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# Unions' Record in Repeat Elections 

By EDGAR R. CZARNECKI

A repeat election-from a union standpoint-would seem to be an ideal opportunity to finally realize success in attempts at organization. But, according to the author, the statistics do not substantiate what amounts to unions' intuitive faith in the salutary results of these repeat elections.

THE ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS of union organizing efforts has received little attention in the literature. One type of election that occurs regularly and is an integral part of union organizing campaigns is the repeat election. This is a representation election in which the union (or, in some cases, a company) petitions for the same unit of the company in which a previous election was held.

## Introduction

The results of representational elections as reported by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) makes no attempt to isolate these repeat elections from all other types of elections. ${ }^{1}$

As far as can be determined, there has been no previous attempt to analyze repeat elections. However, the implications of such knowledge for both union and management are obvious. Comparing the percentage outcome of repeat elections versus other elections should be meaningful to the unions in decisions of whether or not to organize units whose votes they may have previously lost. Likewise, management is interested in the probability of success when a union "knocks again."

The sequence of events involved is that initially there is a union election, which can result in the union either winning or losing. In either case, a repeat (or subsequent) election may take place after a one-year wait. ${ }^{2}$ If the union wins the original election, there may

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be another election because of: a decertification election; or a contract not being consummated after more than a year, which lapses the original certification of the union; or a raid by another union; or an employer petitioned election. ${ }^{3}$ If a union loses the original election, there can be a subsequent or repeat election: involving the same union (or unions, in the case of an original multi-union election) ; involving different union or unions; or involving some combination of the same or different union or unions. These possibilities can exist in a repeat election involving a unit of workers identical to those in the original election,

## (Footnote 2 continued.)

an election among all the employees in the unit would bar another election among all the employees in the unit for 12 months. Similarly, an election among the draftsmen only would bar another election among the draftsmen for 12 months. However, an election among the draftsmen would not bar a later election during the 12 -month period among all the production employees including the draftsmen.

It is the Board's interpretation that Section 9 (c)(3) only prohibits the holding of an election during the $12-$ month period, but does not prohibit the filing of a petition. Accordingly, the NLRB will accept a petition filed not more than 60 days before the end of the 12 -month period. The election cannot be held, of course, until after the 12 -month period. If an election is held and a representative certified, that certification is binding for one year and a petition for another election in the same unit will be dism'ssed if it is filed during the 1 -year
or they may exist in a unit of workers slightly different, though at the same location, as in the original representation election. This process may be indefinitely repeated, that is, the unions may attempt to go back and try to organize after successive losses. ${ }^{4}$

Besides following this sequence, decisions are necessary to determine if the subsequent or repeat election includes the identical units of employees, in the same plant, in the same city, and with the same Standard Industrial Classification. Judgments made by the author to determine whether an election really was a repeat election will be made later in this paper.
period after the certification. If an election is held and no representative is certified, the election bars another election for 12 months. A petition for another election in the same unit can be filed not more than 60 days before the end of the 12month period and the election can be held after the 12 -month period expires. Source: A Layman's Guide to Basic Law Under the National Labor Relations Act, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D. C., 1966, pp. 14-15.
${ }^{3}$ An employer petitional election in a unit already represented by a union must be accompanied by a "substantial reason" why he suspects the union no longer represents a majority of the workers.
${ }^{4}$ It may also involve combinations of wins and losses in elections of the same unit. For example, a union loses an election, comes back after a year and wins; then a year later it is raided by a union, and another union represents the workers, after which the plant may be decertified.

In this study a few of the electionsbecause of delays involving unfair labor practices that extend over a year's time-may really be a rerun, not a repeat election. It is assumed in this study that the number of such cases are minimal and do not drastically modify the results obtained.

This study has two main objectives. The first is to determine how prevalent repeat elections are in relation to the total number of NLRB elections and the total number of people involved in such elections. Since no statistics on repeat elections are currently available, it is assumed by many that the election results as reported by the NLRB represent new organizing endeavors, whereas in reality many of these are: either additional attempts to organize the same people; or attempts by other unions, or companies, or employees themselves, to challenge existing units; or attempts by unions to become "new" bargaining representatives following the elections that may not have culminated in a signed collective bargaining agreement. By definition, then, this first objective will include the broadest definition of repeat elections; that is, all elections in the same unit or in comparable units, involving both those situations where the union won or lost the original election. It includes, for example, decertification, raids, slightly different units, etc.

