


# THE FLOODS OF 1993

## IOWA FLOOD DISASTER REPORT



MAY 1994

EXPERIENCE IOWA

# THE FLOODS OF 1993

## IOWA FLOOD DISASTER REPORT

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THIS REPORT WAS PREPARED BY THE IOWA FLOOD RECOVERY COORDINATION TEAM PROJECT OFFICER, BRIGADIER GENERAL HAROLD M. THOMPSON. COMMENTS CAN BE PROVIDED TO IOWA FLOOD RECOVERY COORDINATION TEAM 7700 NORTHWEST BEAVER DRIVE, JOHNSTON, IOWA 50131-1902. TELEPHONE (515) 252-4211 OR FAX (515) 252-4656

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## OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

STATE CAPITOL

DES MOINES, IOWA 50319

515 281-5211

TERRY E. BRANSTAD  
GOVERNOR

To All Citizens of Iowa and Those Who Helped Us

May, 1994

Our Iowa spirit was given the ultimate test during the Floods of 1993. Never in our history has such widespread destruction affected our lives. Our worst natural disaster caused flooding from the Mississippi to the Missouri Rivers. Along with seemingly endless rain with little sunshine, the floods' impact touched every county, ruining homes and businesses, destroying crops, and testing our strength and determination to overcome adversity.

Adversity is the true test of character. Iowans met the challenge of 500-year flooding in 1993 with courage, hard work, and a determination to overcome ruination and disaster by helping each other move ahead. Neighbors helped neighbors. There were no strangers. Everyone pitched in and pulled together. People who suffered losses helped those still fighting and sandbagging. The outpouring of volunteers and contributions was phenomenal. It was paramount in bolstering our efforts to save lives, protect property, clean up, and restore our life to normal.

Iowans are extremely grateful for the support that poured in from throughout the nation. I am proud of the way Iowans have shown their willingness to assist each other and win this battle. We continue to be determined to help deliver quick assistance to those in need and assist in long-term recovery efforts. There has been much cooperation among various government agencies at all levels. This spirit of cooperation has allowed our response and recovery efforts to become united and effective in restoring our quality of life. This report summarizes our statewide efforts in dealing with the disaster. Hopefully, it will assist others in dealing with similar disasters as well as enhance our own preparedness for future calamities.

Iowans are united in an indomitable spirit to succeed, despite adversity. Truly, the unselfish giving, willing cooperation, and determination to make a difference characterized the flood relief effort as "Iowa's finest hour."

Terry E. Branstad  
Governor

## PART I. OVERVIEW

*"In Iowa, we must never lose a healthy respect for the force and the rhythms of nature. We can work with nature but we can never fully control it. Our closeness to the land gives us a sensitivity to the environment"*


Governor Terry Branstad January 11, 1994

Excessive moisture and flooding, brought on by persistent heavy rains throughout the Midwest during the spring and summer of 1993, caused a myriad of negative incidents to the region. Serious economic and infrastructure losses occurred across Iowa and other Midwestern states. The magnitude of the disaster to people, properties, businesses, farms, the environment, and personal livelihoods was staggering, and unmatched by any previous flood in history.

Damages ranged from \$3-7 billion in Iowa and up to \$30 billion throughout the Midwest region according to federal estimates. Iowa lost over \$2 billion in crops and untold millions in business, tourism, public property, homes, personal prop-

erty, and other losses. Over \$1 billion was provided to citizens through disaster assistance and millions more through private insurance. Damaged roads, bridges, and rail lines disrupted transportation. The Mississippi and Missouri Rivers were closed to shipping. There was massive damage to levees and dikes, electric and gas utility systems, communication systems, farms, housing, industry, rural and community water systems, and sanitation systems. Millions of acres of farmland were under water for weeks during the peak growing season affecting agriculture and livestock production. Severe erosion, siltation, well pollution, chemical pollution, and other environmental damage were evident across the state.

Iowa suffered greatly by the floods. All 99 counties were declared federal disaster areas. Nearly 23,000 homes were damaged and over 10,000 residents were evacuated for their safety. Seven people died. Over one-third of the cropland was affected and for some crops, production dropped 62% from the previous year. Revenues lost from tourism was nearly \$1 million. Damages to public property and businesses were staggering. Some residents lost



everything. The floods did not discriminate between small towns and large cities. Chelsea's 376 residents were flooded five times. Over 250,000 residents in the capital, Des Moines, were without safe drinking water for 19 days after flooding overran the water treatment plant. President Clinton said during a visit, "I have never seen anything on this scale before... It was awful." Iowa will never know the actual cost of the damage. One can not put a price on human suffering.


The greatest flooding in Iowa history during 1993 followed the greatest annual rainfall in Iowa history. Virtually every maximum precipitation record was broken. Average rainfall across the state totalled 48.13 inches, compared to a yearly average of 33.11 inches. In July alone, over 10.50 inches fell across the state and some areas received far more in less time.

It all started several months prior to 1993. The summer of 1992 was cool, leaving the ground moist. A very wet fall was followed by a cold, cloudy, and snowy winter. The flooding began with heavy rains and snowmelt in the spring of 1993. It remained cloudy and cool throughout the spring. The cool temperatures and severe

thunderstorms during the summer months produced torrential rainfall. Rivers, reservoirs, lakes, levees, dikes, and fields quickly filled to over capacity setting record flood levels in July. Physical damages to private and public property simply could not be totally prevented.

The weather pattern that dominated the Midwest during early 1993 was a "split flow" west pattern, typical of El Nino events, causing extremely wet conditions. The westerly air flow at the jet stream level was split by a high pressure ridge over the western United States. The subtropical jet stream forced itself well to the south of the ridge into southern California while the polar jet stream was pushed to the north of the ridge into northwestern Canada. These two rapidly moving streams of air then swung around the eastern side of the high pressure ridge and converged over the Midwest. This produced ideal conditions for significant rainfall. In June, a large dome of stationary high pressure (Bermuda High) was lodged over the southeastern United States, resulting in hot, dry weather. The High circulated moisture from the Gulf of Mexico into the Midwest. Concurrently, a strong low pressure system was present in the upper atmosphere in the northern Rockies. This

# SUMMER 1993



resulted in cool weather in the Mountain West during the summer. Unfortunately, the Midwest was located at the boundary of these two competing weather systems.

The high pressure system brought warm and humid air into the Midwest while the low pressure system continued to spin off disturbances across the plains, generating widespread thunderstorms. The exact demarcation line between the two systems continually changed, explaining why the heavy rains also changed locations. Indeed, Iowa had no chance to escape. Except for 13 days, it rained somewhere in Iowa every day for 130 days between mid-April and September!


Finally, the weather pattern did not break up until after the Atlantic coast hurricanes in August. Iowa then returned to a drier and cooler than

usual autumn followed by a drier winter and early spring in 1994.

Iowa's emergency management systems responded to the flood disaster quickly and efficiently. Never in history has the destruction been so devastating and widespread throughout the state. Resources were stretched thin in efforts to aid flood victims. The overwhelming assistance from volunteers who responded to the call for help was the key ingredient to the success in battling mother nature.

As the state and each community throughout moved through the response and recovery phases, it is important to acknowledge the lessons learned from the 1993 floods and how preparedness for future disasters can be enhanced. Long-term recovery was dependent greatly upon broad, coordinated federally funded

## IOWA RIVER FLOODING



### MISSISSIPPI RIVER

- ◆ **Chanawha**  
Flood stage: 16  
Peak July 6: 22.95
- ◆ **Des Moines**  
Flood stage: 15  
Peak July 8: 22.85
- ◆ **Muscataine**  
Flood stage: 15  
Peak July 8: 23.61
- ◆ **Burlington**  
Flood stage: 15  
Peak July 10: 24.86
- ◆ **Kennett**  
Flood stage: 16  
Peak July 10: 21.15

### IOWA RIVER

- ◆ **Iowa City**  
Flood stage: 22  
Peak Aug. 10: 28.52
- ◆ **Marshalltown**  
Flood stage: 13  
Peak July 10: 30.55
- ◆ **Wapella**  
Flood stage: 20  
Peak July 7: 29.53
- ◆ **Near Lena tree**  
Flood stage: 15  
Peak July 7: 22.94

### DES MOINES RIVER

- ◆ **Emberville**  
Flood stage: 7  
Peak July 10: 15.21
- ◆ **Near Tracy**  
Flood stage: 14  
Peak July 12: 24.16
- ◆ **Near Ottumwa**  
Flood stage: 18  
Peak July 12: 22.13
- ◆ **Near Saylerville**  
Flood stage: 23  
Peak July 11: 24.12
- ◆ **S. E. 14th Street (DM)**  
Flood stage: 23  
Peak July 11: 34.29
- ◆ **Kassavuga**  
Flood stage: 25  
Peak July 13: 32.66

FIGURES EXPRESSED IN FEET

### WESTERN IOWA RIVER

- ◆ **Above Humbert**  
Flood stage: 16  
Peak July 23: 28.82
- ◆ **WEST WESTERN IOWA RIVER**
- ◆ **At Hineston**  
Flood stage: 18  
Peak July 10: 23.53

### SOUTH SNAKE RIVER

- ◆ **Near Sisson Creek**  
Flood stage: 7  
Peak July 9: 25.53
- ◆ **At Center**  
Flood stage: 17  
Peak July 10: 19.49

### Near Okobatois

- ◆ **Near Okobatois**  
Flood stage: 15  
Peak July 15: 25.16
- ◆ **At Anas**  
Flood stage: 7  
Peak July 6: 18.54

### SQUAW CREEK

- ◆ **At Anas**  
Flood stage: 7  
Peak July 6: 18.54

### CHARITON RIVER

- ◆ **Chariton**  
Flood stage: 15  
Peak July 6: 22.37

### RACEDON RIVER

- ◆ **Near Walker**  
Flood stage: 13  
Peak July 10: 25.83

### SOUTH RACEDON RIVER

- ◆ **Radfield**  
Flood stage: 14  
Peak July 10: 21.89





DES MOINES, IOWA



# CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

## FLOODS OF 1993

- 1 April Governor proclaimed Black Hawk, Butler, Floyd, Humboldt, Kosuth, Mitchell, Tama and Wright Counties state disaster areas due to Northern Iowa flooding.
- 12 April Governor proclaimed seven additional counties as state disaster areas and requested a Federal Disaster Declaration for 15 counties from March 26, 1993 through April 12, 1993.
- 28 April A Disaster Field Office became operational in Cedar Rapids.
- 2 May President Clinton declared 15 counties Federal Disaster Areas. First Presidential Declaration.
- 20 June Des Moines River seven feet above flood stage above Saylorville Lake north of Des Moines.
- 25 June Locks closed on Mississippi River. Governor proclaimed 12 counties as state disaster areas.
- 27 June National Guard activated for sandbagging, traffic control, security, evacuation assistance, and levee patrol in Davenport for Mississippi River flooding. State Government Emergency Operations Center activated for continuous operations.
- 28 June Commercial traffic closed on Mississippi River with flooding in Dubuque and Davenport. Governor proclaimed three additional counties state disaster areas.
- 30 June Mississippi River six feet above flood stage, causing evacuation operations in Davenport. Flash flood warning for entire state, except Northern Iowa. Agriculture Secretary Espy toured Northeast Iowa.
- 1 July Governor proclaimed 27 additional counties as state disaster areas. Raccoon River rose rapidly, threatening Des Moines Water Works Plant.
- 2 July Mississippi River at or above all-time record high. Record level on Des Moines River at Saylorville Lake, outflow raised river three feet. Coralville Reservoir 38 feet higher than normal. Governor proclaimed another county as state disaster area.
- 4 July President Clinton surveyed damage in the Quad Cities. Coralville Reservoir (Iowa River) over emergency spillway for first time in history.
- 5 July Governor proclaimed another county as state disaster area.

- 6 July Several lower Des Moines River towns evacuated. Two miles of I-80 closed near Iowa City. Mississippi River closed from St. Louis to above Iowa's Northern border. Governor proclaimed another county as state disaster area.
- 7 July Levees fail along Iowa River causing 800 people to flee in Louisa County. Saylorville Lake at 96% capacity (4.8 feet over emergency spillway). Damage assessment teams sent out to Eastern Iowa. Tornado damaged 30-40 homes in Cottage Grove. FEMA (Region 10) to support Iowa operations.
- 8 July Heavy rainfall in Raccoon River Basin (7.83 inches in Jefferson). Rained 37 of last 40 days across Iowa. 300 homes evacuated on Lower Des Moines River at Ottumwa.
- 9 July Major flooding in Central Iowa. Iowa State University's Hilton Coliseum contained 14 feet of water. I-35 highway closed south of Ames. Record flooding predicted for Valley Junction area of West Des Moines. Corps of Engineers announced that Saylorville, Coralville, and Red Rock Reservoirs are at capacity. Governor proclaimed six additional counties as state disaster areas. Nishnabotna River flooded I-80 highway in Southwestern Iowa. FEMA National Teleregistration Center began accepting applications for assistance. Governor requested 2nd Federal Disaster Declaration from April 13th through October 1, 1993. Approved by the President.
- 10 July 5,000 people evacuated in West Des Moines. Final day of the Ruan Greater Des Moines Grand Prix cancelled due to street flooding. FEMA Region 10 Advance Emergency Response Team arrived at the Davenport Disaster Field Office site and State Emergency Operations Center. Governor visited flooding on Spirit Lake as emergency water control activities were initiated.
- 11 July State of emergency declared in Des Moines and West Des Moines. Des Moines Water Works Plant flooded, causing 250,000 residents to lose water. Electrical outage in downtown Des Moines due to flooding. FEMA Region 7 activated the Federal Response Plan and opened the Regional Operations Center. A Disaster Field Office became operational in Davenport. Governor proclaimed another county as state disaster area. Seventeen water distribution sites established in Des Moines.
- 12 July Governor proclaimed four additional counties state disaster areas.
- 13 July Saylorville Lake at record high (892 feet) and Lake Red Rock at record high (782.67 feet). Remaining 43 counties proclaimed disaster areas by Governor. Electrical power restored to most of Des Moines. Governor Branstad, Senator Harkin, and FEMA Director Witt visited flooded areas. Fifty water distribution sites operational in Des Moines.
- 14 July President Clinton visited Des Moines. Lake Red Rock outflow 104,000 cfs (previous record 40,000). Flood water removed from Des Moines Water Works Plant with pumps airlifted out for repair. Four water purification sites established in Des Moines. Three Disaster Assistance Centers opened in Davenport. All 99 counties declared a Federal Disaster Area for Individual Assistance.

- 15 July Saylorville Reservoir outflow 40,800 cfs (previous record 30,000). Des Moines Mayor ordered all non-essential businesses closed until tap water is restored. Ninety-seven water distribution sites operational in Des Moines.
- 17 July Ames hit by second flood.
- 18 July Cherokee flooded by Little Sioux River. Anamosa and Toledo received five inches of rain.
- 19 July Mississippi River bridge opened at Keokuk. Over 100 water distribution points open in Polk County.
- 20 July Iowa City sandbagged water treatment plant.
- 21 July Federal Public Assistance approved for ten counties (Crawford, Des Moines, Dickinson, Johnson, Polk, Pottawattamie, Scott, Shelby, Van Buren, Wapello).
- 22 July Des Moines residents allowed to turn on water taps for first time in 12 days, although water not safe for drinking.
- 23 July Fremont County received six inches of rain. Missouri and Nishnabotna Rivers flooded.
- 24 July Nishnabotna River overran levee at Hamburg. Coralville Reservoir at elevation 716.75 feet (previous record 711.84 feet).
- 26 July Hamburg reported 20 inches of rain in 17 days. Most Des Moines businesses reopened. Jet stream shifted, promising to end heavy rains.
- 27 July Coralville outflow 25,100 cfs (previous record 13,000). Mississippi River fell below flood stage in Dubuque. Two FEMA mobile DAC units deployed. Additional 26 counties approved for Federal Public Assistance (Allamakee, Audubon, Boone, Cedar, Clarke, Clinton, Decatur, Emmet, Guthrie, Henry, Iowa, Jasper, Jones, Lee, Linn, Lousia, Lyon, Madison, Monona, Page, Palo Alto, Ringgold, Story, Tama, Warren, Woodbury).
- 28 July Iowa Department of Transportation officials estimated 40 bridges and 60 highways damaged.
- 30 July Des Moines water declared safe to drink.
- 1 August Additional 16 counties approved for Federal Public Assistance (Adair, Buchanan, Buena Vista, Carroll, Cass, Clay, Dallas, Green, Hamilton, Marshall, Mills, Muscatine, Sioux, Taylor, Union, Worth).
- 10 August Additional eight counties approved for Federal Public Assistance (Fayette, Jackson, Dubuque, Clayton, Harrison, Montgomery, Benton, Cherokee).

- 16 August Cedar River flooded Charles City and created problems in Nashua, Plainfield, Waverly, and Janesville. South Skunk and Squaw Creek flooded Ames for third time.
- 17 August Tama flooded a fourth time and Chelsea for the fifth time. Elgin flooded by a levee break on the Turkey River.
- 20 August Additional 12 counties approved for Federal Public Assistance (Black Hawk, Davis, Franklin, Fremont, Jefferson, Keokuk, Kosuth, Lucas, Mahaska, Osceola, Webster, Winneshiex).
- 22 August Mississippi River opened for barge traffic first time since June 25th.
- 29 August Five inches of rain in 24 hours caused widespread flooding and sewer backups in Des Moines and suburbs.
- 7 September Davenport Disaster Field Office moved to Des Moines.
- 20 September Additional 21 counties approved for Federal Public Assistance (Adams, Appanoose, Bremer, Butler, Calhoun, Cerro Gordo, Chickasaw, Delaware, Floyd, Grundy, Hardin, Howard, Humboldt, Marion, Mitchell, O'Brien, Pocahontas, Sac, Washington, Winnebago, Wright).
- 1 October All major rivers below flood stage.
- 4 October Remaining six counties approved for Federal Public Assistance (Hancock, Ida, Monroe, Plymouth, Poweshiek, Wayne).
- 8 October FEMA Region 10 staff transitioned DFO Operations to Region 1 staff.



## PART II. DISASTER RESPONSE OPERATIONS

### A. ORGANIZATION AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

#### RECEIVING FEDERAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE

Each year states are struck by a wide range of natural disasters varying in form and scope. The effects of disasters range from local impacts from a storm striking a single community to a hurricane or large-scale flooding.

Communities are responsible for their own protection, and as a result, are the first line of defense when a disaster strikes. The intent of the Stafford Act [In 1988, Public Law 93-288 was amended by Public Law 100-707 and retitled as the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Public Law 93-288 as amended)] is that federal assistance be to state and local efforts supported by private relief organizations.

When flooding occurred in Iowa during 1993, communities responded to the best of their ability. When they realized the overwhelming magnitude of the disaster, they turned to the state for assistance. The Governor directed that the state's emergency plan be executed and directed the use of all state resources including the National Guard. When the response exceeded the capabilities of the state, the Governor requested that the President declare a major disaster within Iowa under the authority of the Stafford Act.

While this request was being processed, local and state government officials continued to take immediate actions to respond to and begin recovery from the disaster. Commensurate with the supplemental nature of Stafford Act assistance, the federal share of recovery expenses was normally limited to 75 percent of

eligible costs. State and local governments were required to absorb the remaining expenses.

After the declaration, the Governor's Authorized Representative (GAR) made requests for additional assistance. All requests were directed through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region for Iowa.

When the declaration was made, FEMA designated the areas eligible for assistance and the types of assistance available. With the declaration, a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) was appointed responsible for coordinating all federal disaster assistance programs administered by FEMA and other federal agencies. FEMA's response and recovery activities were closely coordinated with those of other federal agencies as well as state agencies and the availability of state resources. These coordination activities were conducted primarily through the Disaster Field Office (DFO).

