The Annals of Iowa

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In This Issue

JERRY HARRINGTON, an independent historian, narrates the effort by Harold E. Hughes—in his campaign for governor in 1962 and during his first year in office—to legalize liquor by the drink in Iowa. Harrington situates the debate as the culmination of more than a century of political conflict in Iowa over access to alcohol. This “last liquor battle” in Iowa also marked the rising influence of Iowa’s urban interests after the longtime dominance of the state’s political life by rural interests.

KEITH OREJEL, a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Missouri, describes the origins of the Iowa Development Commission (IDC) during and after World War II. He shows how the IDC, the first permanent state agency dedicated primarily to promoting industrialization in the state, marked an important institutional breakthrough in the history of government sponsorship of rural industrialization, and he argues that the emergence of the IDC was directly linked to the agricultural transformation occurring in the state during those years.

WILLIAM J. WARREN, professor and chair of the Department of History at Western Michigan University, shows how, as Local 1 of the United Packinghouse Workers of America in Ottumwa moved beyond plant bargaining into a larger political struggle for greater power in local and state politics after World War II, it helped spur a transformation of Iowa’s political culture from solid Republicanism to competitive two-party status.

Front Cover

Iowa Governor Harold Hughes spurred the movement to legalize liquor by the drink in Iowa. Photo from State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City. For Hughes’s campaign, both before and after his election, to legalize liquor by the drink, see Jerry Harrington’s article in this issue.

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The Annals of Iowa

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HISTORY has a number of uses. The one I cite most often is its ability to tell us, or remind us, who were are and how we got to be the way we are. Just as, individually, we often tell others our personal history as a way of telling them who we are, our state’s historians recount the history of the state to tell others—and, perhaps even more importantly, ourselves—who we are as a state. History often calls us to recognize that aspects of the present that we take for granted as given were actually the product of conscious and even controversial choices in the (sometimes not-so-distant) past.

The three related articles in this issue do this particularly effectively. All three are set during the three decades from the beginning of World War II to 1970. Many features of Iowa’s present political culture were shaped by transformations that occurred during that time.

For a century or more, the question of access to alcoholic beverages was probably the most contested issue in Iowa politics. As a result, Iowa’s official policy on liquor access vacillated regularly, even as alcohol remained accessible, often extralegally, in many locales. Following Governor Harold Hughes’s successful campaign—both before and after his election—to legalize liquor by the drink, however, that policy has held firm. It’s now a policy most of us take for granted. In his article below, Jerry Harrington relates compellingly how that came to be.

Similarly, many of us take for granted Iowa’s status as a competitive two-party state. For much of Iowa’s history, however, the Republican Party dominated the political scene. As the nineteenth-century politician Jonathan Dolliver once said, “Iowa will go Democratic when Hell goes Methodist.” Indeed, between the Civil War and the Great Depression, Iowa had exactly one Democratic governor. Between World War II and 1970, however, Iowa became a competitive two-party state, thanks in large part, as Wilson Warren argues, to a labor movement that moved out of the union halls and away from the bargaining table.
into the larger world of local and state politics. It is perhaps worth noting that Wapello County, which is at the heart of Warren’s story, flipped from 55–43 percent for Barack Obama in 2012 to 58–37 percent for Donald Trump in 2016.

Finally, many of us take for granted the role of state government in attracting industry to Iowa. But that, too, as Keith Orejel shows, is a product of choices made during and just after World War II. The Iowa Development Commission, the first permanent state agency dedicated primarily to promoting industrialization in the state, marked an important institutional breakthrough in the history of government sponsorship of rural industrialization, and, Orejel argues, its emergence was directly linked to the agricultural transformation occurring in the state during those years.

One final note about the contemporary relevance of this period in Iowa history. At the conclusion of “Iowa’s last liquor battle”—and an intense battle it was—Governor Hughes commented, “It is the peculiar genius of democracy that persons with diverse points of view can get together and work out solutions to complex problems that are in the public interest. In my opinion, this is exactly what happened with this liquor bill. . . . Those who followed the development of this legislation were amazed at the way wets and dries, Republicans and Democrats, worked together patiently, subordinating their individual interests to the interest of the state as a whole.” That’s a valuable political lesson for any time and place.

—Marvin Bergman, editor
Iowa’s Last Liquor Battle:
Governor Harold E. Hughes
and the Liquor-by-the-Drink Conflict

JERRY HARRINGTON

THE DEEP, RESONANT VOICE of Iowa Governor Harold E. Hughes echoed throughout the packed Iowa House chamber on January 17, 1963, as he finished his half-hour inaugural address. Facing an audience that included all of Iowa’s representatives and senators in Des Moines for the new legislative session, the recently elected Democrat had just proposed an aggressive agenda for the overwhelmingly Republican legislature.

It was the speech’s final flourish, however, that so captured the nature of the new governor, a political personality many Iowa legislators were just beginning to size up. “It is sometimes said that the knack of skillful government is to hang back, do as little as possible, and make no mistakes,” Hughes said. “I hope there is another way—for between you and me, this prospect does not invite my soul.” Promising to “experiment and make some mistakes,” Hughes pledged to actively engage with legislators to reform Iowa’s political landscape. Many of the Iowa politicians listening to these words undoubtedly believed that Hughes would apply this dynamic attitude to an issue that was on everyone’s mind and had been at the core of his campaign for governor—the question of liquor by the drink in Iowa.1


Political analysts at the time generally interpreted Hughes’s 1962 election victory over incumbent Republican Governor Norman Erbe as a referendum on liquor by the drink. Citing widespread violations of the prohibition of over-the-counter liquor sales, Hughes had aggressively campaigned on allowing purchase of liquor drinks in bars, social clubs, and other establishments, complementing the existing legal sale of liquor by the bottle through state monopoly liquor stores. Either change the law or, Hughes pledged, he would enforce the current one. To do otherwise, he said, shows disrespect for all laws. To pass such a reform, however, the new governor would need to overcome resistance from a conservative, rural-based legislature that had long blocked the change. The debate across Iowa in the 1962 gubernatorial campaign and the subsequent legislative approval of liquor by the drink dominated Iowa politics for nearly a year.

The liquor-by-the-drink question, however, was more than just a single campaign issue and legislative debate. The episode marked the culmination of more than a century of political conflict within Iowa over its citizens’ access to alcohol. Beginning with the state’s first General Assembly, Iowans and their elected officials had argued passionately over the issue, prompting solutions ranging from outright prohibition to limited licensing of liquor sales in saloons to the sale of bottled liquor through state stores. Legalizing liquor by the drink in 1963 effectively ended that debate; it was the last political conflict in Iowa when the terms wets and drys were used. With that action, Iowans—through their elected representatives—came to accept legal liquor sales in both bottle and glass, as long as the state enforced strict licensing laws and regulated the practice. If state and local governments collected fees from licenses and taxes, that was an added benefit. Political debates after this point were not over whether liquor should be openly sold but over such issues as the minimum drinking age, allowable alcohol levels for drivers, and whether bottled liquor should be sold through state monopoly stores or private businesses. Since 1963, limiting liquor sales to the general adult population has not been a viable political issue in Iowa.

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2. This article focuses primarily on the politics of the liquor-by-the-drink issue. It does not attempt to review the religious, moral, ethno-cultural, or social
By the early 1960s, a majority of Iowans—at least according to opinion polls—favored liquor by the drink. The roadblock was the Iowa legislature—especially, many said, the House—which was fundamentally apportioned by geography, not population, and dominated by more conservative rural interests. Hughes’s win and his successful effort to enforce existing liquor laws put intense political fire under the feet of recalcitrant legislators. These and other factors prompted enough of them to modify their attitudes and support the change, ending this part of the state’s long-standing liquor argument.

This episode reflects a transitional moment in Iowa history, a shift from a rural state to an urban one. For the first time, the 1960 federal census showed more Iowans living in “urban” areas than in “rural.” An expanding urban population, with its greater acceptance of liquor consumption, was overpowering more conservative rural opposition to easy access to alcohol. The liquor reformers’ triumph exemplifies the rise of Iowa’s urban interests.

LIQUOR ISSUES have been debated in Iowa for as long as it has been a state. The first Iowa General Assembly in Iowa City passed liquor control legislation in February 1847, giving county residents the option to vote on whether or not commissioners could grant liquor licenses in each county. In elections held in the frontier state on April 5, 1847, every established county except Keokuk voted to prohibit liquor sales, but the prohibition was often overlooked, and commonly merchants either secretly

conflicts that accompanied this long-standing and hotly debated issue among Iowans. All of those aspects of the historical liquor debate in Iowa are certainly important, but this study leaves those to other scholars. Iowa churches and religious groups are part of this discussion but only as lobbying and pressure groups that sought to affect the debate. I use the terms wet and dry, which were commonly used in liquor debates. Wets refers to those who supported expanded liquor availability; drys were those who wanted to limit liquor use.

4. U.S. Census Bureau, Census of Population and History, Census of Population: 1960-VI-Part 17, General Population Characteristics—Iowa. According to the 1960 census, 53 percent of Iowans lived in urban areas and 47 percent in rural areas. The 1950 census had recorded 47.6 percent of Iowans in urban areas and 52.4 percent in rural. The U.S. Census Bureau defined rural residents as anyone living outside of urban areas with a population of 2,500 or more.
or openly sold liquor illegally. By the early 1850s, the Maine Law, named after a state prohibitory law passed in Maine in 1851, was the rallying cry of prohibition forces and became part of the Whig Party platform in 1854. The next year, with the Iowa legislature under Whig control, both Iowa houses passed a law prohibiting the sale of liquor in Iowa and Whig Governor James Grimes signed it. On April 2, 1855, Iowa voters approved the law, 25,555 to 22,645. But, according to historian Dan Elbert Clark, local officials “simply folded their hands and paid little heed to its enforcement.” In 1857 the General Assembly, responding to that reality, passed a liquor licensing law, allowing sales that would happen anyway, although prohibition remained on the books. Especially with the influx of German immigrants into the state, Clark notes, “prohibition seemed to fall into disfavor,” and by the 1860s “liquor was sold almost without restrictions.”

Activists rallied in 1877 with a prohibition candidate for governor who called for the law’s enforcement. He garnered more than 10,000 votes in a losing cause. That campaign—through speeches, correspondence, newspaper coverage, and networking throughout the state—helped revive the temperance movement and expanded support for curbs on liquor traffic. The next year, at the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) convention in Burlington, J. Ellen Foster, who chaired the committee on legislation, proposed amending the Iowa Constitution to prohibit liquor. That, she argued, would make prohibition a permanent part of Iowa law, removing it from the changing winds of yearly politics. That effort gained enough popular support to prompt Iowa General Assemblies in 1880 and 1882 to pass a constitutional amendment banning the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor, including ale, wine, and beer. In June 1882 Iowa voters approved the prohibition amendment, 155,436 to 125,677, with 75 counties voting in favor. However, a Scott County district court that fall declared the amendment invalid on a technicality, because the amendments passed by the two sessions of the Iowa legislature had slightly different wording.

The Iowa Supreme Court upheld the decision in 1883, throwing the prohibition amendment out of the Iowa Constitution.6

Not wanting to begin the long, multyear amendment process again, prohibition supporters in the Iowa General Assembly passed a law banning intoxicating liquor in Iowa. The law went into effect on July 4, 1884, but despite attempts at enforcement, many cities, especially Iowa river towns, ignored it. According to Clark, “It is a commonly known fact that in many cases municipal and county officials were elected solely on the condition that they would not attempt to enforce the prohibitory law.”7

The issue became a centerpiece of the 1889 gubernatorial race, resulting in the election of Iowa’s only Democratic governor between the Civil War and the Great Depression: Horace Boies, who opposed prohibition. Iowa Republicans, who could certainly read election returns, eventually reached a legislative compromise in 1894, passing the unusual Mulct Law. While keeping prohibition on the books, it allowed merchants to sell liquor as long as they paid fines, or “mulct taxes,” for breaking the law. Prohibition remained the rule and violations the legal exception.8

In 1909 the General Assembly passed the Moon Law, named after its sponsor, Senator Edwin Moon. The act limited saloons to one for every 1,000 inhabitants in a community; towns of fewer than 1,000 were allowed a single seller, and, in communities with more than one already existing saloon per

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6. Clark, “History of Liquor Legislation, 1861–1878,” 339–74; Dan Elbert Clark, “History of Liquor Legislation, 1878–1908,” Iowa Journal of History and Politics 6 (1908), 503–608. To amend the Iowa Constitution, two consecutive sessions of the Iowa legislature must pass an amendment through both houses; then the amendment must be approved by Iowans in a popular vote. In this case, however, the 1882 session of the legislature passed a version of the prohibition amendment that omitted the phrase “or to be used” between “No person shall manufacture for sale, or sell, or keep for sale, as a beverage” and “any intoxicating liquor whatever, including ale, wine and beer” that was in the 1880 version. The courts ruled that passing two different wordings of the amendment violated the process and tossed out the amendment. The courts also ruled that the Iowa House had not completely followed the rules in recording the amendment in its journal, making the amendment invalid.


8. Ibid. For a summary of the Iowa prohibition debate in the 1880s and ’90s that includes ethnoreligious alignments, see Richard Jensen, “Iowa, Wet or Dry? Prohibition and the Fall of the GOP,” in Iowa History Reader, ed. Marvin Bergman (Iowa City, 1996), 263–90.
1,000 residents—mostly Iowa river towns—the law allowed those establishments to continue. As a result of the Moon Law, the number of Iowa businesses selling liquor was cut in half—from 1,600 in 1908 to 740 in 1912. Another law passed in 1909 made it unlawful for any person or corporation engaged in the “manufacture, brewing, distilling or refining of intoxicating liquors” to be involved, either directly or indirectly, in the retail liquor business.\(^9\)

The Mulct Law lasted until 1915, when vital portions of it, such as those addressing payment and collection of the mulct tax, were repealed, effectively killing it. According to Clark, that move was a “spontaneous expression of the quiet convictions of the people of the State, rather than a response to an active, organized demand.” The prohibition statute, still on the books, remained state law and established policy, and the legislature increased penalties for violations, together with providing additional means for enforcement. This marked the third time in Iowa’s history that absolute prohibition of liquor was state law.\(^10\)

The Iowa legislature passed another constitutional amendment on prohibition in two sessions in 1915 and 1917, with a statewide vote set for October 15, 1917. This time, however, Iowans rejected placing prohibition into the constitution, voting down the effort by 932 votes among over 430,000 cast, the first time Iowans vetoed prohibition by popular vote. Soon, however, national prohibition became the law of the land with passage of the Eighteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.\(^11\)

With the repeal of national prohibition in 1933—an action Iowans supported in a statewide popular vote on the federal Twenty-First Amendment, 377,275 to 249,943—state political leaders faced the challenge of responding to liquor use in Iowa in a post-prohibition age. The solution was the creation in 1934 of an Iowa liquor monopoly, which sold—and controlled—alcohol through state stores managed by the State Liquor Control Commission. The only alcohol Iowans could legally pur-

\(^10\) Ibid., 57–58.
chase and possess was sold through the state stores. Iowans who wanted to buy liquor for consumption off the premises had to buy permits, and each purchase was registered with the state. Store managers held the right to refuse purchases to individuals they felt would abuse the privilege. (Prior to repeal, beer in Iowa was already legal and had a different distribution system. In early 1933 Congress passed legislation redefining “intoxicating” under the Eighteenth Amendment, stating that this did not include beer with a 3.2 percent alcohol content or less. Iowa lawmakers followed suit on April 15, approving the same definition on the state level for “beer, ale, porter, stout or any other malt liquor” and setting up regulatory guidelines for beer brewers, bottlers, wholesalers, and retailers. Retailers with state permits could sell beer in stores and serve it over the counter in glasses in establishments that became known in Iowa as “beer taverns.” By law, “intoxicating” liquor could not be sold in taverns; nor could it be found on the seller’s premises.)

By the mid-1950s, some Iowans were clamoring for more liberalized liquor access laws, specifically the right to enjoy intoxicating beverages outside the home with friends and neighbors at local venues. Iowa legislators acceded to this demand in 1955 when they passed legislation allowing for “key clubs.” These establishments—social settings such as country clubs, VFWs, Elks clubs, American Legion halls, and others—were allowed to set up lockers where members could place bottles of alcohol purchased from the state liquor stores; each member was given a key to a locker and, when visiting, could take out bottles and consume alcohol on the premises. The establishment itself could not legally supply liquor, either by bottle or glass.

By the early 1960s, the legal framework in Iowa for alcohol sales centered on the state liquor stores, which sold to Iowa citizens; by that time, there were nearly 190 stores throughout Iowa. Liquor consumption was legally allowed in key clubs as long as the bottles were brought into clubs by consumers, not club managers or owners. Liquor by the drink—serving alcohol in

glasses and charging for the service—was illegal in the state, although, by this time, it was legal in all states surrounding Iowa. Bills calling for legalizing liquor by the drink had been introduced in nearly every session of the Iowa legislature in various forms since World War II, but was seriously debated only once: in 1961 a bill came to the floor of the Iowa House, was debated, and soundly defeated, 72–22.¹⁴

As most Iowans knew, however, the practices in their communities did not reflect the laws on the books, which were commonly violated across the state. In 1962 the fiction of Iowa’s liquor laws was about to collide head-on with the reality of a heated gubernatorial campaign.

ON SUNDAY MORNING, May 6, 1962, Iowans woke to read a banner headline in the *Des Moines Sunday Register*: “‘Liquor By Drink’ in 2/3 of Iowa!” According to a story written by *Register* reporter George Mills, assisted by a staff of reporters, liquor was sold by the drink in at least 66 of Iowa’s 99 counties, counties with 2.2 million of the state’s 2.8 million residents. *Register* reporters had combed the state to “make available the facts about liquor law observance in Iowa.” They found that “sale of liquor by the drink has been more or less commonplace in even small towns.” “In most county seats,” wrote one reporter, “you don’t need your own bottle. All you need is the money, and courage enough to walk into a club and ask for bourbon, after telling the bartender you are sick of beer.” In some cases, wrote Mills, local law enforcement officials did not “crack down” on violators because they believed a majority of citizens opposed enforcing the law or did not care one way or the other; those officials were often elected and re-elected several times. The *Register* listed a county-by-county summary of eastern Iowa counties, citing whether or not they offered illegal liquor sales; western counties were listed in a follow-up story a week later.¹⁵


¹⁵. *Des Moines Register*, 5/6/62, 5/13/62. The *Register* reported that establishments were not afraid of local or state crackdowns, but they were of federal law enforcement. Those selling liquor were required to buy a federal Retail Liq-
The defiance of the liquor-by-the-drink prohibition reflected public opinion in Iowa. In May 1962 the *Des Moines Register* reported the results of an Iowa Poll: 55 percent of Iowans favored changing state laws so that liquor by the drink could be sold legally in Iowa; 37 percent were opposed. This public stance had not altered significantly in recent years; in a 1957 survey 54 percent of Iowans had favored the practice, and 52 percent had in 1959. The 1962 poll showed that “city” residents strongly favored a change (62 percent), but only 42 percent of “farm” residents reacted positively; 52 percent of those in “towns” favored open liquor sales, with 41 percent opposed. Rural Iowans consistently opposed liquor by the drink.16

The disparity between city and farm was part of the difficulty in translating popular will on the liquor issue into legislative change. The Iowa legislature was dominated by rural forces, set by a reapportionment plan established in 1904, when legislators passed a constitutional amendment creating a House with 108 members, one from each of Iowa’s 99 counties, with an additional member granted to each of the nine most populous counties. The 50-member Senate was apportioned by population, but in 1928 another amendment prohibited counties from having more than one senator; even as counties with large urban populations grew in twentieth-century Iowa, their Senate representation was limited. Both chambers—but especially the House—vastly underrepresented urban interests. For instance, by 1960, the six least populated counties (Adams, Ringgold, Clarke, Davis, Van Buren, and Wayne) had a total of six members in the Iowa House, representing 52,377 people. The three most populous counties (Polk, Linn, and Black Hawk) also had six members in the House, but they represented 525,696 Iowa citizens, nearly ten times the constituency of the bottom six counties.

Urban legislators were simply vastly outnumbered by rural legislators in the Iowa House. Given that liquor by the drink traditionally had low support among rural Iowans, the construction of the Iowa legislature was a high hurdle for those supporting a loosening of Iowa liquor laws.\footnote{Charles Wiggins, “The Post World War II Legislative Reapportionment Battle in Iowa Politics,” in \textit{Patterns and Perspectives in Iowa History}, ed. Dorothy Schwieder (Ames, 1973), 403–430; \textit{Iowa Official Register}, 1963–1964 (Des Moines, 1964), 303–4.}

In the early 1960s, the Iowa Republican Party dominated the state legislature; in the 1961 session of the General Assembly 78 of 108 seats in the House and 35 of 50 seats in the Senate were Republican. The party’s establishment was traditionally hesitant to change liquor laws—at least according to its statewide public pronouncements. When Iowa Republicans met at Veterans Auditorium in Des Moines on July 20, 1962, to pass a platform and mark the beginning of the campaign for state offices, Iowa GOP members voted simply to study the issue of liquor by the drink, urging the legislature to undertake a “re-evaluation and re-approval” of the “present liquor control act.”\footnote{Des Moines Register, 7/21/1962; \textit{Iowa Official Register}, 1961–1962 (Des Moines, 1962), 96.}

THE IOWA DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE for governor, Harold E. Hughes, did not share that attitude. He supported legalizing liquor by the drink. Born in 1922 in the small western Iowa town of Ida Grove, Hughes was a star high school athlete; he won the state discus championship in 1938 and was selected as all-state football guard in 1939. He attended the University of Iowa for a year and played on its football team. Marrying Ida Grove native Eva Mercer in 1941, he dropped out of college and worked a series of jobs until he was drafted into the military during World War II. He fought in the battle to take Sicily and Salerno in Italy in 1943. After military service, he returned to Ida Grove, where he got a job driving trucks; he then managed Hinrichs Truck Line in Ida Grove and later worked as a field representative for the Iowa Motor Truck Association. Dissatisfied with the low rates independent truckers were getting for hauling freight, he organized them into the Iowa Better Trucking Bureau.
As the head of the bureau, he butted heads with members of the Iowa State Commerce Commission. In 1958 he ran for one of the three statewide commission posts and was elected. Initially a Republican, Hughes grew disenchanted with the party’s conservatism and became a Democrat prior to his election as commissioner. He ran for governor simply because he thought he could do a better job than any other candidate running. He lost the primary on his first try in 1960 but won in 1962.19

To those who supported him in his race for governor in 1962, Hughes was a magnetic personality who often acted in ways contrary to those of a traditional politician, frequently forceful, charismatic, and direct. He was initially an awkward candidate, uncomfortable with small talk and light chatter. As he said, “I don’t run up and down the street shaking hands because I don’t believe it does much good.” He was much more comfortable directly addressing the issues in blunt, stark terms in his speeches and conversations. A large man, 6′ 2” tall, Hughes was handsome with a full head of dark hair. One of his strengths was his personal delivery: his deep, baritone voice commanded attention. According to longtime Des Moines Register political journalist James Flansburg, Hughes delivered “the most telling and moving oratory I’ve ever heard.”20

Hughes was also a deeply religious man. He experienced a “born-again” Christian spiritual transformation in 1952 when in the depths of personal despair. His desolation rose from a serious problem with alcoholism that almost destroyed his marriage and led him to the brink of suicide. Following a drinking binge after his wife and daughters had left him, he sat in his bathtub with a gun in his mouth, ready to pull the trigger, when, he later claimed, he had a religious experience. At that point, he vowed

to give up alcohol, sought help, and became intensely involved in the Methodist church, even volunteering as a Sunday school teacher. Hughes was open about his alcoholic past, discussing it freely when asked about it on the campaign trail. He was careful to say that he was a recovering alcoholic, not a cured one.21

Soon after the Des Moines Register exposé on statewide liquor-by-the-drink violations and after several weeks of careful study, Hughes announced that he backed legalization. Accepting the Democratic nomination at the State Democratic Convention on July 28, 1962, he called it a moral issue.

