BEFORE THE IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION

DARRELL HARVEY, Complainant, and IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION,

vs.

SANDY CALDWELL, Respondent.

Course of Proceedings

This matter came before the Iowa Civil Rights Commission on the Complaint filed by Darrell Harvey against the Respondent Sandy Caldwell alleging discrimination on the basis of sex in housing.

The text of the complaint states in full:

From this text, it is evident that Complainant Harvey is alleging four violations of the Iowa Civil Rights Act. First, that Respondent Sandy Caldwell (hereinafter referred to as Sandra Caldwell) failed to renew his lease for rental of an apartment because of his sex. Second, that Respondent Caldwell made a statement to him on June 1, 1989, when he first rented the apartment, "that she preferred renting to girls, but since she had none inquiring about the apt. she would rent to me and my two male roommates." Third, that on March 28, 1990 she stated to him, when refusing to renew the lease, "that she has some girls that want to rent." Fourth, that she "is also allowing the 4 women to pay the same rate that we [the three males] did and they should pay more." Any one or combination of these acts would constitute a violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act. See Conclusion of Law No. 3.

The public hearing on this complaint was held on December 11-12, 1991 before the Honorable Donald W. Bohlken, Administrative Law Judge, at the Black Hawk County Courthouse in Waterloo, Iowa. The Complainant, Darrell Harvey was not represented by counsel. The Respondent was represented by Douglas Coonrad, Attorney at Law. The Iowa Civil Rights Commission was represented by Teresa Baustian, Assistant Attorney General. The last brief in this case was filed on March 5, 1992.

A proposed decision was issued in this case on September 2, 1993 recommending that the case be dismissed. On October 22, 1993, the proposed decision was reversed and remanded back to the Administrative Law Judge with directions to reconsider the decision and to issue a new decision (a) finding that the witnesses supporting Complainant's version of events were credible; (b) retaining the finding that a prima facie case of discrimination, with respect to the failure to renew his lease, was established; and (c) finding that Respondent either did not show a legitimate non- discriminatory reason for its failure to renew the lease, or, alternatively, that she did, but the complainant established that the reason was pretextual and was done to cover up the real reason for the failure to renew the lease.

The changes in findings of fact which are made in this decision necessarily follow from the mandated change in findings of fact on credibility and pretext. Findings of fact and conclusions of law on remedies are now made as discrimination is being found with respect to the alleged failure to renew the lease and with respect to the discriminatory statements. No change is being made with respect to the ultimate finding on the allegation of lower rent being provided to females than to males because (a) no change in this finding was required by the motion approved by the Commission and (b) this finding, unlike the findings on the discriminatory statements and the discriminatory failure to renew the lease, was primarily based on documentary evidence and not on the evaluation of witness credibility. In other words, a change in this finding was neither expressed nor implied by the Commission's remand.

In order to be consistent with the law, the instruction addressing Respondent's reason for failure to renew Complainant Harvey's lease is being interpreted, with respect to the McDonnell-Douglas analysis, to require a finding that the Complainant proved that Respondent's reason for failure to lease the apartment is a pretext for discrimination. The finding of fact to the effect that Respondent produced evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason remains unchanged because, at the second stage of the McDonnell- Douglas analysis, it is not appropriate to weigh whether or not the Respondent's reason is believed. The basic question at that stage is whether evidence of a legitimate non- discriminatory reason for the alleged discriminatory action has been produced, not whether that evidence is believed. Such evidence, in the form of testimony of Sandra Caldwell, was produced. Therefore Respondent's burden of production of evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason was met. See Conclusion of Law No. 23.

Respondent's reason for failure to renew the lease was, however, ultimately not believed by the Commission. At the third stage of the McDonnell-Douglas analysis, this disbelief, in combination with the inference of discrimination remaining from establishment of the prima facie case, is sufficient to show that the reason is a pretext for discrimination. Pretext was also shown by evidence which persuaded the Commission that discrimination was the more likely motivation for Respondent's actions. See Conclusion of Law No. 16.

The finding that Complainant's witnesses are credible also has an impact with respect to a second method of proof, the direct evidence method. The testimony of these witnesses, which includes evidence of statements by Respondent Caldwell indicating a sex discriminatory policy was placed into effect, must be considered anew in light of the direct evidence method of proof. See Conclusions of Law Nos. 6-10.

The findings of fact and conclusions of law are set forth below because there must be separately stated findings of fact and conclusions of law in every decision in contested cases including reversals or modifications of proposed decisions. Iowa Code S 17A.16(1) (1993); Iowa State Fairgrounds Security v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 322 N.W.2d 293, 295 (Iowa 1982). Failure to do so may result in a remand back to the agency for a new opinion when the decision reviewed by the court reveals no sound factual or legal basis. Wiese v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 389 N.W.2d 676, 681 (Iowa 1986). The findings of fact are required to be based solely on evidence in the record and on matters officially noticed in the record. Id. at 17A.12(8). Each conclusion of law must be supported by legal authority or reasoned opinion. Id. at 17A.16(1).