The Federal Response Plan (FRP) was the primary vehicle for interagency coordination during the emergency response period. As emphasis shifted from response to long-term recovery, coordination with other federal agencies was maintained through FEMA's Regional Office and the Disaster Field Office. The FRP described mechanisms and structures by which the federal government mobilized resources and conducted activities to augment state and local response elements. Twelve Emergency Support Functions (ESF's) served as the primary mechanism through which federal response assistance was provided:

- ESF#1 - Transportation (Department of Transportation)
- ESF#2 - Communications (National Communication System)
- ESF#3 - Public Works and Engineering (DOD, US Army Corps of Engineers)
- ESF#4 - Firefighting (US Forest Service, Department of Agriculture)
- ESF#5 - Information and Planning (Federal

Emergency Management Agency)  
ESF#6 - Mass Care (American Red Cross)  
ESF#7 - Resource Support (General Services Administration)  
ESF#8 - Health and Medical Services (US Public Health Service, Department of Health and Human Services)  
ESF#9 - Urban Search and Rescue (Department of Defense)  
ESF#10 - Hazardous Materials (Environmental Protection Agency)  
ESF#11 - Food (Food and Nutrition Service, Department of Agriculture)  
ESF#12 - Energy (Department of Energy)

## STATE AND LOCAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Iowa's flood relief effort was coordinated by the Emergency Management Division (EMD) of the Department of Public Defense. This office is responsible for the development and maintenance of state multi-hazard plans, emergency operations training, and coordination with state, local, and federal government agencies in all phases of emergency management. The Administrator of EMD served as the Governor's Authorized Representative (GAR) and as the State Coordinating Officer (SCO). EMD was also responsible for the management of the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC), located within the division in the Hoover Building. Emergency Management extends into each of Iowa's 99 counties through the County Emergency Management Coordinator, responsible for maintaining state approved county-wide disaster plans.

Flooding was not a new experience to most of the affected communities. The degree of preparedness was adequate, however, the magnitude and duration of the flooding found many communities and government agencies unable to cope without assistance. The majority of the requests were for sandbags, pumps, and personnel. It has been emphasized within Iowa that planning, training, and exercising for a major

disaster or catastrophic event is the most effective way to insure that crucial elements for response and recovery are successful.

There have been five Presidential declarations for flooding alone since the spring of 1990 and many events that were not declared, causing most communities to refine their emergency operations plans frequently. Building an effective emergency response and recovery capability obviously requires a great deal of planning and training. An emergency operations plan must be in place and be continually updated and tested to address all hazards. The experience, combined with the training and exercising by local communities and the state, led to a very effective response and recovery for the 1993 flooding.

Funding for emergency management programs is not adequate. Local and state governments operate on limited funds. They are unable to be proactive and keep pace with all requirements placed upon them. The state presently receives very limited (less than 30 cents per capita) emergency management assistance funds from FEMA for state and local programs. Iowa currently has 57 of 99 counties participating in the Federal Emergency Management Assistance Program. This program is the funding foundation for the emergency management system. State and local governments rely heavily upon funding provided through the Federal Emergency Management Agency to aid in maintaining and improving emergency response and recovery capabilities.

## B. DISCUSSION OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

Due to early spring flooding, Governor Branstad requested that 15 counties be declared federal disaster areas. A Presidential Disaster Declaration was declared for those counties for the period March 26th through April 12th. A Disaster Field Office was operational in Cedar Rapids from April 28th to June 4th. Again on July 9th, the Governor requested a federal

disaster declaration for flooding. A second Presidential Disaster Declaration was declared ultimately for the period April 13th through October 1st. All 99 counties were eligible for Public and Individual Assistance.

EMD supervised the activation of the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) which evolved into fully staffed, 24-hour operations during the period June 27th through July 30th. During these emergency operations, the response capability toward nuclear power plants became a concern. To assure an adequate response capability by the state, an alternate response cell was created in the Hoover Building to monitor the nuclear power plant disaster planning phase.


The State EOC was staffed with representatives from numerous state and federal agencies:

- Governor's Office
- Emergency Management Division, Department of Public Defense
- Iowa National Guard, Department of Public Defense
- Department of Natural Resources

- Attorney General's Office
- Department of Human Services
- Department of Public Safety
- Department of Transportation
- Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship

- Department of Public Health
- Department of Elder Affairs
- Department of Corrections
- Department of Economic Development
- Department of Education
- Department of Inspections and Appeals
- Federal Emergency Management Agency
- American Red Cross
- Salvation Army
- US Army Corps of Engineers
- National Weather Service
- Amateur Radio
- Civil Air Patrol

EMD provided technical guidance and coordinated the actions of the State EOC to insure the emergency plans were executed correctly and delivery of assistance was accomplished efficiently.






The Governor immediately ordered the Iowa National Guard to state active duty when communities in disaster-declared areas were in need. Over 4,500 Army and Air National Guard men and women were called to respond at various times during the spring and summer months. In July, there were over 2,000 on duty at one time. Nearly one half of them were in the Des Moines area assisting with water distribution and flood control in the capital city without tap water. Soldiers and airmen from units across the state performed heroically by conducting massive sandbagging operations, patrolling levees, evacuating and providing security, operating municipal pumping stations, cooking meals for the elderly, providing public showers, and assisting with state and local communication and administrative needs. They performed duty in over 48 communities, many simultaneously. Without the help provided by the National Guard, community damage would have been much greater, and the response effort would have been much slower.

Due to overwhelming and catastrophic flood damage beyond the state's ability to provide relief, the state again requested assistance from the federal government. After receiving another Presidential Disaster Declaration on July 9th,

and after 250,000 Des Moines residents lost drinking water the night of July 10th, FEMA Region 7 activated the Federal Response Plan (FRP) and opened the Regional Operations Center (ROC) on July 11th. FEMA National Teleregistration Center had begun accepting applications for assistance on July 9th. FEMA Region 10 Advance Emergency Response Team became operational in Davenport and at the State EOC in Des Moines on July 10th. The Davenport Disaster Field Office (DFO) was fully operational on July 11th with federal and state personnel. Auxiliary DFO's were opened in Davenport and Des Moines to accommodate Public Assistance requests. On July 12th the Davenport DFO took over ESF activities from the Region 7 ROC. The Davenport DFO moved to Des Moines on September 7th and continued operations from that location throughout the remainder of the disaster recovery period. Region 10 staff transitioned DFO operations to Region 1 staff on October 8th. All Emergency Support Functions within the Federal Response Plan were implemented, except 2 and 4, and are discussed later in this report.

FEMA's response was effective considering the scope of their mission under the FRP. FEMA personnel were dispatched to the State EOC



quickly and continued to provide assistance throughout the recovery process. The FEMA and state outreach to disaster victims was enhanced through the use of mobile disaster application centers (DACs), in addition to the 14 fixed centers. Two teams of federal and state officials deployed in mobile units between July 27th and August 11th to cover outlying areas of the state where remote geographical location or flood induced inaccessibility made

fixed DACs impractical.

Avaliable assistance included funds for housing, low interest loans, grants, disaster unemployment assistance, casualty loss tax treatment, and other disaster related aid. The ability to deliver disaster assistance more directly to affected communities provided additional reassurances to citizens that help was available. Although the total applications accepted at the mobile DACs totalled less than 500, the on-site assistance was very visible, allowed for greater walk-in requests, and satisfied local, state, and national requests for assistance centers in specified areas.

EM/D organized special teams to coordinate specific areas such as volunteer and donation support, public information, and health and sanitation needs. The volunteer and donation team included representatives from major volunteer organizations who maintained control of donations and goods totalling over \$21.8 million donated to Iowans from people all over the United States and some overseas. After a brief period of receiving many unsolicited goods, the team established a policy that no goods could be accepted into the state unless a volunteer group, government agency, or a private entity was willing to accept responsibility for its receivership and distribution. Effort was made to centralize needs with resources and to decentralize the receipt and distribution of resources and maintain accountability. Actions have been taken to formalize procedures and permanently include in the emergency management system.

An enlarged public information team was mobilized using public information staff from other state agencies. The team included members from the Departments of Public Health, Employment Services, Economic Development, Human Services, and Natural Resources. A staffing plan was created that required two PIO specialists to be on duty during 24-hour EOC operations.

A media area was established outside the EOC. This area included phones, computers, fax and copy machines, televisions, and a briefing area. Staff members were sent to monitor briefings at other locations, such as city and county EOCs. Briefing books were assembled by staff, which included summaries of briefings held elsewhere. In addition, all media releases published by state government were placed in the book as were situation reports. This allowed all the public information staff to share information and provide common output.

The State EOC received technical assistance from other state emergency management staffs, including Florida, Indiana, Mississippi, and Utah, which greatly expanded the technical expertise necessary in emergencies.

The Governor not only issued disaster proclamations, he also exercised his powers to waive restrictive rules and timeliness that would otherwise have impeded disaster response and recovery efforts. Most importantly, he extended his disaster proclamation to enable local government to continue to avail themselves of state resources.

Response and recovery efforts were coordinated through the emergency management system in Iowa and supported with federal resources. State resources were used extensively before federal assistance was requested. Federal assistance and resources were provided primarily through twelve emergency support functional areas.

#### ESF #1 - TRANSPORTATION

State transportation and public safety officials monitored road, railroad, and bridge conditions by both air and ground surveillance and developed detour routes. News releases of road closures were passed through State EOC public information sources. Public Assistance damage assessment teams inspected damaged roads, highways, bridges, railroads, airports, river terminal facilities, waterways, trails, and

other public transit systems. Emergency repair work was performed as soon as conditions allowed. Damages existed in most counties and some major roads and other systems were inoperational. Damage to county secondary roads was severe due to washouts and gravel erosion. Total transportation system damage exceeded \$35 million.

### **ESF #2 - COMMUNICATIONS**

Federal resources in this ESF were not requested, therefore this ESF was not activated in the federal response plan.

### **ESF #3 - PUBLIC WORKS AND ENGINEERING**

State and local agencies were generally capable of restoring essential public services and facilities until the early morning hours of July 11th. Record flooding on the nearby Raccoon River caused flood waters to rise above the levee system surrounding the Des Moines Water Works Plant. Several feet of river water covered plant facilities and pumps causing over 250,000 citizens to lose all tap and drinking water. More importantly, the capital city was left with no effective fire protection capability and nearly 40,000 residents were without electrical power in homes, offices, and businesses. The Governor, state and local officials, and relief support per-

sonnel quickly devised a plan to obtain and distribute water and other essential services. The first water distribution site was operational eight hours after the loss of water. Priority was given to fire stations and hospitals. Bulk tanker trucks and bottled water began to arrive from all across the nation. Iowa National Guard resources were quickly detailed to manage a water distribution and water site security system. Federal resources under ESF #3 were requested to assist in bulk water tanker support and portable toilet service. The US Army Corps of Engineers later provided contracting teams to Des Moines to contract for requested support. This assistance was not coordinated initially with the state and resulted in a duplication of effort in arranging for bulk water tanker support. Mobile contracting teams should have been forwarded immediately to the state upon activation of ESF #3. Thirty-two Army National Guard water purification units from several states were brought in to purify water for hospitals, allowing them to use their internal water delivery system in sufficient quantities for medical needs. Military bladders capable of storing 3,000 gallons of water were installed. Within four days, nearly 100 water distribution sites were operational, dispensing nearly 3 million gallons of water daily to the citizens of Des Moines and neighboring communities. The state employees union managed a delivery system of water for nursing home residents and the elderly. Assistance to



restore the Des Moines Water Plant began immediately. Army National Guard helicopters assisted water plant officials and contractors in raising the height of the levee system surrounding the plant with sandbags filled by thousands of volunteer citizens. Helicopter assistance was also utilized in transporting large, heavy water pumps and associated equipment for restoration and return to the water plant. By July 30th, the water system had been reactivated and the water tested as safe for human consumption. Other ESF #3 activities provided by the COE included water hauling for other Iowa communities and securing pumps for removing ponded water from various local communities. Demobilization of water distribution sites, water purification units, and over 1200 portable toilet services was begun as federal resources consumed in this ESF were deactivated on July 30th.

#### **ESF #4 - FIRE FIGHTING**

Federal resources in this ESF were not requested, therefore this ESF was not activated in the federal response plan.

#### **ESF #5 - INFORMATION AND PLANNING**

This ESF focused on the collection, analysis, and dissemination of critical information to facilitate the overall response and recovery operation. Data was provided to the DFO in Davenport and to the State EOC in Des Moines. Aerial reconnaissance for damage assessment was evaluated for each county. Collected Individual Assistance damage data was analyzed to facilitate target areas of anticipated heavy Public Assistance damages. Many media, interagency, and political requests required the FEMA staff to focus on analyzing extensive amounts of damage data. Most requests were urgently needed by Congress to formulate supplemental appropriations, or for some agencies to determine funding levels. The lack of qualified, trained staff restricted the capability of this vital function. The planning and analysis requirements are critical to the entire response and recovery effort.

#### **ESF #6 - MASS CARE**

As the primary agency for federal support, the American Red Cross (ARC) took the lead in providing food and shelter for thousands of flood victims. Service centers opened, taking applications for assistance. Mobile feeding stations were instrumental in providing meals to local citizens forced out of their homes. A toll-free ARC Disaster Relief Hotline was established to request assistance. The Salvation Army, various church organizations, and other volunteer agencies joined in to provide outreach and assistance to flood victims across the state. Donations, pledges, and contributions were quick to come into the state. Resources for mass care needs were met by volunteer agencies without much federal support. ARC declared the Iowa floods a Level 5 disaster relief operation, the highest level possible. Contributions from the corporate sector were remarkable. Items such as cost free hotel rooms, food and water, money, and free services and supplies were abundantly available to needy citizens. The volunteer spirit was clearly evident, not only from Iowans, but from thousands of non-residents as well. All volunteered their time to fill sandbags, save lives, salvage individual belongings, and generally assist wherever a need existed to people whom they had never before met. Volunteerism continued for months after the end of the flooding, as volunteers assisted in rebuilding homes, public facilities, and in general putting people's lives back together.

#### **ESF #7 - RESOURCE SUPPORT**

General Services Administration was activated to assist in acquiring supplies and equipment needed by various federal disaster assistance agencies. Goods and services were procured through contracts for support aimed primarily at DFO operations. Similar activities were performed by the Iowa Department of General Services for supplies, equipment, and services necessary for state government operations.

## **ESF #8 - HEALTH AND MEDICAL SERVICES**

The Iowa Department of Public Health coordinated with FEMA on anticipated issues such as water and food safety, sanitation, vector control, crisis counselling, injury and disease surveillance, health facility surveillance, pharmaceutical, hazardous substances, and debris. Representatives from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Public Health Service, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Administration, Food and Drug Administration, Health Resource Service, and Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health's Office of Emergency Preparedness were alerted for possible deployment and assessment of conditions in Iowa. Safety of potable water arriving in Des Moines and replacement of syringes and needles were early issues. Potable water was tested by the COE and state labs. The Veterans Administration supplied 50,000 hypodermic syringes for immunizations. The Iowa Department of Public Health, with federal technical assistance, surveyed all 99 counties concerning health issues including reports of increased biting insects. Technical assistance teams from the State EOC visited counties according to a state-developed priority system. Resources were allocated based upon input from the technical assistance teams.

## **ESF #9 - URBAN SEARCH AND RESCUE**

The Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) and staff were activated on July 12th and operated under elements of this ESF. Logistics support for water purification units and 5,000 gallon water tankers were areas of major involvement. Civil Air Patrol airborne survey and damage assessment missions were executed throughout July.

## **ESF #10 - HAZARDOUS MATERIALS**

This ESF was activated on July 11th, at the Davenport DFO. Technicians from the Environmental Protection Agency were mobilized

to identify potential hazardous waste problems. Aerial flights and photographs assisted in identifying areas requiring on-site evaluations. Local fire department reports assisted in locating areas of potential concern. Abandoned containers were collected, analyzed, and disposed under controlled conditions. Petroleum-related spills were also evaluated and analyzed. Local efforts were effective in minimizing potential damage. Known chemical storage sites were contacted and warned of potential hazard risks associated with flooding. Household hazardous waste collection was conducted in Polk County. Materials collected included paints, thinners, automotive oils and products, and various amounts of unknown materials. Retrieval operations were successful in collecting hundreds of drums, containers, and tanks from the Mississippi, Des Moines, and other rivers including the reservoirs.

## **ESF #11 - FOOD**

United States Department of Agriculture commodities were requested by only a few sites where shelters were located. The donations for food received through grocery chains and other private sources were generous and generally sufficient to meet local needs. Several truckloads of National School Lunch Program commodities were distributed throughout Iowa and served at many of the American Red Cross and Salvation Army feeding sites. All food was inspected before consumption. Commodity requests ended as emergency food stamps began to be issued in mid-July.

## **ESF #12 - ENERGY**

Power systems and fuel supplies were generally unaffected by the flooding. There were some isolated area electrical outages, including a major outage in downtown Des Moines, however, no major damage resulted to transmission lines. Mobile substations and bypasses around damaged distribution circuits enabled power to be restored to residents. Sandbagging around power generation stations was taken as a precaution.

tionary measure and auxiliary generators were mobilized for possible emergency use. There were no gasoline or petroleum shortages or damages. Sixty to ninety-day fuel supplies were sufficient to meet needs until transportation systems were restored.

### C. AREAS OF EXCELLENCE

The activation of the State Emergency Operations Center, execution of emergency plans throughout the state, immediate action by the Volunteer and Donations Team, and coordination and cooperation among federal, local and state agencies in securing resources in a timely manner was excellent and key toward effective disaster response.

FEMA's response to the state request for federal assistance, and the organization and function of the Disaster Field Office and Disaster Application Centers were critical in coordinating and delivering disaster assistance.

Quick action by the Governor to activate members of the Iowa National Guard and mobilize state resources provided critical resources to augment city, state, and local efforts in administering relief. National Guard actions in managing the distribution of drinking water in Des Moines were important in satisfying citizen needs.

The use of cellular telephones was instrumental in contacting personnel in an outside, highly mobile disaster situation. A tremendous amount of time was saved in coordination of emergency matters.

The willingness of people both inside and outside of Iowa to volunteer time and personal resources for flood relief was truly remarkable. Numbers of people exceeded needs in certain instances as calls for help went out to fill sandbags, assist in evacuation of people and property, and help with any specific need or task. The cooperation and timely delivery of public infor-

mation was assisted greatly through the media. The issuance of timely, factual information reduced panic and rumor and allowed emergency personnel to deal effectively with urgent matters.

### D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Continual refinement of state and local government multi-hazard emergency plans and procedures for disaster response is needed. A comprehensive training program insuring that emergency management personnel throughout state government and disaster coordinators in each county are maintained at a high level of proficiency and readiness is the key to effective emergency response. Functional responsibilities in the state plan need to be greatly expanded and detailed by department or organization. Supporting plans and procedures must be more fully developed at department level. Damage assessment, formalized volunteer and donation management plans, communications, and media operations have been identified as needing additional planning and requiring more formal procedures for future emergencies.

State EOC operations were effective but need additional refinement. The size of the Hoover Building EOC is not conducive to large scale, 24-hour operations. A new, enlarged EOC located at Camp Dodge available in early 1994 will adequately accommodate future emergencies of this magnitude. State department heads should send qualified, key decision makers to the EOC. These individuals must make decisions on behalf of their organization without undue contact with higher level management over extended periods of time. EOC team members should be preselected, trained, and available to quickly respond as emergency situations dictate. Finally, department heads must be committed to 24-hour EOC representation over perhaps several weeks as well as actively supporting full scale training exercises conducted periodically for at least 24-48 hours in duration.

Coordination with FEMA is greatly enhanced when the DFO is located near state government operations. Perhaps an auxiliary or forward DFO could be established on site, however, overall coordination and effectiveness was enhanced when DFO operations were relocated to the capital city after two months of operations in Davenport.