It is a moral issue because it involves an issue of official hypocrisy that shames the entire state. The real issue is not whether or not we shall have “liquor-by-the-drink” in Iowa. Let’s face it. You

21. Hughes, Harold E. Hughes, 102–9; Cedar Rapids Gazette, 11/7/1962; Des Moines Register, 10/7/1962.
know and I know and every honest person in Iowa knows that we have liquor-by-the-drink in this state now. . . . The moral issue, then, is: Shall we straight-forwardly legalize the sale of liquor-by-the-drink, enforce the law and really control the liquor traffic in this state? Or shall we perpetuate the present wide-open key club system that subsidizes the bootleggers and racketeers with revenues that rightfully belong to the taxpayers of Iowa?22

Hughes also attacked the incumbent governor for mishandling the state budget, allowing a $46 million surplus inherited from the prior administration to shrink to $18 million. Citing capital improvement needs throughout the state, Hughes proposed raising new revenues to meet those needs and to provide for property tax reform to relieve those stressed on the local level. Looking forward to an aggressive fall campaign, Hughes said, “What can happen in these three months can shake this state out of its coma as it has never been shaken before and get it on the forward move again.”23

OPPOSING HUGHES was the incumbent Republican governor, Norman Erbe of Boone, running for his second two-year term. The youngest of six children of a Boone Lutheran minister, Erbe had served on 35 combat missions with the Eighth Air Force during World War II and was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross and four air medals. After earning a law degree from the University of Iowa in 1947, he practiced law in Boone, served as county attorney, and chaired the Boone County Republican Party from 1952 to 1956. Elected Iowa attorney general in 1956, Erbe gained a second term by little more than 2,000 votes two years later. On September 1, 1959, he sought to raise his statewide profile by reaching back to an 1886 Iowa law and announcing that he was banning 42 “girlie” magazines as obscene literature. The action did little to actually change magazine availability, but the controversy and publicity helped Erbe win a close GOP gubernatorial primary in 1960, and in November he was elected governor.


23. Ibid.
Erbe’s strategy during his re-election bid in 1962 was to avoid making waves. The Iowa legislature, not the governor, he argued, makes the laws. “I don’t want to come out whole hog for this position or that if it doesn’t materialize in the Legislature,” he said. “There’s no use doing this unless you know you have the votes. . . . My concept of the governorship is that of an administrator and executive through persuasion. In our weak governor system, it’s impossible for the governor to impress his will if the Legislature or government departments don’t want to follow.” Erbe said that the liquor-by-the-drink issue was up to the Iowa General Assembly; he wasn’t going to push the issue. He claimed to be guided by the state Republican platform, which only said that the issue should be “studied.” He refused to go further than that.24

24. Des Moines Register, 10/14/1962; Iowa Official Register, 1961-1962, 4. Iowa’s “weak governor” stems from the Iowa constitutional provisions allowing for
As the campaign progressed, this conservative stance seemed a safe bet for Erbe. In the first poll on the race conducted by the *Des Moines Register* and released on October 7, Erbe led Hughes, 49 to 42 percent, with the rest undecided. Among “city” voters, Erbe led 46 to 44; among “town,” 50 to 41; and among “country,” 53 to 38. However, the polling numbers included an ominous sign for the Erbe campaign: when Iowans were asked who would do the best job on “liquor,” Hughes led 46 to 30 percent.25

There were indications around the state that opinion on the liquor-by-the-drink issue was divided along urban/rural rather than partisan lines. At the Polk County Republican Party convention, delegates representing the most populous county in the state passed a resolution in favor of liquor by the drink under strict regulation. The resolution “deplored” the “almost complete disregard of the present Iowa liquor laws which permit the operation of phony key clubs.” County Republican meetings in Pottawattamie and Des Moines counties approved similar planks.26

Among the businesses at the forefront of the issue—restaurant owners—the consensus was that it was time for a change, according to *Register* reporter Nick Lamberto, covering the annual meeting of the Iowa Restaurant Association in Des Moines. Ermol Loghry of Iowa City, newly elected treasurer of the organization, said, “The way we’re bringing up children now to wink at the law is not right. . . . We’ve had 30 years of handling liquor the way it is now. Thirty years is long enough to see if it can be enforced.” Others at the meeting said it was unfair to businesses close to the rivers on either side of the state because those in Nebraska and Illinois could serve liquor legally.27

Hughes aggressively raised the issue everywhere he spoke around the state during the 1962 fall campaign. In Erbe’s home

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town of Boone, Hughes asked, “Why hasn’t Mr. Erbe done anything about the shocking statewide, open violations of the state liquor control laws?” In Davenport, he said, “Since we have it [liquor] anyway, why not have the profits go to the taxpayers?” Estimating that legalization could bring in as much as $15 million per year, Hughes argued that the revenue could be put to good use for state capital improvements, though he was careful to say that the issue was one of respect for law, not revenue enhancement. “To restore respect for our laws is our first objective. The revenue issue is secondary—but it is nonetheless important and worth considering.” Addressing “drys,” Hughes argued,

Many good temperance people frown upon liquor tax revenue as being ‘tainted’ money. I appreciate the sincerity of their viewpoints but it is high time we faced realities. The state is already in the liquor business through package sales in the state stores. The state tax commission—amazingly enough—admits that it collects some sales tax revenue from illegal liquor-by-the-drink sales in key clubs! If the revenue is tainted, we are already tainted. Moreover, the full measure of revenues from taxing by-the-glass should go to the taxpayers to whom such revenues rightfully belong, rather than largely bootleggers and racketeers as is the case at the present time.

As governor, Hughes pledged on October 3 in a front-page Register story, he would enforce the current law prohibiting liquor-by-the-drink sales “whether the law is changed or not.”

Recognition of the need for additional state revenue arose when the Des Moines Register interviewed members of the bipartisan Iowa Legislative Revenue Study Committee and reported the group’s consensus that $30 million was needed just to maintain present expenditures and the current rate of development at the state colleges. Additional funds would also be needed for proposed property tax relief. This further raised the profile of revenue from liquor sales that Hughes continued to stress. He added that he would urge a combination of sources—increased sales tax, a broadened sales tax, or increased state income tax—to meet the state’s needs. Erbe’s response was that he would not

make any recommendations until after the committee made its final report, which would be after the election. Hughes accused Erbe of using that to duck the issue.29

Calling Erbe “the Great Vacillator,” Hughes pounded his opponent for not generating a plan for property tax relief or enforcing the state’s liquor laws. Speaking in Denison, Hughes blamed Erbe for the problem. “The plain facts are that as governor . . . and as attorney general for years, he himself is more responsible than anyone else for the wide-open illegal liquor traffic in this state that corrupts our young people and makes a mockery of our laws.” Hughes scoffed at Erbe’s argument that Iowa’s “weak governor” system made the governor answerable to the legislature, calling it a “curious spineless concept of the governor’s role.” “The executive branch has always had the necessary authority—and the responsibility—to enforce the law,” Hughes claimed. “As usual, Mr. Erbe passes the buck on liquor law enforcement to the legislature—but this is an absurd excuse. Under our system, the legislature makes the laws; the executive branch is supposed to carry them out. The weakness in the ‘weak governor’ system is Mr. Erbe himself.”30

As the campaign moved on, several “dry” supporters saw the climate beginning to change and concluded that they needed to take a stand in the debate. In late October, the Greater Des Moines Evangelical Ministers Association passed a resolution opposing liquor by the drink. The group, representing 50 Des Moines churches, argued that “alcohol-caused expenses will cost a state from $1.33 to $5.75 for every dollar collected on liquor tax” and that, among the six surrounding states with liquor by the drink, “liquor consumption is more than 47 percent higher than in Iowa.” On October 21, the Temperance Legislative Council, a lobbying group with members from the Iowa WCTU, the Iowa Temperance League, and the Iowa Council of Churches, announced its support for Erbe. Responding to potential opposition to his position from church pulpits, the Hughes campaign


in October sent a letter signed by the candidate to more than 1,000 Iowa clergy, explaining his stand on liquor by the drink. Addressing the “thousands of good people who oppose any change in the liquor laws because of temperance convictions,” Hughes wrote that his advocacy of liquor by the drink is not “simply another chapter in the wet-dry issue. It isn’t. It is an issue of law and order over crime and confusion. It is an issue of honesty over hypocrisy.” More directly, Hughes said in a speech in Corning, “It is time that the temperance people in Iowa opened their eyes and looked at reality.”

With the campaign moving into its final month, Erbe stressed that it was important for Iowans to elect a Republican governor to work effectively with an overwhelmingly Republican legislature. Erbe argued that Hughes was irresponsibly overestimating the role of a governor in the legislative process. “Any candidate who says his election will mean any bill will be passed is being considerably less than honest with the voters,” he said in Harlan. “The lawmaking rights of our state are only within the domain of the legislature.” Hughes responded that Erbe was taking credit for past legislation while claiming that he could not influence legislation in the future.

In a mailing to the state’s 945 Iowa mayors that was widely publicized in the Iowa media, the Hughes campaign pointed out that per capita liquor sales in state stores were substantially lower in most of the state’s eastern and western border counties than in interior counties (where the average was $20.80 versus $14.56 in the eastern counties and $11.99 in the west). The point was that substantial quantities of liquor were brought illegally into Iowa from neighboring states to serve the liquor-by-the-drink market. Iowa counties and towns were not getting that revenue from state liquor stores. “Iowa should either get out of the liquor business or get into it right,” Hughes said, adding that “cities, towns and counties should share in these extra monopoly store profits and in license fees.”

Erbe obtained the *Des Moines Register*’s endorsement on October 28. Its editorial writers believed that the incumbent could get more done because Republicans dominated the legislature, which would block efforts supported by Hughes. Other newspapers supported Hughes. The *Davenport Morning Democrat* noted that “he faces the facts realistically” and “has shown the kind of courage and clarity of thinking as a candidate that would make him a good governor.”

Beneath the editorials and headlines, Hughes appeared to be making inroads, even among those who disagreed with him. Harry Beardsley of West Des Moines wrote in a letter to the editor in the *Des Moines Register* that even though he opposed liquor by the drink, “I respect Harold Hughes for the intelligence and integrity he has shown in trying to think honestly about the liquor problem, and for his willingness to state clearly, unequivocally and forthrightly what he believes should be done about it.” The final opinion poll issued by the *Des Moines Register* the weekend before the election showed Hughes behind but gaining. Erbe had a narrowing 52–48 percent lead among those already decided; the two were tied among city voters, 46–46, with Erbe showing a lead among “town” and “farm” voters.

The result on election day—November 6, 1962—was a solid victory for Hughes over Erbe, 430,899 to 388,602. In the lightest voter turnout since 1946, Hughes cruised to victory by carrying Iowa’s population centers, including Polk County, by more than 23,000 votes, accounting for more than half his victory margin. Among the five counties with populations above 100,000, Hughes carried all but one (Scott County) and won seven of the top 10 counties and 14 of the top 20. The victory was personal for Hughes; all the other statewide elected officers were Republican, prompting *Des Moines Register* editorial cartoonist Frank Miller to draw a state banquet table with a large donkey, grinning broadly at the center, surrounded by smaller, grumpy, and irritated elephants.

The banner headline in the *Cedar Rapids Gazette* after the election was “Hughes—Liquor Mandate.” That immediate judgment may have been too simplistic, however. If some assumed that voters in border counties wanted liquor by the drink because they were next to states that had it, the evidence is not there. Only 9 of the 36 border counties and only 12 of the 19 river counties (next to the Missouri and Mississippi rivers) gave Hughes a plurality. One commentator, Frank Nye of the *Cedar Rapids Gazette*, wrote that many in the river cities did not want legalized liquor by the drink “since this would mean operators now paying no license fee would have to do so under almost any kind of legalizing act passed by the legislature.” Many, including Hughes, said that he won the election because he took a strong stand on issues—certainly on liquor, but also on property.
tax relief, the need for capital improvements and other concerns. “We won because we had a program,” said Hughes, “and because a majority of the voters believe that we had every intention of putting this program into effect, if elected.” He added, “The liquor issue was to our campaign what a tail is to a dog. The tail is an important part of the dog, but the tail does not wag the dog—it is the other way around.”

Another important factor in Hughes’s win was a strong Democratic organization, especially in urban areas. Democratic State Chairman Lex Hawkins, a young, energetic Des Moines attorney elected in 1962, helped build the party, especially in the more populous counties, and improved the party’s finances to get out the vote. In Polk County alone, Democrats moved from matching Republicans in party registration to having a 7,000 voter lead in 1962. Democratic Party workers in the larger counties were seen out at 6 a.m., getting supporters to the polls. Also, by the early 1960s the Iowa Democratic Party had cemented an expanding political relationship with organized labor that brought more working class voters to the party; in 1962, Democrats worked with labor leaders close to the election to register union members in 16 Iowa cities and get them to the polls on election day. In the other campaign, Erbe ran a lackluster effort, refusing to take a solid position on liquor by the drink and other significant issues, earning the wrath of Hughes’s rhetoric and giving potential supporters few reasons to enthusiastically back the incumbent. Nevertheless, the consensus among state opinion makers was that Hughes’s election had shifted the liquor-by-the-drink debate by placing in the governor’s chair a strong, forceful proponent.

37. Cedar Rapids Gazette, 11/7/1962, 11/11/1962, 1/5/1963; Des Moines Register, 12/16/1962. One question is whether some Iowans voted for Hughes because he pledged to enforce current laws, not because he supported liquor-by-the-drink reform. That may have been the case for some, but that is difficult to determine. The fact is, however, that Hughes was very clear about aggressively pushing for liquor-by-the-drink reform, not for keeping the legal status quo. If there were voters who thought Hughes stood only for clamping down on liquor violators, they were getting only half his message on this issue.

38. Larew, A Party Reborn, 90; Des Moines Tribune, 11/7/1962; Davenport Morning Democrat, 11/8/1962; Des Moines Register, 7/29/1962, 11/7/1962; 11/10/1962; Sioux City Journal, 11/12/1963. By this time, many Iowa labor union leaders turned to the Democratic Party to pass legislative reapportionment,
THE NEW DEMOCRATIC GOVERNOR, however, faced a Republican-dominated Iowa legislature that—at least on the surface—looked like it would present a significant challenge to passing a liquor-by-the-drink law. At the same time as they elected Hughes as governor, Iowa voters gave the GOP 78 of 108 Iowa House seats—all elected in 1962—and 19 of the 27 Senate seats at stake, giving Republicans a 38–12 Senate majority. Most political commentators believed that the liquor legislation would be much tougher to pass in the House, with its overwhelmingly rural makeup, than in the Senate. Some, such as the *Sioux City Journal*, doubted that much could be done from the governor’s chair. “As governor, Mr. Hughes will be unable to push any legislation through the legislature, including his promise of liquor-by-the-drink for Iowa. This always has been a legislative decision. No governor can do much about it, even if he so desires.” In mid-January 1963 *Des Moines Register* reporter Nick Kotz estimated that the Senate had a majority ready to pass liquor by the drink, but the House, at that time, was about ten votes short of passage. Former Speaker of the House Henry C. Nelson (R- Forest City), who was not a candidate for the office in 1963, came out strongly against liquor by the drink, saying that “just because there are widespread violations of the present law” is not an argument for legalization. Comparing it to speeding on the highways, he said, “There are many violations of those laws also.”39

But attitudes were starting to change, even before the legislature met in January 1963. The most significant shifts were in hoping to make the General Assembly more representative of urban populations and to repeal the state’s right-to-work law. They simply had no confidence in achieving those goals through the Iowa Republican Party with its strong links to business through the Iowa Manufacturers Association (IMA). The 1956 merger of the AFL-CIO created a more politically unified labor movement at both the state and local levels and was a factor in Democrat Herschel Loveless’s Iowa gubernatorial wins in 1956 and 1958. Growing labor support certainly helped Hughes in 1962 in such counties with strong union populations as Black Hawk (home of John Deere and Rath Packing) and Wapello (home of John Morrell and Company). See Wilson J. Warren, *Struggling with “Iowa’s Pride”: Labor Relations, Unionism, and Politics in the Rural Midwest Since 1877* (Iowa City, 2000), esp. chap. 6, “Local 1’s Unionism and the Transformation of Iowa’s Politics, 1939–1970,” pp. 85–102 (reprinted in this issue).

the Iowa Republican Party itself. In a secret poll taken for the Republican Party in the fall of 1962 by Central Survey, Inc., of Shenandoah, 63 percent of Iowans favored liquor sales, with only 30 percent opposed; even Republicans favored it 49 percent to 45 percent. Facing such stark numbers, on December 10, 1962, Republican Party State Chairman George Nagle of Iowa City publicly endorsed passage of liquor-by-the-drink legislation and convinced the Republican State Central Committee to also support the effort, although the vote was not unanimous. Nagle realized that opposition to this reform was becoming an albatross around the neck of the Iowa GOP, and he wanted it removed as soon as possible. That attitude was becoming widely shared throughout the state party. In a survey conducted by the Iowa Daily Press Association among Iowa Republican Party chairmen and vice-chairmen in early 1963, 60 percent of the 75 leaders contacted favored liquor by the drink, as long as it had stringent enforcement provisions. One respondent was quoted as saying, “Don’t repudiate city Republicans or our party is dead.” Even the leader of the Republicans in the fall campaign—Governor Norman Erbe—had a change of heart and threw his support to the effort. In a newspaper interview after the election, Erbe said that he “personally felt there should be some liquor-by-the-drink system in Iowa” and, if he had to do it over again, he would have supported reform. He said he had refrained from doing so in the campaign because felt bound by the GOP platform, which only called for review of liquor laws.\textsuperscript{40}

Newspapers around the state, taking the election of Hughes as an indication that Iowans wanted liquor by the drink legalized, supported change—as well as Hughes’s pledge to enforce current law until it was changed. The \textit{Burlington Hawkeye} wrote, “A principal reason Iowa has never become serious about changing its laws is that most areas already have liquor by the drink, so why stir it up? If most areas suddenly do not have liquor by the drink, the demand for a legislative change could well be so loud it will even penetrate the dense ears of the legislators.” Others noted that increased state revenue would accompany legalization and that this was changing the minds of many “drys.”

According to the *Davenport Morning Democrat*, “Many who do not favor liquor itself under any circumstance have nevertheless been won over to the idea [that] since we actually have liquor by the drink in much of Iowa, the state should be collecting revenue from it.”

THE MAN at the center of the effort immediately showed that he meant what he said in the campaign about enforcing current law. At a victory celebration in mid-November in Ida Grove, Hughes declared, “I hope illegal sale of liquor comes to a stop before I become governor. It will make things simpler for everybody if that happens.” During a press conference in Des Moines in early December, Hughes called on sheriffs and county attorneys to start enforcing the law on liquor. If they did that, he said, it would not be necessary to use state officers for that purpose after his inauguration on January 17, 1963. In a meeting with legislative Democrats the same day, he met some opposition to strict enforcement, but he made it clear that he was not changing his mind: “They might as well go home and make peace with their constituents.” The strategy—and the gamble that Hughes was taking—was to make legislators see that the current liquor law, when enforced, was unpopular, thus putting pressure on them to change it.

Others in state government began altering their tone. Formerly lukewarm about liquor law enforcement during his first term, Iowa Attorney General Evan Hultman, a recently re-elected Republican, addressed county attorneys on November 16 in Cedar Rapids and urged them to cooperate with Hughes if he sought to enforce the liquor laws. Hultman said that he was prepared to give his support and hoped the county attorneys would do so as well. Later in November Hultman announced that he was forming a 15-member state crime council, composed of state and local officials, to work out uniform enforcement of Iowa’s present liquor laws and other statewide crime problems.

