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CAP EXPENDITURES IN THE FIFTY STATES

A Comparison

by

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CONGRESSIONAL approval of the Economic Opportunity Act in 1964 brought into existence programs which represented marked departures from the traditional governmental welfare programs. Although patterned in part after New Deal programs such as the Civilian Conservation Corps, conceptually the programs are far removed from the dole and "make work" orientation of earlier public welfare. Recent headlines and comments by some political figures indicate that the most controversial of these programs is the Community Action Program (CAP).

Community action programs may involve as wide a range of services as can be imagined. These services may involve getting an acting group started, the initial organizing of some type of neighborhood credit union, or any other type of activity, as long as the activities

give promise of progress toward elimination of poverty or a cause or causes of poverty through developing employment opportunities, improving human performance, motivation and productivity, or bettering the conditions under which people live, learn, and work . . . [U.S. Code; Title 42, Sec. 278].

These activities can be financed out of CAP grants with the help of other funds, but the local program must represent an addition to, not a substitution for, programs already operating. The administrating agency within each community is the Community Action Agency (CAA). The CAA may be a public or a private, nonprofit agency, and it must meet other eligibility requirements. Among the operating requirements for CAA's and their

programs is the maximum feasible participation of the poor in the agency. The poor must be on the policy-making and appropriating boards of the agency, and means must be provided for the poor to propose additions to or changes in the local program (Office of Economic Opportunity, 1965: 16-30).

Governmental welfare programs in the United States have been concerned mainly with financial aid. Even after the passage of the 1962 Social Security Act, amendments calling for an increased emphasis on services designed to enable the poor to help themselves, the categorical assistance programs still can be characterized as providing maintenance and not improvement. The administrative agency of the categorical and other assistance programs in a public body seldom has representation of the poor.

In comparing the older welfare programs with CAP, there seems to be large potential for controversy. Whereas state and local officials can be relatively confident that they know what is done in a categorical assistance program such as old-age assistance, they cannot have this assurance with a Community Action Program. While it is not without precedent to have a private agency administer a public welfare program, there is no evidence that the poor have been given the role in public welfare that they are supposed to have now in CAP. There also is evidence that the administration, from both a planning and operational perspective, has fostered conflict between state and local governmental officials and the CAA's.

The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations found that one of the reasons why those who made the original proposal for CAP did not limit CAA's to local governmental agencies was to avoid having the programs channeled through and operated by the "establishment." Commission research also found that one of the main complaints about CAP by local officials was the failure of the programs to make use of existing public and private agencies (Advisory Commission, 1966: 25, 79). There also have been attempts by some local governmental officials to reduce the role of the poor in CAP decision-making. These attempts have ranged from statement by the U.S. Mayor's Conference to local governmental action in New York and Chicago.¹

Perhaps the most important factor which contributes to the controversy around CAP and CAA's is that the CAA represents a new source of political leadership in the communities. The programs themselves may generate new demands for services in the community. In sum, CAP represents a threat to existing political orders.²

Given the controversy surrounding CAP and the CAA's, do the states

behave differently toward CAP than toward other governmental welfare programs? Does the different nature of the program mean that expenditures for CAP are influenced by factors other than those associated with other welfare programs? To try to suggest an answer to this question, statistical tests will be applied to the following exploratory questions:

- (1) Is there any relationship between CAP expenditures and expenditures for other Economic Opportunity programs?
- (2) Is there any relationship between CAP expenditures and expenditures for traditional public welfare programs and welfare orientations in the states?
- (3) Is there any relationship between CAP expenditures and interparty competition, the political culture, and personal income of the states?
- (4) Is there any difference between CAP expenditures in the more urban areas of the states as compared with expenditures in the less urban and rural areas of the states?
- (5) Are there any differences in CAP expenditures in those states with a strong localistic tradition as compared with those states with a strong centralistic tradition?
- (6) Is there any relationship between CAP expenditures and the votes of state congressional delegations on the Economic Opportunity program appropriation?