The entire disaster assistance application process involves a great deal of paperwork. Each federal agency should review and streamline their requirements. Ways need to be identified to expedite the delivery of Individual and Public Assistance programs, such as using mobile strike teams to provide information to local governments quickly.

FEMA state liaison personnel should be deployed to the State EOC even prior to the anticipated disaster declaration. States should thoroughly communicate their needs to FEMA and anticipate long term recovery issues early in the disaster.

The FEMA Central Processing Office (CPO) created coordination problems and took control away from the FCO/SCO. The CPO was located out of state, too far from the DFO for maximum effectiveness. Processing applications requires direct interface with the DFO and applicants.

Conflicting river level forecasting information was not coordinated between the Corps of Engineers and the National Weather Service. Both should coordinate and resolve conflicting information to reduce confusion and enhance confidence in published data. Advance warning is needed for selected roadways, levees, and floodplain areas.

Federal agencies should review with counterpart state agencies what assistance is available during disasters. Augmenting state staff with federal officials was especially beneficial in health matters. DFO officials should be kept abreast of agency coordination to prevent conflicting

information being relayed to applicants. Inconsistent information from FEMA regarding substance abuse assistance and counselling created delays in the delivery of these services.

Agencies that used toll free telephone hotlines were effective in informing citizens of emergency issues. Hotlines should be established quickly, widely publicized, coordinated through the EOC, and staffed with knowledgeable personnel. The Consumer Protection Hotline established by the Iowa Attorney General's Office was effective in reporting consumer concerns.

Executive level management would be greatly enhanced with a quick and efficient conference calling capability between all state departments. The current system is outdated and time consuming to set up.

## PART III. DISASTER RECOVERY OPERATIONS

### A. ORGANIZATION

There is not a clear division between response and recovery operations, and this was especially so during the floods of 1993 as flooding impacted Iowa communities at different times between April and September. Federal and state emergency plans do not specifically address recovery assistance, including the provision of temporary housing; loans and grants to individuals; loans to businesses; and grants to state and local entities provided under disaster assistance programs of FEMA and other agencies. In most cases, recovery activities were conducted concurrently with response activities. The FCO and SCO were responsible for coordinating recovery activities. These operations were initiated in accordance with state priorities and based upon availability of resources which did not conflict with response operations.

Generally, as flood waters receded, local officials transitioned from response to recovery operations. There were numerous recovery procedures considered by local officials during the floods. Funding, infrastructure repair, building codes, hazard mitigation, and delivery of assistance were a few of the major concerns. Immediate actions associated with the initial situation report and preliminary damage assessments were extremely important in planning for assistance. Knowledge and understanding of federal disaster relief was the key aspect of securing quick and effective assistance. During the last week in July, FEMA and state Public Assistance staff conducted Public Assistance briefings throughout the state targeting those counties needing assistance. Additional briefings were conducted based upon needs, some by teleconference. Feedback indicated that these briefings were helpful and expedited the relief effort.

Fourteen stationary Disaster Applications Centers (DACs) were operational with federal and state staffing. County emergency coordinators assisted with site identification and facility accommodations. Mobile DACs extended the outreach into 25 less populated communities.

To expedite Iowa's economic recovery from the floods, the Governor assembled a State Flood Recovery Coordination Team in mid-July. This task was to coordinate an immediate and sustained disaster response to help families and businesses return to normal activities and reduce the continued loss of economic opportunities quickly. Overall goals were to assess the damages to the state regarding personal and public property, agriculture, and business; identify resources available to satisfy needs; educate and inform public and private officials on available assistance; and to provide an overall network of assistance and support to speed recovery operations and funding. The Deputy Adjutant General of the Iowa National Guard/Deputy Director, Department of Public Defense was appointed as the Team Project Officer. Several state department heads were selected as response team leaders in various functional areas.

The Education Assistance Response Team consisted of representatives from the Iowa Department of Education, College Student Aid Commission, University of Iowa, and Iowa State University Extension. The team, unlike other response teams, did not meet together. An





Iowa National Guard liaison officer coordinated with each department to resolve flood related issues.


The Department of Education damage assessment totalled \$3 million for providing statewide counseling to assist in determining loan eligibility, and to provide general assistance to citizens.

The College Student Aid Commission damage assessment totalled over \$16 million for student aid and received over \$11 million in the form of grants, loans, and work. Additional funding from recent legislation is expected in 1994. The ISU Extension damage assessment totalled \$600,000 for funding an assistance hotline. Funding was provided through the Department of Human Services.

The Farm Assistance Response Team monitored crop damages reported by government and agricultural agencies. It provided crop yield estimates based upon damage reports and various agricultural agency predictions. The team coordinated information and resource announcements made to the farm community. ASCS was instrumental in providing farm program and disaster aid benefits through state and local county offices. The team coordinated and participated in several meetings throughout the state to receive input from farmers and producers. Infor-

mation regarding disaster and farm program assistance was also shared during these meetings. Interaction and information received from individual producers served to confirm estimated crop damage assessments and projected crop yield information used to project impacts to the overall Iowa economy.

The Health and Human Services Response Team consisted of representatives from Iowa Departments of Public Health, Human Services, Elder Affairs, Inspections and Appeals, Human Rights, and Public Defense, and Iowa State University Extension. The team met weekly between July and November. The team coordinated Stafford Act and supplemental disaster requests submitted to FEMA, Iowa Emergency Management Division, and Iowa Department of Management. The team was instrumental in receiving and implementing federal assistance for mental health, crisis counselling, emergency food stamps, social services, substance abuse and prevention, Iowa Rural Concern Hotline, elderly outreach, migrant worker gas vouchers, disease control surveillance, environmental health, communication, assessment, TB programs, primary care, and community action agency programs. This team provided significant support to state department efforts to help flood victims. By coordination with other agencies, the



team helped reduce duplication of effort, fill service gaps, improve communication with federal and state agencies, and provide information to federal, state, local officials and applicants about the availability of services.

The Housing Assistance Response Team consisted of representatives from the Iowa Department of Economic Development. The team was instrumental in obtaining federal funding for housing repair, acquisition and demolition, relocation, floodproofing, and infrastructure serving sites for new or temporary housing for flood victims. Additional information in this area of assistance is included in the IDEED After Action Report in Annex A.

The Industrial, Commercial, and Dislocated Worker Response Team consisted of the Iowa Army National Guard, Iowa Departments of Economic Development and Employment Services, the Iowa Insurance Commission, and the Division of Banking (DOB). The team met weekly to discuss flood related issues and submit Stafford Act and supplemental disaster requests through Emergency Management Division to FEMA. Major efforts included:

- \* Small Business Development Centers (SBDC) communicated with businesses informing them of services available. The SBDC published a disaster loan workbook and aggressively utilized its network of 15 flood coordinators to interact with businesses and industries.

- \* The DED produced and mailed to the chambers of commerce and bankers a request for their assistance in publicizing availability of services. The DED worked with Iowa Public Television and Radio Station KIOA, Des Moines, on advertising spots announcing assistance.

- \* A Process Action Team (PAT) consisted of DED, Small Business Administration (SBA), Association of Business and Industry, Iowa Bankers Association, SBDC, and the National Guard. The PAT reviewed the entire SBA

application process and provided recommendations for improvement to the SBA. The SBA Administrator approved and implemented the recommendations.

- \* Business and banking associations were requested to lend their assistance in publicizing availability of services. The DOB surveyed state chartered banks to access flood damage and provide an estimate for financial aid. Primary area of concern was the agricultural sector. Approximately \$550 million in agricultural loans and \$69 million in commercial loans were affected. The DOB allowed maximum flexibility to loan classification and capital requirements.

The Transportation and Natural Resources Response Team consisted of personnel from the Iowa Departments of Transportation and Natural Resources. The team met weekly from August to October to establish a system to assess damage to Iowa infrastructure, and to define the respective roles of each department in the assessment. Special meetings were held between DNR staff and local citizens and governments affected by flooding in the Great Lakes region of Dickinson County. Staff of both the DNR and DOT appeared before citizens on June 21 to answer lake area resident's concerns about existing and predicted flood conditions. Another meeting in Dickinson County with the Governor on July 10 produced an agreement with the National Guard and the Army Corps of Engineers to commence an emergency water control project that ultimately provided relief to area residents. Technical assistance was provided throughout flood recovery operations concerning floodplain protection, levee repair, and regulatory requirements for municipal wastewater treatment systems.

The Volunteer, Clean Up and Donation Coordination Response Team consisted of personnel from major volunteer organizations, church groups, community service groups, the Governor's Office for Volunteerism, Emergency Management Division, National Guard,

and others. This team initially functioned in conjunction with the State EOC with Emergency Management Division as the lead agency. Unsolicited goods started to arrive within the state. Telephone calls offering donations of cash, goods, and services began to overwhelm volunteer coordinators. A policy was established that goods would not be accepted into the state unless a volunteer group, government agency, or private group was willing to accept responsibility for the receipt and distribution of accepted goods. A process of referring goods and services was established and implemented. Immediate needs were separated from future needs and matched with available donors. Donors were contacted within twelve hours and informed whether the goods, services, or other resources could be used. Donations and resources were entered into a data bank and reported daily to the team, management, volunteer agencies, and county agencies. Cash donations were accepted by volunteer organizations. An account was set up (Governor's Flood Fund) for donors who chose to meet other unmet needs not handled by established volunteer agencies. Local donations were accepted directly by local organizations. Local agencies were able to submit needs to the State EOC team. Later efforts by the team focused on unmet needs and requirements to formalize procedures for volun-

teer and donation management during future disasters. Coordination at the local level is necessary to insure volunteer resources are efficiently provided to those in critical need. Volunteer resources were very generous and abundant from citizens and businesses across Iowa, the United States, and other nations. Efficient and effective management of these resources was a continuing requirement and will continue for future emergencies. Fully coordinated, formal plans and procedures for volunteer and donation management must be included in state and local multi-hazard plans.

The Flood Recovery Coordination Team was instrumental in obtaining resources for Iowans and greatly reducing the economic losses from the impact of the flooding in each community. The team remained active into 1994 with participation by the Governor, state government department heads, and various public and private agencies involved in long-term recovery efforts.


## B. DISCUSSION OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

Disaster assistance programs were available under the Presidential Disaster Declaration. Individual applications for assistance were made

at Disaster Application Centers and by calling the toll-free disaster tele-registration number. Major elements of most programs are described and highlighted in this section.

### 1. INDIVIDUAL ASSISTANCE

*Disaster Housing Assistance--* This program provided a 100% FEMA grant for up to 18 months for homeowners and renters whose permanent residences were made uninhabitable by the floods. The follow-



FONDS DISBURSED \$31,112,794

MAY 2, 1994

ing categories of assistance, without regard to an income means test, were available: rental assistance, home repairs, transient accommodations, furniture rental, mobile homes, and mortgage assistance. Over 18,000 applications were approved totalling over \$31 million. The US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) made emergency arrangements to help flood victims with repair or replacement of homes, and to prevent loss of homes through foreclosure. Qualified citizens displaced from their home or apartment were eligible to purchase a replacement home with 100 percent financing, no money down, using HUD's mortgage insurance assistance. Their previous residence must have been destroyed or damaged to such an extent that reconstruction or replacement was necessary. HUD also had a special mortgage insurance program available for major repairs or rehabilitation of homes. Help for homeowners wishing to relocate out of a flood zone or to elevate was available through the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Program.

**Emergency Assistance** -- Emergency food, clothing, shelter, and medical assistance to individuals and families were available, as well as referrals to church groups and other voluntary agencies. Benefits disbursed by the American Red Cross, Salvation Army, United Way, Governor's Flood Fund, and others exceeded \$20 million. Additionally, over \$250 thousand in benefits were disbursed by area volunteer organizations to flood victims.


**Disaster Food Stamps** -- Flood victims in 55 counties applied for food stamp assistance and received nearly \$2 million in coupons for over 6,000 households from July 17th through July 30th.

**Home/Personal Property Disaster Loans** -- Disaster loans through

the Small Business Administration (SBA) were available to homeowners and renters for restoring or replacing disaster damaged real and personal property. Homeowners applied for loans up to \$100 thousand to repair a flood damaged primary residence. Up to \$20 thousand was available to homeowners and renters for personal property losses. Loan amounts were limited to the amount of uninsured, SBA-verified losses, and could be increased by up to 20 percent for mitigation measures to help prevent future losses to damaged real property. Interest rates were generally at 4 percent with a few at 8 percent, both for periods up to 30 years. Over 2,700 applications totalling over \$28.6 million were approved.

**Community Action** -- The Community Action Agencies provided a funding source for low-income individuals and families. Included in their services were grants for home and personal property repair and replacement, energy assistance, and weatherization. There was a \$2.5 million allocation for Community Services Block Grants.

**Individual and Family Grant Program** -- Grants of up to \$11,900 were available for eligible flood victims to help meet serious disaster-related needs or necessary expenses not covered by other assistance programs or insurance. The



program was administered by the state with costs shared 75 percent by FEMA and 25 percent by the state. An application was approved only after SBA determined that the applicant did not have the ability to repay a loan. The IFG program increased its minimization benefits by awarding 1,152 grants (\$1,194,449) to fund elevation or relocation of utilities damaged by the floods. This helped disaster victims protect water heaters, furnaces, and main utility panels from future flood damage. IFG also established a new program, Emergency Living Expense, for applicants who were forced to evacuate and were out of their homes for a period of time. This helped people endure the hardship of being forced to find living accommodations elsewhere resulting in out of pocket expenses. Approximately 600 Emergency Living Expense grants were issued totaling approximately \$500,000. IFG funding was also available for buyout programs in selected Iowa communities. Up to \$11,900 was available for over 120 homes that were at least 50 percent damaged and homes that could not be rebuilt because of zoning requirements. Overall, over 7,900 grants totaling over \$9.2 million were approved.

The Iowa Department of Human Services was provided a FEMA-funded crisis counseling grant. The grant was used to support the Iowa Concern Hotline for confidential assistance and referral

for stress (included Spanish language services). The department funded local community mental health providers for free individual crisis counseling and to conduct outreach screening and diagnosis, referral, and local consultation and education services.


The Iowa Department of Public Health was initially provided funds for disease surveillance and control, stress and mental health needs, local community health agencies, migrant health, assistance to the elderly, and aid to low income citizens.

*Aging/Elderly Assistance* -- Over \$1.6 million was disbursed for outreach, home repair and clean up, transportation, meals, and health care to meet the needs of the elderly.


*Disaster Unemployment Assistance* -- A 100 percent federally funded program provided up to 26 weekly benefits to those out of work due to the disaster, including self-employed persons, farm workers, farmers, and others not covered under regular unemployment insurance programs. Over 9,540 applications were approved by local Job Service offices. Over \$39 million in benefits have been disbursed under this program. Migrant workers unable to continue work were given assistance to allow for their return to their homes.

*Tax Assistance* -- Federal and state tax authorities allowed casualty losses that were suffered on home, personal property, and household goods to be deducted on income tax returns if losses were uninsured or underinsured. Taxpayers could file amended 1992 returns and receive tax refunds. Local tax assessors provided assistance on possible property tax relief.

*Job Assistance* -- A program was created to allow local agencies to provide temporary jobs for up to



## SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION



totaling nearly \$80 million. A major effort was initiated by state government leaders, business community leaders, federal officials, and others to revise and streamline the SBA business loan application process and procedures. This effort resulted in more user friendly application requirements that were approved and implemented immediately by SBA.

**Farm Assistance** -- The Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) made

six months or \$6 thousand in wages. Jobs involved cleaning up public and private non-profit property, restoring public utilities, and performing other disaster response activities. Over 1,659 Iowans were employed under this program and were paid prevailing wages for the type of work performed. Funding for this program came from a \$15 million special emergency grant from the US Department of Labor.

**Other Assistance** -- Several forms of other assistance were provided to flood victims including insurance, legal, social security, veterans, financial, and consumer protection.

### 2. SMALL BUSINESS AND FARM ASSISTANCE

**Business Disaster Loans** -- SBA provided disaster loans up to \$1.5 million for businesses to repair or replace destroyed or damaged business facilities, inventory, machines, or equipment. Small businesses unable to pay bills or meet expenses as a result of the flooding could also apply for SBA economic injury disaster loans generally at 4 percent interest for up to 30 years. Over 1,256 loans were approved

loans to farmers operating or managing a farm at the time of the flooding. Emergency loans for 100 percent of uninsured physical losses to pay for replacement buildings, equipment, livestock, and supplies were made at 4.5 percent interest or less for up to 40 years. Loans for 80 percent of uninsured production losses to pay creditors, buy feed, and pay operating and family living expenses were made at 4.5 percent interest or less for up to normally 20 years. Producers must have suffered at least a 30 percent loss in one crop or livestock enterprise. Regular loan and loan guarantee programs to assist flood victims were also available. Loan restructuring and other benefits were provided to farmers who had already received FmHA assistance. Over \$25 million was disbursed by FmHA. Numerous programs were available from the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS) through local ASCS offices to assist farmers victimized by flooding. Disaster payments to eligible farmers who suffered at least 40 percent loss to uninsured crops may reach \$400 million.

Additional crop and livestock feed programs as well as haying and grazing programs were available. Also, cost share assistance (federal


64%/individual 36%) was available to producers who applied for emergency conservation programs (ECP) funds, such as debris removal, repairs to land and water conservation structures, and permanent fencing. ECP funding is expected to reach \$11 million. Two other programs offered landowners an alternative to producing crops on flood-prone farmlands. The Emergency Wetland Reserve Program (EWRP) was established as part of the federal flood relief appropriation in 1993. Landowners, in exchange for a one-time payment, agreed to a permanent easement restricting the land for wetlands use. Eventual buyout of the land is being planned. Iowa farmers offered to enroll over 17,000 acres into the program. Over 5,300 acres were initially enrolled with farmers receiving \$4.2 million. Those acres will improve surface water quality, add land to wildlife habitat, provide an alternative to levee repair, and reduce damages from future floods. A similar program, the Wetland Reserve Program (WRP) accepted applications in March, 1994. Farmland that was not flooded in 1993 was eligible as well as flood-prone land. Officials have greater discretion in selecting wetlands that meet specific state environmental goals. Over 75,000 acres in 20 states (including Iowa) are expected to be approved during this enrollment.

### 3. PUBLIC ASSISTANCE

In addition to Individual Assistance, another major source of disaster funds was Public Assistance funding. Eligible applicants were state and local governments, as well as certain private non-profit organizations to assist with restoration projects. Categories of work included emergency work (debris clearance and protective measures) and permanent work (road systems, water control facilities, public buildings and equipment, public utilities, public parks, and recreational areas).

Under the Stafford Act, the federal share of Public Assistance must be not less than 75 percent of the net eligible cost of repair, restoration, reconstruction, or replacement activities carried out during relief operations for a Presidentially Declared Disaster. A new cost-share adjustment policy was announced by the FEMA Director on September 2nd. It raised the federal share of Public Assistance costs to 90 percent once a \$64 per capita damage threshold was reached. The Governor immediately requested a waiver of the \$64 per capita threshold. He also asked for a cap on the state and local match using a formula of 25 percent of \$10 per capita. After much state, regional, and national

## ASCS DISASTER PAYMENTS TO FARM PRODUCERS




FUNDS DISBURSED \$387,682,742

MAY 2, 1994

interaction, the Public Assistance cost share was adjusted to 90 percent federal and 10 percent state and local for the Midwest flooding. The Governor then, in an effort to ease the financial burden on local flood-affected communities, requested the state to pay the entire 10 percent share of Public Assistance costs. This action resulted in Iowa communities saving millions of dollars. Earlier attempts by the Governor to have a full waiver of the

# PUBLIC ASSISTANCE



FUNDS APPROVED \$75,123,472

MAY 2, 1994

state and local cost-share match were not approved.

