

# Contemporary Public Affairs

CHINA, THE U.S., AND THE U.N.

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## CHINA, THE U.S., AND THE U.N.

### I. A New Era Begins

Monday night, October 25, 1971, the United Nations, in a surprisingly swift series of events entered a new era of its history. With a seldom seen speed, over twenty years of tension concerning the admission of the People's Republic of China was resolved. Only one week after debate had formally opened on the issue for the twenty-first time, the Communist government of China was declared the only representative of the Chinese people to that world assembly.

The tempo of the maneuvering on the issue had quickened during the week of debate until the General Assembly was going at almost a dead run into the voting of the 25th. It was literally an eleventh hour vote which admitted the Peking government, but in the strange way that politics is done, it was really two other votes on procedural matters in the earlier evening that settled the issue.

As the week of debate had been going on, the United States delegation was busy off the floor lining up support for its compromise plan of admitting Peking but not expelling the Nationalist Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek based in Taipei, Taiwan. For the first proposition there was no problem. It was evident that there would be a large majority in favor of seating the Peking government. However, there was considerable difficulty over retaining the membership of the Taipei government. To do so had at least two major disadvantages: 1) it would recognize two governments as representing the Chinese people, and 2) more importantly, both these governments had repeatedly affirmed that they could not co-exist in the United Nations. The consequence was that the United States was having a hard time lining up support to keep the Taiwanese Chinese in the General Assembly.

Monday morning, the 25th, as debate resumed after the weekend, it seemed that the vote would come some time Tuesday. The Albanian delegation, which was leading the floor fight for entrance of Peking and expulsion of Taipei, apparently had decided over the weekend that a faster moving timetable would be to their advantage. By mid-afternoon Monday it was widely rumored that the vote would come that evening rather than the next day as expected. At about 6 p.m. the Saudi Arabian delegation proposed a motion which would have had the effect of postponing all voting on the issue of Chinese representation until Tuesday. That motion was narrowly defeated by a 56 to 53 vote with 19 abstentions. This defeat set the stage for the climax of the issue in the late hours of Monday night.

The hope of the United States was to split the issue, thereby having separate votes on the admission of Peking and the expulsion of Taipei. Since there was probably only a slight majority of members in favor of expelling the Nationalist government, the United States sought to have this declared an "important question," thus requiring a two-thirds majority for expulsion. The Americans won a minor but necessary victory by getting the vote to split the issue scheduled before the main vote on Red Chinese admission. However, at mid-evening when that vote was finally taken, it, too, was narrowly defeated, 59-55, with 15 abstentions.

This all but settled the matter. So clear was the final outcome that the Nationalist government's delegation walked out of the General Assembly and was not present to vote against its own expulsion. That vote just before midnight was 76 in favor, 35 opposed, 17 abstentions. And with that vote a new era of United Nations history was begun.



The unanswered question, of course, was what the changed relationships of the new era would be. Apart from the effects upon the United Nations itself, effects were felt outside the world body as well. In some places, it seemed, the aftershock might continue for some time.

The immediate reaction, though, was swift and in some quarters sharp. Chiang Kai-shek announced that the unseating of his Nationalist delegation was an "illegal action." The Russians said that the vote had been "a triumph of common sense." The Chinese Communists themselves made little overt reaction. But in the United States the reaction was the strongest of anywhere in the world, with the possible exception of Japan.

Tuesday morning following the vote Secretary of State William P. Rogers made a few remarks to the press. He, of course, welcomed Peking into the United Nations, but most of the conference time was spent on the expulsion of Taipei, which Rogers saw as "a mistake of major proportion." Within a day, President Nixon let it be known through his press secretary that he was considerably less than happy with the jubilant reaction on the floor of the General Assembly following the vote. As the *New York Times* reported it:

Mr. Ziegler, who was obviously well primed and who spoke from notes compiled during a conversation with Mr. Nixon early in the day, told newsmen at his regular morning briefing that the President had found the behavior offensive and undignified and had warned that it "could very seriously impair support for the United Nations in the country and in the Congress." . . .