To answer the above questions, CAP funds for the two-year period from the initiation of CAP in 1964 to June 30, 1966, will be analyzed. While these data cover only federal funds, they are reasonable measures of total CAP expenditures because: (1) there is no evidence that the non-federal share of funds has diverged greatly from the presently required ten percent; and (2) because nonfederal shares have been mainly in kind and not in cash payments (Advisory Commission, 1966: 155). The precise figure used will be CAP expenditures per poor person. The figure was computed by dividing CAP expenditures within the states by the 1960 estimate of the poor within the states made by the Office of Economic Opportunity.³

Admittedly "CAP expenditures per poor person" is a gross measure for comparing programs because it does not take into account differences in quality of programs. It is assumed, however, that CAP expenditures per poor person is an adequate measure of "effort." While effort may be thought of as total expenditures from available wealth (such as assessed valuation), it is more pertinent, assuming relatively equal purchasing power

of dollars, to determine how much is spent for each poor person. States with fewer poor people should not be expected to divert as large a percentage of their funds to welfare programs as states with large numbers of poor.

IS THERE ANY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAP EXPENDITURES AND EXPENDITURES FOR OTHER ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY PROGRAMS?

If a relationship exists between CAP and other Economic Opportunity programs, the correlation between CAP and the other programs should be high. The other Economic Opportunity program selected for this test was summer Head Start. Summer Head Start, which was separated from CAP in 1965, appears to have been one of the programs which has had the most favorable reception in the states. Head Start, unlike the Job Corps but like CAP, is conducted in a large number of localities in the 50 states; and, unlike VISTA and the Neighborhood Job Corps but like CAP, Head Start is a major program in terms of individuals aided. For these reasons Head Start and CAP appear to be the most comparable of the Economic Opportunity programs. If these two programs are highly intercorrelated, there would seem justification to assume that the Economic Opportunity programs are intercorrelated. If there is no correlation between Head Start and CAP, this may suggest that the intercorrelation of the Economic Opportunity programs is low. Because of the problem of comparability, this can only be an assumption.

The comparison between Head Start and CAP was made by dividing the 50 states into three groups—high (15), middle (18), and low (17)—for rankings on CAP and Head Start expenditures per poor person. To control for differences between state expenditures which might be the result of a larger number of children, the states were divided into the same three groups for percentage of the population under the age of four (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1964: S2). The *taus* for the correlations between CAP and Head Start for the states grouped by percentage of children were: high, .26; middle, .31; and low, -.07.⁴

Apparently there is some relationship between CAP and Head Start expenditures for states with middle and high percentages of children in their populations, and virtually no relationship for states with a low percentage of children. While there is no test of significance for partial *taus*, these correlations do not seem high. Certainly, they do not appear to

suggest that CAP and Head Start come from the same statistical population. If the relationship between CAP and Head Start can be used as an indication of a low correlation between the Economic Opportunity programs, what can be said of the relationship between CAP and the more traditional public welfare programs?

IS THERE ANY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAP EXPENDITURES AND EXPENDITURES FOR TRADITIONAL WELFARE PROGRAMS AND WELFARE ORIENTATION IN THE STATES?

Since 1935 the categorical assistance and state general assistance programs have been the main items in what is commonly termed public welfare. It seems reasonable, therefore, to try to determine the relationship between these basic components of the traditional public welfare programs and CAP. For this comparison the total state, local, and federal expenditures for the assistance programs under the Social Security Act and for general assistance programs within the states in fiscal 1963 were used.⁵ The expenditures were divided by the 1960 estimate of the poor within the states. The figures for 1963 were used to avoid any anticipatory actions which may have accompanied the introduction of the Economic Opportunity Act in 1964. Using Sharkansky's (1966: table 2) finding that there is a strong relationship between welfare measures from one year to the next, this should provide an acceptable measure of the overall relationship.⁶ The rank correlation between these two measures is .79, suggesting a very strong relationship between these two types of programs, much stronger than that between CAP and summer Head Start. The strength of the relationship between CAP and the more traditional public welfare programs suggests that there also may be a strong relationship between CAP and a broader concept of welfare.

Hofferbert (1966: 78) has constructed a welfare orientation ranking for 48 states (excluding Hawaii and Alaska) based on mean per recipient expenditures in the period 1952-1961, for aid to the blind, old age assistance, unemployment compensation, expenditures for elementary and secondary education, and family payments for aid to dependent children. The correlation between Hofferbert's measure and CAP expenditures is .49, which is significant above the .0005 level.