Disaster applicants submitted notices of interest for emergency needs and repair. State and federal inspectors surveyed identified damages and prepared Damage Survey Reports (DSRs) to outline the scope of work, estimate repair cost, and document any completed work. FEMA obligated the 90 percent federal share for all approved DSRs. The individual DSRs currently exceed 11,000 and were the basis of the project application for a subgrantee (currently 1,105). Funds were available for the state to make payments to individual applicants as FEMA obligated the funds, projected to exceed \$100 million. The entire federal share of the estimate was paid upon approval for small projects, and on a percentage completed basis for large projects. The state share was paid upon completion for small projects. Large projects received an advance payment of one-half (5%) of the state share with the remainder paid upon project completion.

*Community Development Block Grants* -- Iowa received \$39 million from the US Department of Housing and Urban Development to assist flood

recovery efforts. This money was used to meet needs not covered by other emergency assistance programs. The initial allocation was earmarked for residential damage relief, and later allocations included assistance for damage to businesses and public facilities. If funds were available for public facility and housing projects not covered by another source of assistance, they were awarded by the Iowa Department of Economic Development through Community Development Block Grants (CDBG). Communities applied for these funds through the regular CDBG imminent threat contingency fund process, which involved submitting a letter describing the project and estimated total cost. Funds were limited to those cases where local resources were severely strained and capabilities to raise additional revenue (i.e. property tax and user fees) were not practical alternatives.

*CDBG Business Flood Recovery* -- Cities and counties could seek financial assistance on behalf of businesses in imminent danger of ceasing operation entirely. Assistance was made available to businesses that were unable to obtain recovery assistance elsewhere in an amount or form sufficient to aid in their recovery. Assistance was provided for physical losses and, in some cases, for economic injury. The amount of assistance provided was limited to an amount necessary to return the business to a viable level of operation. Priority was given to industries and retail businesses that are major employers or provide essential services to the community.

*Cultural Affairs Funding* -- Iowa received nearly \$1 million from federal agencies for cultural restoration activities and historic preservation



projects created by the flooding. Additionally, state grants and donations were provided to needy recipients.

### C. AREAS OF EXCELLENCE

Feedback from the small business community identified an immediate need to streamline the SBA business loan application process and the loan documentation required. An action team consisting of small business owners, business, industry, and banking leaders, and state and federal government officials examined the loan application process and submitted recommendations to SBA to revise the process and refine required supporting documentation. SBA was helpful and quick to approve and implement suggested improvements. Most of the several thousand small businesses in Iowa impacted by the floods found the revised process to be more user friendly and less time consuming. The result of these efforts proved to be a model for problem solving and cooperation between the provider of disaster assistance and those victimized by the flooding.

Another effort that paid huge dividends was the use of outside technical expertise to augment functional activities providing disaster relief. Relocation of personnel assets were made in agricultural offices to assist with disaster application paperwork and damage assessments. Federal and state personnel from other states and regions were brought in to augment state counterparts in state government. Local and out of state military assets were mobilized for augmentation of efforts down to local and community level. Many businesses used similar procedures to bring in outside assistance to repair facilities and normalize outputs of goods and services badly needed by Iowa citizens. Quick and effective mobilization of personnel and resources was the key to effective delivery of assistance to flood victims who were suffering from stress and unrest.

The creation of the Flood Recovery Coordina-

tion Team and its impact in pursuing an immediate and sustained response to individuals, families, businesses, and farmers was instrumental in reducing the loss of economic opportunities caused by the floods. Response teams staffed with action personnel focused on assessing needs, identifying resources and facilitating the delivery of resources into priority areas of need. The leadership, actions, and involvement by personnel from both the public and private sector resulted in millions of dollars of recovery assistance for Iowans. The state was quickly back into full operations and "open for business".

### D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Each FEMA regional office has a different view in the interpretation of laws and regulations concerning disaster relief. This disaster brought three different regions successively into the state to administer relief, causing confusion and the expenditure of additional resources to deconflict issues. Although the need for additional regional staffing was understandable, a standard application of disaster relief is needed across FEMA regional boundaries.

There is no permanent FEMA presence in Iowa. This state has had five Presidential Disaster Declarations for flooding alone since 1990. It is therefore recommended that FEMA establish a minimum full time permanent presence near state government. A forward regional presence or field office would improve coordination on a daily basis, improving preparedness and facilitating the transition to emergency operations.

There is too much overlap in federal assistance programs. It causes state and local governments, as well as individuals and businesses to spend time sorting out avenues of relief. This is especially visible in the Public Assistance program. It is recommended that FEMA conduct an in-depth review and analysis of all assistance programs with a goal of streamlining, eliminating overlap,

and deconflicting various program elements. Also, it is recommended that FEMA further increase their response activities. Increased use of mobile strike teams to provide relief information to local citizens and governments would be of tremendous assistance.

In an effort to share resources, a more regional approach to disaster assistance could be provided. Regional or multi-state agreements for resource sharing and funding could be developed to assist one or more states within a region. This would make state resources available to a disaster area quickly and be more cost-effective than the current national response effort.

The cost-share arrangement for federal and state sharing of Public Assistance program funding was favorably adjusted in September. Considerable energy and resources were expended in this effort. The state and local governments could reduce future anxieties and frustrations if a more consistent and clearly defined cost-share arrangement was provided.


The federal, state, and local damage assessment process needs to be streamlined into a joint and coordinated function. Inspections should fulfill all assessment needs, be prioritized by extent of damage, and be shared by computer for uses among various agencies. Consideration should be given to the use of block grants for small damage sites, giving the state more latitude in the use of funds. Contract inspectors allow for more rapid assessments, however, a system needs to be developed which requires complete performance standards with required technical competencies to fulfill the needs of all agencies.

Environmental reviews associated with elevation and relocation of houses appear unnecessary as the potential harm to the environment is nearly nonexistent. Waiver of this requirement or use of an expedited environmental review process is warranted. A minimum baseline environmental standard should be established rather than an assessment or review. Also, this program should

be combined with other housing programs to avoid overlap and duplication.

Lack of sufficient funding in various disaster programs causes states to waste time combining or layering programs together. Levee repair and restoration, and housing assistance are two areas of specific need. The lack of individual program funding and the timely release of funds severely hampered these programs. Funding should be quick if recovery efforts are to be effective and assist in future hazard mitigation efforts.

The regulation and management of the several large reservoirs by the Corps of Engineers need review and refinement. Associated supporting emergency plans also require revision. The duration of the rains, record reservoir levels, record water releases, and record flooding levels on most Iowa rivers and streams provides new data that can prove beneficial in future reservoir management. Other factors such as



situation, forecasting, and coordinating state and local areas of concern are important to effective reservoir regulation plans.

River level forecasting needs refinement and revision. The National Weather Service (NWS) has the mission of providing all flood forecasts. Improved coordination with the COE to deconflict information and provide greater warning time for flooding is needed. The use of additional, more effective stream gauging systems that allow for real time evaluation and warning is badly needed. Increased NWS representation in the State EOC will assist in the overall conduct of emergency operations.

Disaster relief and assistance for small businesses needs to be revised and improved. Delays in receiving National Flood Insurance advances and settlements caused difficulties in maintaining cash flow. Funding to pay for immediate recovery needs, temporary relocation, and replacement inventory and supplies was needed. Helping businesses get back on their feet is more cost-effective than funding unemployment and other associated costs. A small business program needs to be developed and funded nationally to provide grants, advanced loan money with deferred payments, and government-backed credit guarantees on replacement inventory and supplies. These benefits would assist low risk businesses return to normal, productive operations.

The National Flood Insurance Program is not popular among Iowans. A streamlined review of program guidelines is recommended in an effort to provide comprehensive, low cost insurance to needy citizens. Perhaps costs and benefits could be adjusted as the program has been self-supporting through policyholder premiums without federal assistance for several years. A more user friendly program combined with increased marketing and consumer information would increase coverage throughout Iowa.

Regulations for determining payments to self employed individuals, especially farmers, are

inconsistent with other workers, and are perceived to be unfair and unjust. Regular unemployment insurance is based upon gross worker earnings while disaster unemployment insurance for self-employed personnel is based upon net earnings. It is recommended that the US Department of Labor review and revise this program to eliminate unfair and unjust policies. The entire program, instructions, manual, and forms have not been updated in several years. A thorough review and revision is badly needed to deliver this vital form of assistance to citizens, especially those in an agricultural state.

## PART IV. HAZARD MITIGATION

### HAZARD MITIGATION GRANT PROGRAM

This program is designed to provide cost effective measures to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to human life and property from natural hazards. FEMA's Public Assistance program and the programs of other federal agencies were available as the primary means of funding. The Hazard Mitigation Grant Program provided an opportunity to fund measures that could not be funded under other program provisions. The federal share of hazard mitigation projects could not exceed 75 percent of project cost with at least a 25 percent applicant share matched with dollars or in-kind services. The total federal funding could not exceed 15 percent of the total estimated federal grant assistance (excluding administrative monies) provided under the Stafford Act. Eligible projects included property elevation, acquisition, relocation, retrofitting, flood drainage area improvement, and improved mitigation standards. FEMA has provided the state with over \$31 million in Hazard Mitigation Grant funding to reduce the hazards associated with flooding. That effort is primarily oriented at elevation, relocation, or acquisition of flood-prone homes throughout Iowa. Several funding sources were sought to finance mitigation mea-

tures in each of Iowa's 99 counties, all declared as disaster areas. HMFGP funds are being matched with a substantial portion of Community Development Block Grant funds to finance projects for applicant communities. Total mitigation costs are expected to rise as 72 of over 120 potential applications identify over \$50 million for total project costs.

Housing issues have received the primary project emphasis. Most applications involve moving people who presently reside in a floodplain to areas less likely to suffer flood damage. Currently, 37 projects or applications involving over 1,000 homes need financial assistance from HMGP. Elevating, outright purchase or demolition, or relocating homes to higher elevation will require over \$24 million in HMGP funds for projects totalling over \$32 million. CDBG funds were matched with HMGP funds, resulting in little or no local government funding for project completion.

The US Economic Development Administration is expected to provide up to \$39.3 million for flood mitigation projects. These projects include community development and infrastructure improvements.

Iowa set the pace, nationally, regarding plans to assist homeowners voluntarily leave floodplains. The City of Des Moines was the first community in the nine Midwestern states to develop, implement, and purchase a flood damaged property. That purchase on December 21, 1993 was a milestone in the property acquisition policy development effort between FEMA and the state. This event culminated in establishing a new national policy for the purchase of flood damaged properties. A conference designed to assist applicants from Iowa and surrounding states become familiar with property acquisition processes was held in January. This resulted in FEMA's approval of the procedures developed by the state.

## NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM (NFIP)

Administered by the Federal Insurance Administration, the NFIP is a federally-backed program that makes low-cost flood insurance available to residents of communities in exchange for the community's adoption and enforcement of NFIP floodplain management regulations. The program is self-supporting in that all flood insurance claims and operating expenses are funded through policyholder premiums.


Over 1,000 claims were approved for losses totalling over \$15 million for Iowans by December, 1993. Additional claims were processed by NFIP. In August, there were 6700 policies in force. By December, that amount had risen to over 9000. Out of 800 Iowa communities, 394 participate in NFIP, and an additional 194 have completed mapping requirements. Iowans with NFIP flood insurance are well below the national average of 17%.

NFIP also has provisions to purchase damaged insured property and to provide property owners with the opportunity to relocate to nonflood-prone areas, providing damage criteria is met. Property owners are offered a settlement check based on fair market value less the amount of their claim settlement.

## GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEM

In an effort to improve floodplain management, the state proceeded with the development of digitized computer data to assist in the review of hazard mitigation and levee alternative programs for flood disasters. This data will also have application for damage assessment and emergency response efforts in future disasters. Data will include roads, levees, utilities, railroads, bridges, soils, public lands, historical structures, and other areas. The Corps of Engineers acted as a support agency in this effort scheduled for completion in spring 1994.

# LEVEE REPAIR PROJECTS



POTENTIAL FUNDING \$21,802,768

MAY 31, 1994

Iowa Department of Natural Resources  
Iowa Department of Economic Development  
Iowa National Guard, Iowa Department of Public Defense

In evaluating applications for levee repair and restoration, each agency considers: nonstructural alternatives and design modifications that could provide greater local benefits of flood control, reduction of future potential flood damages to the applicant and

## LEVEE RESTORATION AND MANAGEMENT

An Interagency Levee Review Committee for Iowa was organized to ensure the proper consideration of relevant options for repair, reconstruction, and other alternatives to levee restoration necessitated by flood damage.


The overall goal was to achieve a rapid and effective response to the damaged flood control system that will minimize risk to life and property, ensure a cost-effective approach to flood damage mitigation and floodplain management, and protect important environmental and natural resource values.

The Interagency Levee Review Committee for Iowa consisted of representatives of the following federal and state agencies:

Federal Emergency Management Agency -- Chair  
US Army Corps of Engineers  
Soil Conservation Service  
US Fish and Wildlife Service  
Environmental Protection Agency  
Economic Development Administration  
Emergency Management Division, Iowa Department of Public Defense

adjacent upstream and downstream localities, lower long-term cost to the federal government, and natural resource protection. Agencies are encouraged to include other interested agencies during their evaluation process, to the extent practicable. Levee repair and restoration is extremely complex. There could be up to 300 individual levee repair projects in Iowa. Many of these projects do not fit into the scope of work covered by federal funding.

There are differences in repair projects. The SCS makes no emergency repairs, as all projects are reconstructed as permanent projects, whereas both FEMA and COE authorize emergency repairs. There are differences in match requirements, 75%/25%, 80%/20%, or 100%. In some cases the applicant can apply for more favorable benefits in certain programs. FEMA can authorize the use of Public Assistance (Section 406) funds for alternate projects such as relocation, buy-out, or elevation. The SCS and COE cannot use repair or reconstruction funds for any other use. SCS has funds for the Wetland Protection Program. The COE has no alternate funds. If applicants refuse repair, the funds are used for another repair project. Additional time and information would assist in making a more complete assessment of the impact of levee



repairs in a basin-wide area. A FEMA Hazard Mitigation technician should to be assigned to participate in the initial review, field inspection, and design to propose and assess the alternatives to repair or reconstruction to the previous condition.

## PART V. DISASTER SUMMARY

The Midwestern floods of 1993 were record events, flooding over 17 million acres in nine states. Iowans were not alone as millions of people were affected across a wide region of the United States. In Iowa, the floods were unique in that they were of long duration and impacted every county. Environmental losses relating to erosion, siltation, and water pollution were severe. Economic impact was staggering. Over \$2 billion in crops were lost compared to the previous year. Great damage was done to transportation, commerce, and industry. Impact on state and local governments was great. An immense amount of energy was expended to conduct response and recovery activities to aid citizens and rebuild the state infrastructure. Social impact was felt statewide. Unbelievably few losses of life and no major illnesses or diseases

were offset by a huge disruption in homes, jobs, and overall quality of life.

Finally, the floods reminded Iowans that no one can prevent natural disasters. Damages can be minimized through effective floodplain management and maintaining emergency preparedness at high levels of readiness. These areas must receive primary attention to reduce the risks of future widespread flooding and to protect the most precious of all resources, the citizens of Iowa.

IOWA FLOOD

DISASTER REPORT

ANNEX A

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY

AFTER ACTION REPORTS

# IOWA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND LAND STEWARDSHIP

## FLOOD DISASTER AFTER ACTION REPORT

### I. AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

Evaluated and promoted the role of soil and water conservation practices in flood control and infrastructure protection.

### II. ORGANIZATION DURING EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

Normal department staffing including field staffing in each Soil Conservation Service office.

### III. SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

#### A. DISASTER RESPONSE PHASE

Technical assistance, field inspections, and damage estimates provided by field staff.

#### B. DISASTER RECOVERY PHASE

Severe storms during summer months are common in Iowa. Every year there are isolated situations where heavy rain and runoff cause localized damage to cropland and county infrastructure. What is not common is (1) the extent of distribution and (2) the frequency of occurrence of severe storms that Iowa experienced from the Fall of 1992 through the Summer of 1993. Storm after storm on saturated soils led to severe flooding problems over virtually the entire state.

Damage to the state's agricultural infrastructure was great. It may take years to fully recover. For example:

\* 10 percent of the state's terrace systems (1) suffered damage due to cutting (structural failure), or (2) filled with sediment that will need to be removed for them to continue to perform at their designed capacity.

\* 80 percent of the waterways two years old or less, suffered cutting or gully damage that will require reshaping and reseeded.

\* 2.4 million acres of cropland suffered severe erosion damage (more than 20 tons/acre soil loss), due to upland erosion, or bottom land scouring when creeks and rivers left their banks.



#### IV. AREAS OF EXCELLENCE

Agricultural cropland damage estimates for the state exceeded \$30 million. But it is important that this damage be put in perspective. Successful conservation achievements far outweighed failures. Most of the conservation systems of the state performed well, despite conditions that exceeded their design and capacity.

These successes were due to three factors:

- \* Sustained effort over the years on the part of farmers and conservationists to install total conservation systems to protect soil resources.
- \* Recent acceleration of practice installation in response to the approaching Food Security Act and conservation compliance deadlines.
- \* Dramatic increases in no-till and other residue management farming for economic as well as conservation benefits.

Damage surveys of Iowa farmland show that much conservation progress has been made over the last ten year period. In the months April - August 1993, the state received more than 17 inches excess rainfall. This compares to 9 inches excess in May - July 1990 and 5 inches excess in April - June 1984. Yet, the number of cropland acres with severe erosion problems does not mirror the excess rainfall amounts. Over 2.4 million acres of cropland were damaged in 1993, but is considerably less than the 4 million acres damaged in 1984, a year with much less rain and flooding.

In fact, comparing 1993 to 1984, excess rainfall in 1993 was 3.4 times as great as 1984, but cropland acres damaged due to severe erosion were 40 percent less. Conservation practice installation over the past ten years has done a remarkable job of protecting Iowa's cropland soils.

Between 1984 and 1993, conservation practices established by Iowa farmers are estimated as follows:

2,500,000	acres no-till
1,500,000	acres conservation tillage
200,000	acres protected with terraces/structures
1,800,000	acres protected with contouring
100,000	acres protected with stripcropping
6,100,000	acres with conservation practices established

Assuming a 35 percent overlap of practices established on cropland acres, it is safe to assume that 4,000,000 acres have benefited from conservation treatment. Add to that figure the land protected by the Conservation Reserve Program and those acres damaged by the 1993 rain and floods, and it becomes possible to estimate the number of acres that would have been severely damaged were these floods to have occurred ten years ago.

4,000,000	acres that were not treated in 1984
2,200,000	acres enrolled in the CRP
2,400,000	acres damaged in 1993
-----	
8,600,000	acres that would have been damaged in 1984

Cropland damage from storms of the past year would have been 3.5 times greater in 1984 than it was in 1993.

The cost of this damage can be estimated as follows:

\$ 0.80/acre	soil depletion damage
4.75/acre	annual sheet and fill erosion damage
8.82/acre	ephemeral cropland gully erosion
-----	
\$14.37/acre	cropland damage

Comparing this year's cropland damages (2,400,000 acres x \$14.37/acre) of \$34.4 million to the potential damages (8,600,000 acres x \$14.37/acre) of \$123.5 million that could have occurred illustrates the value of erosion protection.

Although more difficult to quantify, the reduced cropland erosion across the state undoubtedly reduced (1) downstream flooding impacts, and (2) damage to infrastructure such as roads, bridges, and urban areas. Conservation practices on the agricultural landscape of a watershed also reduce the amount of soil deposited in the state's lakes.

Flood waters are very dirty and carry an incredible sediment load. However, more than half of this sediment load comes from floodwater scouring and streambed erosion; considerably less than half comes from upland cropland erosion.

