat about the technique of value presentation, about the way in which values are, or are not, or perhaps *should* or *should not* be, presented in courses. This, of course, implies a general value judgment too, which may be looked upon one way or the other. In view of what has been said before by some of my predecessors, what happens in the classroom does not make much difference anyway. And yet, frankly, I am not altogether sure about this. I know during my time at Grinnell at least several dozens of people who, coming to the college with certain sets of values but finding themselves confronted by a whole assortment of new and different values, oftentimes in the courses they take, have radically changed at least their superficial allegiance to other value structures. I do not know whether this will change their *conduct* when they leave college, but it *has* often changed vocational decisions. (I am thinking especially of those boys who come in ready to go into the ministry and before they get through, decide to be actors or psychologists or good solid businessmen or sometimes the reverse—though their basic values may already have been chosen.

Effective or not, here we meet the troubled question of how one presents values, or if he should at all present values, in the classroom. Of course, the different ranges of the materials of instruction obviously offer different problems. Courses in religion all would be called "value courses," I presume. At least value-language is hanging pretty thickly around in the general atmosphere. And we do have at our college a philosophy or religion requirement. It used to be solely a religion requirement; now it has been expanded. Is this progress or is it retrogression? This depends, perhaps, on one's viewpoint.

One of the courses I teach is a Bible course. I have to make a value decision to begin with in some sense: Shall I teach it sermonically or "inspirationally?" or shall it be taught in terms of a rather neutral, objective, impartial, even "negative" manner? (Some take the viewpoint that this last *is* the way it is taught.) But use of the terms of contemporary biblical scholarship results in searching questions about the origin and history of the documents which we have in the Bible, with a seeming diminution of its authority. Is this "good" or "bad"?

If one teaches a course in world religions, does he try to give a fair shake to Buddhism, Judaism, and Islam, even though he himself happens to be a Protestant Christian? He may, of course, follow in the way of R. E. Hume and compare all religions with Christianity to their

detriment, proving that Christianity is the best after all, or does academic honesty force one to try to make each one authentic in its own right?

Elsewhere I can speak only from the outside. I do not think there is any Christian or Judeo-Christian mathematics, economics, biology, sociology, or history—or is there? It usually is said that one ought not drag his own preferred values into the classroom presentation here. Yet, I would point out that even in the teaching of these subjects, values are not avoided. We can speak of the art of assumptionship by which the dice are preloaded. For example, is it not a value-loaded assumption when a certain type of psychology suggests that there is no fundamental difference between animal learning and human learning; that if one can determine how animals learn, then he has essentially solved the problem as to how human beings learn? Or if the assumption is made that man is *primarily* and *essentially* biological? If one starts with this assumption, not even discussing it, and takes it for granted, in the very way his questions are set up, is there not an undeclared value implication or stance which is constitutional to the course itself? Or if one starts out with the suggestion that history is meaningless, or directionless, or is determined solely by economic forces, has not an important value-assumption been made here already? Or infers that free enterprise, capitalism, the New Deal, socialism, new frontiersmanship, new frontier eclecticism, or what have you, is best or to be preferred? Thus, in fact, one can find in many an instructor's attitude, or his syllabus, or syllabus organization, his reading assignments, or texts, some value positions which are there implicit, and which, perhaps, are very basic and powerful in their influence.

Then, there is always that thing which is very hard to tie down because it is negative and undeclared, and exercised by those who often declare themselves to be "objective." I might call it unavowed partisanship or the fine art of sneersmanship. The way in which one speaks of certain doctrines or beliefs, especially those of the opposition party, without ever saying anything *directly* about them, the lift of an eyebrow, the flick of a finger, a casual intonation can convey a full load of meaning, by insinuation, of very specific value relationships.

In conclusion: I have been presenting only some of the *problems* of value presentation in an academic institution, none of their solutions; but it seems to me that in order to provide any answers at all, it is more important to see what we are trying to do and the difficulties that face us, than to make any particular pronouncements as to the way in which it *ought* to be done.

IN CONCLUSION

Robert S. Michaelsen
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I once heard an erudite professor argue that we in the academic community ought always to distinguish carefully between fact and value and that our basic concern ought to be with the former. This sort of opinion contrasts sharply with that of some who would seem to hold that the primary task of college is the inculcation of a set of values.