No matter what measure is used, CAP appears to be related to the traditional welfare programs either narrowly or broadly conceived. Apparently, CAP expenditures involve some motivation for the state and

local governments that is similar to that involved in other welfare programs. Selected political and socioeconomic variables may provide some indication of these motivations.

IS THERE ANY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAP EXPENDITURES AND INTERPARTY COMPETITION, THE POLITICAL CULTURE, AND PER CAPITA INCOME IN THE STATES?

Several studies of welfare expenditures have shown varying relationships between such expenditures and selected environmental variables.⁷ In general, these studies have shown a relationship between welfare expenditures on a per recipient basis and interparty competition, personal income, and degree of urbanization. These studies also have shown no relationship, or a negative one, between these environmental variables and welfare expenditures on a per capita basis. These relationships indicate that states with more competitive party systems, higher personal incomes, and higher degrees of urbanization are paying higher amounts to a fewer number of recipients. Conversely, they also indicate that states with less competitive party systems, lower personal incomes, and lower degrees of urbanization are paying lower amounts to a larger number of recipients. The environmental variables should have a similar relationship with CAP expenditures per poor person given the relationship between CAP and the more traditional public welfare programs.

The expectation that there will be a relationship between CAP expenditures and degree of interparty competition is further strengthened if the CAA's are viewed as possible sources of competition in one-party or dominant one-party states. In such states, the dominant party is faced with the possibility that other parties may play a role in CAA's. The possible community conflicts which a Community Action Program may raise also would hurt the dominant party. It seems plausible, therefore, that there would be some opposition to the creation of CAA's or efforts to keep the programs at a minimal level. Using Ranney's (1965: 65) classification of the states for degree of interparty competition, of the eight states where the governor has exercised a veto over community action programs, six were one-party or modified one-party states (Advisory Commission, 1966: 86-87).

To test the difference between CAP expenditures for one-party, modified one-party, and two-party states as classified by Ranney, the Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance will be used. Comparing the three

groups of states, there is an H of 12.775. With two degrees of freedom, H is significant at between the .01 and .001 levels. The main difference occurs between one-party and two-party states. A lack of interparty competition is associated with lower CAP expenditures; and a high degree of interparty competition is associated with higher CAP expenditures. If there is a relationship between CAP expenditures and political culture narrowly conceived through interparty competition, what is the relationship with political culture more broadly conceived?

Elazar (1966: 81-85) has constructed a classification scheme for political culture for 48 states, excluding Hawaii and Alaska.⁸ While there is no indication as to data used to designate a state as belonging to a particular culture, Elazar indicates that each represents a particular synthesis of the American's two contrasting cultural concepts: political order as a market place and political order as a commonwealth. He sees three types of political culture in the states: individualistic (I), moralistic (M), and traditionalistic (T).

For the purposes of this paper the cultures will be described according to dispositions which might affect attitudes toward CAP and the CAA's. The I culture emphasizes the use of government to fulfill the demands of its citizens. While government in the I culture is thought of as being limited to the economic arena and secondary to the private sector, it is viewed as proper within its sphere (Elazar, 1966: 86-89). If the people within the I culture states see a need for CAP, they should be willing to expend as much as necessary for the program. The M culture emphasizes public good. The M culture, unlike the I culture, sees politics as a proper if not preferred method for achieving public good. Elazar does, however, qualify the commitment of M culture states to the public good when he notes (1966: 89-92) that some M culture states have shown a reluctance to utilize bureaucratic over communal organizations. If CAP is viewed as a bureaucratic program, there may be a lessening of the readiness of M culture states to utilize CAP. The T culture emphasizes the maintenance of the existing social order. One of the functions of government in such states is to confine political power to a small group (Elazar; 1966: 92-94). If this description is accurate, the very goals of CAP and the roles of CAA's will be looked on with disfavor in the T culture states.