The 1993 data shows that cropland soils in Iowa were better protected from erosion in 1993 than in previous years, and as a result, the damage sustained by the state's infrastructure was considerably less. For these reasons, it is important that progress in the establishment of conservation practices across the state be accelerated, rather than diminished. Evidence clearly substantiates the value of soil conservation practices and conservation tillage systems, protecting soil resources and diminishing flood impacts.

V. PROBLEMS/ISSUES: None

# IOWA DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

## FLOOD DISASTER AFTER ACTION REPORT

### I. AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

The Iowa Department of Commerce provided assistance during the floods of 1993. Specifically, the divisions of insurance, banking and utilities answered questions, monitored damages and supervised the businesses within their jurisdictions so that service was effectively maintained throughout the disaster.

### II. ORGANIZATION DURING EMERGENCY OPERATIONS: Normal

### III. SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

The Banking Division provided assistance to businesses and individuals by alerting the communities to low interest loans which were available at local banks. The Bankers Association helped in completing loan forms and alerting businesses about low interest loans.

The Utilities Division monitored damages of utility companies throughout the state. They notified and encouraged utilities to apply for FEMA aid in the event there were losses. Special meetings were held to keep communities apprised of changes in service.

The Insurance Division set up a hotline staffed by insurance experts to answer questions regarding insurance coverage. Public service announcements were aired both on television and radio notifying the public of assistance on insurance matters. A mediation service was established to help companies and their insureds handle questions of coverage due to flooding. All flood related insurance questions were filtered through a flood project coordinator.

### IV. AREAS OF EXCELLENCE

Of special note was the mediation service which handled approximated 125 complaints. This voluntary program was heartily embraced by the insurance industry. All parties involved showed good cooperation in reviewing policy coverage and damage issues. Not one complaint went to full mediation with most complaints being resolved informally. The service will be used in the future if necessary.

The Insurance Division's Flood Project Coordinator worked with private interest groups such as the Bar Association and Legal Services of Iowa in answering questions and directing parties to the correct source for assistance. The Insurance Division worked with National Flood Insurance Program personnel in obtaining help for people covered under the Program who were experiencing difficulty with the claims process. Division personnel met with federal officials following many complaints concerning the Federal Program and, in most cases, a suitable resolution was obtained.

The hotline and public service announcement brought immediate response from insureds. The division believes such immediate outreach following the flooding reduced the number of complaints and calls. This service will be used in the future if necessary. The division commends the insurance industry

for its cooperation and assistance in helping Iowa's insured during the flooding. Their efforts, no doubt, reduced the number complaints received by the division.

## V. PROBLEMS/ISSUES

The Insurance Division believes that the National Flood Insurance Program must be more "user friendly" toward policy owners. The majority of complaints received by the division involved the federal program and the policy owners lack of knowledge as to flood insurance. Upon meeting with members of the program, suggestions were made to make the policy more understandable. It has been suggested that at the time of flooding, at a minimum, more information should be presented to the policy owner as to the steps in filing a claim and the policy owner's rights under the policy and steps to be taken should the policy owner disagree with the amount of the claim received. Additionally, the federal program should provide experienced personnel to staff information and complaint lines within the state immediately upon the onset of a flood disaster.

The Insurance Division does not have jurisdiction over the National Flood Insurance Program. However, the division was asked for assistance in regards to the federal program. The division found that many people were unaware that flood insurance was available. Only a very small percentage of those eligible to purchase flood insurance did so. National Flood Program personnel must do a better job of marketing the product. This can be done with the help of both the private insurance industry and government. Notices can be sent to local officials of counties and cities eligible to be part of the program alerting them to the availability of flood insurance.

The division believes that the National Flood Insurance Program personnel were ill equipped for a disaster on this magnitude and, therefore, were understaffed. Delays occurred due in part to the change in administrators following the flooding. Because the claims adjusters did not live in the region, people could not easily contact the adjusters to ask questions and more easily file claims and receive updates on their claims. In working with the Flood Recovery Coordination Team and federal officials, we believe that work can be done to make the program more accessible to the public, both at the time of purchase of the policy and when flooding occurs.

# IOWA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

## FLOOD DISASTER AFTER ACTION REPORT

### I. AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

The Department of Corrections is responsible for community based corrections and the prison system within the State of Iowa.

### II. ORGANIZATION DURING EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

The Department maintained normal organization behavior during the flood crisis.

### III. SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

#### Mitchellville

- \* Received approximately 200 Polk County Jail inmates on 7/11. The county prisoner count has changed frequently during their stay. Approximately 20 female county prisoners were housed at the visiting room. Males were kept in the new Violator Facility.

- \* Polk County provided its own security for its prisoners. Also provided food and other supplies. Mitchellville shared its phones, copier, fax and other office resources.

- \* Some community concerns about safety and costs were initially expressed but were alleviated. Polk County Sheriff maintained a very high visibility and presence in the community.

- \* Mitchellville city water supply was threatened by the flood. City officials were unable to obtain adequate supply of sandbags until DOC intervened with disaster officials.

- \* Major maintenance and repair on the administration building was delayed by the crisis. This may mean the loss of funds for this project if not completed on schedule.

#### Newton

- \* Stand down from emergency status at 3:00 p.m. on 7/14.

- \* One of the institution's two wells was safe from the floods, as was their reservoir. A backup pump was obtained and adequate levels in the reservoir were maintained.

- \* Inmate crews were not used by area communities. Were used on 7/14 to move computers in a Des Moines office, but not called on for flood work. Staff contacted Jasper County Disaster Services about availability for work. Staff was willing to take crews where needed within a 50 mile radius.

#### **Fort Madison**

- \* Flood threat to the institution decreased as water receded. No problems occurred with water or power.
- \* A bridge closing hampered staff's ability to get to work from the Illinois side. A trolley was used to transport staff from a pickup at Hamilton, Illinois to Keokuk where vans were used for transport to the institution.

- \* Many inmate crews helped with area flood control.

#### **Anamosa**

- \* The institution was not threatened by flood and operated normally.
- \* Between 4,000 and 5,000 sandbags were filled at the institution. Inmate crews sandbagged at the local water plant.
- \* Luster Heights crews worked on flood control and clean up in their area.

#### **Oakdale**

- \* Flooding did not directly impact this facility but many area roads were closed.
- \* Housed 38 Polk County inmates. All were housed on one of the regular units. These inmates were fed on the unit. Polk County provided some security.

#### **Mt Pleasant**

- \* Not threatened by flooding, but heavy rains damaged a number of roofs on the campus. Rain damage was critical and compromised parts of the fire alarm system.
- \* Inmate work crews were used extensively in the Burlington area to fight flooding.

#### **Rockwell City and Clarinda**

- \* No serious flood or related problems reported by these institutions. Work crews not needed in these areas.

#### **Community Corrections**

#### **5th District (Des Moines)**

- \* Fort Des Moines residential facility and the Work Release facility had power but no water. Neither were physically threatened by the flooding. Approximately 140 facility residents were furloughed. Residential staff worked with regular supervision staff on home visits and supervision of furloughed clients. Some problems developed because of disruption of courts.

**2nd District (Ames)**

- \* Facility not threatened but many staff had trouble getting to and from work.

**7th District (Davenport)**

- \* Flooding did not reach residential facility.

**8th District (Ottumwa)**

- \* Flooding did not reach residential facility.

**1st District (Waterloo/Dubuque)**

- \* Heavy rains caused some flooding of the Dubuque facility.

**3rd District (Sioux City), 4th District (Council Bluffs), 6th District (Cedar Rapids)**

- \* No reported problems

**IV. AREAS OF EXCELLENCE: See previous summary**

**V. PROBLEMS/ISSUES: None**

# IOWA DEPARTMENT OF CULTURAL AFFAIRS

## FLOOD DISASTER AFTER ACTION REPORT

### I. AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

The Department of Cultural Affairs is responsible for developing the state's interest in the areas of the arts, history, libraries, and other cultural matters for Iowans and visitors.

### II. ORGANIZATION DURING EMERGENCY OPERATIONS: Normal

### III. SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

#### A. DISASTER RESPONSE PHASE: None

#### B. DISASTER RECOVERY PHASE

In response to widespread flooding and damage to the state's historic properties and sites, art galleries, museums, and other cultural facilities in Iowa, the Department of Cultural Affairs (DCA) sought and received \$27,865 in federal funds from the Chairman's Emergency Grants Program of the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH). These funds enabled the department to establish and staff the Cultural Resources Emergency Attack Team (CREAT), with the mission of identifying damaged or threatened cultural resources in Iowa, and to assist them in recovery from the flood and its after effects.

Professional consultants from around the country joined DCA staff in a damage assessment tour of the most flood-affected counties in Iowa. Once there, professional conservators gave valuable advice and consultation to local curators and private citizens on approved procedures for removal of molds, water stains, and high humidity levels affecting historic collections, and drainage, roofing, landscaping, and other structural concerns relating to historic structures and archaeological sites. Free evening seminars on aquatic conservation and structural stabilization and renovation were also provided in seven Iowa cities. A special toll-free information line was established to the Historical Building in Des Moines so that our constituents who had suffered the effects of the flood could reach our staff promptly and without cost.

Follow up contacts were made with these cultural resources in an effort to provide ongoing consultation, and to assist these entities with the requirements needed to receive federal financial assistance. The department, in cooperation with the Iowa Cooperative Preservation Consortium (ICPC) of Iowa City, utilized remaining grant funds for the printing and mailing of the Flood Recovery Booklet, a 70-page document which outlines proper procedures for dealing with collections, and even personal belongings, damaged by flooding or its after effects.



Over 2000 of these booklets were mailed across Iowa, including copies to all of Iowa's libraries, both public and private, all county disaster officials and elected officials, to all museums, galleries, and historical societies, and to a host of others. The booklet was so well-received, a second printing was ordered to meet the demand. The department received requests for additional copies from across the nation, and a supply was sent to California upon their request to help deal with the aftermath of the recent Los Angeles earthquakes.

The remaining grant funds from the NEH were utilized to establish a flood recovery depot at the Historical Building in Des Moines. There, flood relief supplies for cultural organizations were stockpiled for delivery to areas damaged by future widespread flooding or localized disasters. Crucial, specialized, and often readily unavailable materials are available and can be tailored to the specific needs of constituents based upon types of historic and cultural materials damaged.

The department's arts division, the Iowa Arts Council, sought and received a grant of \$32,800 from the National Endowment of the Arts (NEA) through its Underserved Program. These funds were regranted to artists and arts organizations for flood relief and recovery. A second component of the grant awards was in recognition of the value of the arts as therapy to persons suffering from the ravages of flooding. The use of the arts is seen by many to have a calming effect on persons who may feel that they are not in control of their lives due to the forces of nature. In this regard, grants were awarded to artists to provide stress-reducing creative seminars, to drama troupes for interpretive productions related to the floods, and to arts organizations for the creation of specific works and exhibits. Additional funds helped art galleries purchase such needed equipment as dehumidifiers for collections conservation.

The department's historical division, the State Historical Society of Iowa (SHSI), aside from its role in the CREAT team effort mentioned above, adopted an aggressive stance in the search for and administration of federal disaster assistance funds. A total of \$910,000 was received from federal agencies for historic preservation projects. A sum of \$835,000 was made available in two installments from the National Park Service (NPS) while \$75,000 was forthcoming from the National Trust for Historic Preservation. Thirty-two grants were awarded based upon a strict flood recovery and stabilization criteria. Eligible structures included those either listed on or eligible for the National Register of Historic Places. The majority of the funds went for structural stabilization of historic properties while other funds helped restore adequate environments and HVAC systems for structural and collections conservation.

Additionally, the Historic Resource Development Program (HRDP), a state grant program administered by the SHSI, prioritized its 1994 awards to go to flood-damaged historic properties. Over \$114,000 in non-disaster funds were reallocated and subsequently awarded to help preserve Iowa's cultural landmarks.

IV. AREAS OF EXCELLENCE: See above summary.

V. PROBLEMS/ISSUES: None

# IOWA DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

## FLOOD DISASTER AFTER ACTION REPORT

### I. AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

The department's mission is to enhance the economic development of Iowa and provide job creation and increased prosperity and opportunities for its citizens. It provides direct financial and technical assistance and training, and coordinates other economic development programs from the local, community, and federal levels. During the floods, the department analyzed and provided data on the:

- A. Isolation of businesses from public use.
- B. Extent of disruption in business services or closings.
- C. Business damage estimates.
- D. Extent of insurance coverage for businesses.
- E. Financial hardships of businesses.
- F. Number of employees out of work.
- G. Loss or damage to business facilities or inventories and their importance to the area.
- H. Extent of lost tourism business.
- I. Loss and damage to community facilities and housing units occupied by low and moderate income persons.
- J. Feasibility of foreign firms establishing or expanding their business in Iowa.

### II. ORGANIZATION DURING EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

The Communications and Technology Services Bureau delivered a variety of services during the disaster. At the height of the flooding, the bureau provided organizational and staff support to the State Emergency Operations Center.

The Bureau of Community Financing developed ten "Housing Recovery Zones" throughout the state to efficiently distribute Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) and HOME flood recovery funds. These zones were created by utilizing the existing regions served by the Councils of Governments (COGs).

The State Economist functioned with the Department of Economic Development's (DEED) Research and Small Business personnel, with staff assistance from the Department of Employment

Services (DES), Des Moines Chamber of Commerce, and Department of Management.

The Small Business Administration set up a Disaster Application Center in the IDEED office building.

### III. SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS:

#### A. DISASTER RESPONSE PHASE

The Communications and Technology Services Bureau staff wrote press releases, fielded phone calls from the media and government officials, conducted interviews, gathered and checked information for accuracy, and conducted media interviews. The bureau assisted in the production of public service announcements to inform flood victims of assistance available. Later, the bureau wrote news releases concerning federal funding available to flood-stricken communities.

#### B. DISASTER RECOVERY PHASE

##### 1. Work Force Development.

##### a. Iowa Conservation Corps Activities.

Two days after the flooding hit the Des Moines area in July, Norwest Bank Iowa contacted the Office of the Governor and offered to pay for 300 youth to work for two to three weeks to assist with flood clean-up activities. After initial discussions with Norwest, the department contacted the Commission on National and Community Service to see if the Norwest money could be matched with a federal grant. On July 19, the department received a \$250,000 grant from the Commission matched with \$120,000 from Norwest Bank Iowa. The money allowed expansion of the Iowa Conservation Corps by 387 young people. These workers provided over 41,720.5 hours of flood relief services and clean-up efforts in the Des Moines, Davenport, and Ottumwa areas.

The young people performed work for the state (3%), counties (33%), municipalities (41%), public schools (5%), private, low income homes (10%), and other agencies (American Red Cross, Salvation Army)(8%). They performed the following tasks:

- \* Removed debris and mud, cleaned/painted facilities, and cleared public areas, downtown districts, state and local parks, and public streets.
- \* Prepared a facility for a shelter house, including painting.
- \* Removed sandbags from 70 blocks in West Des Moines. Removed 15,000 sandbags in the Davenport area.
- \* Cleared debris and mud, cleaned, performed demolition work, and painted in 53 low income homes and 4 schools.
- \* Reseeded and laid new sod in washed out areas. Replanted flower beds.
- \* Distributed 3,609,760 gallons of water to Des Moines residents.

- \* Delivered 300,000 gallons of water to nursing homes, day care centers, schools, and shut-ins.
- \* Distributed personal items, bedding, clothing, and food to an estimated 800 families.
- \* Prepared and served 75,000 hot and cold meals and assisted in clean-up, inventory and packing 60,000 pounds of food items shipped to other flood areas.
- \* Assisted in restoring 1.5 miles of railroad tracks and right of way in downtown West Des Moines.
- \* Provided 300 families with 10,000 food pantry items.
- \* Helped process flood relief claims.
- \* Provided 93 hours of day care for a PTA-sponsored day care center.

Another application has been approved by the Commission on National and Community Service for an additional \$400,000 to assist with DNR trail reconstruction at state parks, the 4-H Camping Center and to hire 10 VISTA volunteers to develop flood clean-up projects for young volunteers and youth service groups. Part of this effort will also be helping coordinate college students from around the country that wish to come to Iowa and assist with clean-up efforts.

b. Emergency Dislocated Worker Grant - JPTA

The Division of Workforce Development applied to the US Department of Labor for JPTA Title III dislocated worker funds and received a \$15 million Emergency Dislocated Worker Grant. The purpose of the grant is to place the workers dislocated due to the devastation caused by the flooding, long-term unemployed individuals, and other dislocated workers in temporary emergency public jobs to assist in the cleanup, repair and reconstruction of public and private non-profit property in floodstricken areas. This emergency public jobs activity is restricted to work directly related to flood disaster and is to be concentrated in those areas experiencing the most severe public sector damage.

The Emergency Dislocated Worker Grant funds have been distributed via contracts to the 16 JPTA Service Delivery Areas where the JPTA staff develop workites and provide intake and eligibility determination. The Division of Workforce Development entered into a contract with the Labor Institute for Workforce Development to help with outreach efforts and worksite development in the southeastern quadrant of the state where most of the damage took place. In addition, three monitors were hired to monitor the workites and review the participant records.

The 16 JPTA Service Delivery Areas have fully obligated the \$15 million available from the original grant. A request for an additional \$10 million has been submitted to the US Department of Labor along with a request to extend the time period of the grant to December 31, 1994.

Through the end of March 1994, 1659 individuals have been placed in emergency temporary public jobs doing a wide range of flood-related activities. Currently, 907 participants are employed with the Emergency Dislocated Worker Grant funds. Following is a list of types of work that has been and continues to be accomplished with the Emergency Dislocated Worker Grant funds:

- \* Removing debris, brush, and trees
- \* Property damage assessments
- \* Restoration of non-profit private property
- \* Removing and reconstructing collapsed retaining walls
- \* Washing, sanitizing, and painting flood-damaged surfaces
- \* Checking and restoring flood-damaged information files
- \* Measuring grain bins and land for the purpose of determining yield losses for ASCS disaster assistance program
- \* Arranging, publicizing, and presenting workshops regarding flood recovery
- \* Processing disaster claims
- \* Repairing water meters
- \* Clean-up and repair of sewer systems
- \* Rebuilding trails and footbridges
- \* Cleaning and restoring swimming pools
- \* Street, culvert, shoulder, and bridge repair
- \* Helping clients with disaster applications
- \* Setting up warehouses and offices for flood relief supplies
- \* Delivering supplies to flood relief recipients
- \* Assisting in the repair and inspecting of electrical, painting, sheet metal, plumbing, carpentry, and insulation projects
- \* Providing general clerical assistance directly related to the disaster response
- \* Replanting and reseeding

## 2. Business Finance Activities.

IDED identified a need for grants or delayed payback loans to assist businesses affected by flooding. Small Business Administration loans, while helpful in the long run, did not provide the immediate

relief needed by some impacted businesses. Also, it was felt that a number of key businesses could have used grants in order to qualify for, or leverage other loans.

Using 1993 regular CDBG and supplemental CDBG flood recovery funds, IDEED established a program to assist businesses whose closure would cause undue hardship to a community. Companies in basic industries like manufacturing were eligible for up to \$100,000; while essential retail and service business in communities under 5,000 were eligible for up to \$25,000.

A total of six applications were received for this program. Should severe flooding occur in 1994, consideration should be given to reactivating this program.

### 3. Marketing.

The Bureau of Marketing and Business Expansion responded to the flood with a variety of programs which communicated to our business prospects that Iowa was "open for business." A previously scheduled business recruiting trip to Los Angeles proceeded as scheduled and incorporated a special press conference for the Governor to extol the advantages of doing business in Iowa. Free ads were utilized in Inc. Magazine and Site Selection Handbook. A direct mail campaign aimed at key prospects was created reminding them of Iowa's many attributes. Public relations efforts were aggressively pursued: 1) four editions of the "Iowa Beats" newsletter were distributed to the national press and 2) a special edition of the Businessphere newsletter was distributed to former Iowa residents.