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The prime focus, he said, was enforcing the state’s liquor-by-the-drink laws.43

On December 10, Iowa Safety Commissioner Carl Pesch, anticipating an order from Hughes to crack down on illegal liquor traffic, announced that he was ordering 27 state agents into training. The agents included 17 from the State Bureau of Criminal Investigation and 10 from the auto dealer, license, and motor vehicle registration division who would be diverted from their primary duties to enforcing liquor laws. Creating what he called “liquor law schools,” Pesch said the agents in the State Department of Public Safety would receive refresher courses in raiding techniques, search and seizure, preservation of evidence, and other subjects related to liquor law enforcement. He said he was “certainly aware that new and novel responsibilities soon may be thrust upon this department,” adding that this could force “a drastic and irreversible change in the philosophy and mechanics of all law enforcement in Iowa.” This was not his preference, he noted, but “my personal opinion is not pertinent.”44

Hughes made the effort official on January 3 when he appeared at a Des Moines press conference with Pesch to announce a statewide crackdown on illegal liquor sales. The Des Moines Register headlined the story, “Hughes Set to ‘Dry Up’ Iowa.” The governor-elect said that he hoped he would not have to use state forces; he would prefer that local law enforcement bodies make sure that businesses complied with current law. “I believe that adequate warning has been given that I expected voluntary enforcement before taking office,” he said. “And we are not going to wait two months and see what the legislature will do with the liquor laws.”45

The effect was immediate around the state. According to an investigation by the Des Moines Register, many tavern and club operators, especially in the river cities, voluntarily stopped selling liquor by the drink, fearful of prosecution by either local or state officials. Linn County Attorney Jack Fulton reported, “I understand that it has been very difficult to buy a drink in Cedar

Rapids and Linn County.” Tamiel Bleyart, a Davenport tavern operator who said he spoke for others in his business, said that most operators had agreed to “call things to a halt” before Hughes took office. Requests for a mixed drink at Council Bluffs water places drew a “sorry, no more” from the bartender. Louis Meyer, president of the Dubuque Tavern Keepers Association, claimed that the loss of over-the-counter liquor sales would put about 200 people out of work in the county.46

For the most part, the “drying” of Iowa came through voluntary action or from warnings by local law enforcement. In Fort Madison, tavern owners were called to City Hall and advised that “if they had illegal liquor to get rid of it,” said Police Chief Richard Peak, who called the town “drier than a bone.” Muscatine Police Chief Clifford Bennett reported that “almost all of the liquor is gone from Muscatine and all of it will be gone when Hughes becomes governor”; he said he had made it known that the laws would be enforced and that plain-clothes police officers would make periodic liquor checks. In Clinton most taverns stopped serving liquor in early January, said Police Chief M. H. Etherton, who added that two liquor raids at that time “gave some impetus” to the dry-up. Davenport’s tavern owners reached a “gentlemen’s agreement,” informally binding them to serve the last shot of liquor the evening of Saturday, January 13; the agreement was preceded by a well-publicized promise by the Scott County attorney and sheriff to fully cooperate with state authorities to shut down the illegal liquor trade there.47

One clear sign that the change was real came with a drop in sales at the state liquor stores in traditionally “wet” counties on Iowa’s eastern and western borders. Merchants selling illegal liquor by the drink had purchased some product from Iowa state stores—despite statistics from the Hughes campaign showing that some alcohol came from outside the state—and, when that stopped, sales fell. Purchases at state stores for January 5–11 in Davenport, Dubuque, Bettendorf, and Council Bluffs

47. Des Moines Register, 1/13/1963; Davenport Morning Democrat, 1/6/1963, 1/11/1963. The Scott County agreement soon proved to be less binding than promised.
were estimated at 50 percent below the same week a year earlier. In Sioux City, Fort Dodge, and Carroll, sales were down by several thousand dollars compared to a year earlier. Sales were about the same or off only slightly in major stores in Cedar Rapids, Waterloo, and Des Moines. “There is little doubt that the sales falloff is a result of Governor-elect Harold Hughes’s warning that illegal liquor sales must stop,” said Homer Adcock, who chaired the Iowa Liquor Control Commission. A week later, the commission reported that statewide liquor sales had fallen $85,000 from the previous year and, the next week, had plunged $100,000.48

Most merchants voluntarily ended over-the-counter liquor sales, but they did not see this as a permanent condition. Most accepted the halt of liquor sales as temporary, seeing it as putting pressure on the legislature to change the law. Some said that the pause would last only until state agents demonstrated their course of action or lack of action. Ben Thomas, president of the Tavern Owners Association in Clinton, commented, “How long it will last, I don’t know. The dry-up is to show Hughes we are willing to co-operate. We want liquor by the drink.” “I’m interested in seeing what’s going to happen if the legislature ditches liquor by the drink,” said Carroll County Attorney Robert Bruner. “I personally think this will last as long as the governor maintains his stiff attitude.”49

One reason many saw this as temporary is that merchants could not sustain the serious income losses they were suffering. “Our loss will be tremendous,” reported Robert Rosenthal, manager of Cedar Rapids Elks Lodge 251, which had removed all liquor from its bar. The owner of a leading bar in Sioux City said restaurant business had fallen sharply there and was going to South Sioux City, Nebraska. He added, “They think they’ve got a gold mine now.” Some establishments in Sioux City closed because they simply could not do business. By early February in the western Iowa city, many bartenders and waitresses were laid off, and meat and food sales to restaurants were below normal. Sioux City Councilman Julian Torgerson said that 11

49. Des Moines Register 1/13/1963.
conventions had either cancelled in Sioux City or moved across the river to South Sioux City. In Dubuque, city officials estimated that enforcement was costing the city a $1 million drop in business, a $200,000 loss in wages, and $40,000 less in taxes for the city. The economic impact of enforcing the liquor-by-the-drink prohibition was real, significant, and affecting the lives of Iowans. In Davenport, Scott County Attorney Martin Lear said that by late January he had received no complaints of liquor being sold in bars—“not even any anonymous letters.” According to one Davenport tavern owner, “Business is lousy. I couldn’t sell enough beer to even pay my help.” Some city tavern owners increased the price of draft beer from 15 to 20 cents simply to make ends meet. A number of Davenport taverns closed before midnight due to lack of business.⁵⁰

After Hughes took office as governor on January 17, 1963, he formally launched his effort to clamp down on illegal liquor sales. After a week on the job, the governor met with Attorney General Hultman and, in a joint news conference, Hultman pledged his full support to Hughes in state enforcement of liquor laws. The attorney general said his role would be to give county attorneys a firm policy statement on liquor enforcement and handle relations with them on execution.⁵¹

By the end of January, according to a report submitted to Governor Hughes, state undercover agents had investigated 63 taverns and clubs throughout Iowa over seven days and found no liquor for sale by the drink. Nevertheless, some still had not gotten the word, and the governor’s office was working behind the scenes to stamp out violations. Hughes and his aides received several communications from Iowans, alerting them to operators still selling illegal liquor. Dwight Jensen, executive assistant to Hughes, received an unsigned letter on February 4, stating, “A good time to check on Phillis Tavern on Locust Street in Carter Lake, Iowa would be next Tuesday.” Jensen passed the letter on to Carl Pesch. On the same day, Jensen sent another letter to Pesch, describing a phone call he had received

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⁵¹. Des Moines Register, 1/24/1963.
from Elma Deacon of Bernard, Iowa, on sales at the Laverne Klocker establishment: “Mrs. Deacon reports the following: They are still selling liquor there. It has not stopped one bit. They have minors behind the bar serving liquor. Sometimes they don’t close until 1:30 on Sunday mornings. And, they have poker games every Saturday night. They keep liquor in a tool shed right outside the door and I think it’s time something is done about it.” Jensen added, “Would you please have this investigated?”

Hughes himself contributed to this surreptitious assistance to law enforcement. In mid-February the governor related to Pesch a conversation he had had with Cresco Mayor Frank Church discussing a “liquor control problem in this town that he cannot solve and asked assistance from State Agents.” The mayor told Hughes that “local authorities are thwarted by political strife between county and city officials.” “He added that his visit to Des Moines was known by several people in the town. For these reasons, he advises waiting about three weeks before sending a man in.” Hughes also conveyed to Pesch correspondence he had received from a source on the Midwest Tavern in Davenport: “My informant says that the best time to investigate this situation is around 3:00 p.m. on Friday afternoon.” Later, the governor wrote to Pesch, “We have received information that Davenport is far from dry. The source of our information says that Davenport is 90% open on liquor, that bartenders are mixing drinks in Coke and 7-Up bottles and pouring liquor from pitchers kept under the bar, and that he would like to see some action.” Still other letters from Hughes mentioned violations in Remsen, Merrill, and Hilton.

The administration turned its words to action on both sides of the state beginning the evening of February 28. In Davenport, three state agents, together with local police, raided the Tip-topper Tavern, arresting owner Chester Bowes, confiscating 18 bottles of liquor and charging Bowes with possessing liquor on premises with a beer permit. The state agents had checked 15

taverns and clubs in Davenport that day and raided the Tip-topper Tavern after they were able to purchase liquor there. Early in the morning of March 1, 35 officers (six state agents, six local regular and six special deputies, as well as sheriffs and other deputies from other counties) armed with a dozen shotguns raided the Shangri La Club owned by Leo Kublik at Carter Lake on the Nebraska/Iowa border north of Council Bluffs. In all, 127 bottles were seized at the club and another 48 were found in a car in the driveway. Several days later, in an action that was the result of undercover work by state agents, police raided the Chateau Club in Clinton, arresting owner Peter Rankins of Camanche and confiscating 19 bottles of liquor. Raids continued in other areas of the state.54

Davenport’s over-the-counter liquor merchants proved to be more resilient than others in the state and received continued close attention from state agents. Another series of raids was planned in Davenport for Saturday evening, March 30, after state agents had either bought illegal liquor or watched it being sold in six Davenport establishments. The raids were called off after an agent overheard a barmaid in one tavern telling a customer every detail of the plan, including the places to be raided, the exact times, and where the agents were to gather before staging the raids. Davenport law enforcement officials were blamed for the leak, creating some tension between them and state agents. Several days later, Hughes himself mentioned the cancelled raids in a Des Moines news conference, referring only to “a border city” and indicating that state agents might operate

54. Davenport Morning Democrat, 3/1/1963, 3/13/1963; Council Bluffs Nonpareil, 3/7/1963, 3/20/1963, 3/29/1963. One interesting legal technicality that played itself out in the Carter Lake raid concerned the car containing full liquor bottles in the trunk. Carter Lake holds the peculiarity of being the only Iowa town west of the Missouri River, due to flooding that redirected the river to the town’s southeast in 1877. At the time of the raid, the car, registered under the name of the club owner’s wife, was parked near the Nebraska/Iowa border. Club owner Leo Kublik claimed that Iowa authorities had no jurisdiction over the car, since it was parked out of state at the time—or so he claimed. Authorities photographed the car’s location and did a survey to determine the exact border line between the two states. The photo and survey showed that the trunk of the car edged into Nebraska with the front of the car in Iowa, so the district judge disqualified the liquor in the truck as evidence. Kublik, however, was convicted of illegal possession of alcoholic beverages within a beer tavern at a later trial, based on the liquor found in his club.
there in the future with minimal local involvement. That was the policy when six state agents simultaneously raided two downtown Davenport taverns on the evening of Wednesday, May 1, without the knowledge or assistance of the Davenport police, seizing four bottles and a glass at one place and three bottles and a glass at the other.55

Hughes was well aware that the statewide crackdown was putting a strain on Iowa law enforcement. At the end of March, he acknowledged that other law enforcement efforts were suffering because state agents were assigned to liquor enforcement. “If these agents are devoting their time to liquor law enforcement, they cannot take part in investigations of murders, robberies, burglaries and other crimes. But until present liquor laws are changed, they must be enforced.” The message was clear to legislators meeting in Des Moines: pass liquor-by-the-drink reform or face the dire consequences of hampered law enforcement—to say nothing of the negative economic impact suffered by many merchants.56

A MINIMUM of 55 votes was needed for passage in the 108-member Iowa House. One legislator who was a longtime advocate of liquor by the drink said in mid-January that he could count only 41 House members likely to support such legislation. Assistant House Majority Leader John Camp (R-Brant) counted 35 “drys,” 40 “wets,” and 33 undecideds. Camp believed that seven or eight among the undecided would vote for a “good bill if convinced there are enough votes to pass it”; another two or three would vote for a bill containing a provision for compulsory testing of persons arrested for driving while intoxicated, leaving 50 to 52 votes for a possible liquor-by-the-drink bill, just shy of a majority. At the beginning of the 1963 legislature, supporters of liquor by the drink had work to do.57

The divide between “wets” and “drys” was not partisan; it was an urban/rural issue, with members of each camp in both

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parties. Democrats, led by Hughes, were for the most part on the side of change, though there were a few opponents within the party. The great battle was among the Republicans. Party leaders, such as George Nagle and Norman Erbe (after his change of heart), were on the side of reform. Given that the Republican platform in 1962 called for a “re-evaluation” of liquor laws, the Republican leadership in the legislature felt obligated to fully debate liquor by the drink in both chambers and not hold it up in committee. Some in the GOP privately argued that they could not afford to give Hughes a political victory by supporting and passing his liquor pledge; others, like Nagle, countered by warning that, if they did not pass liquor by the drink, Hughes would again carry the issue to the public in 1964—with possibly disastrous results for Republicans.58

Rural Republicans were also uneasy about another 1963 political issue—the Shaff Plan for legislative reapportionment—that could be linked to the liquor issue. The Shaff Plan, drawn up by the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation and named after Republican State Senator David Shaff of Clinton, called for a 99-member House with one representative from each county and a Senate based on population. This was a compromise put forth by rural interests to deflect comprehensive change to a legislature based entirely on population. The plan had passed as a constitutional amendment in the 1961 session of the legislature and would pass again in 1963; the proposal would go before the people in December 1963. Some Shaff supporters feared that, if liquor by the drink failed in the 1963 session, urban interests would blame the rural bias in the current General Assembly and reject the Shaff Plan at the polls. This caused some rural politicians to reconsider their longtime opposition to liquor by the drink. Another impact of the Shaff Plan was that it could potentially set up a House controlled by 24 percent or less of the Iowa population, creating a strong rural block to a liquor bill in future legislative sessions; this prompted liquor-by-the-drink supporters to push aggressively for reform in 1963 or risk losing a chance for years.59

58. Larew, A Party Reborn, 85; Des Moines Register, 1/10/1963, 1/20/1963.
The legislative strategy of Hughes and the Democrats was to avoid introducing liquor legislation that could be labeled a “Democratic bill,” destined for probable defeat in the Republican-dominated General Assembly. Instead, they decided to participate in a bipartisan effort. Supporters believed that efforts should begin in the Senate, where it had the best chance of passage. Thus, in mid-January, legislation was taken up by the Senate Judiciary II Committee. (This was one of two Senate Judiciary Committees, and it was responsible for liquor legislation.) The committee was chaired by Senator Jack Schroeder, Republican from Davenport and an ardent backer of liquor by the drink. Schroeder, 38 years old and vice president/general counsel of General Life of Iowa, had extensive contacts in both chambers; he had served several terms in both the Iowa House and Senate to defeat anyway, 191,421–271,217, in the December 3, 1963, vote. One factor was Hughes’s campaign against the measure. See Larew, A Party Reborn, 86. Iowans then lived through a series of court battles and political debates, complicated by the U.S. Supreme Court decision, Reynolds v. Sims in 1964, which ruled that legislative chambers must be apportioned on population, one-person, one-vote, until the issue was settled.
and was the former Republican majority leader. It was well known that his committee had a solid “wet” majority.60

Legislators began their committee work against the backdrop of statewide and local enforcement of current liquor laws, resulting in the “drying of Iowa” and intense statewide lobbying for and against liquor by the drink. At first, it appeared that opponents held the upper hand. On January 21 alone, five petitions opposing liquor by the drink were filed in the House with only one in favor. Tom Riley, one of the two representatives from Linn County, the second most populous county in the state, said that he had received 100 letters against a liquor bill and only one in favor; John Ely, Linn County’s other representative, had received 22 letters against a bill and only one phone call in favor.61

Much of the opposition was spearheaded by church leaders, particularly the powerful Methodist church, with about 290,000 members throughout Iowa. Methodist Bishop R. Gerald Ensley of Des Moines had already issued a statement in December 1962 opposing liquor by the drink, saying that it would increase alcoholism in Iowa and that every dollar collected in taxes would be offset by three to five dollars in expenses to combat “crime, poverty and marital misery.” On January 4, the board of directors of the Iowa Council of Churches, representing 15 Protestant denominations with 2,600 local congregations and 700,000 members, declared its opposition to liquor by the drink. They were joined on January 20 by the executive committee of the Iowa Yearly Meeting of Friends, which issued a statement that liquor by the drink would increase consumption, resulting in loss of life on highways and more crime. In late February the Iowa Council of Churches conducted an all-day meeting at Wesley Methodist Church, a block north of the Iowa Capitol, to discuss its position, inviting legislators to dinner and urging local churches statewide to invite their legislators to attend.62

Religious opposition to liquor by the drink was not unanimous, however. Episcopal Bishop Gordon Smith, speaking for his church, which had 25,000 members in Iowa, said, “This is

61. Des Moines Register, 1/22/1963; Cedar Rapids Gazette, 1/22/1963.
not a moral issue with us at all but merely a question of the best way to control the use of alcohol. The present Iowa liquor laws have proven inadequate to properly control liquor and have produced attendant evils including the key club situation and a general disrespect for law and order. We should enact liquor-by-the-drink legislation which can be enforced and accepted by the majority of our citizens as the proper way of handling the liquor problem.” Speaking for Iowa’s 435,000 Catholics, Bishop James J. Burnes observed that “nowhere in history has the Church condemned the moderate use of liquor.” Citing respect for law and its enforcement, he called the existing liquor laws “bad legislation and therefore not law.” Among religious leaders supporting change, the most direct was Rabbi Irving A. Wein- gar of Tifereth Israel Synagogue, Des Moines. “We have no objection to liquor. We never have a celebration without the use of wine. . . . I personally believe that our present liquor laws are a farce. We are taking honest people and making them dishonest. If liquor is evil, then let’s make an issue of liquor, not of liquor by the bottle or by the glass. Certainly people will violate liquor-by-the-drink laws. But this would be better than what we have now—plain drinking without any control.”

Opposition to liquor by the drink also stemmed from a non-religious body. In a half-page ad appearing in the statewide Sunday Des Moines Register in March, the Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Company of Des Moines, calling itself “America’s Original Non-Drinkers Auto Insurance Company,” issued a message to Iowans, “Is Liquor-by-the-Drink Worth 44 Lives?” Citing statistics from surrounding states, the ad argued, “If Iowa’s highway death toll had been the same as liquor-by-the-drink neighbors, it would mean 44 more Iowans killed last year.” It urged readers to call, telephone, or write legislators through card or letter to tell them to vote against liquor reform. The ad also offered readers a free report: “Will Legalizing Liquor-by-the-Drink Increase the Death Toll on Iowa’s Highways?”

During a press conference in mid-January, against the backdrop of lobbying efforts by some religious groups and others,

64. Ibid. (emphasis in original).
Hughes urged “wets” to be more vocal in voicing their opinions to legislators. Legislators had told the governor that most of their mail was running against liquor by the drink and that much of it was organized by religious groups, primarily the Methodist church. One rural Democratic legislator told Hughes that he was personally in favor of reform but that he had received 300 letters against liquor law change and only one in favor. Hughes insisted that “persons who want the law changed must organize in conveying their feelings to legislators.”

The governor was also beginning to play hardball with Democratic legislators. In a meeting at the Hotel Savery in Des Moines in late January with his party’s legislative caucus, including an estimated eight “dry” Democrats, Hughes warned that failure to support liquor by the drink “may determine the amount of consideration their recommendations for appointments in state jobs may get.” He added that he would “mobilize every man he can find to enforce the present law in the next two years, if the legislature does not act on the liquor issue.”

One unexpected argument against liquor reform was that enforcement of current law was actually working, so no change was needed. A young Charles Grassley, then a state representative from New Hartford and a solid “dry,” said, “The Hughes campaign is proof the law can be enforced and there is little need for a change.” But the general feeling among most legislators was that enforcement was only temporary and could not continue, given the strains it placed on law enforcement and local economies; after the initial pressure, establishments would simply go back to selling liquor. As Representative Scott Swisher (D-Iowa City) said, “There are not enough law enforcement officers in the state to override the wishes of the people.”

Hughes’s call for petitions and, no doubt, a response to state and local enforcement began to bear fruit by early February. An unofficial tally of petitions received in the Iowa House showed 60,000 names in favor of liquor by the drink and 4,000 against.

65. Des Moines Register, 1/20/1963.
67. Des Moines Register, 1/24/1963.
By February 21, nearly 100,000 Iowans had petitioned legislators in favor, with only 6,031 against. Representative Riley Dietz (R-Walcott), who was tracking the petition numbers, said, “In several instances, legislators have received more signatures favoring liquor by the drink than they did votes in last November’s election.” One representative, after receiving another packet of petitions favoring liquor by the drink, said, “I thought my county was dry.” In addition to petitions, legislators were being overwhelmed by letters from voters. George Mills of the \textit{Des Moines Register} called it the “biggest mail session of modern times.”\footnote{Des Moines Register, 2/11/1963; Cedar Rapids Gazette, 2/21/1963.}

By mid-February, Governor Hughes was regularly meeting with a bipartisan group of legislators from both houses, including Schroeder of Davenport and the Senate and House majority leaders, to see how votes were lining up on the liquor issue and to discuss the shape of legislation. The numbers were looking good, though specific legislation had not yet been drawn up. The \textit{Des Moines Register} reported on February 20 that a survey of House members showed 58 representatives—36 Republicans and 22 Democrats—backed general liquor-by-the-drink legislation, surpassing the 55 votes needed for passage.\footnote{Des Moines Register, 2/12/1963, 2/20/1963.}

Senator Schroeder, leading the legislative writing of the bill and guiding it through the Senate, refused to accept any deals or “horse trading” to get liquor by the drink passed. “If legislators—after receiving the petitions they have received for legalizing liquor and after the polls indicating the vast majority of Iowans are in favor of changing the present laws—aren’t willing to vote for a measure on its merits then certainly I’m not going to be willing to trade or exert any undue pressure to get a liquor bill passed.” He saw passage of the liquor reform effort as nothing less than the preservation of the Iowa Republican Party. “My own feeling is that the future of the Republican party in Iowa is at stake and that changing the liquor laws could be its redemption. If, as the majority party in Iowa, we Republicans don’t accede to the wishes of a majority of the people, then sooner or later we’ll become the minority party.”\footnote{Cedar Rapids Gazette, 2/24/1963.}
In a further effort to counter pressure from church groups against liquor reform, Democratic and Republican legislative supporters met with business leaders at the Wakonda Country Club in Des Moines in late February—just ahead of a weeklong midterm recess when legislators would be talking with voters. At this strategy session, participants urged the business people to apply pressure to House members considered “marginal” on the liquor issue. Senate Majority Leader Robert Rigler (R-New Hampton), one of the leaders of the gathering, said, “It would be very helpful if business groups such as Chambers of Commerce and commercial clubs take a stand and let their legislators know how they feel about liquor by the drink” and “how the business men back home felt about it.” Robert Tyson, executive secretary of the Republican state central committee, announced on March 1 that he and other Republicans would fan out across the state during the legislative recess to gain additional support for liquor by the drink.71

As the issue continued to drag on into late March without action, Hughes applied public pressure to legislators. In a speech at a six-county Democratic dinner in Perry that was publicized statewide in a press release, the governor said, “It would be disastrous if they wait much longer.” He called on legislative leaders to “start taking action—and soon—on a sensible liquor control bill.” Repeating his earlier arguments that “we will soon see this state drift into an atmosphere of cynicism where there will be little respect for any law,” he said that his enforcement efforts since January did not “mean we have made Iowa ‘dry’ or halted the intemperate use of alcohol. It only means we have driven bootlegging in this state further underground. Make no mistake about it. If the people of Iowa do not wish Iowa to be dry, a few state police agents cannot make it dry.” Tossing aside the arguments of some “drys” that enforcement could work in the long run, he said that it was temporary at best and liquor-by-the-drink reform was the only alternative to lawlessness.72

PROPOSED LEGISLATION finally emerged from the Senate Judiciary II Committee on Wednesday, April 4, on a 7–0 committee vote. The only token opposition came from Senator Jacob Grimstead (R-Lake Mills), a committed “dry” who still spoke with a Norwegian accent. By voting “present,” according to the Cedar Rapids Gazette, he “yielded to the growing demand for legalized glass liquor sales.” (Schroeder told Grimstead at the vote, “Jake, you’ve come a long way.”) The committee bill called for a 10 percent tax on gross receipts from the sale of alcoholic beverages and set up licenses with different fee levels among four classes: clubs, hotels/motels, commercial establishments with tables and seats for at least 25 people, and airlines and railroads. The bill set hour limits on liquor sales. City and town councils and county boards of supervisors would have final approval on whether liquor licenses would be issued. There was no provision in the bill for a “local option” vote to prohibit sales within counties or towns. After reading the proposed bill, Governor Hughes objected to a clause limiting liquor sales to only within business districts, which would prevent neighborhood taverns from participating, and he said that he would prefer that enforcement powers be under the Liquor Commission rather than the Bureau of Criminal Investigation. But that was only the beginning of the negotiating process.