The second objective of this study is to analyze what will henceforth be referred to as "single loss elections," that is, elections in which the union(s) lost in their first attempt to organize a group of workers, and subsequently an additional election was held involving the same or different union(s). This excludes repeat elections involving a union victory in the first instance and

[^1]also excludes repeat elections where the same unit was involved in more than one subsequent election. In other words, if a union petitioned for the same unit three or four times, this is not included. This analysis of "single -loss elections" will focus first on whether there is a significant difference in the percentage of union victories in repeat elections in which the union initially lost an election involving the same unit versus those elections in plants that never before had experienced a representational election.

The second analysis of "single loss elections" will determine whether or not in the subsequent or repeat election having the same union or a different union alters significantly the results obtained. That is, are the results of repeat elections modified if a different union is involved in the second election as opposed to a repeat election involving the same union in both the repeat and subsequent election?

Finally, two specific factors will be analyzed to determine whether they may contribute to the explanation of the results obtained above. One of these factors is size of the unit involved; the other is the particular union involved. These two factors were selected because in comparing any two elections, it is necessary to check whether there is any wide disparity in size of the unit and to determine whether the same or different union is involved in the results. ${ }^{5}$

## Assumptions

In general, there seems to be an implicit but statistically unsubstantiated feeling by union officials that it is easier to organize in plants previously involved in a union election than in one in which no union has ever been
of the print-outs were necessary. This limited the securing of other information such as SIC, geographic location, etc.
on the scene. ${ }^{6}$ This idea may stem directly from the fact that even in elections lost by unions, a nucleus of some union support remains behind. Instead of starting with initial contacts and organizing new committees within a plant, an organizer can contact those people who were previously sympathetic toward the union and work to enlarge this nucleus into a majority in the subsequent election. This view is reinforced in a survey of elections conducted by the AFL-CIO organizing committee in Los Angeles and Orange County, which reported that: "More than one-third of the individuals who voted for the union previously had participated in a similar election, which points to the importance of repeat efforts by unions following defeat." 7 While there is undoubtedly similarity of the voting patterns of individuals in two separate union elections-just as there is similarity between individual voting patterns in two separate political campaigns -this can scarcely be cited as evidence that determines outcomes of elections. Without an analysis of repeat elections themselves and a measurement of the probability of success, one cannot rely on the general impression that "it is easier to organize the second time around."

Another factor is that it is probably cheaper to conduct an organizing campaign for a repeat election than for a "new" one of equal size. This would be so because much of the initial groundwork has been accomplished: not only personal contacts, but home addresses have been listed, the products and profits of the company have been analyzed, printing arrangements have

[^2]been worked out, etc. This cost factor may be a consideration to unions to undertake more repeat elections than they normally would.

Naturally, there are other motives in organizing; the union may, for example, just want to organize a large non-union establishment to put economic pressure on a particular company. The company involved may be a pattern setter, thus being important in the industry. It may select the plant because the geographic area is more conducive to unionization. Or it might want to organize 100 per cent of the plants of a multi-plant company. These non-economic bases for targets for organizing exist-regardless of the altruistic motive that the labor movement's basic purpose is to organize all, regardless of cost or probablitiy of success. An assumption of this study is that if probabilities of success are known, a union faced with alternative targets will act wisely by choosing the target with the greatest potentiality for victory. If repeat election results indicate that unions have a higher probability of success than in initial union elections, this may override other considerations the union may have in pursuing organizing campaigns in other target plants.

In fact, one can argue that repeat elections should present a greater possibility for victory, because the unions have a second chance to eliminate extremely hostile employers. If in an initial campaign a union unexpectedly runs into a bitter opposition and loses, it can then evaluate more clearly whether or not to pursue this plant again. Repeat elections also enable the union to eliminate, if it so desires, elections
in which it received only a small percentage of the total vote in the first election.