### 4. Iowa Tourism.

The impact of summer flooding on tourism in Iowa was severe. Visitation rates were down 33.9 percent during July, down 30.4 percent during August, and down 19.9 percent during September. Some businesses closed early during the season and some never opened. Lodging establishments and private campgrounds saw sharp decreases in business for the entire summer. An inaccurate perception that all of Iowa was "closed" due to extensive national media coverage of the flood caused many travelers to avoid Iowa. Even AAA was telling people not to drive through Iowa. In reality, only a few tourism attractions were closed at any given time during the summer. But even in the fall, people still stayed away because of misconceptions.

Several initiatives were taken by the department. A toll-free hotline was established in July to give travelers accurate information about which attractions and events were closed, relocated or still open. Over 15,000 calls were received on the hotline. The Division of Tourism hopes to keep this line open indefinitely to inform travelers of future events and attractions. Money for this project was taken from other division programs. Radio and printed advertising were placed in Iowa and major Midwest markets during August and September to dispel the myth that Iowa was "closed for business" and to encourage travel in Iowa for late summer and fall. A portion of the budget earmarked for spring advertising was used for last fall's campaign, and cannot be recouped without federal assistance. In cooperation with the Iowa State Convention and Visitors Bureau Association, the division conducted a special promotion at the Iowa State Fair and at several trade shows in August and September, stressing that "Iowa is open for business." Larger cities which depended on filling hotel rooms and booking conventions were hit particularly hard because of the decrease in the number of nights reserved and cancellations of reservations. It was extremely important for them to get the word out about Iowa's situation.

Marketing dollars are needed to replace the division's depleted fund and supplement advertising efforts for 1994. With its remaining budget, the division is able to do only a very small amount of marketing, when in reality, it is more important than ever to increase interest to out-of-state travelers and encourage them to visit Iowa in 1994. Immediate action on federal requests for supplemental tourism advertising is needed due to the short timeframe for planning and executing spring promotion and advertising campaigns. If poor weather and flooding problems occur in 1994, there will be a need to counteract negative publicity with positive messages about Iowa.

#### 5. International Business Activities.

The Governor led a delegation of state and local officials and developers to Europe and Asia to hold discussions with potential investors about the advantages and business opportunities in Iowa. Visits were targeted to ongoing projects initiated prior to the flooding to address concerns over the viability of locating in Iowa.

#### 6. State Economist Activities.

Chambers of Commerce were surveyed for extent of business losses and worker displacement. Follow-ups were conducted with affected businesses to determine specific damage impacts. Information and analysis were shared with emergency business groups (SBA, Small Business Development Centers) and state budget planners.

#### 7. Community and Rural Development Activities.

Since the flooding, the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has allocated approximately \$38.7 million to Iowa in flood appropriations. Almost \$10 million of the funding was made available through the HOME program. The remaining \$28.7 million was made available through the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program. The Bureau of Community Financing (BCF), a component of the Division of Community and Rural Development, is responsible for administering the \$38.7 million in HUD funds allocated to the state. In addition, HUD allocated approximately \$15.8 million in flood appropriations directly to eight "entitlement" cities in the state. The primary objective for the use of HUD flood funds was to repair, restore, and replace facilities damaged by the floods of 1993.

#### Repair and Restore

The CDBG funds were targeted to address the need to repair and restore flood damaged housing. This includes the rehabilitation of housing, the elevation of housing, and the acquisition, relocation of occupants, and demolition of housing that is too severely damaged to be repaired. In order to address this need as quickly as possible, the BCF created ten "Housing Recovery Zones" by combining several counties together to form each zone. Each zone has a "lead" county that receives the CDBG funds and disburses them to the other counties in the zone. The BCF utilized the existing Councils of Governments (COGs) in each zone to administer these funds. The COGs were chosen for this purpose because of their technical expertise in housing rehabilitation and CDBG grant administration, as well as their familiarity with local governments in their respective region. By creating the "Housing Recovery Zones" the BCF is using a cooperative approach to provide expeditious housing recovery assistance.

## Replace

The HOME funds were targeted to address the replacement of lost housing stock due to the floods of 1993. The three primary objectives of the replacement housing program are to replace the housing stock destroyed by the floods of 1993, to provide replacement housing that is affordable to low/moderate income households, and to provide replacement housing that would be attainable to flood victims. A simplified application form for the HOME funds is currently available.

## Other Flood Recovery Efforts

Although housing recovery assistance has been the primary focus of the BCF's flood recovery efforts, the bureau has also used CDBG funds to finance other unmet recovery needs. Examples of these efforts include: the repair of several flood damaged levees, the financing of several community based housing "buy-out" programs, and providing the 25 percent local match for FEMA 404 Hazard Mitigation Housing Projects. The BCF's flexible use of CDBG funds has allowed these funds to be a valuable resource in assortment of flood recovery projects.

## IV. AREAS OF EXCELLENCE

A. The innovative creation of "Housing Recovery Zones" to quickly and effectively repair and restore flood damaged housing as well as assess housing flood damage has streamlined the recovery process, and has provided an equitable allocation of funds throughout the state.

B. The reservation of HOME funds to finance housing initiatives for the replacement of housing stock that was lost due to the floods of 1993 was very beneficial. It was determined by the BCF that funds from the HOME program would be more suitable for new construction than for repair and restoration. This decision has assured the availability of funds for the construction of replacement housing in the state.

C. The flexible use of CDBG funds to address a wide spectrum of unmet flood recovery needs was very helpful. The ability and willingness of the BCF to use CDBG funds for a variety of flood recovery projects has expedited the flood recovery effort in many areas. Many important projects would have been delayed or cancelled for lack of funds had CDBG funds not been utilized.

D. Surveys to identify business losses and worker displacement was a cooperative effort through the Chambers of Commerce. Over 97 percent of the surveys were returned.

E. The quick response time of Norwest Bank Iowa and the Commission of National and Community Service in providing funds to augment the flood clean-up effort, greatly enhanced this evolution during a time when volunteer labor was becoming scarce.

## V. PROBLEMS/ISSUES

- A. Primary problem was the lack of quick and sufficient funding for business recovery.
- B. A system for coordinating the initial damage assessments was not in place. Recommend a data system fed by FEMA, Red Cross, and designated state/federal agencies.



C. A perception exists that economic conditions and infrastructure have been detrimentally harmed for the long term. Work will continue to put the situation in perspective with sound factual data reporting.

D. Federal funds should have been made available immediately to inform the public as to which tourism facilities were closed. This action would have avoided mass cancellations of reservations and planned visits to attractions not impacted by the disaster.

E. Application for the second round of funding for the Northwest Youth Task Force was slow and cumbersome.

# IOWA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

## FLOOD DISASTER AFTER ACTION REPORT

### I AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

The staff of the Iowa Department of Education were involved in two different phases with respect to the flood recovery coordination: 1) local level assessment, and 2) local level assistance.

### II ORGANIZATION DURING EMERGENCY OPERATIONS: Same

### III SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

The first major activity undertaken by the Department of Education was the assessment of flood damage to school districts, area education agencies (AEAs), and community colleges. A staff member in the department was assigned as the point of contact for all flood related local education agencies issues. Staff was assigned the responsibility of conducting a survey of damage to local schools, AEAs, and community colleges. An initial written assessment was conducted with the assistance of the Iowa Association of School Boards. A second assessment was conducted to ascertain a better cost estimate of damages and to gain more information on the types of damage incurred. Included in the second assessment was an inquiry when FEMA had been contacted, an assessment of long-term impact of the district, i.e. increased transportation costs, and inquiries to ascertain if asbestos was present in any of the facilities damaged by the flood. A direct contact was made to all districts which had flood damage but had not been in contact with FEMA.

The second activity in which department staff have been involved has been to provide state level support to the project "Outreach Iowa." This project which is being coordinated at the University of Iowa School of Social Work is providing training for school personnel to help identify children under stress and to provide training to enable staff to help these children. The Department of Education has promoted this effort and continues to provide support, advice, and coordination. A staff member of the department has been serving as our point of contact and has represented the department in some of the planning associated with "Outreach Iowa."

### IV AREAS OF EXCELLENCE

To enable us to survey all local school districts quickly, we asked for assistance from the Iowa Association of School Boards. Through the use of their fax system, we were able to quickly survey the extent of damage and help districts seek help and encourage them to contact their county FEMA coordinator. Having a single point of contact within the Department of Education also enabled districts to receive accurate and timely information. We believe we provided excellent support and communication to districts and were able to answer questions regarding the impact the flood had on districts. We were also able to alert districts to keep records throughout this year on areas such as increased transportation costs. These increased costs may be eligible for federal reimbursement.

## V. PROBLEMS/ISSUES

The most significant problem was the slow federal response to the University of Iowa's proposal from the School of Social Work to provide training to school personnel to help them identify and provide help to children in need of assistance. The workshops are in place and will occur between January and March, 1994. These workshops should have been set up prior to school starting or early in the school year.

# IOWA DEPARTMENT OF ELDER AFFAIRS

## FLOOD DISASTER AFTER ACTION REPORT

### I. AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

Primary mission is to assist 13 designated area agencies on aging conduct outreach and advocacy services for older Iowans so that disruption and unreimbursed losses for elders are minimized. Primary assistance to area agencies is the provision of communication and financial resources.

### II. ORGANIZATION DURING EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

Emergency operations required no structural changes in the organization of the aging network. The Department of Elder Affairs designates funds and provides broad policy guidelines and communication to 13 private, not-for profit area agencies on aging covering all 99 Iowa counties. All area agencies provide outreach, information, assistance and advocacy services on an ongoing basis. The timing and scope of these services were sharply intensified during this statewide disaster.

### III. SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

#### A. DISASTER RESPONSE PHASE

Department of Elder Affairs

The Department provided around the clock coverage in the State Emergency Operations Center. Tasks included:

- \* Communication with area agencies about Disaster Application Center schedules, declaration of counties, emergency shelter and feeding sites, elder services facility damage and assessments of unmet needs;
- \* Communication with all Des Moines area nursing facilities immediately prior to and after loss of the water system;
- \* Communication with Red Cross and US Department of Agriculture regarding feeding needs and resources;
- \* Application for federal financial resources to assist area agencies accomplish their mission.

Area Agencies on Aging

Area agencies immediately provided the following services:

- \* Opened senior centers and meal sites for emergency shelter and feeding for people of all ages;

- \* Contacted elders to determine needs and provide assistance;
- \* Staffed Disaster Application Centers;
- \* Expanded home delivered meals, transportation, home clean up and chore services;
- \* Delivered water for drinking and toilet flushing in Des Moines area.

## **B. DISASTER RECOVERY PHASE**

### **Department of Elder Affairs**

The Department provided the following assistance for the aging network recovery mission:

- \* Assisted communication between disaster recovery agencies and area agencies regarding individual benefit programs, eligibility requirements and restrictions;
- \* Obtained and immediately disbursed to area agencies, three federal grants in the amount of \$1,076,812 for elder outreach, advocacy and gap filling services;
- \* Obtained and immediately distributed to area agencies, monthly lists of all elderly FEMA applicants for follow up about unmet needs;
- \* Assisted communications between area agency recovery advocates and various recovery agencies on individual case resolution;
- \* Assisted elder service providers apply for FEMA Public Assistance program to reopen damaged facilities.
- \* Met weekly with the Health/Human Services Recovery Team (Elder Affairs, Human Services, Public Health, Division of Community Action Agencies and Iowa National Guard) to plan actions for outreach, migrant worker issues and the provision of resources to local agencies assisting targeted populations with flood recovery.

### **Area Agencies on Aging**

Area agencies assisted older Iowans recover from this disaster in the following ways:

- \* Located elders with flood losses who had not applied for recovery assistance by marketing and one-on-one contacts;
- \* Helped elders understand the application processes for multiple recovery benefits;
- \* Coordinated with other disaster recovery agencies;
- \* Advocated for the older population and individual elders;

- \* Identified gaps in recovery services and developed resources to fill those gaps;
- \* In some communities the area agency brought human service agencies together to plan for and avoid duplication of services.

#### IV. AREAS OF EXCELLENCE

##### A. Communication

Response phase communication among the Iowa Emergency Management Division, Department of Elder Affairs, U.S. Administration on Aging and the area agencies on aging was timely and effective. The key elements for this success were the decision to activate the State Emergency Operations Center for extended hours and the level of trust among federal, state and area staff in the aging network. Recovery phase communication among the Iowa Flood Recovery Team, Health/Human Services Recovery Team, Iowa National Guard, Department of Elder Affairs, U.S. Administration on Aging and area agencies has been helpful for completion of the recovery mission.

##### B. Coordination

Coordination among state departments and among local agencies produced positive results. Coordination problems were quickly resolved when identified. Weekly meetings of the Health/Human Services Recovery Team greatly assisted coordination and problem resolution.

#### V. PROBLEMS/ISSUES

##### A. Communication

1. Response phase communication regarding utilization of aging network resources for emergency feeding by the lack of decision making authority delegated to assigned representatives of the U.S. Department of Agriculture and Red Cross.

Recommendations for Improvement: Encourage organizations represented at the State EOC to either delegate adequate authority for action or arrange for immediate access to staff with such authority.

2. Communication of response and recovery between the Department of Elder Affairs, area agencies on aging, and other agencies was delayed because there were not direct computer linkages between these organizations.

Recommendations for Improvement: Encourage the application of current technology for communication of data.

##### B. Financial Resources

1. Federal, state, and local representatives in this disaster have almost universally acknowledged that thousands of vulnerable older Iowans would not receive equitable access to federal disaster entitlement assistance without substantial investment in outreach and advocacy services. Despite this agreement, and with the exception of an early infusion of Administration on Aging resources of five percent

of the identified need, federal support was delayed for months.

Recommendations for Improvement: Anticipate the needs of underserved populations in major disasters by including funding authority for agencies serving such populations either in FEMA appropriations or in other federal agency appropriations.

2. Federal financial resources did not always fit the needs of Iowa response and recovery. There were financial shortages at the same time there were unused funds. Millions of dollars of US Department of Labor Dislocated Worker Program funds were unable to be utilized due to a disparity between recovery needs and program requirements.

Recommendations for Improvement: Establish more flexibility in federally funded programs. Flexibility could either be built into the programs or authority for waivers of program requirements could be added to existing programs.

3. Some application procedures for federal funds were unclear and cumbersome. The US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) required the Department of Elder Affairs applications to be rejected by FEMA twice before being considered by HHS for recommendation to OMB, which in turn made recommendations to the President for Congressional approval of funds that Congress had already appropriated. This process delayed aid to older Iowans by months and placed additional administrative burdens on FEMA.

Recommendations for Improvement: Establish clear procedures for timely access to federal financial assistance.

# IOWA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES

## FLOOD DISASTER AFTER ACTION REPORT

### I. AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

Maintain employment security and workplace safety services. Implement Disaster Unemployment Insurance Program. Provide specialized service to employers, workers, the general public and public officials impacted by the flooding.

### II. ORGANIZATION DURING EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

Held daily flood impact update meetings. Daily meetings with Governor's Office and department heads. Posted information for staff.

Worked with Emergency Management Division and DES staff including three information specialists detailed to work in EMD. Contacted employers/businesses for water distribution sites.

Job Insurance Bureau formed a Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) unit, made up of nine temporary assignments to process DUA claims. If tax personnel moved out of temporary quarters due to flooding and worked out of their homes or were stationed in the administrative office. Other staff located in local offices that were flooded worked out of their homes or traveled to another office.

Three local offices were evacuated and temporary headquarters were obtained and occupied within 24 hours.

### III. SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

#### A. DISASTER RESPONSE PHASE

Identified essential services, contacted key staff to formulate plans.

Workers' Compensation operations continued as normal. Requests for continuance granted in instances where attorneys were unable to get to their offices.

Maintained Job Insurance tax operations availability to employers. Assisted affected employers reconstruct records and responded to employer's general needs.

Some Job Insurance appeal hearings in Des Moines were postponed until suitable space was acquired. By the second week of the flood, alternative hearing sites were found and the parties notified.

Disaster unemployment unit was established and DUA claims were taken at Disaster Application Centers and local offices. Several media releases were made to insure affected workers knew of program.

Available working conditions were modified. The claims section provided areas for the Des



Moines local staff to conduct factfinding and take initial claims by phone.

Bureau of Staff Services developed a computerized method to determine volume of claimants by week who filed during flood period.

Staff services information specialists worked 12-hour days and weekends disseminating flood information and handling media inquiries.

ADES employer hotline was set up to assist firms affected by severe flood damage to recruit clean-up workers.

Bureau of Staff Services and Kansas City Bureau of Labor Statistics staff telephoned over 1,100 employers to urge them to provide monthly employment and payroll data as soon as possible.

Information and analysis of flood impact on Iowa economy and employment provided to various officials and organizations.

#### **B. DISASTER RECOVERY PHASE**

DUA claims taken and processed. Des Moines local office in temporary quarters.

#### **IV. AREAS OF EXCELLENCE**

Staff responded positively throughout disaster. Evacuated, moved, operated in less than 24 hours in several locations. Virtually no interruption in service.

Division of Labor developed a safety and health checklist for employers in conjunction with the Association of Business and Industry. This information provided at no charge gave a list of hazards to be aware of when sending employees back in after the business had been flooded. Alerted the public of the need to verify contractor registration.

Businesses which were flooded were given priority when requesting on-site consultation visits. This service was free of charge. Additional emergency staff was added on a temporary basis.

The State of Texas assisted in supplying the agency with software to help in the processing of DUA. Colorado and Nebraska provided staff to assist with claims.

#### **V. PROBLEMS/ISSUES**

A. Although DES handled the emergency exceptionally well, DES was not prepared for such an emergency. A disaster recovery plan is underway. This plan needs to address:

DES Disaster Team appointed with identified liaison for state and community with responsibility statements. Up front plans for evacuation by bureau.

Staff - People available with physical capability to lift and relocate computer/electronic equipment to safe locations.

Transportation - Readily accessible trucks with enclosed covers and lift gates to relocate equipment to safe areas.

Warehousing - Adequate space to use on a temporary basis to store equipment in safe, dry conditions until it is acceptable to place back in service.

Communications plan for phones and other equipment.

Alternate locations available to house staff.

Additional staff to meet disaster needs.

B. Need to build into Job Insurance system an identifier of applicants affected by disaster.

C. Disaster Unemployment Assistance Program

The formula for calculating the weekly benefit amount for self-employed individuals is grossly unfair. Regular unemployment insurance is based on gross earnings of worker while under DUA, self-employed assistance is based on net earnings.

US Department of Labor policies for payments to the self-employed are prejudicial to farmers and bears no reasonable relationship to modern agriculture.

The five-step calculation for unemployed worker DUA weekly benefit amounts is a bureaucratic nightmare, impossible to explain to trained staff or the general public.

The federal DUA manual and forms have not been updated since 1977 and are completely out of date.

The process for funding applications to pay DUA claims needs to be simplified to prevent delays in paying claims.

The US Department of Labor should consider forming a strike team of at least five DOL employees who would go to a state (or states) when a disaster strikes to provide assistance.

Biannual national meetings of state DUA coordinators would provide a forum for developing national strategies and an opportunity for developing DUA expertise.

D. State legislation on handling Job Insurance charges should be enacted for future disasters.

# IOWA DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL SERVICES

## FLOOD DISASTER AFTER ACTION REPORT

### I. AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

The Department of General Services is responsible for maintaining the entire State Capitol Complex. Protective measures were taken to insure health and safety of all complex employees and visitors. It was a priority of the Governor to keep the State offices open and operating. This entailed a wide variety of services. The responsibility was magnified by the loss of water and limited electrical usage/availability. Another key area of responsibility was communications. There was a threat of the Des Moines River bridge washing out connecting the State Complex with US West. With the possibility of losing all telephones, a microwave was purchased and installed at the Lucas Building. The Department also maintains the Iowa Communications Network, the fiber-optic system, constructed throughout the state. The flood caused several wash-outs of the fiber-optic cable and required immediate repair to keep the Network operational.