The bill’s supporters waited a week before bringing the legislation to the Senate floor. Hoping to get a jump on opponents and avoid an avalanche of phone calls to wavering legislators, on Wednesday, April 10, at 9:37 a.m. they suddenly announced that they would begin debate. Senators Schroeder and David O. Shaff led the floor fight for the bill and thwarted most attempts to amend it. Opponents—led by Senators Eugene M. Hill (D-Newton), a farmer, and John A. Walker (R-Williams), a banker and farmer—made several attempts to increase license fees, but these were rejected. “If we get the cost too prohibitive,” argued Schroeder, “it will give incentive to circumvention through bootlegging.”

One turning point in the debate came with the effort to include “implied consent” in the bill; this meant that, when a citizen signed his or her driver’s license, it implied that the person had given consent for chemical tests of breath or body fluid for alcohol content if suspected of drunken driving. Presiding over the Senate, Lieutenant Governor William Moody ruled the provision out of order because it was contained in legislation currently being debated in the House. Without the “implied consent” clause in the proposed legislation, some Senate supporters considered changing their vote to “no,” throwing the bill’s passage into doubt.75

As the debate lingered on that day, it was obvious that supporters did not yet have the votes to pass the legislation, so they stalled with unplanned speeches and questions while applying pressure to undecided senators. The battle was for the votes of three individuals—Leigh Curran of Mason City, Donald Beneke of Laurens, and Irving Long of Manchester, all Republicans. “At midmorning, we had 26 or 27 votes [26 were needed for passage],” said one senator supporting liquor by the drink, “but as the radio announced over Iowa that the debate was on, the pressure started pouring into this chamber.” This included calls from ministers and other opponents throughout Iowa; they came in person, calling senators off the floor to lobby, and flooded the Senate’s telephone switchboard. At late afternoon, Mason City’s Curran was at the center of the pressure tactics, receiving calls, pro and con, from his home county and taking part in hushed discussions in the Senate cloakrooms, aisles, and hallways. Finally, at 4:41 p.m., talk suddenly stopped in the chamber for the first time that day and Senate Secretary Carroll Lane’s voice started reading the roll call in alphabetical order. When Leigh Curran voted “Aye,” an anonymous voice from the floor cried, “That does it!” When the roll call was finished, the Iowa Senate had passed its liquor-by-the-drink bill, 26–24.76

The final Senate vote divided both political parties. Seventeen Republicans and 9 Democrats voted yes; 21 Republicans and 3 Democrats voted no. In addition to Curran, two other known

75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
“drys” voted for the bill: Charles Van Eaton (R-Sioux City) and George O’Malley (D-Des Moines). “I’m against liquor in any form,” said Van Eaton after the vote. “I am also a practical individual. I’ve seen attempts to enforce the present liquor law and it can’t be enforced. The whole question is this: Are you going to have liquor by the drink in Iowa legal or illegal?” Cedar Rapids Gazette reporter Frank Nye added up the county populations represented by the senators voting for and against the bill, coming up with a total of 1,829,362 to 928,175. “This vote pretty well bears out the polls which indicated that about two-thirds of Iowa’s residents are for legalizing liquor by the drink,” he wrote.77

All Iowa eyes then turned to the House. By late April 1963, the House had received petitions from 143,022 Iowans in favor of liquor by the drink and 29,208 opposed. But several complications emerged. A group of southwest Iowa House members threatened to vote against the liquor bill if the Senate raised the Iowa sales tax from 2 to 3 percent to pay for growing state expenses; Representative Conrad Ossian (R-Red Oak), speaking for the group, said, “The number is enough to beat a liquor bill.” Some representatives proposed legislation forbidding sales of beer by any establishment other than a licensed liquor establishment, drawing fire from tavern operators and grocery stores that probably would not choose to get liquor licenses but still wanted to sell beer. Others were strongly opposed to the provision allowing city and town councils and county boards of supervisors to have final approval on granting liquor licenses, saying it would put enormous pressure on local officials and make liquor an issue at every council and supervisor election; instead, some favored a vote by the people. Still others insisted that the “implied consent” clause be added to the bill. As the date of debate neared, House supporters were unsure of the bill’s future. “I simply don’t know what’s going to happen,” said Representative John Mowry (R-Marshalltown), the bill’s floor leader. “I’m not even sure which day we’ll take it up.” Hughes predicted that the House would pass reform by one vote, saying, “It will be a bloody and close battle.”78

On Wednesday, May 1, 1963, the House began debate by voting down a so-called “dry” amendment, 59–49, which would have defined beer as an intoxicating beverage, banning package sales of beer at grocery and drug stores. By defeating that amendment, the House made the Senate bill the liquor vehicle. The likelihood of passage brightened when the block of anti-sales tax representatives indicated their support for the bill since it looked like the 3 percent tax would go down to defeat in the Senate. In turn, liquor-by-the-drink supporters selected the leader of the anti-tax group, Representative Bill Scherle (R-Henderson), to direct the bill in the House. Later that day, the House passed the “implied consent” amendment, 79–29, incorporating into the bill a mandate that motorists under arrest for drinking must take a chemical test for intoxication or automatically lose their license. By then, even “dry” House members conceded that a bill would pass. Charles Grassley, who, along with nine others, had proposed the implied consent amendment, said, “Many sincere drys want to be able to vote for liquor by the drink. They have conditioned their action on the acceptance of implied consent by the Senate.” While noting that “I would like to see liquor by the drink killed every place,” he admitted, “It appears that liquor by the drink will pass this session.”79

The final House bill was shaped by votes and compromises over the next few days. By 71–37, members voted down an effort to give counties the right to vote “wet” or “dry” every four years when petitioned by 10 percent of those voting for governor in the most recent election. The goal was to make it plain that counties could not have liquor by the drink unless they voted for it. Known as the “dry local option,” this meant that a county would be “dry” unless it voted itself “wet,” in contrast to the “wet local option,” which would allow counties to vote themselves “dry.” The House agreed to the latter, allowing people to vote their areas “dry” in special elections. By a vote of 53–51, House members also removed the ceiling on the number of licenses that could be issued for sale of liquor by the drink by a city or town council or a county board of supervisors; supporters argued that this would eliminate any under-the-table bidding

for licenses, permitting market demand and the public through elected officials to determine the number of establishments. The vote also removed the provision limiting licenses to within city business districts. The House version created an enforcement provision authorizing the Iowa Liquor Control Commission to police liquor operations throughout the state. Key clubs, which were at the center of so much debate over the years, were legislated out of existence; rather than granting Iowans the right to bring their own bottles of liquor to store and pour at establishments, legislators, hoping to improve enforcement, granted businesses the right to serve drinks to customers.80

On May 3, the Iowa House passed its liquor-by-the-drink bill, 68–40, a more lopsided vote than anyone would have predicted months earlier. With all 108 members voting, 45 Republicans and 23 Democrats voted for it and 34 Republicans and 6 Democrats opposed it. The Cedar Rapids Gazette’s Nye again added up the pro and con county totals based on county populations, showing that the 68 yes votes represented 2,073,898 residents and the 40 no votes represented 683,639, a 3 to 1 margin. In a statement issued on the day of the House passage, Governor Hughes specifically cited for special commendation “the many members of the House from nonurban areas who voted for this bill, doing what they thought was right despite great pressure of a highly emotional nature from their home districts.” He added, “This bill will control liquor-by-the-drink, for the first time since Iowa became a state in 1846. We have had for the past 107 years hypocrisy, double standards of law enforcement, dry laws and a wet state. We have never had adequate liquor control. Today’s action by the House is a step toward bringing this to an end.”81

The final legislative stage was for the Senate to concur with the House amendments. The Senate passed the bill, 27–23, on May 9, gaining the vote of an additional senator with passage of the “wet local option” feature. The bill then went to Hughes for his signature. Even after the agreement of both chambers, some looked upon the bill’s passage with gloom. Senator Franklin

Main (D-Lamoni) said, “We are approaching a brink of moral decay with the passage of this bill.” Others cited historical change. Representative John Murray (D-Fort Dodge) believed that the law would end “an age of hypocrisy and disrespect for the law.” Still others were even-handed. According to Senator Donald Beneke (R-Laurens), “This liquor bill won’t produce the dire results the drys predict or the rosy future for Iowa the wets predict.”

For the man who was the force behind the change—Governor Harold E. Hughes—the bill’s passage was “statesmanship of the highest order.” At the signing ceremony on Tuesday morning, May 14, 1963, Hughes said, “It is the peculiar genius of democracy that persons with diverse points of view can get together and work out solutions to complex problems that are in the public interest. In my opinion, this is exactly what happened with this liquor bill. . . . Those who followed the development of this legislation were amazed at the way wets and dries, Republicans and Democrats, worked together patiently, subordinating their individual interests to the interest of the state as a whole.”

THE LAW went into effect on July 4, 1963, and the Iowa Liquor Commission began to issue licenses the day after the holiday. Within days, the commission had approved 567 licenses for establishments scattered throughout 64 of Iowa’s 99 counties. By the end of the month, 91 counties had liquor by the drink. Over the next year, the commission issued 2,452 licenses. Iowa liquor sales to over-the-counter buyers in the first year of liquor-by-the-drink legalization was $11,778,048 out of the total of $49,778,394 in state liquor, wine, and ale sales, an increase of more than $5 million from the previous fiscal year. It was impossible to estimate sales of liquor drinks—and state income that was not collected—from prior years, but presumably most over-the-counter liquor sales in fiscal year 1964 were legal and taxed. The State of Iowa collected more than $3 million through

the 10 percent per drink tax, part of the overall $19 million from state liquor sales contributed to the state’s General Fund and local city, town, and county governments in fiscal year 1964. The state was well on its way to collecting taxes on liquor sales that it had missed in prior years.84

By 1970, the Liquor Commission was issuing 3,172 licenses annually, earning $1,175,675 for the state. By then, the liquor-per-drink tax had increased to 15 percent and was contributing $3,271,619 to state and local governments. In addition, a 3 percent sales tax that went into effect in 1967 brought in $1,623,384 to the state coffers from over-the-counter liquor sales. The amount of liquor sold to licensees through Iowa monopoly stores totaled $21,481,666, with the state earning profits from those sales. Liquor by the drink was contributing to the budgets of both state and local governments—and it was legal and regulated throughout the state.85

WITH THE PASSAGE of liquor by the drink in 1963, legal alcohol availability among adults within Iowa became settled policy, ending a conflict that had raged in the state since its beginning. To date, there have been no significant efforts by Iowa legislators or governors to pull back liquor sales from the general adult population. This debate’s demise accompanied the transition of Iowa from a state with powerful rural interests that kept liquor limitations alive as a political issue to one of more urban sensibilities more tolerant of alcohol consumption.

Alcohol consumption and distribution were certainly political issues in Iowa after 1963, but never in relation to limiting the general adult population’s access to liquor. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the minimum legal drinking age in Iowa fluctuated from 21 to 19 to 18 and finally back to 21. Efforts to curb drunken driving prompted legislators to establish minimum legal blood


alcohol levels and set strict fines, jail time, and driver’s license confiscation for violators. During the Farm Crisis of the 1980s, Iowa political leaders, who were looking for reductions in state expenses, eliminated state liquor monopoly stores and shifted to distribution through private businesses.

The fundamental reason for the end of this debate on over-the-counter liquor access in Iowa is that Iowans wanted it to end. In the nineteenth century, clear majorities of Iowa voters wanted prohibition—as shown in the popular votes of 1847 and 1882—though enforcement was a significant challenge. Politicians tried to chart courses between the desire to eliminate liquor and the reality that some Iowans wanted to continue to drink alcohol. Prohibition returned in the early twentieth century, but Iowans showed that their attitudes were changing by narrowly rejecting state constitutional prohibition in 1917 and voting for repeal of national prohibition in 1933. In 1934 Iowans turned to a state monopoly distribution system to manage and control liquor sales, but soon residents, wanting expanded availability, voted with their actions by defying the law in many quarters. When Harold Hughes gave Iowans a clear choice in 1962 to open the state to liquor by the drink, they voted him into office. That was not the only issue in the campaign, but it was a significant one, and his victory was seen as a mandate to change Iowa’s liquor laws. Given the tools of government, Hughes—with bipartisan support in the Iowa legislature—aggressively fought to accommodate the will of Iowans of the time. This reform of Iowa’s liquor laws closed a debate among Iowans that had been fought for over a century, making it Iowa’s last liquor battle.
The Origins of the Iowa Development Commission: Agricultural Transformation and Industrial Development in Mid-Twentieth-Century Iowa

KEITH OREJEL

ON JULY 1, 1945, the Fifty-first Iowa General Assembly passed an act creating the Iowa Development Commission (IDC). The commission, as a later report explained, was to serve as the “state’s official promotional agency,” tasked with overseeing postwar economic development. The state legislature assigned the IDC a “three-fold responsibility”: (1) research, specifically the “collection of facts and figures pertinent to Iowa’s economy”; (2) information, centering on a “program of publicity and education about Iowa”; and (3) promotion, defined as “the procurement of new industrial enterprise, and the encouragement of existing business and industry.” The IDC’s membership was composed largely of “business and professional men,” along with a handful of state legislators, all of whom were appointed by the governor. A professional staff headed by a salaried director oversaw the group’s day-to-day operations.¹

Although it received only modest attention at the time, the creation of the Iowa Development Commission was a ground-breaking event. The IDC was the first of its kind within the state—


a permanent government agency dedicated primarily to promoting industrialization. With the formation of the IDC, the state of Iowa entered a modern era of government-sponsored economic development, as the public sector played an expansive role in the pursuit of manufacturing and other enterprises. A bold move into the cutthroat competition for new industry, the creation of the IDC represented a direct response to long-term agricultural transformations and new industrial opportunities that converged during World War II.

Since the 1920s, farmers throughout rural America had confronted a volatile global market, with declining crop prices resulting in shrinking incomes and rising farm foreclosure rates. In an attempt to hold on to their property and maintain their standards of living, many farmers adopted new practices aimed at increasing productivity. Farmers with available capital invested in machinery (primarily tractors) and other technological innovations to maximize output. But these decisions not only failed to alleviate the plight of the farmer, they also initiated structural transformations that undermined the fabric of rural society. Increased output drove prices down further, necessitating ever greater production to survive. The social implications of these developments were staggering. As rural historian David Danbom has shown, “The minority of farmers whose ownership of tractors increased productivity intensified economic pressures on others.” Many farmers mortgaged their property to the hilt in order to keep up, while those unable to compete “withdrew from agriculture, usually by selling to expanding neighbors.” With “fewer farms and declining labor needs on those that remained,” the “pace of rural-to-urban migration” reached new heights. Outmigration led to the “deterioration of rural social networks,” since “depopulation” resulted in “fewer parishioners for churches and fewer pupils for schools.” Local businesses and other institutions also buckled under the weight of mass exodus.

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3. My main source for this broad sketch is David B. Danbom’s wonderfully synthetic survey, Born in the Country: A History of Rural America, 2nd ed. (Baltimore,
Despite attempts by federal bureaucrats to limit overproduction during the 1930s, the New Deal did not significantly hinder the transformation of agriculture. In some ways, the New Deal propelled farm modernization. Federal agencies such as the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and the Commodity Credit Corporation provided American farmers with infusions of capital through acreage reduction and price support programs. With fewer overall acres in use and more income generated by transfer payments and government-backed price levels, market-oriented farmers continued to improve their individual circumstances through greater productivity.4

Farm mechanization and rural outmigration were already issues by the early 1940s, but World War II accelerated those processes. The global conflict catalyzed what some scholars have referred to as a “production revolution.” The number of tractors in use exploded during the war in response to labor shortages, resulting in the permanent replacement of manpower with machines. Simultaneously, rural and small-town inhabitants migrated en masse to nearby industrial centers to fill growing demand in wartime factories.5


4. Danbom, Born in the Country, 206–33. The historian Sarah Phillips has argued that New Deal farm policymakers were divided “between those who believed that farmers had to ‘get big or get out’ and those who claimed that more could be done to help farmers remain on their land.” Over time, federal policy “shifted toward those who believed that there were just too many farmers.” This Land, This Nation: Conservation, Rural America, and the New Deal (New York, 2007), 9–11.

Between 1920 and 1950, Iowa’s farm population declined from 984,799 to 790,424. Outmigration and depopulation caused the state as a whole to experience anemic population growth in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, with increases of only 2.8, 2.7, and 3.3 percent. The U.S. population, in comparison, grew by 16.1, 7.2, and 14.5 percent during the same decades.6

During World War II, these decades-old rural ailments intersected with new industrial opportunities. In response to the outbreak of war in Europe, the state legislature in 1940 created the Iowa Industrial and Defense Commission, which brought together a coalition of elected officials, agribusiness representatives, labor leaders, industrialists, and other notables. The commission melded state-level civilian defense with a campaign to acquire wartime industries. The acquisition of several major ordnance plants and smaller factories during the war created enthusiasm for industrial development. Proud of their accomplishments, but fearful of the potentially disastrous effects of peacetime reconstruction, state officials called for a permanent program of industrialization after the conflict.

The Iowa Development Commission (IDC) was created in 1945 out of the simultaneous confidence created by the war that new industry would come to Iowa and growing fears about the continual loss of farm jobs and rural inhabitants. In Iowa, industrial development and agricultural transformations went hand in hand. But if changes in farming motivated many state officials to pursue industrialization, agricultural interests shaped the nature of Iowa’s postwar industrial campaign. Agribusiness representatives, primarily the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation, insisted that new industries should not infringe on large landholders’ access to cheap labor. Also, agricultural interests pressed for industries

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that would process farm products, thereby generating demand for their crops, eggs, milk, and meat.

The IDC addressed these various interests by laying out its vision for a “balanced economy.” In early promotional material, the IDC melded agricultural transformations and industrial development into a blueprint that promised prosperity, harmony, and growth. In this synthesis, displaced agricultural producers and laborers, freed from farming by mechanization and scientific advancements, would staff newly acquired industries. Promising mutual benefit to both agriculture and industry, the IDC gave the most attention to recruiting enterprises that would utilize the state’s natural resources and farm products. Those business concerns would then increase demand for Iowa’s abundant raw materials.

By analyzing the origins of the IDC, this article adds to the wealth of scholarship highlighting the interconnection between agriculture and industry in the greater Midwest. In his classic work, *Nature’s Metropolis*, William Cronon emphasized the symbiotic relationship between city and countryside, showing how agricultural production, resource extraction, and rural consumerism in the hinterland facilitated the rise of urban industrial Chicago.7 More recent scholarship, most notably the valuable work of Wilson J. Warren, has emphasized the persistent importance of “agro-industrialization” in the economic development of Iowa and the Midwest. Farm-oriented industries, such as meatpacking and flour milling, have, since the nineteenth century, been at the center of the rural industrial economy.8 The early years of the

Iowa Development Commission represented one facet of these longstanding and well-documented development patterns.

At the same time, the IDC represented an important institutional breakthrough in the history of rural industrialization, a development that has received little scholarly attention. The creation of the IDC signaled the state government’s modern stewardship of economic development, elevating industrialization to official public policy. Much like James C. Cobb’s characterization of Mississippi’s Balance Agriculture with Industry program, the IDC embodied a “long-term commitment to state sanctioned and supervised economic development.”9 This article contributes to existing scholarship by showing how and why industrial development became institutionalized in Iowa. Industrialization achieved a new level of government sponsorship during World War II because of concerns about rapid changes in agriculture. The precipitous decline in farm jobs led many state officials to conclude that only concerted government action could stem out-migration. Faith in state intervention was reinforced by Iowa’s wartime experiment with industrial development. Iowa had experienced industrialization in the past, but it was the agrarian crisis of the mid-twentieth century that produced the modern form of government-directed development exemplified by the IDC.

It is important to note that this article, as the title indicates, is an origin story. The IDC would have a long career, operating under its original name until 1986, when it was replaced by the Department of Economic Development (which was later supplanted by the Iowa Economic Development Authority). Rather than tackling the organization’s entire history, this study examines the IDC’s founding and early promotional efforts, focusing especially on the interconnection between agriculture and industrial development.