Mr. Ziegler said the Administration did not intend to retaliate against the nations involved, but he said the President feared that the "spectacle" might "affect foreign aid allocations."<sup>1</sup>

Two days later the President's remarks had become a reality. The administration's foreign aid authorization bill, which had been up for debate in the Senate, was voted down, leaving not only the "nations involved," but all other countries as well without American aid. The ending of all American aid to foreign countries was clearly a temporary one. Within two weeks the Senate was considering several new approaches to the problem. However, the old style foreign aid program stemming from the Marshall Plan days after World War II was clearly finished--the first casualty of the United Nations China vote. Beyond the question of general foreign aid, there was another question: what would be the future willingness of the Congress to vote financial support to the United Nations itself? At present the United States is paying almost one-third of all the United Nations' expenses. These funds have already been appropriated through the 1972 fiscal year, but it is an open question as to whether they will continue at that level.

There was also the possibility that the shock wave following the vote could play an important part in toppling the government of Japan. Premier Eisaku Sato was already treading on thin ice with many of his constituents because of his extremely close cooperation with the United States. Several American moves just prior to the United Nations vote had made that cooperation even less popular. Among them were America's floating of the dollar which endangered the value of the Japanese yen, the imposition of a ten per cent import charge and import quotas, and the announcement of a presidential trip

<sup>1</sup> *New York Times*, October 28, 1971; 1:6.



to Peking without prior consultation with the Japanese government. Now the United States had pressured Japan to be on what ended up as the losing side in a critically important vote. The Japanese position on China is a much more central issue to them politically since they are the other major power with China on the East Asian scene:

Outside of China and perhaps the United States, the impact of the United Nations decision appeared to be felt hardest in Japan, America's major ally in East Asia and Communist China's chief rival for influence in the region.

Premier Eisaku Sato was subjected to a bitter attack by the four opposition parties, by labor unions, many businessmen, and some members of his own party for having sided with the United States in a losing cause. Many called for his immediate resignation.<sup>2</sup>

While two immediate votes of no confidence in the Sato government were defeated in the Japanese Diet, the overall effect has surely been to weaken both the position of Premier Sato and the possibilities for close cooperation with the United States, at least for the immediate future.

A major effect of the vote outside of the United Nations is its impact on the Nationalist government of Taipei. If, in fact, it is harder for them to carry on the image of the exiled, but true, government of the mainland, will the self-determination movement already present among the 12 million Taiwanese grow into a pronounced threat to the Nationalists?

Stanley Karnow, writing in the *Washington Post*, proposed another effect when he advanced the thesis that the long run aims of the Nixon Doctrine, that is, "the President's formula for reducing the United States commitment to Asia," will be advanced by the United Nations' action. He gives three reasons for this: 1) the lessening influence of Chiang Kai-shek will leave a less complicated and less tense Asian scene, 2) there is some evidence that the Chinese are encouraging the North Koreans to moderate their hard-line stance toward South Korea and the United States, and 3) "Peking's rise to the role of a recognized international power could contribute to the settlement in Indochina."<sup>3</sup>

As for the effects within the United Nations itself, here the matter is even less well defined, nor is that definition likely to emerge immediately. The Peking government does not come to the United Nations as merely another member, however. It comes as one of the five major members of that body. Besides its seat in the General Assembly, China will be a member of the more select and powerful Security Council. In fact, it will be one of the five permanent members of that group (along with the U.S.S.R., France, Britain, and the U.S.). Thus, China will be given veto power over most of the truly important United Nations actions. As James Reston observed:

much will depend now on how Chou En-lai and his associates in Peking react to China's new responsibilities as one of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council--whether they accept the vote as invitation to help in the peaceful settlement of world disputes--the main purpose of the U.N.--or whether they attempt to use the U.N. as an instrument of their own national ambitions and of world revolution.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, October 27, 1971; 1:5.

<sup>3</sup> *Washington Post*, October 27, 1971; 1:6, A16:5.

<sup>4</sup> *New York Times*, October 27, 1971; 45:1.