Given the fact that there are arguments to show that repeat elections are easier, cheaper, and eliminate the extremely hostile employer, one would expect that this should result in a much higher percentage of union victories in repeat representational elections. ${ }^{8}$

Many of these general assumptions also pertain to whether or not one should expect varying results if a different union is involved in the repeat election. For example, would one expect-in a situation in which the United Auto Workers (UAW) petitioned and lost an election-that the results of a repeat election would be significantly different if the International Association of Machinists (IAM) petitioned the second time-compared to a case where the UAW went back and tried to organize the same unit again?

In this situation one could present arguments from both sides. On the one hand, if the UAW came back the second time, it could recontact the same individuals it worked with on the first campaign ; it would have information on the plant, its products, and the type of workers employed ; it should also have some idea of why the initial campaign was unsuccessful.

On the other hand, the IAM would have to begin with its own contacts just as in a new campaign. (There is the possibility, however, that it could pick up some of the individuals who were disenchanted with the UAW during the first campaign or who were not involved as much as they wished in the initial campaign.) The distinct advantage the IAM would have would

[^3]be to present a new approach, a "nonloser" image; it could approach the campaign in a slightly different fashion, stressing certain issues not stressed in the initial campaign or taking a different posture-either tougher or milder than in the first; it may also use communication techniques not present in the earlier election.

One other aspect would be that the IAM would find it less expensive to enter a situation where a union had previously conducted a campaign than to begin a new one. Similarly, the UAW expenses would be less, and in fact it may look at it from the viewpoint that since it has already expended a certain amount of money, it may put in a few more dollars in the hope of a victory.

The net effect of all these factors has never been analyzed through statistical evidence; the question of who is more likely to win, the incumbent or petitioning union, has only been a matter of speculation.

As mentioned earlier, two factorssize and individual unions-also will be analyzed because they contribute to the outcome of repeat elections. There does not seem to be any reason why repeat elections should not mirror the statistics in initial union elections; that is, generally speaking, the smaller the size of the unit in the election, the better the probability of a union success. Smaller plants would be characterized by less turnover and stable employment; given a union nucleus, it would seem likely that the union, by picking up a few more votes, could carry the repeat election.

The larger the firm, however, the more likely a union would be to attempt a repeat election, at even the slimmest hopes of success. The ra-
decertification elections, and in cases where a contract has not been consummated after one year.
tionale being that so much time, money, and manpower have already been involved, why not add a little more of each and see if this could bring a union victory. This would be especially true if the union lost the initial election by a small margin. ${ }^{-}$

Again, no evidence has ever been prepared on the subject of the individual union itself. The author's analysis would attempt to solve these questions: do some unions follow up their own elections more than others? Are some unions more successful than others in repeat elections? Is there any discernible pattern that can be measured?

Although information on the other factors could not be secured in this project, there is no implication that such factors may be unimportant as explanatory variables. To mention a few : the industry itself may be "difficult" to organize and therefore may be more likely to have repeat attempts by the unions; or the industry may be so well organized that unions may continually try to organize the remaining unorganized plants. Geographical location of the plant may be a factor-if it is located where the union has a strong base of operations, it may feel that it is easier and cheaper to go back to a plant it has lost previously than to go outside the "sphere of influence" to start another union campaign; also, in certain parts of the country, the union may have a very poor percentage of victories and hence would be reluctant to try again at any particular plant. Other factors would be the type of unit-production and maintenance or craft or department; whether it is a white-collar or blue-collar unit also may be a fac-
tor to consider for a repeat election. The list could go on and on, to include a multitude of social and economic characteristics. The variables indicated above, however, are the major factors that could be analyzed from the data reported by the NLRB.

## Methodology

The basic source of information used in this study is a five-year compilation (July, 1961, to July, 1966) of NLRB elections which lists alphabetically the companies involved. ${ }^{9}$ It was prepared by the Industrial Union Department of the AFL-CIO from records of NLRB elections. This study sought to identify all repeat elections by examining 50 per cent of the elections reported during this fiveyear period.

In this process it was necessary to make a number of judgmental decisions to determine whether the election really was a repeat election.