THE IOWA Industrial Resources and Defense Council held its first meeting in the offices of Governor George A. Wilson at two o’clock on Tuesday, September 10, 1940, almost a year after the invasion of Poland by German forces, and roughly four months since the fall of France.\(^\text{10}\) Present at the meeting were representatives from the most important interest groups in the state, including A. A. Couch, president of the Iowa Federation of Labor; Frank Wilson, president of the Iowa United Mine Workers of America; Allen Klein, vice-chairman of the Iowa Farm Bureau; R. R. O’Brien, publisher of the *Council Bluffs Nonpareil*; George S. Call, a member of the executive committee of the Midwest Defense Conference; J. Tracy Garrett, editor of the *Burlington Hawkeye-Gazette*; Ralph Smith, president of the Iowa Grange; Edward Kimball, president of the Iowa Manufacturers Association (a state branch of the National Association of Manufacturers); L. A. Rowland, vice-president of John Deere and Company; and Dale L. Maffitt, general manager of the Des Moines Water Works. The group’s diversity reflected the need for economic cooperation among all sectors of the Iowa economy, as well as for communication between public representatives and private interest groups, for the purpose of wartime preparedness. In the words of one member, the “cross-section of representation on the Council” was an attempt at “unselfishness and working toward the welfare of both the state and the nation.”\(^\text{11}\)

Governor Wilson started the gathering by laying out the goals and responsibilities of the newly formed group. Given recent developments across the globe, the central focus was Iowa’s role “in the national defense program.” Wilson called for the collection of data on “Iowa’s manufacturing, processes, transportation, resources and labor,” all of which was meant to ensure that the state

\(^{10}\) Both events had a tremendous effect on American public opinion and produced increased calls for U.S. military preparedness. George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York, 2008), 519, 537.

would be ready at a moment’s notice should the country start mobilizing for war. Undergirding these grand ideals and national civic values, however, were more material and pragmatic concerns. Wilson insisted that all “the information received by the Council” must be “made available to every community in Iowa” so that “the industries and citizens of the state may receive the fullest benefit of this national expansion” of the defense sector. Wilson made clear that one of the commission’s central duties was “making . . . applications for the location of new industries” in Iowa.12

Hovering over these initiatives were the menacing specters of outmigration and depopulation that had plagued Iowa since the 1920s. Commission member L. A. Rowland, vice-president of John Deere and Company, “expressed the opinion that labor supply was basic and that everything must be done to keep labor here in Iowa.” Noting that the “construction of munitions factories has a tendency to draw not alone men but supplies from Iowa for the industrial centers,” Rowland implicitly suggested that an agricultural state like Iowa could only hope to hold on to its domestic population and economic resources by achieving some degree of industrialization.13 Many in Iowa’s local communities shared Rowland’s perspective. The Centerville Iowegian, the town of Centerville’s local newspaper, argued in 1940 that “southern Iowa has many ex-farmers and coal miners who are now jobless. They must either remain in the small towns on relief or go to the cities to get work.”14

Council members realized that the imperatives of modern warfare played to their advantage. Observers of the international scene forecasted that total war, especially the aerial bombardments witnessed during the Spanish Civil War and the invasion of Poland, made the concentration of industrial facilities in large urban centers a defensive liability.15 As a result, Frank Wilson of

12. “Minutes of the Meeting of the IIRDC, September 10, 1940,” 2.
13. Ibid., 3.
14. “Iowa Industrial Institute Seeks War Industries,” Centerville Iowegian, 12/19/1940.
15. George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (New York, 2008), 484. An excellent discussion of aerial warfare’s psychological effects and its political ramifications for the larger world can be found in Richard Evans, The Third Reich in Power (New York, 2005), and idem, The Third Reich at War (New York, 2009).
the Iowa United Mine Workers of America asserted, “We were undoubtedly headed toward the decentralization of industry,” which would “apparently be accomplished by the necessity of national defense.” Governor Wilson made similar claims in numerous public statements, arguing on one occasion, “If there is any single lesson which has come out of Europe, it is that the decentralization of defense industry is equal in importance to the scattering of airports.”16

From the Defense Council’s first meeting it was apparent that Iowa’s industrial development program would have to accommodate itself to the demands of agribusiness. Allen Klein, vice-chairman of the Farm Bureau, insisted that all “new plants will require” a “proper relation to agriculture.” Klein spoke for Iowa’s “agricultural interests” when he argued that “consideration” in “locating industries” had to be given to ensure that there would be “no shortage or surplus of labor.” While Klein claimed to have the interests of rural and small-town communities at heart, he was obviously attempting to protect agribusiness’s access to cheap labor when he concluded, “Larger industries must be located near larger communities.”17

The first meeting of the Iowa Industrial Resources and Defense Council, which would soon be renamed the Iowa Industrial and Defense Commission (IIDC), set the tone for the organization’s wartime operations. The IIDC would play a dual role. On the one hand, it would ensure military preparedness and domestic defense by coordinating with representatives from agriculture, industry, and labor. Simultaneously, it would attempt to bring defense, munitions, and ordnance plants to the state. Policymakers rationalized and justified these measures by arguing that Iowa would lose inhabitants to urban centers outside the state if it did not acquire manufacturing enterprises of its own. Implicit within this argument was a growing concern that Iowa was too dependent on farm jobs, which not only paid less than their industrial counterparts but also were in shrinking supply as a result of mechanization. By war’s end, this implicit logic would become

an explicit argument as the need to replace agricultural employment with industrial jobs would be the central rationale for the creation of the Iowa Development Commission.

Between 1940 and 1945, the IIDC aggressively campaigned to attain defense contracts. In March 1941 the commission passed a motion calling for Governor Wilson to travel to Washington, D.C., to “confer with the Iowa senators and the Iowa congressional delegation on the problem of obtaining industries for Iowa.” In July of that same year the commission decided to acquire new office space and hire more employees to establish “a branch office of the Defense Contract Service Division of the Office Production Management,” an attempt to solicit federal contracts. These initiatives had significant success, as defense spending in Iowa skyrocketed, rising to $57 million by March 1941 and then to $68 million the following month.18

What exactly did the IIDC do to bring new industry to Iowa? Primarily, members of the IIDC worked closely with communities that wanted to secure defense-related industries. The IIDC’s most important function was facilitating interaction among local towns, Iowa’s congressmen, and wartime government agencies. The attempt to secure a corn alcohol plant for the small town of Eagle Grove provides a compelling example of how the IIDC navigated various political channels in pursuit of wartime industries. On March 4, 1941, a “delegation of business men” from Eagle Grove met with the IIDC to “discuss the possibilities of corn alcohol [plant] construction in northern Iowa.” On March 13, IIDC Secretary Rodney Q. Selby met with the director of the Agricultural Experiment Station at Iowa State College “to ask him to prepare material” on the manufacture of corn alcohol that “could be presented to defense production agencies in Washington.” About a week later, Selby visited Washington, D.C., to meet with Senator Guy M. Gillette (D-IA) to explain how these plants could produce corn alcohol necessary for the production of explosives. Gillette also proposed the possibility that corn alcohol could be

used as a motor fuel. After receiving the report produced by agricultural experts at Iowa State, Senator Gillette promised to discuss the finding with the secretary of war. Selby also disseminated the material to Iowa Democratic Senator Clyde Herring and “other members of Iowa’s delegation in Congress.”

Although the War Department recognized the importance of ethyl alcohol for military purposes, notably in the production of smokeless powder, it informed Senator Gillette and the IIDC that the “present facilities will be adequate to supply . . . military needs.” Nonetheless, the IIDC pounced on its newfound access to federal wartime bureaucracies. In April 1941 IIDC Secretary Selby met with P. H. Groggins, a chemical consultant who worked with the Council of National Defense, to once again promote the construction of corn alcohol plants in Iowa. Groggins reaffirmed the War Department’s initial assessment, informing the IIDC official that there was little demand for industrial corn-based alcohol.

This did not deter Iowa’s public officials, however. On May 20, 1941, Governor George Wilson, IIDC Chair Edward Kimball, and Secretary Selby met with Under Secretary of War Robert Patterson and two officials from the Office of Production Management to once again press for the “construction of corn alcohol plants in Iowa as a needed war production measure.” In January 1942, the IIDC held a meeting in Ames, to discuss how corn alcohol could be used “as an adjunct to synthetic rubber manufacture.” Throughout February and March 1942, IIDC officials continued to travel to Washington to champion corn alcohol as a viable ingredient for the manufacture of synthetic rubber and explosive devices.

In March 1942 the entire process came full circle when Otto Knudsen, a local businessman from Eagle Grove, joined Selby and several IIDC members on a trip to Washington, D.C. The group met with Senator Gillette, numerous Iowa representatives, and Vice-President Henry A. Wallace to once again push for the construction of corn alcohol factories in Iowa. At one point, Dean

20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., 2–3.
Buchanan, director of Iowa State College’s Agricultural Experiment Station, was called to testify before a U.S. Senate subcommittee on the prospect of corn alcohol production within the state. The campaign remained active throughout the summer of 1942, with IIDC member A. A. Couch lobbying in “Washington . . . to forward the promotion of corn alcohol plant construction.” In the latter months of 1942, Iowa’s spokespersons focused their sales pitch on the use of grain alcohol in the production of synthetic rubber. Within Congress, Iowa’s elected officials, most notably Senator Gillette, pushed hard to convince their colleagues that grain alcohol could replace the then dominant petroleum in the manufacture of synthetic rubber.\(^{22}\)

Despite early setbacks, the IIDC’s campaign was an eventual success, as Iowa received numerous military contracts to manufacture alcohol from corn and other grain products. In early 1943 the federal government initiated an ambitious program to spur the production of grain alcohol, which resulted in the construction of several industrial plants in Iowa. In February 1943 the Grain Processing Corporation of Muscatine, signed a contract with the federal Defense Plants Corporation to build a factory that would “produce 8,500,000 gallons of alcohol a year” for sale to “the defense supplies corporation” as part of the production of synthetic rubber. The following month, the cities of Dubuque and Keokuk were also picked as sites for federally sponsored grain alcohol plants. Perhaps most heartening for the IIDC was the announcement on March 10, 1943, that Otto Knudsen’s Iowa Farm Processing Cooperative was “allocated the contract to construct and operate the Dubuque plant,” and that the town of Eagle Grove had also been selected as a site for one of five other future grain alcohol plants. Both measures were fitting since Knudsen and Eagle Grove had been deeply involved in lobbying for wartime grain alcohol production.\(^{23}\)

\(^{22}\) Ibid., 3–4; “Grain Alcohol-Synthetic Rubber Fight to Senate Floor Today,” Centerville Iowegian, 7/20/1943. See also “Gillette in New Inquiry,” Centerville Iowegian, 1/5/1943. For the broader history of this campaign, see Mark Finlay, Growing American Rubber: Strategic Plants and the Politics of National Security (New Brunswick, NJ, 2009), esp. ch. 5.

\(^{23}\) “Gillette Predicts Gov’t to Expand Alcohol Program,” Centerville Iowegian, 3/6/1943; Finlay, Growing American Rubber, 190–97; “Contract for Alcohol Plant Given Muscatine: Facilities to Produce 8,500,000 Gallons a Year,” Centerville
Grain alcohol plants represented just one part of Iowa’s wartime industrial boom. Several large-scale munitions and ordnance facilities located in the state, along with a host of smaller defense-related enterprises. One of the earliest and most noteworthy acquisitions was the Iowa Ordnance Plant, located near the city of Burlington. Construction of the massive factory began in January 1941, and the $60 million ordnance plant was officially dedicated on July 31, 1941. By the end of the war, the Iowa Ordnance Plant, according to historian Lisa Ossian, would turn out “25 million mortar shells, 200,000 medium-caliber shells, 5 million major-caliber shells, and 2.5 million bombs.” The Iowa Ordnance Plant was soon followed by the Des Moines Ordnance Plant, an equally impressive munitions factory located in the suburban community of Ankeny. Along with these behemoth acquisitions, a slew of private businesses converted their plants for wartime production. In southern Iowa, the Hercules Manufacturing Plant, located in the town of Centerville, refitted its operations and by 1943 was “wholly in the production of defense materials,” including the manufacturing of “steel casing and machining” as well as “stump pullers.”

Along with its promotional duties, the IIDC also played a central role in helping local communities adjust to rapid industrialization. In May 1941 IIDC Chair Edward Kimball made a personal visit to Burlington’s Iowa Ordnance Plant. After inspecting the facilities, he appointed Burlington residents to an advisory committee that would inform the IIDC on “problems” relating to industrialization. The IIDC addressed some of the primary issues related to wartime industrial development, such as pressing for legislation that would help meet the demand for housing in cities and towns that gained defense contracts.

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Iowegian, 2/15/1943; “Keokuk to Get Alcohol Plant WPB Announces,” and “Plants Expected to Produce At Least 56,000,000 Gallons a Year,” Centerville Iowegian, 3/4/1943; “Grain Alcohol Plant,” Centerville Iowegian, 3/13/1943; “WPB Gives Contracts to Five Iowa Plants,” Centerville Iowegian, 3/10/1943. See also “Feud Develops over Spud Sugar,” Centerville Iowegian, 10/6/1945; and “Plant to Produce Enzyme in State,” Centerville Iowegian, 5/21/1945.


25. “Minutes of the Meeting of the Iowa Industrial and Defense Commission, May 21, 1941,” folder: 1940, 1941, box 1, Economic Development Collection:
World War II generated newfound interest in industrial development as the state successfully acquired defense and munitions plants. To a degree never before witnessed, Iowa’s elected officials, small-town business leaders, and various interest groups campaigned to bring industry to their state. Wartime mobilization offered these public and private citizens access to Congress, federal bureaucracies, and even the executive branch. World War II provided firsthand experience in industrial development. The global conflict offered local and state actors a model for industrializing Iowa and a sense of excitement that the state’s agricultural economy could be diversified with manufacturing.

WHILE WAR TIME INDUSTRY BOOMED in Iowa, the state’s farm sector was undergoing dramatic changes with long-term implications. These two processes were directly connected. An abundance of well-paying manufacturing jobs drew farmers and laborers off the land. Farm jobs tended to pay less than manufacturing employment, so thousands of field hands, tenant farmers, and even independent landholders left agriculture in search of industrial employment. Many rural and small-town inhabitants fled their communities for Iowa’s booming industrial areas or urban centers elsewhere in the region, such as Detroit or Chicago. As a result, farmers experienced a dire labor shortage. To make up for the lack of available manpower, farmers turned to machines. Farm mechanization greatly expanded during World War II. Sales of tractors and other equipment spiked throughout the conflict. These capital investments then created an autocatalytic effect, whereby a labor shortage resulted in mechanization, which then eliminated agricultural jobs for good. The number of farm laborers decreased significantly during the war. As the conflict continued, it became clear that farming would not produce postwar job growth.26


But even as transformations in farming helped to fuel the growing desire for new industry, agribusiness continued to determine the contours of the state’s industrial development program. Public officials’ dogged promotion of grain alcohol factories exemplified the obeisance paid to agricultural elites. Grain alcohol plants promised not only wartime industrial jobs for Iowans but also increased demand for the state’s agricultural products. Even the IIDC’s own internal documents made clear that the whole campaign was due to “the efforts of agricultural interests to induce the government to build plants in Iowa for converting surplus grain to alcohol.”

As the tide shifted in 1943 and 1944 and it became clear that the Allies would defeat Nazi Germany and the Axis powers, policymakers prepared plans to carry Iowa’s industrial development program into the postwar era. After the conflict, agribusiness would once again shape industrialization in Iowa.

PUBLIC OFFICIALS, buoyed by their positive experiences with wartime industrialization, began to argue for the continuation of state industrial development initiatives during peacetime. As early as August 1942 the IIDC was in conversation with Governor Wilson about creating a Post War Planning Committee. By December 1943, the IIDC was preparing to hold a joint meeting with the recently established State Post War Rehabilitation Commission (PWRC) “with a view to coordinating the activities of the two bodies.” The IIDC not only offered to share its office space and staff with the PWRC, but the IIDC’s chairman, Edward Kimball, along with several other officials, also served as members of the PWRC.

In April 1944 IIDC Secretary Selby disseminated material proposing the “organization [of] a permanent Industrial Develop-
ment Commission.” At the same time, Governor Bourke Hickenlooper (who succeeded George Wilson in 1943) called on the commission to "undertake a program of industrial promotion by compiling information relative to the State’s resources, opportunities and potentialities as far as raw materials, transportation, labor and other features . . . for presentation to prospective industrial establishments." In December 1944 the IIDC sent Chairman Kimball and Secretary Selby to Topeka to examine the Kansas Industrial Development Commission. Apparently impressed with their findings, the IIDC appointed a committee composed of several members of the state legislature to "draft a bill for presentation to the Fifty-first General Assembly, which would provide for the creation of the Iowa Development Commission." It was clear by mid- to late 1944 that Iowa was gearing up for a major industrial development drive after the war ended.

In January 1945 IIDC members discussed the recently drafted bill that proposed the creation of the Iowa Development Commission and decided to recommend its referral to the appropriate committees within the Iowa House and Senate. In March 1945 the last recorded meeting of the Iowa Industrial and Defense Commission took place. Chairman Kimball informed the group that the law to create the Iowa Development Commission had passed. At the same meeting, copies of the Iowa Development Commission’s first promotional book, Iowa . . . Land of Industrial Opportunity, were passed out to each member of the soon-to-be defunct IIDC. The next time the organization released its meeting minutes, on July 13, 1945, the letterhead read “Iowa Development Commission.”

BY THE TIME the General Assembly approved the creation of
the Iowa Development Commission in 1945, Robert D. Blue had
replaced Bourke Hickenlooper as the governor of Iowa. Sworn
into office in 1945, Blue oversaw the creation of the IDC and offi-
cially signed the legislation that brought the organization into
existence. Archival records from Blue’s administration provide
insight into the motivations behind the creation of the IDC.
Governor Blue’s departmental files include a brief analysis of the
importance of natural gas for new industry. This document offered
a succinct explanation for the IDC’s formation, showing that Iowa’s
campaign for industrial development was a direct response to the
social effects of farm mechanization and rural outmigration.

Through improved farming methods and equipment, the number
of people engaged in agriculture in Iowa has been less each year. . . .
This farm population has generally moved out of the State and into
more congested areas. . . . For the good of the country as a whole,
and for the good of Iowa in particular, it seems appropriate that
every effort should be taken to develop the present industries in
Iowa and secure additional ones, at least to an extent that will
absorb the farm boys and girls that are not going to be needed in
agriculture.

The State of Iowa, through its legislators, has created the Iowa
Development Commission. Part of the duties and objects of this
Commission are to aid in the industrial development of Iowa.31

The impending downward slide of agricultural employment
and the population outmigration that this implied were clearly
on the minds of Iowa’s public officials and policymakers when
the IDC was first created. In November 1945 Governor Blue com-
missioned Professor Ray Wakeley of Iowa State College to pro-
duce a study on population trends and their implications for the
state’s future. A letter from Professor William Murray, head of
the Department of Agriculture and Mechanical Arts at Iowa
State, to the college’s president, Dr. Charles E. Friley, laid out the
report’s central findings: The “Iowa farm population is decreasing

31. Untitled document on natural gas for Iowa’s industrial development, folder:
Development and Industrial Commission, 1944–1946, Departmental and Sub-
ject Files, Records of Governor Robert D. Blue, SHSI-DM. Although the docu-
ment does not have a title or date, its location in Governor Blue’s records and
the content of the analysis suggest that it was produced in 1945 or 1946.
slowly,” and the state needed more “business and industrial development.” The report itself noted the “increased migration out of Iowa,” detailing how the “farm population” had “declined . . . with increasing rapidity from 1920 to the present [1945].”32 The existence of such a dire report on the eve of the postwar period highlighted a growing awareness that overdependence on agriculture implied the perpetual loss of young, educated citizens and a shrinking population.

While declining agricultural employment motivated public officials to extend industrial development into the postwar era, the farm economy remained interwoven with visions of Iowa’s industrial future. Iowa . . . Land of Industrial Opportunity, the IDC’s first promotional book, captured the ongoing affiliation between agriculture and industry in the postwar period. Much like their wartime counterparts, members of the IDC argued that a massive “decentralization” of American industry was taking place. The movement of war-related industries had been motivated by defense imperatives; the relocation of private industry after the war, however, was compelled by political and economic factors. The defining feature of this industrial restructuring was manufacturing’s “movement away from congested industrial centers” to “new locations” outside of urban America. A myriad of reasons were offered for industry’s flight from urban areas: high taxes, unfriendly attitudes toward business, excessive costs, and overpaid and impetuous laborers. Regardless of motivations, the trend was clear: manufacturers were looking for new homes outside of their traditional urban industrial locations.33

The central goal of Iowa’s industrial development campaign, according to Land of Industrial Opportunity, was to achieve a “bal-

32. William G. Murray to Dr. Charles E. Friley, 11/12/1946, folder: Changes in Iowa Population with Special Reference to Post-War Developments and State Institutions and Programs, by Ray Wakeley, box 62, Robert D. Blue Papers, Special Collections, University of Iowa Libraries, Iowa City; Ray Wakeley, “Changes in Iowa Population with Special Reference to Post-War Developments in State Institutions and Programs,” 3–4, ibid.
33. Iowa . . . Land of Industrial Opportunity (published by the Iowa Development Commission, Clyde Hendrix, chairman, and Rodney Selby, director), A1–A5. This book was originally published in 1945. The version cited here (found in Iowa State University’s Parks Library) does not list a publication date, but various textual clues suggest that it was an updated edition published around 1949.
vanced economy.” The concept of a “balanced economy” represented an attempt to align Iowa’s agricultural legacy with its industrial aspirations. According to promoters, “Iowa does not desire to become an industrial center” but rather to “increase gradually her industrial activity” so as to diversify the state’s economy. In almost every sense, Iowa’s campaign for industry was fashioned to avoid threatening agriculture’s status. While the state welcomed any and all manufacturers interested in Iowa, and the IDC paid attention to non-farm-related industries, state promoters gave special emphasis to those firms that oriented themselves toward agriculture because, as the promotional booklet affirmed, “Obviously, the key to Iowa’s industrial importance is her agriculture!” Hemp, corn, wheat, oats, pigs, chicken, milk, eggs, and other “by products from agriculture present endless opportunities for industrial development.” Iowa’s abundance of farm outputs would entice manufacturing and processing firms to move to the state to be “close to raw materials.” In a clear nod to agribusiness interests, this model promised to increase demand for crops and other goods produced on the farm.34

While hailing the industrial potential of Iowa’s agricultural abundance, promotional material also acknowledged that increases in farm productivity drove people off the land, necessitating new manufacturing employment for displaced workers. “The source of Iowa labor,” the IDC explained, “is the farm.” The “old fashioned” labor-intensive form of farming was “out of vogue in Iowa.” Farming had become “a mechanized business” operating with scientific instruments and methods. Thus, the state had witnessed “a steady outward flow of young men and women from the farms of Iowa over the borders of the state,” producing a “decrease in [farm] population of over 200,000” since 1900. But the IDC argued that workers released from agriculture would create an available pool of labor for industry. With mechanical know-how from their years working with tractors and a healthy respect for the principles of business efficiency, Iowa’s farm population would serve as a stable, hard-working, and inexpensive source of labor for manufacturers.35

34. Ibid., A-4, B-1, A-9, B-13 (all italics in original).
35. Ibid., C-7, C-8, C-7-11.
Iowa . . . the Land of Industrial Opportunity fully captured the interconnection between agriculture and industrial development. This linkage existed on multiple levels. First, increases in agricultural productivity, as a result of mechanization and government policies, created a cornucopia of farm goods that might entice food processing and manufacturing plants to the state. Seeking closer access to agricultural inputs, these firms would help to enhance Iowa’s economic position by transforming farm products and raw materials into value-added consumer goods. Second, industrial development boosters clearly crafted their program to appease agribusiness interests. By focusing on farm-oriented enterprises, industrial development would not supplant agriculture but rather would benefit the farm sector by increasing demand for crops, eggs, meat, milk, and other products. Finally, and most important, the shift from labor-intensive to capital-dependent farming reduced the number of available jobs, leading Iowa’s public officials to pursue new industry to keep residents from leaving the state. Without new manufacturing employment, industrial development promoters argued, the state would suffer from low incomes, population outmigration, and a shrinking tax base.

With all of these dynamics in play, Iowa . . . the Land of Industrial Opportunity offered a comprehensive roadmap for Iowa’s immediate postwar economic development. Agriculture and industry would flourish side by side. Mechanization and scientific advancements would not be hindered, but championed, since greater productivity would put more money into the hands of farmers and create a surplus of agricultural goods that would attract processing firms to Iowa. There would be fewer family farms (which would not be able to compete with large landholders) and less need for farm laborers, but that would not be a problem since those displaced workers would serve as a surplus labor force for new industry. In a disturbing twist of logic, boosters viewed agrarian displacement and unemployment as a selling point for luring industrialists in search of cheap labor. IDC promotional material argued that “there is a constant surplus of the finest labor in the world in Iowa!” “The [labor] supply comes from the farms, and there is no more adaptable group in the country than
Iowa farm boys and girls.” The terms “surplus” and “adaptable” implied the existence of a cheap, pliable workforce. In a harmonious and fluid process, promoters suggested, redundant farm labor would drift smoothly into newly created manufacturing jobs. Young and educated citizens, who previously had migrated to urban centers outside the state for greater opportunities, would stay in Iowa to fill these industrial positions.