Charles W. Yost, former United States ambassador to the United Nations, has an opinion about how the Chinese will decide to use those new responsibilities:

It is sometimes claimed that the introduction into the Security Council, as a permanent member with a veto, of a state having a view of the world so alien to that of the majority of UN members, so alien even to that of the Soviet Union, would cripple the Council and bring to a halt even the sadly insufficient peacemaking and peacekeeping enterprises in which it now engages. This of course might just be what would happen.

My judgment would be, however, that the PRC [People's Republic of China] is acutely aware of this suspicion and expectation on the part of many UN members, that it would be clever enough initially to surprise them by displaying in the UN the urbanity and tact characteristic of Chou En-lai, and that over the longer run the Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung would prove no more irreconcilable with the UN Charter than the less explicitly formulated "thoughts" of other great powers and many small ones.<sup>5</sup>

John Steward Service, United States liaison to the Chinese Communists at the end of World War II and presently on the staff of the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, was invited to China by Chou En-lai some five weeks previous to the vote. He talked with the Premier after that vote and later reported to the press:

I have the impression that they don't plan to cut any wide swath. They probably will approach it all very moderately for the time being.<sup>6</sup>

Not everyone would agree with this. Benjamin Schwartz, Harvard China expert, is quoted in *Time* magazine as expecting them to come to the United Nations and "to speak quite toughly."<sup>7</sup> However, another Harvard expert, James C. Thomson, indicated that it may not be as simple as moderation or toughness:

We have never seen China in such circumstances. China's ingenuity will be taxed when it has to deal simultaneously with the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, Poland, Albania. This is a mixed cast and requires a new kind of orchestration.<sup>8</sup>

An unnamed United Nations official, quoted in the same *Time* article, goes on to add:

We have to face the fact that the Chinese probably will not accept the rules of the game as they have been established. They may even weaken the Security Council and the U.N. temporarily. Chinese entry is good and necessary, but it will create more problems than it solves, at least at first.<sup>9</sup>

Two things that should definitely happen within the United Nations would be, first, a new burst of activity as the entrance of Mainland China allows a new perspective on and new initiatives toward old problems. Secondly, there will be a readjustment of the present alignment of nations as the government of the world's most populous nation begins to develop a sphere of influence.

<sup>5</sup> *Vista*, VII (Sept.-Oct., 1971)49.

<sup>6</sup> *Washington Post*, October 29, 1971; A22:1.

<sup>7</sup> *Time*, November 7, 1971, p. 31.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31.



To indicate the kind of subtle power that China will wield, they stopped one major Soviet initiative cold before they even arrived. In early November, the U.S.S.R. hoped to get approval for its proposed world disarmament conference. Instead, they met a wall of silence. Almost no one among the delegates was willing to have any discussion carried on concerning such a major issue before the delegation from Peking made its arrival.

By mid-November the delegation had arrived and taken its seat. However, at that point only five weeks remained in the session. That five weeks may provide only a marginal indication of what role the Chinese will play. Instead, it may function as a crucial period of learning for the Chinese as they begin to juggle many new relationships simultaneously and as they begin to test out their new world role. One barometer of their influence in the United Nations could be the selection of a new Secretary-General. With U Thant retiring, a new man must be chosen by December 31, 1971. What better way for the Chinese to demonstrate their influence and insure their position than to play a strong role in the selection of his replacement?

Having seen the circumstances of this momentous change and the prospects which it has for the future, it is important to examine the changes which took place within the United States leading up to our shift in policy on the admission of the Peking government to the United Nations. Not only is this important background for a more complete understanding of the change itself, but it is also an illuminating case study of the interplay between the making of foreign policy and the nature of the domestic climate. Former ambassador Yost notes that President Kennedy seriously considered this same move for United States policy in 1961, "but found opposition to any change, from the 'China Lobby' and others, still so entrenched and articulate that he decided not to risk a costly domestic battle."<sup>10</sup> This growing climate of change toward China in general and its admission to the United Nations in particular, then, will be the topic of our second unit.

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<sup>10</sup> *Vista*, VII (Sept. - Oct., 1971) 16.