Elazar (1966: 109-111), using the concept of a continuum, has grouped the 48 states into 5 groups: M/MI (17), IM (3), I (11), IT (1), and T/TM (16). In order to provide a larger n for each of the groups, while not greatly disturbing Elazar's grouping of the states, the IT and IM culture states were combined to one group. Because they both have dominant I

cultures, it does not seem that any great violence has been done to the original grouping. The H for these four groups of states for rankings on CAP expenditures per poor person is 7.993. With three degrees of freedom, H is significant slightly above the .05 level. The main difference is between the T and I culture states. The I culture states have higher and the T culture states have lower CAP expenditure rankings.

If the states are rearranged into "pure" and mixed political culture groups, M (9), I (11), T (5), and Mixed (23), the Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance produces an H of 8.337. With three degrees of freedom, H is significant between the .05 and .02 levels. Once again, the main difference is between the I and T culture state. This test, however, indicates a lower ranking for states with mixed political cultures. While these tests indicate that Elazar's political culture typology does explain some of the variation in CAP expenditures, it does not provide altogether satisfactory explanations of the factors involved. Regardless of questions of precision, apparently sociopolitical environment—both broadly and narrowly conceived—has an effect on levels of CAP expenditures; what of economic environment?

The consistency of the relationship between environmental variables and levels of CAP and welfare expenditures indicates that the same relationship should exist with the economic environment. As in other studies, this paper has used the 1960 state rankings for personal income as an indicator of the economic environment (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1960). The correlation coefficient between CAP expenditures per poor person and rankings for personal income is .62, which is significant above the .0005 level. States with higher personal incomes have large CAP expenditures, and states with lower incomes have lower CAP expenditures.

Dawson and Robinson (1963: 287-289), however, have found that a high correlation between public welfare expenditures and interparty competition may be a result of their intercorrelation with personal income. Controlling for personal income, they found the correlation between public welfare expenditures and interparty competition tended to disappear (1965: 400). To determine if this same relationship occurs in CAP, interparty competition, personal income, and CAP expenditures were compared. The comparison was made using Ranney's ranking of the states for interparty competition, 1960 personal income rankings, and the rankings for CAP expenditures per poor person; controlling first for personal income and then for interparty competition. The partial *taus* for CAP expenditures and interparty competition and for CAP expenditures

and personal income are given in Table 1.

TABLE 1
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN CAP EXPENDITURES
AND INTERPARTY COMPETITION AND
PERSONAL INCOME

<i>Personal Income</i>			
Correlation Between:	<i>High</i> (<i>n</i> =16)	<i>Middle</i> (<i>n</i> =17)	<i>Low</i> (<i>n</i> =17)
A. CAP Expenditures			
Interparty Competition	.03	.22	.36
<i>Interparty Competition</i>			
B. CAP Expenditures			
Personal Income	.47	.30	.28

Table 1 indicates, somewhat contradictory to the findings of Dawson and Robinson, a remaining influence from interparty competition even though controlling for the effect of personal income. States with middle or low personal incomes still display some, although reduced, relationship between interparty competition and CAP expenditures. Table 1:B does indicate that personal income is an important variable regardless of the degree of interparty competition. The decreasing sizes of the coefficients as interparty competition decreases suggests that interparty competition is of greater importance in explaining variation in CAP expenditures for states with middle and low levels of interparty competition. This suggestion is strengthened, because approximately the same states are within the high, middle, and low classification for both personal income and interparty competition. Apparently for the groups of states with large *taus*, the different rankings of states for the variable involved (either personal income or interparty competition) are positively related with CAP expenditures.

An environmental variable which has received increased attention in explaining differences among the states is urbanization. While urbanization contains aspects of the environmental variables already discussed, it adds the effect of the values of rural versus urban communities. What then is the effect of urbanization on levels of CAP expenditures?

**IS THERE ANY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CAP EXPENDITURES
IN THE MORE URBAN AREAS AS COMPARED
TO EXPENDITURES IN THE LESS URBAN
AND RURAL AREAS OF THE STATES?**

Previous studies have indicated a relationship between the percentage of a state's population that lives in urban areas and welfare expenditures. Dawson and Robinson (1965: 400) found that in 1961 this relationship ranged from a correlation of .69 for welfare money from state-local sources to a correlation of .19 for per capita welfare expenditures. Hofferbert (1966: 81-82) found a correlation of .70 between an index of industrialization constructed from per capita income, percentage urban, and percentage of the working population in nonagricultural employment, and his welfare orientation index. Once again Sharkansky's (1966: table 1) finding of no correlation between the percentage of a state's population that was classed as urban, and per capita welfare payments and welfare expenditures per \$1,000 of personal income, can be explained by the smaller percentage of urban populations receiving welfare aid.