During its early years of operation, the IDC promoted enterprises in harmony with farming. In 1946 the IDC published Why Iowa Is Great, a promotional book that lauded the “direct relationship between Iowa’s industry and agriculture.” Noting that “more than one-half of Iowa’s industrial income directly depends upon agriculture,” the book celebrated the state’s notable “food processing and meat packing industries,” naming specifically the Quaker Oats Company and Rath Packing Company.

The Development Bulletin, the IDC’s monthly news bulletin, was littered with articles focusing on farm-oriented industries, bearing headlines such as “Food Processing Top Iowa Industry” and “Industry Finds Gold in Iowa Oat Fields.”

In March 1951 the Development Bulletin published an article profiling the Independence Canning Corporation. Located in the small town of Independence, the firm was portrayed as an archetype of postwar industrial development. The company was jointly owned by Don Forsman of the nearby town of Fredericksburg, John Van Zetten and Archie Shannon of Oskaloosa, and two Chicago businessmen. The plant was originally purchased in 1946. At that time, general manager and treasurer Darrel Forsman later recalled, “We thought we had a really good day if we turned out 1200 cans of whole chicken.” By 1951 the plant was producing 9,000 cans of chicken and turkey every day. Initially, the factory had canned both poultry and corn, but it eventually gave up on

corn when the owners “realized the peak demand for poultry conflicted with the sweet corn harvest.” “Under the trade name of Corn Blossom,” the Development Bulletin explained, “the Independence Company puts out four sizes of whole chicken-in-the-can” that included “disjointed halves of chicken, boneless turkey and chicken, and fricassee in butter gravy.” General Manager Forsman admitted that the company was forced to search as far as Tennessee, Texas, New York, and even Canada for chickens during slack periods, but he insisted that locally raised animals were their priority: “During the season, we buy all our poultry within 100 miles of Independence.” A relatively small plant, with just 85 employees in 1951, the firm had nonetheless experienced substantial growth since 1947, when it had employed only 25 people.39

The Independence Canning Corporation embodied the IDC’s early vision for postwar industrialization. The firm bought most of its raw materials (chickens) from poultry houses within the state, generating greater demand for local chicken farmers. Simultaneously, the firm created new jobs for residents in the local community, many of whom were no doubt being turned out of agriculture. Rather than challenging agribusiness’s preeminence, the Independence Canning Corporation helped sustain large commercial farmers’ quest for greater productivity, soaking up surplus raw materials while simultaneously capturing superfluous agricultural workers.

IN THE DECADES after World War II, the Iowa Development Commission could point to steady economic progress, as the number of manufacturing establishments in Iowa increased from 2,965 to 3,388 between 1947 and 1972, while the average number of production workers grew from 112,490 to 157,000. Starting in the mid- to late 1950s, agro-industrial firms would lose their privileged place in the economic development of the rural Midwest. Food products would remain one of the largest industrial sectors

39. “A Switch from Corn to Chicken Pays Off at Independence,” Iowa Development Bulletin, vol. 6, no. 5, 3–4, March 15, 1951, folder 2, box 36, Departmental and Subject Files, Development Commission, Records of William S. Beardsley, SHSI-DM. There appears to have been a slight name change at some point from the original Development Bulletin to the Iowa Development Bulletin.
throughout the twentieth century, but other manufacturing categories, such as non-electrical machinery, electrical machinery, fabricated metal, and transportation equipment, would experience substantial growth. The diversification of manufacturing throughout the rural Midwest would undermine the centrality of farm-oriented enterprises. This trend was apparent in Iowa, where, according to Wilson J. Warren, many small towns hosted “traditional agro-industrial companies as well as companies making television components, construction equipment, windows and doors, pharmaceuticals, plastics, and batteries.”

Yet this later shift in development patterns does not negate the importance of agriculture in the IDC’s early activities. Assessing Iowa’s industrial progress up until 1956, the research specialist George May concluded that “the most important industries in Iowa are those which are closely linked with the farm—food processing plants and the farm equipment industry.” The fact remains that the emergence of state-sponsored industrial development in Iowa was inextricably linked to agriculture. The transformation of American farming inspired, justified, and legitimated the creation of a permanent development agency in Iowa. If Iowa had not been experiencing rural depopulation, outmigration, and farm modernization, it is inconceivable that the state would have invested such a significant amount of time, energy, and resources pursuing new industry.

THE CREATION of the Iowa Development Commission in 1945 marked the beginning of modern industrial development in Iowa. For the first time, the state could claim a professional, institution-

41. May, “Recent Industrial Development” and “Iowa Industries.”
alized, and permanent industrialization program. The proximate origins of the IDC lay in the state’s wartime experience. Officials and residents had worried for over 20 years that low wages and mechanization in the farm economy would drive people out of the state, but it was not until World War II that industrial development presented itself as a viable solution to those problems. The pursuit of munitions, ordnance, and grain alcohol plants gave Iowans experience in, and models for, industrial development. The Iowa Industrial and Defense Commission linked local communities and state officials with Congress, federal bureaucracies, and high-ranking politicians. Wartime industrialization provided Iowans with a sense of hope that the state could acquire manufacturing concerns. At the same time, labor shortages pushed farmers to utilize new machinery and scientific improvements, resulting in fewer available agricultural jobs after the war. In 1945 Governor Blue and the state legislature decided to meet agricultural transformations head on by creating the Iowa Development Commission. The IDC presented a plan for postwar economic development that offered industrial jobs for displaced farm workers, increased demand for agricultural products, and created a “balanced economy” for all of Iowa. The IDC’s original program exemplified the inseparability of agricultural transformations and industrial development during the immediate postwar years.
Local 1’s Unionism and the Transformation of Iowa’s Politics, 1939–1970

WILSON J. WARREN

The following article is reprinted with permission from Struggling with “Iowa’s Pride”: Labor Relations, Unionism, and Politics in the Rural Midwest since 1877, by Wilson J. Warren (University of Iowa Press, 2000). It is reprinted here because it aptly complements the other two articles in this issue, expanding and providing context for their narratives.

Previous chapters in the book recounted the emergence and erosion of a militant unionism in Local 1 of the United Packinghouse Workers of America, which represented workers at the John Morrell and Company meatpacking plant in Ottumwa. – Editor

LOCAL 1’S MILITANT UNIONISM keyed Iowa’s political transformation in the post–World War II years. Morrell workers’ CIO movement quickly moved beyond plant organizing and bargaining with the company into a larger political struggle for greater power in city and state politics. Ottumwa’s meatpacking workers, together with other blue-collar workers and middle-class residents of the city, became Democratic supporters who precipitated a remarkable transition in partisan politics in Ottumwa, Wapello County, and Iowa as a whole. Indeed, Ottumwa’s CIO movement, combined with meatpacking, auto-worker, and farm equipment worker unionism across the state, helped to
transform Iowa’s political landscape from solid Republicanism to competitive two-party status.¹

This Democratic transition started in the 1930s but did not culminate until the 1960s. As historian James L. Sundquist describes in *Dynamics of the Party System*, the Democratic ascendancy in Iowa and fifteen other northern states was part of a two-stage realignment that spanned the 1930s to the 1950s. Developments among packing workers in Ottumwa illustrate these findings quite well. The packing community’s enthusiasm for unionism in the 1930s did not immediately carry over into support for the Democratic party. From the 1860 presidential election until 1928, Ottumwa and Wapello County were usually dependable Republican strongholds in local, state, and national politics, not unlike most of Iowa’s cities and counties. Only during the late nineteenth century and then during World War I had Democrats enjoyed success in Ottumwa and Wapello County. Unlike the situation in other industrial cities elsewhere, the 1928 presidential election results did not presage later Democratic landslides; Hoover drubbed Smith in the packing district’s Ward One by a 60 to 40 percent margin. Beginning with the 1932 presidential election, however, Iowa Democrats in both urban and rural areas won by landslide margins in the 1932, 1934, and 1936 national and state elections. As in so many midwestern states, though, Democratic gains largely reflected farmers’ protest voting. By 1938, with the New Deal agricultural programs addressing farm problems, Democratic gains declined throughout most of Iowa, even in the industrial cities. Although the Democrats received majorities in

Ottumwa and Wapello County during the early 1930s, the packing community did not turn out for Roosevelt to a much greater degree than the rest of the city’s voters.\(^2\)

With the 1936 election, though, Ottumwa’s industrial workers’ selections foretold the significant swing to the Democratic ticket by voters in industrial communities in the state after World War II. Between 1944 and 1972, the original packing district and the south side precincts (where even larger numbers of Morrell workers lived after World War II, and who were joined by workers at the UAW-affiliated Deere plant) averaged 65 and 60 percent majorities, respectively, for Democratic presidential candidates. Even more significant, the residents of Ottumwa and Wapello County as a whole voted solidly Democratic for not only presidential candidates but congressional and state-level politicians as well. From 1932 to 1948, Democrats won 52 percent of Wapello County and Ottumwa’s gubernatorial vote. Between 1950 and 1972, Democrats garnered 58 percent of the total vote in Wapello County, and 59 percent of the vote in Ottumwa during the same period. From the Civil War to 1954, only two Democrats had occupied the governor’s office in Iowa, Horace Boies in 1889 and 1891 and Clyde Herring in 1932 and 1934. With voters in Ottumwa and Wapello County leading the way and contributing to concerted urban support across the state, Democrats Herschel Loveless, an Ottumwa native with working-class roots, and former trucker Harold Hughes won the governor’s seat five times between 1956 and 1966.\(^3\)

Accompanying the transformation of voting behavior was the direct political participation of workers from Morrell and

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other industries in Ottumwa in city and state politics. From the 1940s to mid-1950s several union members ran for various city, county, and state offices, and assumed leading roles in the union-organizing campaigns of other plants around the region. Union representatives from Ottumwa were especially instrumental in the union drive at the Rath Packing Company plant in Waterloo, a somewhat larger manufacturing city in northeast Iowa. Home to Iowa’s two largest factories, Rath and John Deere, both CIO organized, Waterloo would emerge in the late 1940s and early 1950s as the other leading CIO locale in the state. Constituting the largest bloc of union members in the state’s CIO council, Waterloo and Ottumwa representatives, working together with other representatives from the state’s packinghouse and auto worker unions, would promote the political action programs that would transform Iowa’s Republican-dominated political establishment into a much more balanced two-party system by the 1960s.

The transformation of voting behavior and workers’ direct political participation were mutually reinforcing in Ottumwa through the 1950s. Union leaders, motivated by the same desire for power and control that had sparked most of their union objectives in the plant in the 1930s and 1940s, also ran for political offices to gain a more direct role in community affairs. For union leaders, achieving greater influence in the community was just as important as it was in plant affairs. Their concerns were also increasingly expressed in the voting behavior of rank-and-file unionists as well as significant segments of Ottumwa’s population as a whole. As local union achievements became increasingly linked to those of other unions in the industry and around the Midwest by the mid-1940s, Morrell-Ottumwa workers’ political horizons became likewise broader. From the mid-1940s to the early 1950s, as workers battled with Morrell’s management for control in key production decisions, they also struggled for power in local and state political arenas.

Local 1 was at the forefront of Iowa’s Democratic transition long before the post-World War II years. Beginning in 1940, union members registered large numbers of new voters in Wapello County. Then in fall elections of that year, Ottumwa gave Roosevelt his largest percentage victory among all Iowa’s industrial
With the organization of the CIO’s political action committee (PAC) in 1944, workers participated significantly in local Democratic party campaigns. From 1946 through the 1960s, Ottumwa workers’ central role in shaping the Iowa-Nebraska States, later Iowa State, Industrial Union Council’s CIO-PAC efforts and then the merged AFL-CIO Iowa State Federation of Labor’s state-level political efforts resulted not only in consistent Democratic victories in local and county politics, but also helped to secure Democratic successes at the state and national level by the 1960s.

Building a “Union Politic” in Ottumwa

In 1885, Republican orator, later U.S. senator, Jonathan P. Dolliver claimed that “Iowa will go Democratic when Hell goes Methodist.” In fact, Republicans did not dominate Iowa’s politics until after the turn of the twentieth century. For much of the late nineteenth century, struggles among the various groups that had settled the state, including Yankees, upland southerners, and foreigners, particularly Germans, over racial equality and Prohibition made Democrats and Republicans fairly evenly matched. Ottumwa generally reflected the state’s diverse ethnocultural mix and political heritage from the mid–nineteenth century through the 1920s. Although populated by some Irish and German Catholic immigrants, Ottumwa’s Democratic supporters in the late nineteenth century were often American-born with roots in the South, unlike Dubuque, where Irish and German Catholics turned that city into a major center of Democratic party support. Situated in the southern half of Iowa where upland southerners were among the earliest settlers, from its earliest years Ottumwa’s working class demonstrated a noticeable tendency to vote more Democratic than the city as a whole. In the 1856 presidential election, Wapello County, like several of the counties in the two southernmost tiers of the state, returned majorities for the Democratic candidate, James Buchanan.⁵

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4. Among Iowa’s industrial cities in 1940, Roosevelt won 58 percent of the vote in Ottumwa, followed by Fort Dodge with 56 percent, Davenport, Mason City, and Sioux City each with 54 percent, Waterloo with 52 percent, Dubuque and Des Moines with 49 percent. See State of Iowa, Official Register, 1941–42.

5. Dolliver quoted in Hahn, Urban-Rural Conflict, 17. On the cultural streams of Iowa settlers, see Hahn, Urban-Rural Conflict, 35–36; Nicole Etcheson, The Emerging
Yet beginning with the 1860 presidential election through 1928, the majority of Ottumwa and Wapello County voters, like Iowa’s voters in general, normally turned out for the Grand Old Party. Although Ottumwa’s working-class voters, particularly those in the Ward One packing district, did vote more strongly for Democrats between 1888 and 1936, the difference between their turnouts compared to those for the rest of the city’s voters was generally only a few percentage points. Ottumwa and Wapello County voters also demonstrated a somewhat higher proclivity to vote for third-party candidates, especially Socialists and Progressives though not Populists, resulting in somewhat lower percentage returns for Republicans than the state as a whole, but otherwise there was little significant difference between Ottumwa, Wapello County, and Iowa in Democratic voting tendencies during this period. The Republican party’s dominance in Wapello County before the 1930s is also evident when looking at county elected officials. Between 1898 and 1932, only during the period from 1906 to 1912 were there more Democratic officials than Republicans in Wapello County.  


Voting data on Ottumwa and Wapello County were obtained from State of Iowa, Official Registers, 1890 to 1931–32. The two exceptions to Ward One’s slightly higher level of Democratic support compared to the rest of the city in this period occurred in 1916 and 1926. Ward One’s voters cast a higher percentage for the Republican gubernatorial candidate, William Harding, in 1916 because of his anti-Prohibition campaign. In 1926, Republican Smith W. Brookhart, a progressive Republican, captured 60 percent of the First Ward’s votes compared to just 48 percent for Ottumwa. Brookhart campaigned particularly on behalf of economic relief for Iowa’s hard-pressed farmers. This economic focus reflected Brookhart’s conscious rejection of the older state political focus on prohibition.
The real watershed in the packing district’s voting behavior occurred with the 1936 presidential election. Although the packing district gave 56 percent to Roosevelt in 1932, Wapello County as a whole actually supported Roosevelt at an even higher rate of 57 percent. Indeed, the 1932 and 1934 gubernatorial and 1932 U.S. Senate races demonstrated the same pattern. These results lend credence to Harlan Hahn’s argument that Roosevelt’s success in Iowa’s 1932 presidential election was largely owing to rural protest votes. Across Iowa in 1932, farmers gave Roosevelt 70 percent of their vote compared to just over 50 percent from residents of towns over 10,000. The returns from the packing district from 1936 on, however, were consistently higher for Democrats and markedly greater than that of the entire city or county, though the returns from these larger areas also showed consistently higher returns for Democrats.7

The underpinning of this Democratic transition in Ottumwa was the extension of workers’ struggles for greater power and control in the Morrell plant to the city as a whole. The 1939 strike and the shop-floor struggles that were endemic in the plant in the

late 1930s and early 1940s made the larger political context for workers’ local workplace efforts more important. During the 1940s and 1950s, workers’ forays into local politics mirrored the struggles within the plant. Workers running for local and state political offices often contested management representatives from the Morrell plant. As a consequence, while Local 1 struggled to gain union shop and dues check-off agreements in the late 1930s and early 1940s, the local also aggressively expanded its presence in Ottumwa’s politics and within Iowa’s CIO movement.

Over the course of the 1950s, however, as the militants among Local 1’s leadership lost favor among the new workers entering the plant, they also failed to capture support in community political contests. The 1953 city elections saw the last attempt by Local 1 militants to contest for city council positions. During the same period, however, several members of the new generation of Local 1 officials, including Jack McCoy and David Hart, along with politically active members of the UAW local organized at the city’s growing John Deere plant, especially Jacob “Jake” Mincks, as well as a former Morrell worker, Herschel Loveless, would successfully contest for positions in city, state, and state labor politics. Instead of viewing local and state politics as another means of punishing management and gaining greater control in rapid fashion, as the militants tended to view politics, the new generation of labor leaders were in the fray for the long haul. They were willing to work within the political system to gain benefits for their fellow workers in a way that appeared less combative than the militants’ efforts and behavior. In particular, workers who began their tenure at Morrell after World War II saw the new Local 1 leaders as less self-interested and vindictive. This perception translated into a wider appeal among other Ottumwa and Iowa voters when the new generation entered politics.

The central agency of Morrell workers’ political involvement was the Ottumwa Industrial Union Council (OIUC) created in 1939 by Local 1. It quickly overshadowed the city’s AFL central labor body, the Trades and Labor Assembly (TLA). During the war years, animosity between the PWOC and Amalgamated in the Morrell plant mirrored the competition between the OIUC and TLA in part because Henry Hoover, leader of the small group of Amalgamated members in the Morrell plant and infamous
among Local 1 members for his attempted back-to-work movement during the 1939 strike, served as TLA president. In September 1941, for example, competition between the two groups flared into a fierce struggle over union affiliation of the city’s truck drivers. Local 1 had urged the members of the AFL-affiliated International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) truckers to join the CIO’s Motor Transport Drivers and Allied Workers, led by former IBT (and IUAW) leaders Farrell Dobbs, Carl Nilson, and the Dunne brothers, Trotskyites out of Minneapolis and Duluth, Minnesota, and Frank Cronin, a Waterloo-area organizer who later became a CIO regional director in Nebraska. Local 1 provided picketers at grocers still working with IBT truckers. When Local 1’s representatives on the OIUC failed to give unanimous support to the challenge to the IBT, Local 1’s membership promptly asked for their representatives’ resignations. OIUC president Jack Woodrow, secretary Orvel Champ, Donald Jones, and Harold Whitney, all Local 1 members, then threw their support behind Nilson’s CIO efforts, but were nevertheless forced to step down because of pressure from Local 1’s membership. Because of developments in Ottumwa, Iowa-Nebraska CIO director Ben Henry pledged to throw the weight of the state union apparatus behind a move of the truckers into the CIO. Despite this support from Local 1 and the state CIO, the AFL won out over the CIO and signed a citywide contract to handle both motor and rail freight. Although unsuccessful, the struggle over the truckers’ union affiliation demonstrated the widespread militancy within Local 1 and the local’s commitment to larger union and political fights. 8

8. *Ottumwa Daily Courier*, 9/2–5/1941, 9/8/1941, 9/12/1941, 9/18/1941, 9/22/1941; Regular Meeting of September 17, 1941, of Local 3, UPWA Local P-3 Records, 1939–1942 Minute Book, State Historical Society of Iowa (SHSI), Iowa City; Convention and Year Book, Iowa State Industrial Council, CIO, 1951, Iowa Federation of Labor (IFL), AFL-CIO Records, SHSI, Iowa City; Jacob “Jake” Mincks, interview with Iowa Labor History Oral Project (ILHOP), 10/18/1978 and 10/27/1978, SHSI, Iowa City; and Proceedings, Fifteenth Annual Constitutional Convention, Iowa State Industrial Union Council, CIO, 1953, IFL, SHSI. Cronin addressed the 1953 convention, held in Ottumwa, by thanking union members for the support they gave him in August 1941 when the Iowa-Nebraska State Industrial Union Council was also held in Ottumwa, and the delegates solidly supported him even though he was from the “rebel” Teamsters group. See Proceedings, pp. 113–23. On the schism between the AFL and CIO branches of the Teamsters, see Arthur A. Sloane, *Hoffa* (Cambridge, MA, 1991), 18–31. On Carl Nilson’s IUAW roots, see Peter Rachleff, “Organizing ‘Wall to Wall’: The Inde-
Both Local 1 and the OIUC supported candidates for local and state offices beginning in 1940. The experience of the 1939 Morrell-Ottumwa strike convinced union leaders that they needed a more supportive city and county government. In 1940, Charles Sears, president of Local 1 in 1939, ran for a seat on the Ottumwa school board. Sears’s candidacy posed a test of union power against one of the incumbents running for reelection, recently retired Morrell superintendent and longtime worker enemy Ernest Manns. In the race to select members for three seats, Manns finished second and Sears came in fourth out of thirteen candidates. Interest in the elections, however, generated the highest turnout in a school board race in twenty years. In the next two months, Local 1 and the OIUC expanded on this interest by helping to boost voter registration in Wapello County before the May 1940 primaries. Their efforts added 1,625 new voters to the county rolls, an increase of more than 10 percent. That fall’s elections resulted in the Democrats’ sweep of local and state representative slots in Wapello County, a county safely Republican since the late nineteenth century.9

The impact of this 1940 voter registration campaign is also clearly evident when the total votes from the 1940 general elections are compared to earlier results. Whereas Ottumwa’s population increased by 12 percent between 1930 and 1940, the total vote cast for the president went up 15 percent between 1936 and 1940, and was up nearly 20 percent from 1932. The total number of votes cast for Roosevelt in the same periods was up 16 and 25 percent in Ottumwa. At the county level, although the population had increased by 9 percent between 1930 and 1940, total votes cast for the president in 1940 were up 13 percent over 1936 and 20 percent since 1932. Correspondingly, Roosevelt received 11 percent more votes in 1940 from Wapello County voters than in 1936 and 20 percent more than in 1932.10