## CHINA, THE U.S., AND THE U.N.: A New Era Begins

### Discussion Questions

1. The materials in this unit are current up to the time that the Peking delegation was seated in the General Assembly. From November 15, 1971, they have been able to be an active part of the work of the United Nations. In view of that fact, discuss the following:

Try to generate a sort of listing of the United Nations activities of the Peking government since it was seated. What instances have come to your attention? What major things do you remember them as having done since joining the United Nations?

What is your impression of the Chinese contribution so far? In general, do you see them as having strengthened or weakened the world body? Why, and on what do you base your estimate?

Have you been made aware of their influence in the United Nations? Do the Chinese seem to be exerting a significant influence? Remember that the materials we have seen give at least three areas in which this influence can be discussed: 1) selection of a new Secretary-General in December, 1971, 2) the ability of the United Nations to pursue new and more active approaches to some old problems, and 3) the development of a Chinese sphere of influence among the 131 member nations.

2. The materials presented also indicate that there were many effects flowing from the expulsion of the Nationalist Chinese. The main questions raised in the days following the expulsion seemed to be these.

With regard to the United States:

How would it affect our relations with other countries?

How would it affect our support of the United Nations?

Would it help or hinder our attempts to disengage from an active role in Asia?

With regard to Japan:

Would the stability of the Sato government be greatly affected?

Would Japanese-American relations become more strained?

With regard to Taiwan:

Would the Nationalist minority there be able to continue effective control of the island?

What would be the island's relationship to the mainland?

How has the passage of time affected these issues? Have there been any other effects which you consider important? If so, enumerate them. In retrospect, does the expulsion of the Taipei government seem to have been a far-reaching decision, or only cause for temporary excitement? Why?

3. From what sources do you receive your information about United Nations activities and the behavior of the Communist Chinese in the U.N.? Could those sources have any influence on the way in which you have answered questions one and two? If so, what biases might be present and what influences might these sources have had?



## CHINA, THE U.S., AND THE U.N.

### II. The Background: Twenty Years of Growing Toward A Change

In the Spring of 1971 an American ping-pong team touring in Japan went into Red China through what seemed to many the first crack in "the bamboo curtain." Within three months the President of the United States was announcing to the nation that he would be visiting the Chinese mainland personally some time before May of 1972.

To the average citizen on the street this all seemed a very abrupt change in American-Chinese relations. Within a matter of only weeks, it seemed, we had moved from a frozen and uncompromising, hard line to a much softer, "let's talk about our differences" approach. As is so often the case in matters political, however, the abruptness was on the surface. At a deeper level gradual change had been taking place.

In between the two events that we have mentioned, there occurred a third item in the news which reflected this gradual change. It was the filing of the final report of the President's Commission for the Observance of the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the United Nations. One of the duties of this commission was to comment on American policy toward major United Nations concerns. In so doing, they naturally took up the question of who should be a member of the United Nations. Obviously the most crucial specific under that general heading was the question: Should the People's Republic of China (i.e. Communist China) be admitted to the United Nations?

To answer the first and more general question, the commission recommended that "the United States adopt the position that all firmly established governments should be included in the UN system . . ." <sup>1</sup>In answer to the specific question of Mainland China's admission the report observed:

The Commission has found growing public support in the United States for the involvement of the People's Republic of China in the work of the United Nations. There is also a deep American commitment to the continued representation of the Republic of China on Taiwan in the UN . . .

The Commission recommends that under no circumstances should the United States agree to the expulsion of the Republic of China on Taiwan from the UN, but that the United States seek agreement as early as practicable whereby the People's Republic of China might accept the principles of the UN Charter and be represented in the organization. <sup>2</sup>

But, while the recommendation is rather straight forward, its implementation was not to be. The President's Commission had recommended the politically impossible. Let the Mainland Chinese government enter the United Nations, but not at the expense of expelling Nationalist China. No such compromise was possible in the end.

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<sup>1</sup> *Report of the President's Commission for the Observance of the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the United Nations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 35.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36.