### II. ORGANIZATION DURING EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

Main areas will be categorized by divisions.

**Communications** - Kept the telephone complex system operational and the Iowa Communication Network fiber-optic system repaired as needed. Immediate and continuous responsibility installing emergency phones for the Emergency Management Division which were located in different areas of the Hoover Building. The Division's electronic and technical staff assisted in installing and moving equipment as needed or necessary due to possible flood water damage. The state helped Des Moines Water Works and the City of Des Moines with telephone access. The Communications telephone operators were responsible for setting up numerous conference calls between the Governor's staff and all Department Directors. The conference calls were very time consuming and could be streamlined with the purchase of special phones for speed conference calling.

**Property Management** - Maintained building operations on a daily basis. The Complex did not shut down during this emergency. Due to the loss of water, portable toilets had to be leased and necessary supplies had to be furnished for employee health, i.e. sanitary wipes for cleaning hands. Drinking water was supplied to all buildings. The Emergency Management Division is located in the Hoover Building Level A. This area and B-level north-side, the mainframe computer area, have a standalone cooling system equipped with emergency generators. Also, the Emergency Management Division is equipped with a well and bathroom facilities, for this area alone was fully operational. All other areas on the Complex were maintained with minimal lighting, and no air conditioning, which is a water-chilled system. Due to the immediate loss of water over the weekend when the flood first became a reality, damage was caused to various pieces of equipment. Equipment repairs were made during the emergency and after normal operations were reinstated.

**Information Services** - Needed to maintain chiller operation and full electric power to the mainframe computer equipment. Assisted by our Property Management Division.

**Printing** - Had staff available to print material for Emergency Management as needed. Reproduction equipment had to be removed and reinstalled in one of our satellite printing areas located downtown due to flooding in the building.

**Purchasing** - Arranged leasing of portable toilets and emergency purchases were completed on an as-needed basis. Assisted not only General Services, but all state departments on flood-related purchasing. Made arrangements for food being supplied to Emergency Management.

**Vehicle Dispatch** - Had to move State Fleet cars as flood water threatened the facility.

All of the employees of General Services in every division, assisted key staff in keeping the State Complex operational. Some staff were present 24 hours daily during the disaster.

### III. SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

#### A. DISASTER RESPONSE PHASE

The Department of General Services had to maintain and operate the Complex to full capability as much as the disaster would allow. No shutdown of the state facility was allowable. Staff responded immediately as the disaster was announced.

#### B. DISASTER RECOVERY PHASE

Health and safety were maintained at all times - number one concern. Emergency repairs were handled at the time, and permanent repairs were made as time allowed, or after the main thrust of the disaster. The state continued to repair damage to the Iowa Communications Network.

### IV. AREAS OF EXCELLENCE

- \* All General Services staff pulling together as a department.
- \* Construction of 150 portable toilets in four hours.

### V. PROBLEMS/ISSUES

General Services had never been put to the test on such a disaster of this magnitude or such a wide area of responsibility. We as a whole did not know the disaster process, or FEMA procedures. Emergency Management got disaster and public assistance information out, but due to the complexity of an entire state suffering the disaster at the same time, mis-communication occurred and uncertainty of what we, as a department, could do, or be allowed to complete, under FEMA regulations. Possible updates on the process to key personnel would be advantageous to improve knowledge for future disasters. Possibly, Emergency Management should involve more functional areas in their disaster readiness training sessions.

The department was unsure of which forms needed to be submitted to FEMA, and what was, or was not, an allowable expense.

# IOWA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

## FLOOD DISASTER AFTER ACTION REPORT

### I. AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

The Division of Community Action Agencies exists to develop and expand the capacity at the community level to assist families and individuals to achieve economic and social self-sufficiency, and to ensure that the basic energy needs of Iowa's low income population are met. The nineteen Community Action Agencies (CAAs) in Iowa exist to develop solutions to poverty in communities throughout the state. A center is located in each of Iowa's 99 counties, where low income, elderly, and disabled families and individuals may seek assistance. The mission of the Commission on Latino Affairs is to improve the quality of life of all Iowans by increasing statewide understanding of the social, cultural and economic contributions Latinos make in Iowa. Additionally, our mission is to serve as a resource center which promotes positive change by assessing the issues and making recommendations to decision-makers of the challenges facing Iowa's Latino community. It is important to see that the areas we were most responsible for during the floods, were in networking and bridging with community, state and city agencies, i.e. Health Department, Red Cross, FEMA. We were instrumental in communicating issues regarding health warnings, financial aid, emergency shelters, water distribution sites, and in disseminating information to community organizations, becoming a command station for them when their area was put on evacuation alert. Crucial to all of our networking was the output of information in the Spanish language.

### II. ORGANIZATION DURING EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

On August 2, Iowa's 19 CAAs were surveyed for the purpose of securing useful information about their roles during the month of July, 1993 in relation to Iowa's flooding and for their assessment of future needs. The CAAs addressed flood related problems of the poor through their pre-existing network of county centers.

The Commission on Latino Affairs responded by organizing a system of volunteers on an on-call basis for interpreting and translating written flood information from English to Spanish. We distributed lists of interpreters to many agencies including United Way, Red Cross, Health Department, Social Services, etc. We organized meetings with local citizens and community organizations and linked people to correct resources for their needs.

### III. SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

#### A. DISASTER RESPONSE PHASE

To pay for flood-related services, agencies increased their July, 1993 CSBG budgets by as much as 40 percent, and over \$3 million in private sector money was received. Comparing the CAA's July '93 activities to their July '92 activities reveals a substantial increase in activity, reflecting a significant response to flood-impacted households.

Advocating for Migrant Workers - Searching for funds for migrant workers who were displaced workers.

Networking with Proteus - \$10 thousand given by Salvation Army for migrant workers to return to their homes of origin.

Raising public awareness about problems encountered by Latinos who do not speak English or who have minimal aptitude in English.

Increasing the network alert in community organizations who were not responding with urgency to the situation.

Soliciting response from mass media. Public information messages began to go out in Spanish, and this changed the tide for the Hispanic population who were not being reached.

Networking with out of state agencies - i.e. Florida, Hurricane Andrew experiences, and California, earthquake areas. What solutions worked for them and what methods would be better for us here.

In summary, the greatest area of excellence was in avoiding and averting serious health problems because we were able to communicate to the people in two languages. Without Spanish language being used to reach a large segment of the population, we could readily see how we could have had many sick babies and children who would have been drinking contaminated water. The response from the Health Department, United Way, and Red Cross was heroic in their successes with translating materials into Spanish through the use of our interpreters.

#### B. DISASTER RECOVERY PHASE

Staff attended weekly meetings of the Flood Recovery Coordination Team coordinated by the National Guard. To facilitate recovery at Muscatine Island, division staff compiled a report detailing area background information and current needs assessment of residents.

#### IV. AREAS OF EXCELLENCE

Due to the efforts of the CAAs in responding to flood problems of the poor and the advocacy of the Division of CAAs, Iowa was awarded a Federal Emergency Supplemental grant under the State Community Services Block Grant in the amount of \$2,566,000 to assist low-income individuals and families directly affected by the flood disaster. CAA staff, throughout Iowa, attended flood relief meetings with other agencies in their communities to help develop plans to assist flood victims. Staff worked at distribution centers, sandbagged, prepared meals, and assisted individuals in filling out assistance forms. Local offices became distribution sites for food, vouchers, drinking water, school supplies and bedding. Information was mailed out to governmental resources as well as published in area newspapers, offering the local Family Development Centers as a source of assistance to those people who needed to apply to FEMA, SBA, or any source of flood assistance.

## V. PROBLEMS/ISSUES

A. Initially, one of the biggest problems encountered was the unavailability of accurate damage information. FEMA did not seem to discover the capability of CAAs in reaching affected clients until late in the process. Despite massive coordination, the bureaucracy seemed to impede immediate help for desperate people.

### Recommendations for Improvement:

- \* Bring CAAs into state level emergency response plan.
- \* Printed information of resources must be readily available.
- \* Continue to network with other states.
- \* The Division of Community Action Agencies will be preparing a "Lessons Learned" report at the conclusion of the emergency supplemental grant period, which will include recommendations based upon experience during the grant period.

B. There has not been a system in place to network with immediate action. This was implemented during the crisis and is in play today for use in disseminating public information. Before the flood crisis, people were not as aware of how many Latinos reside in Iowa, and especially there was little knowledge of how many are monolingual in Spanish. The greatest problem in all areas was the communication and language barrier.

### Recommendations for Improvement:

- \* Continue to publish materials in Spanish in critical areas such as Health and Human Services.
- \* Maintain ties with media so that they give more air time to Spanish information in times of crisis.
- \* Continue to network and build coalitions that meet on a monthly basis to follow-up and learn from this flood experience.
- \* Identify more interpreting sources and keep communication open with them at all times, thus utilizing them with an emergency network.
- \* Identify Latino community leaders who can mobilize the people with greater speed i.e. when some Latinos did not want to leave their homes during the threat of a levee break. A respected community leader could have been called to influence them to evacuate.
- \* That any published report or manual that results from the study of problems and provides recommendations should be translated into Spanish, so that all of Iowa's citizens can be better prepared for future disasters.

# IOWA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

## FLOOD DISASTER AFTER ACTION REPORT

### I. AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

- A. Administration and delivery of Emergency Food Stamps.
- B. Administration of Individual and Family Grant (IFG) program.
- C. Crisis mental health counseling services.
- D. Administration of flood supplemental funding for Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) services.
- E. Participation on state's Health and Human Services Flood Response Team.
- F. Maintenance of all regular human services programs despite crisis conditions.

### II. ORGANIZATION DURING EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

- A. Central office staff were assigned to 24 hour coverage in the Emergency Operations Center as part of the full state response.
- B. Staff from central or field offices were assigned to the Disaster Assistance Centers (DACs).
- C. DHS's five regional offices, local offices in all counties, eight institutions, and central office in Des Moines provided a service network. All operations continued without interruption.
- D. Administration and central staffing for the Individual and Family Grant program was located at the Disaster Field Office (DFO), first in Cedar Rapids, then in Davenport, and finally in Des Moines. Contract staff were hired, trained, and deployed in each respective location.
- E. Staff were assigned to participate on the Health and Human Services Flood Response Team along with other state agencies.

### III. SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

#### A. DISASTER RESPONSE PHASE

- 1. Emergency Food Stamps

From July 17 through July 30, DHS issued emergency food stamps in the 55 counties approved by the Federal Food and Nutrition Service (FNS). When the program ended on July 30, \$1,854,251 in food stamp coupons had been distributed to approximately 6,000 households of flood victims.



## 2. Individual and Family Grant Program

The IFG unit was established in Cedar Rapids in April. Staffing was comprised of a director and two staff. Additional staff were hired through Employment Services (Job Services Division) with subsequent relocation of the DFO to Davenport and ultimately Des Moines. This recruitment and training of staff was repeated in Davenport and Des Moines.

Peak staff level for this program was 28. Staff are trained to determine eligibility and process grants for personal property replacement, hazard mitigation made to minimize impact of future flooding, provide emergency living expenses for flood victims, and determine the eligibility and participation of IFG funding in relocation or buyout programs in cooperation with local governments in Iowa.

## 3. Crisis Mental Health Counseling

An immediate, crisis mental health, counseling plan was submitted to FEMA on July 23 and approved on July 27. Twenty-seven community mental health centers received local grants for outreach, counseling, screening and diagnosis, referral, and consultation and education services. Included in the plan was a grant to Iowa State University for "Iowa Concern," a flood crisis hotline. This immediate crisis counseling grant totalled \$85,917.

## 4. The Health and Human Services Flood Response Team

DHS participated in frequent meetings with other members of the flood response team, including the departments of Public Health, Elder Affairs, and Human Rights. These meetings helped to coordinate the applications each agency made to FEMA or for supplemental federal funding. The meetings were beneficial in avoiding duplication of efforts, filling gaps in service, resolving problems, and disseminating information to federal, state, and local officials. DHS forwarded over 40 requests for FEMA funding, frequently including requests for programs operated by other agencies but still within the purview of federal agencies related to DHS.

## 5. Maintenance of regular DHS service programs

Despite challenging working conditions and the temporary relocation of two county offices, DHS maintained all on-going regular services. Welfare assistance, child support checks, payments to providers of service, services for residents at the eight institutions, and social work services by local staff continued without interruption at a time many Iowans were especially dependent upon "business as usual" by DHS.

## B. DISASTER RECOVERY PHASE

1. The Individual and Family Grant program is expected to continue at least another year. Totals through February 7, 1994, are 10,619 applications received, 6,924 grants awarded, and a total of nearly \$8 million of grant funds disseminated.

2. DHS is administering two additional mental health grants to provide services during the recovery phase. FEMA granted \$2,945,089 to extend the original crisis counseling grant for a full year and to cover all 99 counties. Also, a supplemental appropriation of \$2,614,000 has been awarded for services to vulnerable populations; for depression awareness trainings; for the National Rural Mental Health Centers

Conference; and to fund a "New Farm Crisis" program in the rural areas.

3. A supplemental of \$2,766,000 in Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) funding has been received from the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). DHS has contracted with the 25 most flood-impacted counties (based upon volume of FEMA requests) to use 75% of this special grant. The remaining 25% will be administered directly by DHS in the 74 remaining counties to purchase social services for flood victims who have not found any other source of assistance. Services can include day care during rebuilding, retraining, relocation, or search for new employment. A variety of family services to cope with crises are also major components of the SSBG program.

#### IV. AREAS OF EXCELLENCE

##### A. Emergency Food Stamps

Aided with special training and computerized support to field staff, a high level of quality control was maintained in this program. Unlike other states, error rates and fraud cases were held to a minimum.

DHS also received excellent support from the Iowa National Guard and from local law enforcement in providing security, crowd control, drinking water, restroom facilities, and general assistance to the public at the food stamp distribution sites.

##### B. Crisis Mental Health Counseling

DHS was fortunate to have had key staff in Washington, D.C. at the very time the President declared a statewide disaster. This played a role in speeding up both the application and approval process for requests for federal assistance.

Coordination was excellent with other state agencies, including the Departments of Public Health and Elder Affairs. These agencies also received funding for matters that were related and integrated into an overall flood recovery program.

##### C. Technical Assistance

DHS deeply appreciates the technical assistance received from federal officials (three officials were on-site in central office for over a week) and from other states. Florida deserves special mention for sending officials to Iowa to share what they had learned the previous year in the Hurricane Andrew disaster and to assist us in transferring a very useful software program for use in our IFG operations.

##### D. Individual and Family Grant Program

The core leadership of the IFG program were experienced workers in IFG, finance, and quality control. The temporary staff referred for hiring were excellent. The training and leadership developed a highly motivated and responsive work group.

##### E. DHS Staff

DHS is very proud of the staff work at the line-level throughout the state, both in flood relief

activities and in the important on-going services of the department. Despite high caseloads in normal times, the additional challenges of the disaster were met with high motivation and deep commitment.

F. Iowa Flood Recovery Coordination Team and Health and Human Services Flood Response Team

Both the Governor's Flood Recovery Coordination Team and the Health and Human Services Flood Response Team were excellent in providing information and coordination necessary to respond to the disaster quickly and effectively.

## V. PROBLEMS/ISSUES

### A. Individual and Family Grant Program

1. The Disaster Field Office was twice relocated. This required recruiting and training contract staff to handle the workload on three different occasions. As a result, processing of applications extended to over two weeks during a critical period of the crisis phase. Once stabilized, the IFG staff were able to reduce the turnaround time to 48 hours.

2. Grant processing operations were located in Kansas City. It would have been much easier to manage processing if the operation had been moved to Iowa. FEMA agrees with this recommendation for the future.

3. Assessing vehicle damage was the single most difficult part of determining the size of IFG grants. The process for determining vehicle claims needs to be improved. A backlog in vehicle claims has accumulated. At present we check ownership, registration, number of vehicles in a household and verify damages submitted by the applicant and a mechanic. Local verifications have been done by DHS staff throughout the state. This process has been slow and very difficult. Vehicle inspection possibly should be included within the FEMA inspection role in future disasters, and perhaps at least to the extent of the number of vehicles damaged in the disaster.

### B. Application process for federal grants

Federal agencies, anxious to provide quick response, nearly overwhelmed DHS with requests for data and damage estimates. DHS was required to estimate Iowa's need for social service assistance during the period in which the floodwaters were still rising and no end was in sight. As a result, DHS filed "worst case" requests that assumed major damage to Iowa's infrastructure and an economic disaster to the state in general that might require the federal government to assume that maximum share of social services funding permitted by law. DHS's initial full list of FEMA requests totalled over \$900 million for a period of two years following the declaration of disaster. As it happened, the "worst case" did not happen. The DHS request total was far more than necessary and did produce a negative reaction from media who assumed DHS was attempting to raid the federal treasury.

A possible solution: Changes in the Stafford Disaster Act to automatically trigger federal assistance in key areas even before accurate damage estimates can be made. This would allow time for estimates to be made based upon actual data rather than either optimistic or pessimistic assumptions.

For example, if in the case of a statewide disaster, HHS were to make an automatic supplemental of 5% of the state's normal SSBG grant, then a stable source of funding would be immediately available. A 5% increase in need would seem to be a reasonable, even modest, assumption. As it happened, the final SSBG supplemental nearly six months after the declaration of disaster was very close to 5% of the state's SSBG regular grant.

Certain automatic triggers of federal funding in many areas of federal/state partnership ought to be carefully considered in possible amendments to the Stafford Act.

# IOWA DEPARTMENT OF INSPECTIONS AND APPEALS

## FLOOD DISASTER AFTER ACTION REPORT

### AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

The Inspections Division of the Iowa Department of Inspections and Appeals (DIA) has the responsibility of licensing, inspecting, and regulating approximately 14,000 food establishments, restaurants, commissaries, and hotels in the State of Iowa. DIA has contracted with 34 county/municipal health departments to complete regular food safety and sanitation inspections as mandated by Iowa code in 80 counties. The remaining 19 counties are inspected by DIA inspectors. There are a total of approximately 80 staff members trained as food inspectors in Iowa among state, county and city agencies on full and part time status. Iowa has adopted model food codes from the US Food and Drug Administration which includes some basic provisions for food safety during disasters and emergency occurrences. Central Iowa Inspectors Health Division (Polk County staff) is the contracting agency responsible for food inspections in Polk County and the surrounding vicinity.

### ORGANIZATION DURING EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

The DIA Inspections Division is responsible for providing on-going training and FDA recommendations on disaster procedures to food inspectors in the state. The DIA Program Manager re-issued previous inspectors and training materials from FDA by mail in early July as eastern Iowa counties started becoming affected by flood waters. Communication by phone was maintained by DIA with the contracting health departments on the current situation occurring in the flood-affected areas. Additional assistance from DIA staff was offered to these counties (eastern Iowa and the Ames area) during the week of July 10th but all contracting agencies stated the food establishment surveillance was under control. Specific questions on salvaging food impacted by the flood waters were answered as they occurred. The contracting health departments are responsible for developing their disaster response plans in line with FDA and DIA recommendations.

### THE SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

#### A. DISASTER RESPONSE PHASE

The disaster response by DIA and the contracting health departments was good until July 11th, when the flood crisis hit the Des Moines area and contaminated the public water supply. Iowa Food Codes require that food establishments have a safe water supply and electricity in order to operate. If neither available, they must close until potable water and power can be restored. Approximately 1,500 establishments in Polk County were affected by the water and power outage, and Iowa had never before had a disaster of this magnitude involving so many establishments at one time.