In addition to entering local political contests and registering voters, Morrell-Ottumwa workers involved themselves early on

in a campaign to retain the structure of city government. Local 1 activists saw the city’s commission form of government as potentially responsive to working people if labor union members or other union allies could be placed in office. Ottumwa’s mayor as well as its streets and public improvements and public safety commissioners each received a salary that allowed them to hold office without needing an additional source of income. This fact also potentially held promise for attracting a working person to run for office. Yet almost as soon as Morrell workers launched themselves into city politics, middle-class groups mobilized to oppose their efforts. Beginning in early 1941, a middle class–dominated Citizens Committee for the Council-Manager Plan proposed that Ottumwa adopt a city-manager plan of local government whereby a salaried city manager would be hired to “administer the city’s business.” The city council would then consist of unpaid elected officials. Members of the Citizens Committee boldly stated that under the present conditions, namely greater labor union influence, “we cannot ELECT and KEEP men of ABILITY in office.” The OIUC led the opposition to the plan, and argued that it was a blatant attempt to remove working people from participating in local political affairs. Using language that echoed workers’ desire for power in workplace affairs, the opposition argued that the city-manager plan would mean “ONE-MAN AUTHORITY” and would deprive citizens of “political and personal liberty.” The opposition said that Ottumwa residents were being asked to “adopt the dictator plan and have a stranger rule us!” In the union’s first true political success in city affairs, the city-manager plan failed in March 1941 by a more than two-to-one vote in the city as a whole and by much wider margins in the working-class precincts. In 1944, however, after racketeering charges resulted in the dismissal of the city’s safety commissioner and nearly ended the mayor’s tenure, middle-class residents once again attempted to secure passage of the city-manager plan. The Fosters [owners of the Morrell plant] were open proponents of the plan this time around. Once again because of Local 1’s and the OIUC’s efforts, it fell to defeat by an almost two-to-one margin.11

Engaging themselves in local politics during the early 1940s, several leading militants from Local 1 also helped to establish and lead the state’s CIO council. The Iowa-Nebraska States Industrial Union Council, CIO, established in Des Moines in April 1938, held its fourth annual constitutional convention in Ottumwa in August 1941. Robert K. Gustafason from Local 1 served as one of the vice presidents. The following year, two members of Local 1 served on the council. Thomas B. Hadden, president of Local 1 in 1941, served as the secretary-treasurer alongside President Ben Henry, and Orvel Champ was one of the vice presidents. In addition, in 1942 Joseph Clark, a member of SWOC’s local at the Ottumwa Iron Works, was another vice president. In 1943, Orvel Champ, Local 1’s recording secretary that year, then became the secretary-treasurer of the state council with James Provvenzano, a member of USWA Local 2134 of the Ottumwa Iron Works, a member of the executive board. Morrell-Ottumwa’s local constituted a strong presence in the founding and World War II years of the state CIO council since it was the second-largest CIO local in the state, behind only the UAW-organized John Deere plant in Waterloo. In 1943, after the Rath plant’s workforce in Waterloo joined the PWOC-CIO, Ottumwa’s Local 1 then constituted the third-largest union in the state council. Indeed, Local 1 was instrumental in providing leaders for the Rath-Waterloo organizing campaign. Lester Bishop, Wilson (Moose) Rogers, and Edward Fitzpatrick all played significant roles leading up to the union’s victory there in a November 1942 certification election. A year earlier, Local 1 activists helped Ottumwa’s Dain, later John Deere, employees gain their first union contract, and also helped establish the Cedar Rapids Industrial Union Council.12

12. Program, Fourth Annual Constitutional Convention, Iowa-Nebraska States Industrial Union Council, 1941, IFL, SHSI; Program, Fifth Annual Constitutional Convention, Iowa-Nebraska States Industrial Union Council, 1942, IFL, SHSI; Yearbook, Iowa-Nebraska States Industrial Union Council, 1943, IFL, SHSI; Packinghouse Worker, 6/19/1942, 11/20/1942, and 12/25, 1942; Ottumwa Courier, 9/27/1941; Edward R. Fitzpatrick, PWOC field representative, to J. C. Lewis, PWOC national office, 6/4/1941, United Packinghouse Workers of America (UPWA) Records, folder 3, box 5, State Historical Society of Wisconsin (SHSW), Madison; Local 1 Regular Meeting of July 2, 1941, Minute Book, 1939–42, UPWA Records, Local P-3, SHSI; Local 1 to Sam Sponseller, UPWA District 3 Director, 7/8/1941, UPWA Records, folder 3, box 5, SHSW; and Fitzpatrick and Theo-
During the World War II years, Morrell-Ottumwa workers continued to run for local political offices. In March 1944, another president of Local 1, Edward A. Filliman, failed in the city’s school board elections. The following year, Filliman also lost by a huge margin to Frank Pedrick, a south side hardware merchant, in a race for city riverfront commissioner. In 1944, however, two union members won Wapello County’s two seats in the state legislature. Dean Aubrey, a UAW member and John Deere employee, and Wade McReynolds, a bus driver and AFL member, captured those seats in a heavy general election turnout. Voters seemed already to have perceived Filliman’s militant credentials as a political liability compared to Aubrey and McReynolds, who did not have the same reputation. As the fall election campaign approached, Ottumwa’s packing workers became involved in the newly formed CIO-PAC. Given the organizational and voter registration efforts of the OIUC, Ottumwa-Morrell workers were well prepared to lead local PAC efforts. Local 1 had already formed its own PAC in November 1943, consisting of nine members including Donald Jones, Louis C. May, Virgil and Gene Bankson, and Dean Aubrey. Although the Iowa-Nebraska States Industrial Union Council did not make PAC a permanent part of its committee structure until 1946, the organization did place ten leading union members from across Iowa on its payroll to help with efforts to increase voter registration and distribute national PAC literature. Much of the CIO political action effort across Iowa in 1944 was focused on recruiting farmers into the Democratic party. Lyle Cooper, the UPWA international’s research director, specifically commended Ottumwa’s Local 1 in this regard as two farmers were elected as Democrats to formerly Republican-dominated county offices. State CIO officials noted that the Iowa legislature also passed a few laws benefiting labor for the first time in twelve years, such as increased workmen’s compensation benefits. Nevertheless, though the packing community’s Ward One gave Roosevelt 69 percent of its vote, up from 61 percent in

dore M. Covey to Lewis J. Clark, PWOC vice president, 5/26/1942, UPWA Records, folder 3, box 5, SHSW. Fitzpatrick and Covey’s report to Clark noted that “there is a very close relationship between the Morrell plant in Ottumwa and the Rath plant here [in Waterloo]. There are many Ottumwa workers here and it is thought by many that Morrell has a large financial interest in Rath.”
1940, across Ottumwa and Wapello County as a whole votes for the Democrats remained at the same levels as in 1940. Roosevelt received 58 percent from Ottumwa voters and 57 percent from voters in Wapello County.\footnote{13}

Nevertheless, at the local political level Democrats already dominated Wapello County’s politics by World War II. Except for the period between 1906 and 1912, when the majority of elected county officials were Democrats, Wapello County’s elected offices had long been held by Republicans. Beginning in 1932, however, Democrats would prevail in Wapello County elected offices through the end of the 1960s. The only year in which Republicans came close to a majority in the county was in 1942, when there were six Democrats and five Republicans. This dominance would continue long after World War II. From 1956 to 1968, in fact, there were only a total of five Republicans elected for ninety positions in the county.\footnote{14}

Through all of its political and welfare efforts by the end of World War II, Local 1 had made significant strides in creating loyalties to union and CIO political goals among a large segment of Ottumwa’s working-class residents. As the largest single organization in Ottumwa during the war years, Local 1 became enmeshed in the city’s welfare and wartime institutional support network. In 1943, Örvel Champ led the OIUC’s War Manpower Commission and Local 1 was the second-largest donor, behind


Morrell, to the National War Fund and Red Cross financial campaigns. Local 1 raised $12,000 in 1943, over 15 percent of Ottumwa’s entire goal. In 1944, Dean Aubrey served on the board of directors of Wapello County’s Red Cross. Local 1 and Morrell together accounted for more than 20 percent of the Red Cross’s quota for the county.15

At both the state and local level, however, the involvement of Local 1’s militants in political efforts often created more controversy and turbulence than success. At the state level immediately following World War II, Local 1 militants were entrenched in positions of power on the Iowa-Nebraska States Industrial Union Council. In 1946, Orvel Champ was the group’s secretary, Donald Jones was the chair of the Legislative Committee, and Edward Filliman was secretary of the Resolutions Committee. With twenty-five votes in the council, the third largest bloc—behind Waterloo’s UPWA Local 46 from Rath and UAW Local 838 from John Deere—Local 1’s delegates supported the council’s establishment of a permanent PAC. Yet Edward Filliman in particular was adamantly opposed to increasing the per-capita tax from four to five cents to help support PAC activities. Filliman had emerged as Local 1’s leading militant during World War II, and as the local’s chief steward from 1945 to 1948, had masterminded many of the local’s worker control efforts against Morrell’s speedup campaigns. He attempted to assert the same sort of control over the state’s CIO council. Instrumental in leading the separation of the Iowa-Nebraska States Council into two separate councils in 1947, he accepted Orvel Champ’s nomination to be the first president of the independent Iowa CIO council and won the election.16

15. Packinghouse Worker, 6/25/1943, 11/12/1943, 3/31/1944, 4/14/1944, and 1/19/1945; and Yearbook, Iowa-Nebraska States Industrial Union Council, CIO, 1943, p. 29, IFL, SHSI. Particularly useful for understanding the CIO’s creation of worker loyalties to union goals in a larger political and cultural sense by the end of World War II is Elizabeth A. Fones-Wolf, Selling Free Enterprise: The Business Assault on Labor and Liberalism, 1945–60 (Urbana, IL, 1994).

Filliman’s tenure as the state’s CIO council president was short and combative. His tenure also coincided with a period of intense factionalism within Iowa’s (and the national) CIO over various issues, particularly the Progressive party’s presidential campaign. Iowa’s CIO left-wingers, supportive of the Progressives, were led by Charles Hobbie, head of the United Farm Equipment and Metal Workers Union (FE). At the 1948 state CIO constitutional convention, Filliman promoted the majority report against third-party candidates in the fall elections. Even though Hobbie had advocated support for third-party candidates, he nevertheless nominated Filliman for another term as state council president, noting that “I have worked with him over a period of time and found him to be efficient, capable and [an] honest trade union leader.” But because of charges of opportunism leveled on him by state CIO president Ben Henry and his frustration with the present council’s constitution that did not allow him to “take and formulate and carry out policy,” Filliman declined the nomination.17

From 1946 through 1948, however, when Local 1’s militants were significant leaders of the state CIO council, they strongly influenced the political efforts the group undertook in conjunction with the national CIO-PAC as well as the various regional representatives of CIO unions, such as UPWA, UAW, and FE. At the same time that the UPWA and FE were especially active politically in Iowa following the disastrous 1946 elections and passage in June 1947 of the Taft-Hartley Act, the state CIO council urged greater PAC activities and greater effort in terms of farmer-laborer cooperation. The state CIO council as well as UPWA, FE, and several other unions brought their members out in droves to protest a proposed “right-to-work” law for Iowa. On April 21, 1947, 25,000 unionists picketed at the state capitol in Des Moines to no avail; the law passed Iowa’s rural-dominated legislature and Republican governor Robert Blue signed it into law.18

Passage of a state “right-to-work” law galvanized both the UPWA and FE into pursuing farmer-labor organizing. Union leaders felt farmers needed to be more sympathetic to the needs of labor and see their common interests. Both unions established full-time farm relations directors in 1946, and began to pursue cooperative efforts with the Iowa Farmers Union (IFU) by the end of that year. The IFU’s president beginning in 1945 was Fred W. Stover, a social democrat and devotee of Henry A. Wallace. As was true of many left-liberals and their organizations during the 1940s, Stover and the IFU pushed issues such as full employment, economic planning, expanded social welfare and civil rights programs, higher farm commodity subsidies, and international cooperation with the Soviet Union. Stover’s first editorial for the *Iowa Union Farmer* called for closer relations with labor since “[a] sympathetic understanding by farmers of labor and labor organizations is of prime importance if we are to progress as citizens in a democracy.” The fact that the IFU was as committed to social democratic programs as either the UPWA or FE greatly helped labor’s coalition-building efforts with farmers.19

To be sure, the social democracy of the UPWA, FE, and IFU in this period was episodic and, as David Plotke carefully points out about this theme in American liberalism in the 1930s and 1940s, should not be seen as “an autonomous political force” and “had no chance of success” in replacing the Democratic party. Moreover, Ottumwa’s workers, as they demonstrated in the 1948 national elections, were not budding social democrats, even if they wanted greater shop floor power. Nevertheless, the social democratic themes and programs of the three organizations captured the imaginations and support, however fleeting, perhaps,
of many workers in Ottumwa and industrial cities in Iowa and the Midwest in the period. The UPWA’s social democratic programs rested on a vision of labor, capital, and the state cooperating to restructure America’s economy and society so that class conflict would be reduced and all Americans would prosper. The UPWA advocated national economic planning or “planned production for abundance,” practiced already in Austin, Minnesota, where union members at the Hormel packing plant had won a guaranteed annual wage. The UPWA also supported pay raises, especially those advanced in the union’s national strikes of 1946 and 1948, social welfare, farmer-labor cooperation, civil rights and antidiscrimination programs, and local union participation in Democratic community politics.

Ottumwa’s Local 1 quickly became one of Iowa’s most active UPWA social democratic advocates, especially in regard to farmer-labor organizing. In April 1947, Lee Simon, the UPWA’s farm relations director, served as a conciliator along with Local 1 representatives for a four-day Ottumwa milk strike, in which 190 dairy farmers refused to accept the price cut imposed by four area milk distributors. Building on the success of Simon’s efforts, Stover, Simon, and the Reverend John Harley Telfer, pastor of the First Congregationalist Church in Ottumwa, elaborated in May on the IFU district conference theme, “Building for Peace and Abundance,” by speaking to Ottumwans on “Farmer-Labor Teamwork for Peace and Abundance.”

since July 1945, had already made a name for himself as an outspoken advocate for black civil rights. Educated at the University of Chicago, he had been director of the Milwaukee Federation Forum and Milwaukee Town Hall before moving to Ottumwa. He chaired Ottumwa’s Interracial Committee and the People’s Flood Prevention Committee, an organization of local farmers and laborers. Beginning in 1947, he became the UPWA District 3’s radio show host. The show aired three times weekly and was described by the UPWA as one of the most widely aired labor radio shows in the country.21

Soon after the IFU conference, Local 1 formed one of the first UPWA local union farmer-labor committees. Later in the fall, Ottumwa was the site of the UPWA-IFU jointly sponsored Farmer–Labor Day picnic. More than 3,000 people attended the two-day celebration at Wildwood Park on Ottumwa’s south side and heard liberal and left-wing farm and labor leaders urge a “political revolt against [R]epublican legislators and congressmen.” The picnic was organized by Ed Filliman and Dwight Anderson, a farmer from Agency and local IFU leader, along with a planning committee including five meatpacking workers, five employees of the Deere-owned Dain Company farm implement plant, two employees of the Ottumwa Iron Works, and one machine operator at the Hardscog Pneumatic Tool Works in Ottumwa. Local 1 militants later complained about how AFL groups were notably absent from this and other farm-labor efforts in Ottumwa during the period, but it is difficult to know just how eager they actually were to work with them, given earlier squabbles between the two groups. The FE also held joint meetings with the IFU during summer and fall 1947 at Charles City, home to a large Oliver farm implement plant, and other nearby north-central Iowa locations.22


Although the state CIO council was strongly supportive of farm-labor cooperation and political efforts, inviting Fred Stover, Homer Ayres, and Lee Simon to speak on the issue at its 1946 and 1947 constitutional conventions, the state CIO, like the national CIO, was not supportive of third-party candidacies in the 1948 election. Thus, a more decidedly left-wing political impact from the joint efforts of the UPWA, FE, and IFU was limited. This is especially evident in the failure of Henry A. Wallace’s presidential bid in 1948. Wallace’s emphasis on programs for full employment, economic abundance, and international cooperation with the Soviet Union were attractive for many left-wingers with social democratic concerns. In late 1947 and early 1948, the FE international and Iowa’s FE District 5’s leadership endorsed Wallace. Some local leaders within the UPWA also lobbied on his behalf. Fred Stover bucked the National Farmers Union to endorse Wallace in the January 1948 issue of the *Iowa Union Farmer*. Yet in 1948, most Americans associated these planks with communism. Accordingly, such efforts were unacceptable to most farmers and laborers. Also crucial in swaying CIO members was the removal of several FE District 5 left-wingers by the state CIO council in August. CIO regional director Ben Henry castigated Hobbie and Stover for their support of Wallace. Despite the support and organizing efforts of the IFU, FE, and some UPWA locals on behalf of Wallace’s presidential candidacy, he did not gain many votes in the November election. He only garnered 1 percent more of the total votes in north-central Iowa counties where the IFU had its largest support than his overall nationwide vote total of 2 percent. He did even worse in Ottumwa, where he received less than 2 percent of the votes cast, primarily because Local 1 leaders, such as Edward Filliman, did not encourage their membership to support him.23

After 1948 left-liberal farm-labor educational efforts declined noticeably. This was owing in part to conflicts within the IFU, to conflicts between them and the state CIO, and to the virtual absence of support for the popular front in Iowa as a whole. Another significant factor was the loosening of ties between the IFU and the UPWA. Even though UPWA District 3 leadership continued to pass resolutions supporting farm-labor work, they no longer organized farm-labor meetings and conferences. Some of this might be attributed to Lee Simon’s death in September 1948. From 1948 to 1950, the UPWA devoted most of its efforts to promoting farm-labor cooperation by distributing leaflets at its booths at county fairs in the Midwest. These efforts were substantial in their own way. In the fall of 1948, for example, UPWA District 3 staffed booths at twelve county fairs in Iowa and at least two 4-H shows, and during the summer of 1949 it increased its allocations for exhibits and literature and even sponsored a group of ballad singers at over thirty local union meetings and county fairs in Iowa and Nebraska. In all, the UPWA visited more than forty fairs in 1949 and expanded its monthly literature mailings to farmers from 14,000 to 100,000 pieces between 1948 and 1949. Yet in 1949 the UPWA no longer was as active in sponsoring farm-labor meetings and conferences, unlike the FE, which merged reluctantly with another outcast CIO international, the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE). Local 1’s farm-labor committee also evaporated during these years. Consequently, after 1948 the FE was the only labor union willing to work in this way with the IFU.24

Criticism within the state CIO council during the early 1950s singled out several problems with mainstream CIO farmer-labor cooperative and political efforts. In 1951, Jacob “Jake” Mincks, a member of UAW Local 74 representing Ottumwa’s John Deere plant, voiced several concerns as chair of the state CIO council’s farm-labor committee about the episodic nature of labor’s political

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Mincks, though never employed at Morrell-Ottumwa or a participant in the factionalism within Local 1, emerged as the most important unionist from Deere in Ottumwa after starting work there in 1947. He immediately became involved in local union, community, and statewide political causes. Raised on a farm south of Ottumwa, he came to live in the city in 1931 after his father’s death. After working at odd jobs and for the Civilian Conservation Corps, he first joined a labor union in 1938 as a Teamster, and then worked at the Ottumwa Iron Works from 1941 to 1947 and joined the local CIO steelworkers union there. Though like the militants who formed Local 1 Mincks was an early CIO supporter, unlike them he apparently never supported militant job actions. He revealed in a later interview that he took pride that Deere had only one significant strike (in 1950) during the long period that he worked there. Although clearly ambitious in his own way, he did not view politics as a forum for punishing employers. Within a year of joining the Deere ranks, Mincks was a clear leader within the UAW local there. He was also one of the UAW’s local representatives on the OIUC. In October 1948, he gave a report to the local’s membership on PAC efforts, and one month later initiated a motion within the local to have them go on record supporting Ben Henry’s purge of the left-wingers within the state’s FE. His political involvement at the local level soon carried him into prominence within the state CIO council. He became a consistent voice for more concerted political efforts on the part of the state CIO council. Indeed, Jack McCoy, part of the new generation of Local 1 leaders to move into state-level politics, later described Mincks as “the pusher behind the political activities of all of us [in Ottumwa].”

Mincks thoroughly backed the new leadership of the state CIO council, led since the controversial 1948 elections by president Vernon Dale and secretary-treasurer Kenneth Everhart. Dale, a member of Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA) Local 261 in Muscatine, and Everhart, part of UAW Local 838 in

Waterloo, were committed especially, like Mincks, to increasing the level of funding for the state CIO council’s PAC efforts. This commitment never wavered from the late 1940s through the state council’s merger with the state AFL council in 1956 largely because both Dale and Everhart were reelected to their offices each year by acclamation. In 1950 this fact led to an attempt initiated by Filliman to oust them by demanding a secret ballot for the election of officers. Three years earlier, Filliman, along with many other delegates from the UPWA especially, had demanded roll call votes for the election of officers so that local union constituencies could be assured that delegates voted for the candidates they had agreed on before the convention. That motion was narrowly defeated, and so was Filliman’s attempt to enforce the secret ballot provision in 1950. Nevertheless, the defeat of this motion caused several local unions, including Local 1, to withdraw from the state CIO council for the next two years. Although Filliman’s overt argument all along was the need for democratic process and responsiveness, his efforts also strongly suggested a personal desire for power and control. After the return of most local union delegations to the state’s fold by 1953, state CIO delegates no longer were swayed by Filliman or other CIO militants. The two-year absence of the most militant voices effectively muted their voice in the state CIO council.26

As articulated by Dale, Everhart, and Mincks, the PAC chair beginning in 1952, effective political efforts demanded more systematic voter registration, more lobbying efforts, especially at the grassroots level, and, more than anything, a greater commitment by local union members to financially support PAC. By 1950, for instance, the national CIO-PAC was working more closely with the state CIO council’s PAC, and had committed substantial funding for selected campaigns, especially Albert Loveland’s candidacy for the U.S. Senate. Morrell-Ottumwa’s Local 1 spent $3,000 of its own funds and expended considerable manpower in canvassing unsuccessfully for Loveland on behalf of PAC. The

CIO hoped Loveland would also appeal to family farmers because of his support for the Brannan Plan, a proposal to hike farm supports to higher, fixed levels. Despite winning 67 percent of the First Ward’s vote as well as 54 percent of Ottumwa’s and 53 percent of Wapello County’s votes, Loveland only mustered 45 percent of the state’s total tally. Some blamed his poor showing on scathing attacks on the Brannan Plan by the American Farm Bureau Federation, a larger organization representing more prosperous individual farmers and agribusiness interests. More important, because of a lack of more consistent political efforts and money overall, Democratic candidates did not do well throughout the state. This sentiment was voiced by Mincks when he noted in his farmer-labor committee report regarding U.S. House efforts, “We down in Ottumwa can carry Wapello County, but we have four counties in the district down there. How are you going to carry the others?” Another CIO delegate noted that too few county-level PAC committees had been established. In his 1952 president’s report, Dale noted that “in the early days . . . too few people tried to do too much. The end result [was] a lot of noise with little accomplished.” On a related issue of farmer-labor political strategies, Everhart noted in 1952 that “setting up booths at State Fairs [was not] particularly conducive to good farmer-labor relations in the state of Iowa.” Though thoroughly supportive of farmer-labor political efforts, he questioned the tactic of “trying to cram a farm program down the farmer’s [sic] of Iowa without knowing what we are talking about.” In another debate on political tactics, Everhart and Mincks stressed the need for more direct visits with local legislators.27

27. Proceedings, Thirteenth Convention, 1951, pp. 2–6, 119–23, 175–76; Proceedings, Fourteenth Convention, 1952, pp. 6–12, 70–76, 149–56. On Local 1’s support for Loveland, see Edward Filliman, UPWA field representative, Weekly Report, 11/4/1950, folder 13, box 415, UPWA Records, SHSW; Morrell-Ottumwa workers’ efforts on behalf of the PAC in 1950 for Loveland’s campaign were most similar to those of Rockford, Illinois, Industrial Union Council’s efforts as described by Fay Calkins in The CIO and the Democratic Party (Chicago, 1952), 86–111. Although unsuccessful, the OIUC was the inside force in Wapello County’s Democratic party’s support for Loveland in 1950. Robert Zieger’s analysis of PAC’s ability to more successfully generate large amounts of money for liberal candidates rather than mobilizing union voters and influencing party leaders was true of the Loveland campaign on the state level but not in Ottumwa. See Zieger, The CIO, 306–12. On the Branna Plan, see Barton J. Bernstein and Allen J.
Again, the underlying need, according to these leaders, was greater funding for the PAC. Before the 1951 state CIO council convention, the militants, led by Filliman, had effectively blocked increases in the per-capita tax. However, without the militants’ attendance at either the 1951 or 1952 conventions, Dale and Everhart were able to make the issue a key point of debate. At the 1951 convention, President Dale noted that he was sympathetic to the packinghouse workers’ delegates’ position against a per-capita tax increase, but he stressed that the need for a two-cent increase (from five to seven cents) was pressing. The two-cent increase would be earmarked for PAC’s use only. This issue was finally resolved the following year. The 1952 convention passed the two-cent per capita increase after a lengthy debate regarding the reaffiliation of the locals that owed back dues or had walked out over the per-capita issue in 1950. Initially, the Resolutions Committee passed a resolution demanding full repayment before locals were allowed back onto the state CIO council. But Fort Dodge UPWA Local 31 member and UPWA Region 3 director Russell Bull, who had helped to move Local 1 militants out of power during the 1950–1952 period, condemned the resolution for trying to “ring [sic] every last cent of blood” out of locals before letting them back in. Both Dale and Everhart reminded delegates that there was no sense in punishing delinquent locals since the PAC program needed all locals to be present and current in dues for it to function effectively. Everhart clinched support for a more moderate resolution that would give the executive board discretionary power over conditional readmittance by exclaiming that “you make councils out of people, not out of money.” Ben Henry made an indirect reference to Local 1 in regard to the local union readmittance and the PAC issue by noting that “one particular local union is in an important spot in this political action program that we are going to try to promote.”