There had been a continuing struggle in the United Nations over the admission of the People's Republic of China since 1950. The other Communist countries, largely through the instrumentality of the Albanian government, had been continuous in bringing the matter up. The United States, for its part, had been continuous in its resistance to Communist China's admission. Yet, throughout the decade of the Sixties there was a gradual lessening in support for the United States position. This was reflected first in a long term rise in the percentage of United Nations members voting for Communist China's admission as successive votes were taken.<sup>3</sup> It was also reflected in the growing number of United States citizens who began to raise questions about the policy of keeping the Mainland Chinese out of the United Nations.

Lines seemed quite clear in the 1950's. True, there were mixed reactions in the Truman administration to the fall of Chiang Kai-shek in 1949, but by the time of the Korean war in 1950 the United States felt strongly committed to the government on Taiwan. This was so much the case that in late 1954 the Eisenhower administration was willing to risk the development of a very touchy international situation of several months duration over Nationalist Chinese forces on the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. This same difficult point arose and subsided again in 1958.

In the early Sixties the American relationship to Mainland China became a part of the developing crisis in Vietnam. In the beginning years of that crisis our aim seemed clearly to be the containment of the Chinese as they sought to extend their influence into Southeast Asia. It would most probably be a fair generalization to say that as national attitudes toward the war in Vietnam changed, so did the American attitudes toward the Mainland Chinese and especially toward having them as a part of the international community through United Nations participation. As it was summed up by A. Doak Barnett, professor of government and acting director of the East Asian Institute, Columbia University:

For almost 17 years we [the United States] have pursued a policy that might best be characterized as one aimed at containment and isolation of Communist China.

In my view, the element of containment--using this term in a very broad sense to include both military and nonmilitary measures to block threats posed by China to its neighbors--has been an essential part of our policy and has been, in some respects at least, fairly successful. . . . But the U.S. attempt to isolate Communist China has been, in my opinion, unwise and, in a fundamental sense, unsuccessful, and it cannot, I believe, provide a basis for a sound, long-term policy that aims not only at containing and restraining Chinese power but also at reducing tensions, exerting a moderating influence on Peking, broadening the areas of non-Communist agreement on issues relating to China, and slowly involving Communist China in more normal patterns of international intercourse.

I strongly believe, therefore, that the time has come--even though the United States is now engaged in a bitter struggle in Vietnam--for our country to alter its posture toward Communist China and adopt a policy of containment but not isolation, a policy that would aim on the one hand at checking military or subversive threats and pressures emanating from Peking, but at the same time would aim at maximum contacts with and maximum involvement of the Chinese Communists in the international community.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> See Appendix I for a complete record of the vote on this issue: 1950-1971.

<sup>4</sup> Statement in hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, Eighty-Ninth Congress, Second Session, *U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China*, March 8, 1966 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 4.



In retrospect, this oft-quoted statement seemed to sum up the direction United States policy would take. Given before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1966, it by no means represented a unanimous opinion. David Nelson Rowe, professor of political science at Yale University, for example, in a prepared statement submitted during these same hearings stated:

On moral, legal, and constitutional grounds, Peking is ineligible for admission. It is an aggressor; its leading spokesmen, beginning with Mao Tse-tung, insist on their right to commit aggression so long as it advances their Communist, international, revolutionary aims. The United Nations Charter, on the other hand, clearly disqualifies an aggressor by stipulating that a candidate for membership must be a peace-loving state.

The question must then be considered on what are called realistic grounds. The main argument is that Peking, once inside the United Nations and exposed to its civilizing, restraining influence, will be less aggressive than if it remained outside the United Nations—an unhappy and rebellious outcast.

Those who advance this argument forget one very crucial point. If Peking were admitted to the United Nations, it would become a permanent member of the Security Council. As such, it would acquire the power to veto any act by the Security Council (and, according to the Soviet view, by the General Assembly, too) which sought to promote peace by curbing Red Chinese aggression. In other words, admission of Peking, in its present frame of mind, could very well tie the hands of the United Nations and thereby advance, rather than inhibit, Red Chinese acts of aggression.<sup>5</sup>

Ishwer C. Ojha, in the book *Chinese Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition*, has referred to two approaches to China, the fundamentalist approach (as represented by Rowe, above) and the gradualist approach (as represented by Barnett above).