Other studies (Derthick, 1966 and Cepuran, 1964) have pointed out the variation that can exist within a state with regard to welfare expenditures. It can be hypothesized that some part of this variation is attributable to differences in urbanization. Given the previous findings of this paper, these same relationships should occur with regard to the community action programs.

The apparent consistency of state rankings for CAP expenditures per poor person and welfare expenditures suggests that rankings of the states for an urbanization measure will also be correlated with CAP expenditures. Is this relationship, if it occurs, a statewide or local phenomenon? In the case of CAP expenditures, does the degree of urbanization in a state affect the rural areas of the state, or are the rural areas relatively unaffected by urban influences?

To measure the relation between the urban and rural areas of the states with regard to CAP expenditures, counties were used. For each state, the

counties were divided into two groups: high urban—counties within SMSA's of over 250,000 population as of the 1960 census; low urban—counties not within SMSA's of over 250,000 population. An estimate of the poor residing within the high urban and low urban areas was made by determining what proportion of the state's total number of families with incomes of under \$3,000 live in the high urban and low urban areas.⁹ The resultant figures were applied to the estimate of the total number of poor for the state, to obtain an estimate of the number of poor within each area. Next, using the estimate of the number of the poor within the high urban and low urban areas and total CAP expenditures for each area, CAP expenditures per poor person were computed for the high urban and low urban areas for each state. Because some states have all or none of their counties within SMSA's of over 250,000 population, the state CAP expenditure per person was retained. There were 38 states with high urban counties and 49 states with low urban counties. Applying Spearman's rank correlation to those states with both high urban and low urban areas (37) to determine the relationships between state rankings for these two groups, there was a rank correlation of .43. While this analysis deals with only 37 states, it is significant between the .005 and .0005 levels, indicating that state is an important factor in the relative rankings of high urban areas and of low urban areas.

What of the relative levels of CAP expenditures for high urban as compared to low urban areas of the states? Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance applied to the 87 high urban and low urban area groups produces an H of 29.417, which with one degree of freedom is significant above the .001 level. Counties in large SMSA's regardless of the effect of state, have significantly higher CAP expenditures than do counties in nonlarge SMSA's. Perhaps a factor involved in this difference is the differences in traditions of strong state or strong local control.

**ARE THERE ANY DIFFERENCES IN CAP EXPENDITURES IN
THOSE STATES WITH A STRONG LOCALISTIC TRADITION
AS COMPARED TO THOSE STATES WITH
A STRONG CENTRALISTIC TRADITION?**

Elazar (1966: 186-88) has grouped the states according to their centralistic (C) and localist (L) traditions. He maintains that in states with an L tradition the state government assumes a minimum amount of responsi-

bility for programs, leaving the major part of the responsibility to local units. In states where localist traditions have been modified by centralist ideas, there is a push to improve services and a recognition that this requires state direction.

Centralist states are characterized as maintaining controls over localities while not expanding state government. Those centralist states that have been modified by localism have decentralized governmental activities (Elazar, 1966: 188).

If the C and L states operate as Elazar has described them, neither type will welcome CAA's or CAP. To the centralist they would represent an expansion of local power, to the localist they represent a possible threat to entrenched local units of government. States with a mixed or changing tradition, however, would appear to be the most apt to accept the possible consequences the CAA and CAP would bring. Since these states are adjusting to a sharing of powers it means simply the addition of a new "sharer."

To determine the effect of localist and centralist traditions on urbanization when considering CAP expenditures, CAP expenditures for high urban and low urban county groups for the states were divided into three groups of 29: high, middle, and low. The high urban and low urban groups were then divided according to the type of localist or centralist tradition prevalent in their state. Table 2 presents the partial *taus* computed for each of these groupings.