If the city reported in the initial and repeat elections was different, that election was excluded from the list, unless the difference could be the result of listing the headquarters or the major metropolitan area in one instance and the individual plant in the other.
The author used his judgment or personal information in deciding whether elections should be included in cases where the SIC or the size of the unit changed appreciably.

Another problem arose when a union lost a particular type unit-either a craft, departmental, or a production and maintenance unit-and in the repeat or subsequent election petitioned for a different type unit. Because it was felt that the different

[^4]number of elections won or lost will be involved in future elections. Because of both of these reasons, the number of repeat elections included in this survey is considerably understated.
units materially affected the outcome of an election, such units were not included in this particular study. An example may illustrate this: if an electrical union originally petitioned for an election of the production and maintenance employees in a plant and lost this election, it may at a subsequent time petition only for the electrical department in contrast to the production and maintenance unit; and hence, because of the interest in this particular craft, the outcome of the departmental election may have a higher probability of success than the original production and maintenance election. Since this factor would undoubtedly affect the result, it was excluded. ${ }^{10}$

One important point should be mentioned here. Because of the way elections were tabulated by the Industrial Union Department (IUD), local independent unions that were victorious in elections were not counted as wins. Wins by independent local unions, in contrast to AFL-CIO unions or international unaffiliated unions such as the Teamsters and Mine Workers, were treated the same as a vote for no union. Therefore, the overall results reported in relation to the first objective underestimate the victory percentage if one includes independent local unions in the definition of unions. In the second objective, involving "single loss elections," those elections involving independent unions that won either one or both elections were excluded from this aspect of the study.

One other procedural question that pertains to the analysis of "single loss elections" is that in many cases identical unions did not appear in both elections, that is, in the original and in the repeat election. The ques-

[^5]tion to be resolved then is whether to count the election as one involving "different" unions or "same" unions, since the analysis attempts to compare the results in each instance. The rule used in this survey was that if the same union was involved in both elections regardless of whether another union appeared-either in the first or subsequent elections-this election was counted as a repeat election involving the "same" union.

For all of the above reasons, it is difficult to accurately identify and enumerate repeat elections. Indeed, it is difficult, given the existing form of information disseminated by the NLRB, to actually find out which elections are really attempts by unions to enlist the same people again into the union ranks (or to prevent them from leaving the union ranks in the case of a decertification election). One rarely finds that statistics involving unions are in ideal form for study relating to research activities. The NLRB statistics are no exception. There is no way to identify the magnitude by which judgments made by the author affect the final tabulations. However, the author exercised care in including as many elections as possible and in using prudent and rational decisions in including or excluding a particular election.

## Results

Pursuing the first objective of this study, the total number of repeat elections held during the period July, 1961, to July, 1966, was 1,099 . This was obtained from a 50 per cent sample; so if this same percentage of repeat elections was prevalent throughout the entire population of elections, there would be approximately 2,200 such elections, or about 440 per year.
take place during a 12 -month period), was excluded on the same rationale.

Of the 1,099 repeat elections, exactly 1,000 involved one repeat election, that is, those involving only one additional election following the original attempt at organization. There were 91 elections with three decisions (two
repeat elections), and eight elections involving four decisions (three repeat elections). Approximately 139,000 people were involved in these elections. ${ }^{11}$ Summation of the results is included in Table 1.

TABLE 1
Tabulation of Repeat Elections Found in Sample of NLRB
Representational Elections
July, 1961-July, 1966

| Results | Number of People Voting ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | Number of Elections ${ }^{\text {b }}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| One Repeat Election |  |  |
| Lost original, lost repeat | 51,450 | 326 |
| Lost, won | 42,126 | 369 |
| Won, lost ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | 7,226 | 152 |
| Won, won ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | 20,846 | 153 |
| Two Repeat Elections |  |  |
| Lost, lost, won | 5,211 | 31 |
| Lost, lost, lost | 6,576 | 35 |
| All other combinations | 4,275 | 25 |
| Three Repeat Elections |  |  |
| Lost, lost, lost, won | 595 | 2 |
| Lost, lost, lost, lost | 100 | 2 |
| All other combinations | 421 | 4 |
| TOTALS | 138,826 | 1,099 |