The so-called “fundamentalists” who clung to this faith [in the Nationalist Chinese government] refused to permit the possibility of a major accommodation with the Chinese Communists under any circumstances . . . .

A second broad category which has been gaining strength in the 1960’s is that of the so-called “gradualists.” In contrast to the fundamentalists, gradualists believe that some concrete steps should be taken to ensure the eventual normalization of Sino-American relations.<sup>6</sup>

In the mid-1960’s even though United States policy toward China was very fixed, it was not seen as irrevocable. Dean Rusk, in a 1966 statement of policy toward Communist China, stated as his final point in the elements of future policy: “Tenth, we must continue to explore and analyze all available information on Communist China and keep our own policies up to date.” A few sentences earlier he had inferred indirectly the same flexibility on Mainland China’s membership in the United Nations: “So long as Peiping [Peking] follows its present course it is extremely difficult for us to see how it can be held to fulfill the requirements set forth in the charter for [United Nations] membership, and the United States opposes its membership.”<sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, March 28, 1966, p. 641.

<sup>6</sup> Ojha, Ishwer C., *Chinese Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. 81-83.

<sup>7</sup> *United States Policy Toward Communist China* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 9-10.



The implication of Secretary Rusk's remarks is that United States policy toward China is flexible to the extent that a favorable change in Chinese policies can cause, by way of reaction, a favorable change in American policy toward China.

However, both President Nixon's July 15 announcement of his intention to visit Peking and Secretary of State William Rogers' August 2 statement that the United States would support the seating of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, seem to echo a somewhat different reasoning. While the administration may in fact have noted some real changes in Peking's attitudes and policies, there was no mention of it in either statement. The dominant reasoning, rather, was a need to deal realistically with the world as it is.

President Nixon said:

The meeting between the leaders of China and the United States is to seek the normalization of relations between the two countries and also to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides . . . .

I have taken this action because of my profound conviction that all nations will gain from a reduction of tensions and a better relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China.<sup>8</sup>

Secretary Rogers said:

The position of the United States is that if the United Nations is to succeed in its peacekeeping role, it must deal with the realities of the world in which we live. Thus, the United States will cooperate with those who, whatever their view of the status of the relationship of the two [Chinese] governments, wish to continue to have the Republic of China represented in the United Nations.<sup>9</sup>

America's total policy toward China, then, had undergone an evolution. And with this evolution came a change in stance on the admission of Mainland China to the United Nations. The long range effects of that shift in policy will take at least as much time, and probably as much difficulty, to work out as did the policy change itself.

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<sup>8</sup> Quoted in *Facts on File*, XXXI (July 15-21, 1971), p. 541, and most major newspapers on July 16th, the day after the statement.

<sup>9</sup> Quoted in *Facts on File*, XXXI (July 29-Aug. 4, 1971), p. 581, and many major newspapers on August 2nd and 3rd.



## CHINA, THE U.S., AND THE U.N.: THE BACKGROUND

### Discussion Questions

1. Discuss to what extent you had thought about Chinese admission to the United Nations previous to the Spring of 1971. You may want to include other aspects of Chinese-American relations in the discussion as well, since they are so closely interconnected, but discuss at least the following points.

To what extent can you remember having a firm opinion on the issue, during, say, the early 60's?

To what extent did you discuss the issue or hear it discussed?

How aware were you of the ongoing series of votes in the United Nations on this issue?

What reaction did you have to those votes, and were you aware of any trend in the voting?

Did your own opinion change during the 60's? If so, when? Why?

How aware were you of other people's opinions on the issue during this time? Did you note any change? If so, what change?

When we finally got to the Spring and Summer of 1971, did the events we have discussed seem to you to be one more step in a series of smaller changes, or did they seem like a radical departure? Why?