TABLE 2
CORRELATION BETWEEN CAP EXPENDITURES AND
DEGREE OF URBANIZATION CONTROLLING
FOR TYPE OF LOCALIST OR
CENTRALIST TRADITION

	C (30)	CL (23)	LC (27)	L (7)
Correlation between CAP expenditures and degree of urbanization	.250	.676	.758	.298

Table 2 indicates that the effect of urbanization, i.e., higher CAP expenditures associated with high urban counties and lower CAP expenditures with low urban counties, is strongest in those states with mixed traditions. This relationship, conversely, is weaker in states with

pure centralist or localist traditions. Apparently either the tradition in those states with a pure form acts to negate the effect of urbanization, or those states with a mixed tradition permit a freer play of urbanization.

Thus far there has been an attempt to describe the environments of the states. One of the underlying assumptions of this approach is that the environment in some way aids in explaining the actions of the states toward CAP. A related and equally important question is whether the actions of legislators from the states are as consistent with regard to CAP as the environmental variables.

IS THERE ANY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAP EXPENDITURES AND THE VOTES OF STATE CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS ON THE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM APPROPRIATION?

Miller and Stokes (1963: 51-52) have found a relationship between the attitudes of congressmen and their perceptions of the attitudes of their constituents on social welfare activities. They found, however, that there was almost no correlation between the congressmen's perceptions and the actual attitudes of the constituents (.17). There are several problems in interpreting votes in terms of a congressman's perception of constituents' attitudes, among which are party loyalty and other nonstate-connected pressures. If a congressman is willing to act in some fashion on a particular vote, however, it does not seem unwarranted to assume that he will take whichever action pleases or at best does not displease a majority of his constituents. Thus, it should be expected that CAP expenditures, as an expression of the attitudes toward CAP existent in the state, should follow the votes of the congressional delegations.

The votes analyzed were those on the first appropriation and the appropriation during the first year of operation of the program.¹⁰ The scores for each state were determined from the *Congressional Quarterly* report of the vote. The votes for each state were then scored in two different ways. For the first method, the absentee votes were discarded, and a favorable percentage of those voting was computed (see Anderson et al., 1966: 21-24). The states were divided into four groups: Oppose, 0-.250; Oppose/Neutral, .251-.500; Favor/Neutral, .501-.750; Favor, .751-1.

Under the second method, an attempt was made to score the votes according to the degree of acceptance or rejection. A yes vote, totally

for-1; a paired yes vote, somewhat less than a yes vote-.750; an announced yes vote, somewhat less than a paired yes vote-.625; absent, not voting, paired or announced, or no discernable opinion-.500; announced against vote, somewhat less than a no vote-.250; and a no vote, totally against-0.¹¹ Each state's House congressional delegation's votes were scored, added, and divided by the number of seats (excluding the Speaker of the House and vacant seats) for each vote. The scores were added together and divided into the four groups used for the previous method. The Kruskal-Wallis test produced an H of 10.112 for the first method, which with three degrees of freedom is significant between the .02 and .01 levels. H for the second method was 10.432, which with three degrees of freedom is also significant between the .02 and .01 levels. Using a Spearman's rank correlation, the correlation between the ranks of the states on favorable votes and CAP expenditures per poor person under the first method was .38; under the second method the correlation was .43 (both are significant between the .005 and .0005 levels). Regardless of the measure used, there is evidence that states whose congressional delegations voted for or indicated favor for the Economic Opportunity appropriation had large CAP expenditures per poor person. Perhaps, then, the congressmen represented the dominant views in their states or perhaps the governmental and other officials in the states followed the lead of their congressmen.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper has presented some exploratory questions about the community action programs in the 50 states. The statistical tests of these questions have indicated some tentative conclusions about the program.

- (1) The relationship between CAP and other Economic Opportunity programs appears to be weak.
- (2) The relationship between CAP expenditures and expenditures for the more traditional welfare programs is strong. This relationship is only slightly diminished when considering a broader measure of welfare orientation.
- (3) The three environmental variables considered—interparty competition, political cultures, and personal income—have a positive relationship with CAP expenditures.
- (4) While there is a relationship between CAP expenditures in the high urban and low urban areas of the states, it is weaker than expected

if the states are considered as being internally homogeneous. This relationship is further weakened with the finding that significant differences exist between levels of expenditures in the high urban as compared with the low urban areas of the states.