[^6]If each repeat election were counted separately, this would add about 17,000 additional people who were involved in repeat elections. ${ }^{12}$

The figure of 2,200 elections represents roughly six per cent of all the elections conducted during the five-year period under study, while the
figure of 139,000 represents slightly more than five per cent of the total number of people casting ballots in NLRB elections over the five-year period. As mentioned earlier, this was the total impact of repeat elections including decertification elections. Therefore, if one wanted to of how many repeat elections there may have been.
${ }^{12}$ This is arrived at by counting again those involved in two and three repeat elections.

[^7]exclude from total NLRB elections those individuals who really are not voting for union representation for the first time, one would have to modify the total figures by roughly five per cent. These persons represent duplication of effort in the sense that the union is involved in an election with the same group of people as in a previous election.

Because of the rigid definitional decisions and also because this study involves one period of time, many other repeat elections may have been excluded. The latter point refers to those elections within the period July, 1961-July, 1966, which may be repeating attempts to organize workers involved in an election prior to 1961. Therefore the estimates used in determining the extent of repeat elections are probably minimal figures. The total number may be somewhat higher.

Attention now can be turned to the second objective: an analysis of "single loss" elections.

The percentage of union victories in "single loss" repeat elections was 53.4 compared to 59.5 per cent in all other elections during the period 19611966. Again, this 53.4 figure includes only elections involving one repeat election after an initial loss, both because of statistical problems, and because it comprises the largest percentage of repeat elections. There were 667 elections in this sample. The union won 356 and lost 311. To test the significance of this relationship, the formula ${ }^{13} \quad \mathrm{Z}=$

$$
\frac{p_{1}-p_{2}}{\sqrt{1 / n_{1}-3+1 / n_{2}-3}}
$$

was used, with the hypothesis that the two proportions were equal to 0 . The statistical test used sets forth the hypothesis that $\mathrm{p}_{1}-\mathrm{p}_{2}=0$; using a level of significance of .05 ,

[^8]the hypothesis is rejected if $Z \leqq$ -1.96 or $Z \geqq+1.96$. This would then indicate that there is a significant difference between the two proportions.

The $Z$ value comparing repeat elections to the overall percentage was 2.214 which is significant at the .05 level and indicates that the hypothesis $\mathrm{p}_{1}-\mathrm{p}_{2}=0$ should be rejected. The result shows that there is a significant difference between repeat elections and all other elections, and that, in fact, it is more difficult for a union to win a repeat election.

Now to the question of whether or not there is a significant difference between repeat elections involving the same union and those involving different unions. For the data used in this analysis see Table 2.

To repeat a rule cited earlier, if the same union were involved in both elections, regardless of whether another union appeared either in the first or subsequent election, it was counted as a repeat election involving the same union.

Various statistical comparisons were made. The first involved comparing repeat elections of the same union with the overall result of union elections during this five-year period. The Z value obtained was 2.235 which is significant at the .05 level. This means that the prospect of victory in repeat elections is significantly less in cases involving the same union. The same union then has a significantly less probability of winning a repeat election than it has in the initial election.

Where different unions were involved in the two elections, there was no statistically significant difference between the outcome of repeat elections and all other elections. This

Methods, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1960, p. 468.

TABLE 2
Tabulation of Single Repeat Elections According to Whether the Same Union or Different Unions Were Involved in the Two Elections, July, 1961 - July, 1966

|  | Same Union |  | Different Union |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Size of Unit | Lost-Won | Lost-Lost | Lost-Won | Lost-Lost |
| $0-50$ | 121 | 96 | 64 | 36 |
| $51-100$ | 38 | 42 | 19 | 17 |
| $101-200$ | 47 | 43 | 25 | 15 |
| 200 and over | 31 | 38 | 11 | 24 |
| TOTALS | 237 | $\underline{219}$ | 119 | -92 |

Combined totals of same and different unions:
Lost-Won
356
Lost-Lost
311
Total elections
would indicate that there is no difference in probable victory if a different union is involved in the second election.