In the initial disaster response meeting with representatives from the Iowa Department of Public Health, Centers for Disease Control, the Food and Drug Administration, Central Iowa Inspections Health Division, and DIA it was decided that trying to close all the food establishments and restaurants in the affected areas would make the crisis worse. Some basic guidelines had to be developed quickly to answer

questions from the food establishments and the public. DIA was in daily contact with FDA officials from the Southwest Regional Office in Dallas, Texas. The Iowa Department of Public Health organized daily meetings at the capitol complex with federal, state, county, and city environmental health officials for approximately the first ten days of the crisis.

The Central Iowa Inspections Chief provided disaster information spots concerning food and lodging establishments to television and radio stations during the crisis. DIA provided phone coverage for hundreds of incoming calls daily, because Central Iowa Inspections phone system was not functioning for over a week. Copies of the update memos were faxed to establishments requesting them. The update memos were also delivered to any operating establishments by staff inspectors from Central Iowa Inspections, DIA, and the City of Des Moines. Other contracting health departments around the state offered assistance to Central Iowa Inspections Health Division. North Central Iowa Inspections (Cerro Gordo County) assisted by providing three inspectors to complete daily tests for chlorine residual on the temporary water supply stations set up by the National Guard around the City of Des Moines.

#### **B. DISASTER RECOVERY PHASE**

DIA and Central Iowa Inspections were in contact several times daily to update information and respond to complaints received. During the weeks of July 12th and July 19th, other contracting health departments reported more food establishments affected by the floods (Lee County, Johnson County, the City of Ottumwa, Shelby County, Carroll County, Black Hawk County, Van Buren County, Dickinson County, and Linn County), but most felt they had the staff to cover the situation. Updates from the Des Moines situation were faxed immediately to those food inspection agencies requesting it and sent by mail to others not directly affected. New questions came up daily and some of the updates had to be changed when a problem occurred. Establishments not willing to comply with the emergency guidelines were handled on a case by case basis by the assigned regulatory agency.

DIA and Central Iowa Inspections were also in contact with FDA investigators responsible for surveillance of wholesale food firms (food processors and food warehouses) in July during the second and third week of the flood crisis. All wholesale food firms without potable water were contacted by phone or in person by DIA, Central Iowa Inspections, or FDA. If food processors were operating, they were required to use commercially bottled water, or show evidence that the water transportation system was properly protected, tested, and chlorinated on a daily basis. Central Iowa Inspections continued to inspect restaurants and grocery stores in the Des Moines area and DIA was responsible for calling on the wholesale food firms.

#### **IV. AREAS OF EXCELLENCE**

The general spirit of cooperation of federal, state, county, and municipal agencies involved in environmental health, along with the public support in all counties in Iowa was exceptional during the flood crisis. Technical expertise was available through this cooperation, and the learning experience for food inspection personnel was one of a kind.

## V. PROBLEMS/ISSUES

Some of the problems that arose during the flood crisis for DIA and the food inspection agencies included conflicting information received from FDA and CDC on one technical issue. This issue involved the use of commercial dishwashers in food establishments without potable water. When public water service was restored to the Des Moines area, the water was not potable. During initial disaster response meetings with the Department of Public Health and CDC, DIA and Central Iowa Inspections were told that when water service was restored food establishments could use non-potable water to operate commercial heat sanitization and chemical dishwashers. FDA officials from the Southwest Region Office in Dallas disagreed with the policy, and stated that dishwashers must be operated only with potable water to sanitize food equipment properly. Another problem was that two agencies, DIA and the Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship, responsible for regulatory food safety, were not contacted initially by the Iowa Department of Public Health to attend the daily environmental health meetings on the Capitol Complex. The miscommunication was rectified, and more planning meetings were scheduled between Public Health and DIA.

Communication between DIA and contracting agencies could be greatly enhanced by the use of computer electronic mail during disaster situations and foodborne illness investigations. Following the flood crisis, a federal disaster grant was provided to purchase computer systems with modems for county health departments in all 99 Iowa counties. The computer systems tied into the Iowa Department of Public Health, but not DIA. The Inspections Division does not currently have computer hardware to tie into the system. However, DIA is exploring the federal disaster grant to determine if funds are available for purchasing this equipment. Since the majority of the food contracts have access to this computer system, it would allow DIA the ability to communicate instantly with the contracting health departments.

At a Food and Drug Administration Seminar in October, DIA food inspection staff attended an initial planning meeting of four midwestern states (Iowa, Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska) that were affected by the flood crisis. The FDA Southwest Region and these four states are in the initial stages of requesting a grant from the US Public Health Service, Office of Emergency Preparedness. This four state Food Safety Work Group is proposing that a disaster training manual for sanitarians be developed to aid us in our continued response to the Floods of '93. What we hope to plan is a combination of printed and video material that will be beneficial to both the sanitarians in the field and the program managers in central office to spot potential problems before they escalate. Work will start immediately if the grant is approved.

# IOWA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

## FLOOD DISASTER AFTER ACTION REPORT

### I. AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

In response to the massive flooding that hit Iowa in July 1993, the Iowa Attorney General mobilized her forces to fight consumer fraud relating to the flooding. Based on Florida's experience with Hurricane Andrew, we anticipated a variety of scams would be directed to flood victims, including price-gouging, home repair scams, false charities, and others.

### II. ORGANIZATION DURING EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

The Iowa Attorney General's office is located in the state capital, Des Moines. However, we opened temporary satellite offices in several eastern Iowa towns that had been hard hit by flooding, including Davenport, Ottumwa, Burlington, and Fort Madison. These offices were set up to help us better protect consumers by using local media to publicize information consumers could use to help themselves avoid being victimized by flood scams. Staff at the satellite offices also monitored local activities and worked with local authorities concerning flood related scams. At each location, the Attorney General met with local officials and media to help publicize the local offices and to offer our assistance. The satellite offices are now closed. However, we felt they were quite successful.

### III. SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

In addition to the efforts of our satellite office, we also got the word out to consumers on how they could protect themselves by having staff members participate in several radio and television interviews across the state. Other staff members took part in a weekly radio call-in program on a large Des Moines AM radio station. The Attorney General also travelled to other regions of the state to visit with local officials and media. In addition, we issued a series of press releases and consumer advisories on flood-related fraud topics and drafted a warning sheet concerning home repair scams that is included with each FEMA check mailing.

### IV. AREAS OF EXCELLENCE

When the floods hit Iowa, the Florida Attorney General offered to fly members of his staff to Iowa to offer their expertise from Hurricane Andrew. One attorney and two investigators from his staff assisted by setting up a "war room" where complaints related to price-gouging during the flooding and recovery period were addressed.

Our office adopted an emergency rule defining price-gouging during or in the aftermath of a disaster, as an unfair practice in violation of the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act. We then recruited state and local retail and home repair business associations to assist us in publicizing the rule and encouraging their members to notify us of violations. We also set up a tollfree number state-wide for consumers to report price-gouging.



We received nearly 400 price-gouging calls during the three weeks following the major flooding in Des Moines. The vast majority of the calls related to sales of bottled water and soda, both in short supply due to the shut-down of Des Moines' public water supply. With the help of the Florida contingent, we investigated the most serious allegations. In most instances, businesses contacted were cooperative and either had not actually raised their before-flood prices or appeared to have legitimate reasons for raising their prices. However, it appeared to us that several portable toilet suppliers may have engaged in price-gouging. Thus, we contacted each company we could identify that served the Des Moines area during the aftermath of the flood and asked them to provide information relating to their before-flood and after-flood prices. We are currently reviewing their submissions and it appears several of the portable toilet companies were engaged in questionable practices.

V. PROBLEMS/ISSUES: None

# IOWA DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT

## FLOOD DISASTER AFTER ACTION REPORT

### I. AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

The Department of Management (DOM) has the responsibility of overall financial management of the State's revenue and expenditures.

### II. ORGANIZATION DURING EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

The Department of Management did not significantly change its structure during the emergency other than to assign staff to track the overall financial damage to the state and analyze state general fund liability as a result of the disaster.

One budget staff member was assigned to EMD due to his previous work experience in that division.

### III. SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

#### A. DISASTER RESPONSE PHASE

A Department of Management representative met as part of a 'core' staff during the onset of the disaster to assist in coordinating information and resources. The Department of Management also assisted in disseminating information to Executive Branch agencies.

#### B. DISASTER RECOVERY PHASE

The Department of Management coordinated meetings with agency disaster liaisons to begin the process of requesting recovery funds through the State's Emergency Management Division (EMD) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). DOM staff worked with Public Defense, EMD, and FEMA personnel to coordinate agency requests for funding. A representative from DOM served on the Governor's Flood Recovery Coordination Team. DOM continues to be involved in the assessment of state damage as it relates to the financial obligation for state general funds.

### IV. AREAS OF EXCELLENCE

During the first few hours of the disaster, a group of Executive Branch department heads was brought together to put emergency plans into place. This helped in setting the stage for a collaborative effort in dealing with the disaster.

The development of a "form" to request disaster relief funding, identifying agency disaster liaisons, and having a central channel for disaster recovery/relief funds was very helpful in keeping a handle on the assistance the state was requesting. This process helped in communicating with EMD, FEMA, and at the congressional level when funding and program waivers were being requested. This also provided a "check and balance" to the information the Department of Public Defense was tracking.

The designation of the Governor's Flood Recovery Coordination Team was vital in addressing the state's issues during the response and recovery phase. The federal recovery meetings were also vital in enhancing communications between the state and federal agencies, as well as between/among federal agencies. Both forums provided the opportunity for a "check and balance" between state and federal officials of how well response and recovery efforts were progressing.

## V. PROBLEMS/ISSUES

Better coordination and communication of the state's financial obligation for disaster recovery costs is needed. It is essential that the Department of Management be kept abreast of the overall state damage assessments and be given prior notice of any pending state general fund obligation that is presented to the Executive Council for consideration.

It would be helpful if ICN could be used to link fiscal information for tracking purposes. An electronic bulletin board system would also be beneficial in providing the most current information on weather conditions, disaster reports, etc.

# IOWA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES

## FLOOD DISASTER AFTER ACTION REPORT

### I. AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

The Department of Natural Resources is responsible for the management and regulation of natural resources in the State of Iowa. Areas of authority include air pollution, drinking water, energy, fish and wildlife, flood plain development, forests and forestry, geology, hazardous materials and conditions, parks, recreation and preserves, solid waste, water pollution, and water use. Specific responsibilities related to the 1993 flood disaster included protection of public drinking water supplies, monitoring of conditions in flood prone areas, protection of parks, preserves, forest and wildlife areas and the public use facilities therein from flooding, monitoring and control of the flood's effects on waste water treatment facilities and protection of Iowa's waterways from pollution discharges caused by flood events. A special assignment was given to the Department by the Governor when he created the Flood Recovery Coordination Team. That assignment involved working with the Department of Transportation in a comprehensive assessment of flood damage to Iowa's public infrastructure.

### II. ORGANIZATION DURING EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

Because the Department of Natural Resources routine responsibilities fall into the area of resource and infrastructure protection, it was not necessary for the Department to implement any special organizational changes related to the flood emergency. Staff employed the usual chain of command and communication channels to assess, report, and deal with the flood's effects within the Department. In providing direct assistance to other state agencies and units of government, certain staff were temporarily "detailed" to other locations. For example, at a time of the worst flood crisis, the DNR Director staffed the disaster emergency operations center at the Hoover Building and participated in strategic planning to deal with immediate impacts. Staff of the DNR's Water Resources Section with expertise in floodplain management worked in the Emergency Management Division providing advice and expertise. Additionally, this staff answered questions and concerns from the public, government agencies and others concerned about floodplains and dam hazards. A staff person of the DNR's Water Quality Section worked several days at the Des Moines Water Treatment Plant and served as the principal authority in reviewing and approving test results as the Des Moines system was brought back on line. Law Enforcement staff of the DNR assisted local law enforcement officials in emergency operations that included rescue and patrol. Similarly, staff from field offices of the DNR's Environmental Protection Division provided technical assistance and advice to local units of government whose water and waste water treatment plants were threatened. Both this and the law enforcement assistance are regular activities of DNR staff so no special organizational changes were required.

### III. SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

#### A. DISASTER RESPONSE PHASE

As described above, DNR staff from the Director down served a variety of roles, all related to the DNR's regular responsibilities. Those roles included participating in the planning and mobilization of

statewide emergency response, offering technical assistance on floodplain management, answering questions about the Public Assistance program through FEMA and assisting in local law enforcement and public safety. Internally, DNR staff took numerous measures to deal with the immediate disaster. This included prompt assessment of damage to DNR operated public use facilities, issuing warnings to recreationists about dangerous conditions, providing assistance to the public directly affected, and producing news releases to keep the public informed about flood conditions and impacts. A significant action was taken when the Director entered into an agreement with the Army Corps of Engineers to construct emergency water conduits to relieve flooding in the Iowa Great Lakes Region.

#### B. DISASTER RECOVERY PHASE

As a member of the Transportation and Natural Resources Response Team with the Governor's Flood Recovery Coordination Team, the DNR worked closely with the Department of Transportation to compile a comprehensive list of infrastructure affected by flooding. The DNR also continues to work with entities that operate water and waste water treatment facilities as they repair and rebuild damaged facilities. In this area, DNR's role consists of permitting and monitoring to protect public health and prevent environmental pollution, and providing technical and financial assistance (via federal revolving loans) for such repairs and hazardous waste management. Whenever necessary, the DNR has accelerated its review and issuance of permits. On public owned lands managed by the DNR, work continues on repair and recovery of public use facilities. A comprehensive inspection of all DNR managed dams and spillways is being conducted (through the FEMA Public Assistance program) to assess any structural damage from the 1993 floods as well as to identify potential future problems in the event of future flooding.

#### IV. AREAS OF EXCELLENCE

**Public Water Supply Protection:** DNR staff worked closely with local public water suppliers whose facilities were damaged or threatened by the flood. As the Des Moines water supply was being brought back on line, a DNR staffperson was stationed at the waterworks plant to review test results and issue final authorization for a declaration that water was again drinkable.

**Water Supplies and Wastewater Treatment:** Staff of the Environmental Protection Division were authorized to temporarily waive discharge and other environmental standards when facilities were threatened or overtaxed.

**Protection of Private Property Along Lakeshores:** Staff stationed near the Iowa Great Lakes provided on-the-spot authorization for measures to protect shorelines on natural lakes when private property was threatened. Later, DNR issued a blanket "no permit" requirement for certain categories of shoreline protection for a one-year period.

**Floodplain Management:** Staff from the Water Resources Section worked closely with the Emergency Management Division to assess flooding potential in affected floodways and issued appropriate advisories.

**Flood Recovery, Ledges State Park:** With assistance from the National Guard, DNR was able to secure the volunteer assistance of nearly 100 cadets from the US Air Force Academy. The cadets worked three days on flood clean up at Dolliver and Ledges State Park along the Des Moines River, two of DNR's hardest hit areas.

## V. PROBLEMS/ISSUES

FEMA response time: There appears to have been a lag time between the time of disaster, Notice of Interest, and the on site inspections provided by FEMA of DNR facilities. In some cases, it seemed as if state parks and other DNR lands were inspected last or not at all. A better understanding of how FEMA will conduct its inspections is needed and a more systematic approach to such inspections should be implemented if one is not presently utilized.

Unforeseen effects on Ledges State Park from Saylorville Lake: The Saylorville Lake Project did identify flood impacts, but it did not address the impacts on Ledges due to the frequency of high flow events experienced in the past ten years. Also, discussions with the Army Corps of Engineers should commence concerning the accelerated loss of flood storage capacity in the reservoir due to siltation and the additional flood impacts this is expected to create at Ledges.

Unforeseen effects of the Saylorville Downstream Corridor Recreation Trail: The Corps and the State of Iowa constructed the trail on land along the Des Moines River below Saylorville Lake with an agreement that DNR would maintain and repair the trail. Unexpected flood frequencies, accelerated releases from the Saylorville Dam and continued loss of flood storage have combined to create extensive damage to the very popular trail. A major portion of the trail has been closed most of 1993 and will take several thousand dollars to repair. Discussions should be initiated with the Corps about its responsibilities, and the maintenance agreement should be reopened for further negotiations.

# IOWA DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL

## FLOOD DISASTER AFTER ACTION REPORT

### I. AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

The Iowa Department of Personnel (IDOP) is responsible for the human resource management function in state government. IDOP assists state departments in interpreting personnel policies, regulations and collective bargaining agreements as decisions affecting state employees are made. Topics of primary concern during emergencies include leaves of absence, hours of work, work schedules, overtime pay, safety, workers' compensation, and temporary duty assignments, among others.

### II. ORGANIZATION DURING EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

During the flood emergency, the regular organizational structure of IDOP functioned, as intended, to facilitate quick responses to the changing circumstances. The department is organized into bureaus. The bureau chiefs report directly to the department director, not through division directors or deputy directors. This flat structure encourages cooperation between the bureaus on significant questions. To further enhance our responsiveness, a project room was established, out of which emergency related activities were coordinated.

### III. SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

The department's emergency responses were focused on ensuring that state departments were provided with prompt and accurate responses to their personnel questions and problems. The director was among the group of department heads working directly with the Governor to make initial flood related decisions, including the decision to keep state office buildings open and staffed in spite of the lack of water and air-conditioning on the Capitol Complex. This decision was made because important government services were still needed during the flood crisis. As departments identified personnel problems and issues, IDOP responded with advice and information.

The department established a clearinghouse for state employee volunteers who assisted departments in maintaining essential operations. Departments that needed assistance were able to make requests for volunteers; departments that were able to make staff available could offer assistance. State employee volunteers were also provided to the water distribution centers established by the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees/Iowa Council #61 (AFSCME) in Des Moines. While these employees "volunteered" to help other departments, they continued to be in pay status with their home departments.

As the Emergency Management Division expanded to cope with the extent of the flooding, the department worked closely with EMD to meet their personnel needs. Additional positions were established, assigned to the appropriate classifications, and qualified applicants were recruited. A personnel officer was dedicated to meeting their needs during the emergency. This became a full-time assignment for over three weeks.

IDOP also dealt with its own problems due to the flooding. The offices of the Iowa Public Employees' Retirement System (IPERS) are located at 600 E. Court Avenue, within the area that would have been flooded had the S. E. 6th Street levee failed. Within a few hours, the vital records for 50,000 retirees were moved to safe storage in the Grimes Building in the Capitol Complex.

#### IV. AREAS OF EXCELLENCE

Communications to other departments were timely. Electronic distribution was used whenever possible in order to avoid mail delays. Also, the volunteer clearinghouse was successful in providing temporary assistance to departments maintaining critical operations and to the AFSCME water distribution sites.

#### V. PROBLEMS/ISSUES

Four issues should be included in the planning for future emergencies. First, the role of the unions that represent state employees must be considered. Because they sincerely want to be good citizens, they offered their help and assistance. Because we did not have tasks identified for them, they sought their own ways of helping. AFSCME established a water distribution network for nursing homes, the elderly and the disabled. This required us to deal with issues caused by state employees wanting to volunteer to work at the AFSCME sites on work time.

The second issue is the application of the collective bargaining agreements during emergency situations. The agreements are negotiated on the assumption of normal operations and working conditions. The lack of air-conditioning and sanitary facilities caused less than ideal working conditions. However, government provides services that often are more important and essential during emergencies than at other times. It is not practical or possible to shut down. Contingency plans should be drafted that incorporate contacts with the unions representing state workers so that collective bargaining implications can be identified and problems addressed.

The third issue is created because state government operates statewide. Much of our effort was concentrated in Des Moines. However, other communities also experienced flooding and disruption to government offices. Contingency plans need to be flexible enough to deal with disasters in some communities and normal operations in others.

The final issue is planning for communications with the media. There needs to be better coordination between departments so that responses are prompt with consistent information. We need to better understand that what might work for one program area may not be needed or feasible for other program areas.