2. Explain the connection, as you see it, between domestic attitudes and foreign policy as exemplified in this instance. Discuss whether it would have been possible to change the foreign policy sooner. Discuss, for example, whether President Kennedy could have done it in 1961, when, according to former U.N. ambassador Yost, he seriously considered it.
3. While the United States government has changed its position in this matter, there is still a truly discussible issue involved. While the statements in the text are more detailed and extensive, the matter put most simply comes to this: are the actions and attitudes of Mainland China such that it should have been excluded from the United Nations or would it have been better to have such a major power involved in the United Nations even if we perceive their actions to be contrary to the aims of the organization's charter? Here one must discuss at least three things:

To what extent are our perceptions of the Mainland Chinese actions and attitudes accurate, at least to the extent that they are shared by most of the other United Nations members?

What is the nature of the United Nations and the meaning of membership in it?

Based on the consensus of those two discussions, what about the specific case of seating Red China?



4. Discuss whether you think that there has been any real change on the Chinese side, a softening of their line, so to speak, that is cause for a change in American policy. Or on the other hand, do you think it is the Americans who have changed their attitude of how they want to handle the problem of our relations with China?



**Appendix I**  
**U.N. Vote on Admission of Peking Government**

YEAR	FOR	AGAINST	ABSTENSIONS
1950	6	33	10
1951	11	37	4
1952	7	42	11
1953	10	44	10
1954	11	43	11
1955	12	42	6
1956	24	47	8
1957	27	48	6
1958	28	44	9
1959	29	44	9
1960	34	42	22
1961	36	48	20
1962	42	56	12
1963	41	57	12
1964	no vote		
1965	47	47	20
1966	46	57	17
1967	45	58	17
1968	44	58	23
1969	48	56	21
1970	51	49	25
1971	76	35	17


Based on William L. Tung, *China and the Foreign Powers*. (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1970), p. 407.



## Appendix II

### Bibliography

- Ballantine, J.W., *Formosa: A Problem for United States Foreign Policy*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1952. The author was a former staff member of the State Department. The book is an early but fair general summary.
- Barclay, George W., *Colonial Development and Population in Taiwan*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954. Another book covering subject matter similar to Ballantine and dating from almost the same period.
- Barnett, A. Doak, *Communist China and Asia: Challenge to American Policy*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1960. The author is a long standing and widely recognized China expert. This book looks at the other side of the coin, U.S. policy toward the Mainland.
- Blum, Robert, *The United States and China in World Affairs*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966. The author was former president of the Asia Foundation and editor of the series of books of which the present is volume five. Finished after the author's death by A.D. Barnett, this book aims at a general discussion of the forces and attitudes affecting American policy. It also discusses alternative policies.
- Chen, Lung-chu and Harold Lasswell, *Formosa, China and the United Nations: Formosa in the World Community*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967. A book rather directly on the topic from the less discussed point of view of Formosa and the United Nations.
- Congressional Service Quarterly, *China and U.S. Far East Policy 1945-1966*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1967. An interesting and useful reference source giving history, chronology, biography, and documents of interest on the topic.
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- Feis, Herbert, *The China Tangle: The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953. An historical piece covering the World War II years of the China problem. Gen. George C. Marshall went to China as President Truman's special ambassador in December of 1945.



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- , *U.S. Policy Toward China*, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968. An extensive excerpting and topical reordering of statements on China made during the Senate Foreign Relations hearings of 1966. May be available where a copy of the full hearings is not.
- Isaacs, Harold R., *Scratches on Our Minds: American Images of China and India*. New York: John Day, 1958. Author is a journalist as well as a scholar. Book is published in paperback under the title *Images of Asia*.
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- Kubek, Anthony, *How the Far East was Lost, American Policy and the Creation of Communist China, 1941-1949*. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1963. The account is somewhat onesided and typically what one would have found for an explanation in the McCarthy era of the early 1950's.
- Liu, Kwang-Ching, *Americans and Chinese: A Historical Essay and a Bibliography*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. Another good general background book on the general topic.
- McClellan, Robert, *Heathen Chinese: The American Image of China*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1971. A very recent book on the subject of misperception across the cultures.
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