- (5) Apparently the particular type of centralist or localist tradition operating in the states affects the relationship between CAP expenditures and urbanization.
- (6) The actions of a state's congressional delegation on CAP questions apparently are related to CAP expenditures in the state.

In summary, the tests have indicated that, somewhat contradictory to the controversy surrounding CAP, CAP is behaving similarly to the more traditional welfare programs. The relationship between social, political, and economic variables and CAP expenditures is similar to that shown to exist with the more traditional welfare programs. Urbanization also is highly correlated with CAP expenditures. The actions of legislators with regard to the Economic Opportunity program are related to the reception of CAP in the states, measured by expenditure levels.

If the controversial nature of CAP has brought a new realm of variables into play with regard to expenditure levels, they must be a group of variables other than those normally conceived of as affecting state policy decisions. It should be borne in mind, however, that there was no way to differentiate those programs administered by CAA's from those with no local governmental representation. Such programs may, if testing were possible, display a different situation.

NOTES

1. The Office of Economic Opportunity found that Chicago and New York had diluted the position of the poor (Phillips, 1965). Also, some mayors attempted to have the U.S. Mayors' Conference go on record against the "class struggle" concept which participation by the poor fosters, and to call for the recognition of the rights and responsibilities of local governmental officials (see Franklin, 1965a, 1965b).

2. Martin Rein and Frank Riessman (1966: 6, 9) suggest that CAA's may prove more responsive to the electorate than the older elites, and CAP's may generate pressures for new services.

3. Estimates of the number of poor are for 1960 and were made by the Office of Economic Opportunity (1966: 27).

4. For the computation of the *taus*, partial *taus*, and the Spearman rank correlation see Siegel (1956: 202-208). It should be noted that the levels of significance are one-tailed, because, lacking any authoritative data, it should be assumed CAP will behave as other welfare programs. Arbitrarily this paper has selected the .05 level as an acceptable level of significance.

5. Includes expenditures for ADC, OAA, MAA, APTD, AB, GR, and administration (U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare; 1964: S54).

6. Sharkansky found a correlation of .87 for expenditures per capita and .90 for expenditures per \$1,000 of personal income.

7. See Dawson and Robinson (1965: 405). In 1960 they found a .60 correlation between interparty competition and state, local, and federal welfare payments per recipient, and a .06 correlation when using per capita welfare expenditures. They found a .75 correlation between personal income and welfare payments per recipient, and a .03 correlation when using per capita welfare expenditures.

Fenton (1966: 2-3), found that approximately 55% of the variance in Midwest states' expenditures for aid to dependent children was related to party competition, urbanism, and personal income.

Hofferbert (1966: 78) found a correlation of .67 between state rankings for interparty competition and his measure of welfare orientation.

Sharkansky (1966: table 1) found a correlation of -.02 between interparty competition and per capita welfare expenditures, and a correlation of -.36 when using welfare expenditures per \$1,000 of personal income.

8. Elazar maintains that three aspects of political culture stand out as influential in affecting the operations of the states: "(1) the set of perceptions of what politics is and what can be expected from government . . .; (2) the kinds of people who become active in government and politics . . .; (3) the actual way in which the act of government is practiced . . . (1966: 84-85)."

9. Statewide grants were assigned to the smaller SMA's and non-SMA's because this seems to be the way in which these funds are spent.

10. The votes chosen were the 1964 vote in the House of Representatives for the initial appropriation, and the 1965 House vote (not on the final bill, this was approved by a voice vote) on the appropriation for the Economic Opportunity Programs (Congressional Quarterly, 1965: 980-981; 1964: 646-647).

11. Admittedly, this scheme has its flaws, perhaps the major one being not relating the individual votes to the total vote. Alker and Russett (1965: 30-31), in coding votes for their study of the General Assembly of the UN, assigned scores on the basis of how the votes actually were cast. They further argued that those who abstain in the face of excessive pressure, actually are closer to those who vote no than to those who vote yes. I have attempted to take their views into consideration by grouping the scores so as to require some sort of a positive act by at least one congressman before a state would be classified as Favor.

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