The next step in the analysis was to determine the extent to which the size of unit and the individual union itself affected the results obtained above. ${ }^{14}$

Using the same basic statistics reported in Table 2, the author divided the elections into four categories of size, $0-50,51-100,101-200$, and over 200 ; using the $Z$ test the only significant category was the last one ( $Z=$ 2.507, significant at the .05 level). This indicates that the largest units (over 200) had poorer results in repat elections than in other elections. There was no significant difference between the results in repeat elections and the overall union results for units with 1-200 employees.

It is interesting to note that when a separate analysis was made of elections involving the same union-ranked
according to size-and elections involving different unions-also ranked according to size-there was no significant difference between the outcome of repeat elections and those involving all other elections. One explanation might be that the number in the sample was too small to clearly substantiate differences in percentage of victories.

The individual union's effectiveness in repeat elections was analyzed next. First, all unions not involved in at least ten or more repeat elections during this five-year period were excluded. Second, only "single loss" elections were included. Then the following procedure was used: if a union won a repeat election involving no other union, the win was counted as a "positive outcome." If it lost a repeat election involving no other union, the loss was counted as a "negative outcome." If it won a repeat election after another union had lost the original election, the win was counted as a "positive outcome."

[^9]If it lost a repeat election after a different union had lost the initial election, the loss was counted as a "negative outcome." If the union lost the original election and a different union was involved in the repeat election, the win counted as a "positive outcome," if the union involved in the second election lost ; and it was counted as a "negative outcome" if the union involved in the second election won. The rationale of the above is quite clear for the repeat elections involving the same union since it is assumed that if the union lost a second time the election was a negative and wasteful effort.

The problem arose when a different union was involved either in the first or the repeat election. The reasoning was that if a union won a repeat election in which a different union lost the original election, it made a positive contribution; whereas if the union lost in an attempt to enroll a unit in which a different union lost the original election, the election was a negative or wasted effort. In cases where the original union did not seek a repeat election but another union did, the reasoning was that if the different union won the second time, the union involved in the original election wasted an opportunity to succeed; whereas if the different union lost the repeat election, the union involved in the original election saved itself wasted effort since in all probability it too would have lost the repeat election. Table 3 indicates the results of this analysis expressed in percentage of the positive outcomes over the total outcomes.

Unions with the best results were: Boilermakers, Furniture Workers, Textile Workers (TWUA), and Sheet Metal Workers. Unions with the poorest results were: Iron Workers, Carpenters, Retail Clerks, Machinists, Printing Pressmen, and Teamsters.

Some results on unions involved in the largest number of repeat elections were (expressed as percentage of positive outcomes to total outcomes) : Auto Workers, 50 per cent; Steel Workers, 56 per cent ; Teamsters, 45 -per cent; Machinists, 45 per cent; Mine Workers, 52 per cent; and Meat Cutters, 52 per cent.

An analysis of the statistics above indicates that there is no definite pattern why certain unions do better than others in repeat elections. Unions with fewer total number of cases do slightly better than those with a larger number of cases. There also seems to be an inverse relationship as to size, with the larger unions having poorer repeat election results, and smaller unions having better results.

The point of this analysis is not to indicate or illustrate causes of why unions succeed or fail in repeat elections, but rather it is intended as a tool to evaluate the effectiveness of particular unions in repeat elections. It is doubtful that unions currently analyze their results in this fashion. Nevertheless, this or a similar type of analysis is necessary to determine particular unions' effectiveness in repeat elections.

## Conclusions

The extent to which NLRB elections involve the same units as in previous elections includes at least five per cent of the total number of elections and the same percentage of the people involved in these elections.