A friend of mine from another state university maintains as persuasively as he can that there is no place for theologians on faculties of state-supported institutions of higher learning because it is inherent in the nature of their trade that they be committed to a particular value system. Thus, he holds, they cannot be objective (as, presumably, other professors can) and their commitment inevitably involves them in an effort to persuade students to embrace their way of looking at things. Strangely enough, this man's view receives some support from the practice of some institutions of higher learning where the required courses in religion are regarded as the setting in which the student will be helped to embrace the position of the ecclesiastical institution or institutions which support the college.

A reading of the papers in this publication indicates (a) that it is impossible to make a sharp and fast distinction between fact and value, (b) that we live in a society in which questions of value are constantly raised and constantly relevant, (c) that nearly all academic disciplines, and especially the social sciences and the humanities, must deal with questions of value, and, by indirection at least, (d) that the inculcation of a value system cannot be assigned to any one department in the institution, if inculcation as such has a place at all. These papers suggest, further, that the question of values and the college is a complex one because the question of values is itself so complex, and thus that an overly simplified and structured approach is likely to be both misleading and irrelevant. However, the conclusion reached is not that the college or university should drop the question, but rather that it should endeavor in all of its activities to confront the student with the nature, operation, and effectiveness of values and value systems. What is needed in the classroom and the dormitory, the library and the labora-

tory, is an atmosphere which will expose the student critically to his own nature and desires, and to the structure and dynamics of his society, and which will prepare him to deal realistically with both while developing the ability to make creative judgments in deciding between competing values and value systems.

A re-reading of these papers serves to recreate something of the stimulation experienced in first hearing them on the day of the seminar. This was no ivory-tower exercise. A psychiatrist shared with us some of his own thoughts about the need for a kind of counseling that goes beyond psychiatric therapy, a counseling which will help *the individual* to reconstruct his own stance in relation to questions of life's meanings, purposes, and values. An economist suggested that the laws of the market place are not so immutable and inevitable that decisions—decisions involving judgment and value—have no place. A former labor organizer pointed out something of the power structure and struggle in which the union leader is involved, and urged, nevertheless, that this man is still a responsible human being who cannot allow the system to be the sole director of his decisions. Somewhat in contrast to this, a political scientist described the nature and dynamics of political life in such a way that one realized that while the time-honored individual virtues have not lost their relevance, still the system is such that the individual is frequently caught in such raging cross currents, in the midst of a multiplicity of interests in a power struggle with each other, that he is greatly frustrated in his efforts to see the entire applicability of these virtues to his situation. This speaker went on to suggest that the college should concentrate on those values that have a *social vitality*, by which he meant values that are operative or can be effective in the social and political life.

Certain questions persist: (1) How can the college help the student to achieve a viable understanding of life's meaning, purpose, and values? (2) How can the student learn about the complexities of the social processes, as evident, for example, in labor-management relations, in politics, et cetera? and (3) how can (1) and (2) be brought together in relevant and meaningful fashion? There appears to be need for maintaining a delicate and dynamic relation between fact and value. The nature of the social processes, for example, is primarily a matter of facts. Skilled analysts are essential in describing these. But, policy decisions, so essential in these processes, involve questions of value. Thus along with the skilled analyst, the vigorous embracer of positions or a position is needed, the man who sees the classroom as an arena of discussion and debate, a place which anticipates and possibly is involved in the decision-making process. One of the seminar leaders suggested

an analogy from the law, that is, "the case or controversy rule." "I believe," he said, "that objectivity is frequently the poorest climate in which to decide matters of judgment: that the temper of a situation is often best developed in the presence of those who are passionately attached to viewpoints."

Addressing himself to the topic, "The Forces that Shape Student Values," one of the speakers flatly asserted that the colleges are *not* as influential in shaping student values as most administrators and faculty members like to think they are. Whether this is a realistic analysis or an overly pessimistic view, there can be little argument about the fact that we need to give much more serious attention to the question. It would seem that this is especially true of those of us who teach. One of the seminar leaders, a man who is a skilled and stimulating teacher himself, suggested that we need to be far more experimental than we are.

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