Based on the available statistics, it seems clear that, contrary to the feelings of many union organizers, unions do not achieve better results in repeat elections compared to results in original elections. In fact, the analysis presented here reveals a significant difference between the two, with the repeat elections representing a

TABLE 3
Percentages and Ratios of Positive Repeat Election Outcomes to Negative Repeat Election Outcomes by Individual Unions

$$
\text { July, } 1961 \text { - July, } 1966
$$

Unions
Allied Industrial Workers
Boilermakers
Iron Workers
Building Service Employees $\quad 5$
Baker Workers (AFL-CIO) 10
Carpenters and Joiners 10
Retail Clerks 5
Longshoremen (IND.) 10
Electrical Workers (IBEW) 10
Operating Engineers 10
Grain Millers
Machinists 35
$\begin{array}{ll}\text { Meat Cutters } & 1 \\ \text { United Papermakers } & 1\end{array}$
Printing Pressmen
Pulp, Sulphite Workers
Sheet Metal Workers
Teamsters
Auto Workers
Electrical Workers (IUE)
Furniture Workers
Mine Workers
Oil, Chemical Workers
Rubber Workers
Steel Workers
Textile Workers (TWUA)

Negative
Outcomes
9
$8 \quad 2$

Per Cent Positive to Total Outcomes

60
80
9
44
455
success; they seem to hate to lose a large unit without at least trying twice. The statistics indicate that this reasoning merely results in a much lower percentage of victories.

Finally, a special analysis of individual union success in repeat elections was made. One cannot measure percentage of union victories in repeat elections versus their overall percentage of election victories since this would eliminate repeat elections involving different unions. Therefore, this study developed a complex analysis of positive versus negative outcomes in repeat elections. While the conclusions were interesting, they did not provide any clues as to why certain unions performed better than others in repeat elections.

As in any report of this nature, considerable follow-up could be under-
taken. For example, further analysis could be made to determine whether industry or geographic location influences the results. As indicated earlier, this information is included in the IUD print-out but was not a part of this particular study.

The implications of this study are clearly apparent. The probability of a union representational victory in a repeat election is less or the same as that in the original election, depending on whether or not the same or a different union makes the repeatelection attempt. It would then seem that without extraordinary influences which may assist the union cause, unions, generally speaking, would be better off seeking to organize a previously unsolicited group of workers rather than going to the well again.
[The End]


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ The NLRB annual report does show the results of rerun elections; that is, elections held after an initial election has been set aside. However, a rerun election is distinctly separate and should not be confused with a repeat election.
    ${ }^{2}$ Section 9(c) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act prohibits the holding of an election in any collective bargaining unit or subdivision of one in which a valid election has been held during the preceding 12 -month period. A new election may be held, however, in a larger unit, but not in the same unit or subdivision in which the previous election was held. For example, if all of the production and maintenance employees in Company A-including draftsmen in the company engineering office-are included in a collective bargaining unit, (Continued on next page.)

[^1]:    ${ }^{5}$ Because the actual computer cards that contained the basic information were unavailable to this researcher, hand checks

[^2]:    ${ }^{6}$ As this pertains to this study, it assumes that in the absence of a previous election, a plant has not been a target of a concentrated union campaign. Obviously this may not be the case. The plant may have been contacted either on an informal basis involving a few individuals, or it may

[^3]:    ${ }^{8}$ These comments refer primarily to original elections in which the union lost; different assumptions would be relevant to "raids" by one union against another, in

[^4]:    ${ }^{9}$ Because this study covered only this five-year period, it naturally eliminated elections held prior to that date and therefore excluded a number of repeat elections. Likewise, because of the cut-off period, a

[^5]:    ${ }^{10}$ Likewise, an election in an enlarged unit, for example, from a department to all production employees (which could even

[^6]:    ${ }^{a}$ Each series of elections involving the same unit is counted once, and the number of people included in this count is the average size voting in the original and in all subsequent repeat elections.
    ${ }^{b}$ This is the actual number of elections found in the 50 per cent sample and not the projected number over the entire population.
    ${ }^{\text {c }}$ Almost exclusively decertification elections and raids.

[^7]:    ${ }^{11}$ The size of the units was determined by averaging in the number of people voting in the original and repeat elections. The total above was arrived at by a summation of the average size of the units with individuals counted only once, regardless

[^8]:    ${ }^{13}$ This formula is from Paul Blommers and E. F. Lindquist, Elemental Statistical

[^9]:    ${ }^{14}$ Again, the reasons for selecting these two variables and the exclusion of others was discussed earlier in this paper.