From 1948 to 1952, Local 1’s militants also made several efforts to assert their power in community politics. But just as occurred within the state CIO council, these efforts all faltered. In their wake, moderate and more conciliatory Local 1 leaders emerged and experienced greater political success. Particularly in the aftermath of the tumultuous 1948 UPWA meatpacking strike, Local 1 militants focused even more attention on controlling city politics. They viewed the 1949 city council elections as crucial to the local’s political power in Ottumwa in several respects. On the most basic level, Local 1 hoped to retake the offensive against the city’s middle-class community that had largely been unsupportive of its strike efforts. True to their tactics at the shop floor level, Local 1’s militants wanted to mobilize union members and other blue-collar Ottumwans to defeat and punish public officials who had hindered the workers’ strike efforts. As a consequence, militants even attempted to dissuade workers from supporting friends of labor, in this particular election, Herschel Loveless, because he and others were seen as not sufficiently militant. Loveless’s victory would be another sign of the weakening hold the militants had in Local 1.

Early in 1949, Local 1, the OIUC, and the TLA formed the Ottumwa Policy Committee to focus working-class votes in the upcoming city elections. During the mid-March primaries, the Ottumwa Policy Committee supported David Nevin, Lester Parcell, and Patrick Harden. Each man won enough votes to be entered in the general election. Mayoral candidate Nevin and safety commissioner candidate Parcell both finished a close second. Mayor Herman Schaefer was thoroughly defeated, having won the scorn of not only working-class voters for his role in the 1948 strike, but also having alienated middle-class voters for not having controlled the situation more effectively. Streets commission candidate Patrick Harden won the primary election for this position. Local 1 then embarked on an intensive propaganda campaign during the two weeks preceding the general election.29

Local 1 supported Nevin over the other mayoral candidate, Herschel Loveless, because union leaders claimed that Loveless had not joined a union until he needed labor’s political support.

Born on a farm near Fremont, Iowa, in 1911, Loveless had moved to Ottumwa as a youngster and graduated from Ottumwa High School in 1927. He then worked for the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad through most of the Great Depression. In 1939, he joined Morrell’s workforce as a turbine operator in the power plant before returning to work for the Milwaukee Railroad in 1944. On a leave of absence from the railroad, Loveless organized the street and sanitation departments and then served as the city council’s emergency chief organizer during the disastrous 1947 flood in Ottumwa. It was in this capacity that he earned widespread support among Ottumwans. Nevertheless, Local 1 accused Loveless of not joining the Railway Clerk’s Union until the mid-1940s when he pursued political ambitions.30

Local 1 also tried to sway working-class Ottumwans to look unfavorably on Edna Lawrence, Lester Parcell’s opponent for safety commissioner in the city election. Lawrence, like Loveless, had considerable support among workers in the city. In 1948, with Local 1 support, she had won a seat in the state legislature but then resigned her office in early 1949 in hopes of winning city office. Local 1 noted that Lawrence had run unsuccessfully for local office many times before and now seemed more concerned about settling old scores than serving Ottumwans on the state level, as she had been entrusted to do. John Meagher, Harden’s opponent for streets commissioner, had served in that position during the 1948 strike and had suffered consequently in the primary election. Although his role in the strike had been minor, Local 1 did not spare him, attesting that “his management of office and regard for the public [since 1947] has been very poor.” Indeed, the local reminded workers of Meagher’s positions as well, labeling him a “scab” for having crossed the picket line during Ottumwa’s 1922 railroad strike.31

Before the general election, Local 1 reminded the packing community and other blue-collar residents to “recall just what position certain members of the City Council took in regards to the strike action at Morrells last year.” Yet, just before the election,

the Ottumwa Policy Committee alliance of AFL and CIO unions broke down. It is not clear which side initiated the split, but Local 1 was left alone in support of its candidates. It seems fair to speculate, however, that many Ottumwa voters, even among the city’s working class, saw Local 1’s decision to stick with its candidates as evidence of its combativeness. Most of the other AFL and CIO unions in town supported Loveless over Nevin because of Loveless’s help for working-class neighborhoods damaged by the 1947 flood. Lawrence, according to other unions in town, boasted significant prolabor credentials. The other unions supported Loveless, Lawrence, and Meagher. When the votes were counted, only Harden among the Local 1 endorsed candidates emerged victorious. Demonstrating the growing divisions within Local 1, the voting results in different parts of the city suggest that many of Morrell’s rank and file ignored their leaders’ endorsements. The east end original packinghouse community supported Nevin for mayor while south side residents, where most of the flood damage occurred, solidly cast their votes for Loveless. Thus, despite a tremendous effort on the part of the militant leadership of Local 1 to reaffirm its power, the largest city election turnout in Ottumwa’s history underscored the unraveling of this control and of unity within the local’s ranks.32

After 1949, Local 1’s militant leaders had little ability to convince blue-collar residents to support their candidates in local elections. Allegations of sloppy handling of local union funds also bothered voters. Ed Filliman, a UPWA international field representative after 1949, exacerbated tensions within the local by noting that the financial stability of Local 1 in 1950–1951 had been seriously compromised by its officers’ predilection for ever-increasing salaries and misappropriations of local union funds. Too many officers, Filliman noted, were “Do-Nothing, Money-Grabbing individuals.” Although it is difficult to know how much Filliman’s charges were motivated by his sense of declining power, having lost a position in not only Local 1 but also on the state CIO council, he named the local’s president in these years, Walter Van Tassel, as a particular culprit. In February 1951, Local 1’s trustees, including Donald Jones, seconded Filliman’s

accusations by filing charges against Van Tassel for drawing pay for lost time at the same time that Morrell paid him for vacation time. To a large degree the fight within Local 1 during these years reflected a power struggle between the older militants and the newer generation of less combative union leaders.33

This power struggle created generally poor results for Local 1 in city elections during the early 1950s. In 1951, Van Tassel and Thomas Cohagan, Local 1’s recording secretary in 1951 and a prominent member of the new generation of union leaders at Morrell-Ottumwa, ran for city offices and lost. Each candidate not only failed to win but could not gain the support of voters in the packinghouse workers’ precincts. Herschel Loveless, however, again won the city’s mayoral election soundly with the OIUC’s solid support. Two years later, Herschel Loveless was the only one of five OIUC-endorsed candidates in the 1953 election who won versus those endorsed by the middle-class and professional voter-backed “Good Government Association.” Van Tassel and Dean Aubrey both lost.34

By 1953, internal factionalism within Local 1 had seriously compromised its ability to effectively run its own members or even gain working-class support for its endorsed candidates in city elections. The deleterious impact of this factionalism was starkly illustrated in that year when the “Good Government Association” revived its campaign to implement a council-manager plan of city government. Unlike the case in 1941 and 1944 when Local 1 had stood at the center of opposition to similar plans, in 1953 the local ignored the campaign until after enough petitions were collected by July to put it on the general election ballot. At Local 1’s July 21 membership meeting, the rank and file decided to spend between $300 and $500 to fight its passage in a last-ditch effort. On July 26, the council-manager plan passed with 58 percent of voters supporting it. Although voters in the old First

Ward immediate packinghouse neighborhood rejected it by a 68 percent majority, packing workers who lived in the city’s south side precincts contributed to its victory.\textsuperscript{35}

Although factionalism within Local 1 contributed to the losses in community politics in 1953, Ottumwa mayor Herschel Loveless demonstrated his strong commitment to labor in the battle over the council-manager plan in that year. Jack McCoy, an employee of Morrell since 1949 and recording secretary for Local 1 in 1953, noted explicitly how Local 1 and the OIUC counted on Loveless’s support:

When the fight over going to a city manager form of government developed, Herschel Loveless came down and visited with Dave Hart and I [sic]. He didn’t want to turn over the city government to the Chamber of Commerce crowd. We said we’d do our job at the plant. The damn election was held on a Saturday, and we assigned our stewards to different precincts. They worked hard to try to stop it. The newspaper had been building that up for a long while, and they beat us on it, in spite of the stewards doing a good job. We must have fielded between sixty and eighty stewards that Saturday in the precincts in Ottumwa.\textsuperscript{36}

**Transforming Iowa’s Politics**

Although factional conflict within Local 1 diluted the union’s political strength in Ottumwa during the late 1940s and early 1950s, the union mobilized sufficient power to transform state politics. By 1953, a new generation of Local 1 leaders, like Jack McCoy and Dave Hart, working closely with Jake Mincks, emerged and began to contribute to the next and more successful stage in this political transformation. In 1952, Mincks became Wapello County

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\textsuperscript{36} McCoy, interview with ILHOP. This portion of McCoy’s interview is reproduced in Stromquist, *Solidarity and Survival*, 284.
Democratic chair and, in 1954, McCoy was selected as one of Local 1’s representatives on the OIUC. That fall, along with Ottumwa AFL unionist Wade McReynolds and after borrowing over $1,000 from the OIUC’s building fund to finance his campaign, McCoy was then elected to the Iowa House of Representatives, a position he won again in 1956. Beginning in the mid-1950s, with the successful merger of the AFL and CIO at both the local level in Ottumwa and, more important, at the state level, Ottumwa’s union leaders contributed centrally to the Democratic party’s successes.

The state CIO council’s 1953 constitutional convention, fittingly held in Ottumwa, opened after an address by Mayor Herschel Loveless with Iowa CIO president Vernon Dale recognizing Ottumwa’s key role in the state’s labor movement. Dale noted that “much of the leadership and a great number of the membership of the early days of our organization [came from the city]. Ottumwa and its labor movement contributed much to the growth of the CIO in our state.” Dale immediately went on to highlight how he viewed the state CIO council’s political action efforts, activities in which Ottumwans Mincks, McCoy, and Hart would all play important roles. Mincks, as he had been since the year before, was chair of the PAC, McCoy was secretary of the credentials committee, and Hart, another prominent member of the new generation of leaders at Local 1, was secretary of the Rules Committee. Born in 1907 in the coal camp town of Hocking, Iowa, just west of Ottumwa, Hart had attended UMWA meetings with his father during the World War I era. He worked at odd jobs in Iowa and Chicago before the 1930s, when he moved to New York City. There, interrupted by military service during World War II, he held a variety of laboring positions. When his father died in 1947, Hart returned to Ottumwa and got a job at Morrell just after the 1948 strike. Quickly selected as a department steward, he became chief steward in 1952 in the wake of Local 1’s receivership and most intense period of factionalism.

37. Mincks, interview with ILHOP; and McCoy, interview with ILHOP, part 1. On McCoy’s election to state office in 1954, also see Morrell Magazine, January 1955, 12; and Packinghouse Worker, February 1955.

38. Proceedings, Fifteenth Annual Constitutional Convention, Iowa State IUC, CIO, 1953, pp. 3–5, IFL, SHSI; and David Hart, interview with ILHOP, 4/12/1978, SHSI.
In his comments on the legislative committee’s reports at the 1953 convention, President Dale identified labor’s most crucial political objectives. Labor unionists elected to the Iowa legislature, such as Kenneth Everhart and Jack McCoy, hammered away at fellow politicians about the need for passing new unemployment and workmen’s compensation legislation and repealing the state’s right-to-work law, the so-called Senate File 109. However, everything, according to Dale, hinged on counterbalancing the control that the Republican party, and its key lobbying group, the Iowa Manufacturers Association (IMA), had in the legislature. The way to neutralize this Republican dominance was through reapportionment. Although Iowa’s constitution required reapportionment after each census, no legislative reapportionment had occurred since 1886. According to political scientist Charles Wiggins, two state constitutional amendments passed in 1904 and 1928 made reapportionment “virtually impossible.” The result, especially in the state house since each county received equal representation, was that urban counties were vastly underrepresented. Dale proclaimed that reapportionment “is the only way that the people in Des Moines, Waterloo, Cedar Rapids, Davenport, Dubuque, Sioux City, and the various other cities of the state can have themselves represented.” In his 1952 opening convention remarks Dale had also stressed the problem of disproportionate representation in the state legislature. There were too many “men from smaller community areas, farmers and people dependent upon the farm for their living [as well as] those directly representative of the antilabor groups, the big business boys and their lawyers” who constituted the legislators’ membership. PAC chair Mincks emphasized how all the convention’s resolutions tied into the need to get “our people into the political parties in this state of ours” and to raise funds for PAC. On the funds, Dale noted that the passage of the two-cent increase in the per capita tax, the so-called citizenship fund, had resulted in much “improved financial condition and ability to carry out needed projects in political action and legislation.”

Reporting on the CIO’s political efforts over the next two years, Dale noted incremental gains. Although the structure of the PAC program was revamped in 1954 with new full-time representatives appointed and training classes started, Dale exclaimed that “you should be getting damn well fed-up with the spectacle of a labor committee [in the state legislature] headed by a business man [sic] and overloaded by farmers who admittedly do not understand the labor problem.” Although Democrats picked up eighteen seats in the House, and Republican governor Leo Hoegh agreed to some favorable appointments to various commissioner positions and made good on promises to provide increases in unemployment and workmen’s compensation, labor otherwise “received little or nothing” from the state legislature. Moreover, by 1955 much of the state CIO council’s discussion pertained to the more immediate issue of the imminent merger of the AFL and CIO.40

To be sure, many veteran Iowa CIO unionists looked skeptically at the merger of the two unions. Many agreed with Ralph Helstein, UPWA president, that the merger was defensive; it was a strategy of effectively combating the strength of growing corporations during a period of national political conservatism while also conserving early gains. At the last state CIO council convention, held in Des Moines on June 26, 1956, much of the convention’s debate was devoted to the upcoming merger convention, held the following two days in Des Moines. Mincks was one of the outspoken voices urging acceptance and the necessity of the merger. Indeed, Mincks was the guiding force between Ottumwa’s CIO and AFL councils’ merger, delayed at the request of the AFL council until after the state’s merger. To allay the fears of the smaller AFL central body that its unions would have no voice in the new city labor council, Mincks negotiated a nearly equally partitioned representative council. Ottumwa was in the nearly unique position of having CIO unions outnumber AFL


unions. The only other Iowa city where this was true was Waterloo, where a volunteer coordinating council had been active since 1950. When founded in August 1956, Ottumwa’s AFL-CIO labor council had four AFL representatives and five CIO representatives, even though Local 1 and UAW Local 74 together accounted for 75 percent of the city’s total labor union membership.41

In large part, the merger between the AFL and CIO in Iowa occurred as smoothly as it did because the top CIO council officials, like Dale, Everhart, and Mincks, were not militants but were moderates interested in practical political gains for laboring people. They saw the necessity of the merger primarily for political action purposes. Important, too, was the decision of the state’s top AFL officials, most notably Ray Mills, the new AFL-CIO president, to throw their support to the Democratic party. Mills, a lifelong Republican, publicly announced his switch to the Democratic party in 1955 after tiring of the IMA-dominated Republican positions on labor laws in the state. Republican governor Leo Hoegh had promised in his 1954 campaign to support the union shop, for instance, but was unable to sway the conservative forces in the legislature to overturn the state’s right-to-work law. By combining forces, AFL and CIO activists could certainly accomplish much more working together in the Iowa legislature than they could separately. Iowa’s AFL-CIO merger in 1956 created a more politically unified labor movement at both the state and local levels. At the founding convention, the CIO was now outnumbered by AFL unions in the Iowa Federation of Labor (IFL), AFL-CIO, by 390 to 587 votes. Yet in several respects, the CIO still wielded considerable weight. For instance, both the UPWA and UAW received their own vice presidents because each had more than 10,000 members. UPWA Locals 46 and 1 as well as UAW Local 838 were the largest locals in the new IFL. By the 1957 IFL convention, Mincks, Hart, and McCoy all held prominent positions in the state labor federation. Mincks was the Credentials Committee chair, Hart was Resolutions Committee chair, and McCoy was the new Committee on Political Education

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(COPE) director. After the death of Russell Bull in 1959, Hart became director of UPWA District 3.  

In terms of approaches to political action, the IFL’s basic strategy, as well as leading personnel, remained true to the CIO’s original plan of attack. Farmer-labor cooperation, for instance, remained a key component of the IFL’s approach to political mobilization. IFL leaders worked closely with a new farm group, the National Farmers Organization (NFO), for joint political benefit. Although its organizing strategies differed, for many farmers the NFO filled a void left by the decline of the Iowa Farmers Union, embroiled in communist accusations throughout the 1950s. Formed in 1955 and led by Oren Lee Stanley beginning in December 1956, the NFO focused its strategy for raising farm prices on aggressive organizing and collective bargaining. The NFO gained members who were disillusioned with the strategies of farm cooperatives and who felt leery about the future of the federal farm program. Adopted at its convention of 1958, the NFO’s collective bargaining aimed at obtaining master contracts with livestock processors and farm commodity buyers on a “cost-plus” basis. Specifically, according to NFO historian Jon Lauck, the “NFO’s plan involved Marketing Area Bargaining Committees, elected by NFO members, presenting offers to meatpackers and promising a steady flow of livestock, all in exchange for contracts for better prices.” After signing up over 100,000 members, the NFO began to stage holding actions in 1959 as a first step toward gaining master contracts. One of the first holding actions took place at St. Joseph, Missouri, for an entire week. Packers there were able to break the effort, however, by trucking in livestock from outside the organized area. More successful holding actions took place in April 1961 in the Omaha, Kansas City, and St. Joseph areas, followed by further efforts in these and other areas in 1962–1964.  


43. On the NFO’s early history, see Fite, American Farmers, 158–64; Schwieder, Iowa, 286–87; and especially chapter 4, “The National Farmers’ Organization and Collective Bargaining in Agriculture,” in Jon Lauck, “American Agriculture
At the local level, this new form of farm-labor cooperation was most successful in Waterloo after the formation of the Black Hawk Labor Council (BHLC), AFL-CIO, in 1956. Besides Ottumwa, Waterloo was the state’s other strong CIO center where the merger with the AFL went smoothly because of several previous years of cooperation between the two unions. Unlike earlier efforts by the UPWA and the FE in the late 1940s, however, the BHLC’s farmer-labor efforts resulted in greater political gains in this period because they were not tainted with left-wing activities. The NFO initially approached the BHLC because the farm group’s organizers, though enthusiastic, had little actual experience with collective bargaining. As a consequence, the BHLC and NFO came to see each other as natural allies.44

The BHLC and NFO’s collaboration resulted in the formation of a Farm-Labor Association in 1956. John Cooney, president of the BHLC from 1956 to 1965, described how farmer-labor organizing in Black Hawk County and surrounding areas of northeast Iowa worked:

Well, what happened, you know, the farmers would have one of their meetings and invite somebody from labor to come there and talk. Maybe they would have a hog roast, and they’d invite so many of us to come there. So finally we sat down and, well, if we can sit and talk here why can’t we sit down at the table and talk business. We found out there was very little that we couldn’t support that they were passing, and vice versa.

Paul Larsen, executive secretary of the BHLC from 1956 to 1965, elaborated on the origins of the Farm-Labor Association:

[The NFO] came to various elements of the labor movement wanting to know how to organize, wanting to work with and use the expertise of the labor movement. There were a number of people that were very active in the labor movement at that time that had had prior experience working with organizing farm groups too. [As a result of this collaboration], that was the first time that they came


44. Proceedings, Second Annual Convention, IFL, 1957, pp. 41–44. On the BHLC’s farmer-labor organizing efforts, see Paul Larsen, interview with ILHOP, Cedar Falls, Iowa, 7/15/1981; Merle Thompson, interview with ILHOP, Waterloo, 7/14/1981; and John Cooney, interview with ILHOP, 7/16/1981.
up with the slogan, “Collective bargaining in the marketplace.” That was the first time that any farm organization had done really anything toward the idea of bargaining for their prices rather than going in and taking [what] was being offered.\textsuperscript{45}

In places other than Black Hawk County, Iowa’s farmers and urban laborers were drawn closer together politically during the middle and late 1950s by several specific concerns that ultimately bore fruit for the Democrats in several state races, most notably the governor’s race in 1956. After several years of rising surpluses and declining prices, farmers balked at U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson’s proposal to combat the problem with flexible price supports. Even Iowa’s Republican governor Leo Hoegh castigated Benson’s proposal, which cost Hoegh the support of the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation. The Democratic candidate for governor, Herschel Loveless, benefited not only from this issue, but also two others, namely Hoegh’s passage of a half-percent increase in the state sales tax and his strong support for blocking the serving of liquor by the drink. The IMA joined Loveless in criticizing the higher sales tax. Moreover, voters in Iowa’s urban areas, where slightly more than one-half of the state’s population now lived in 1956, endorsed liberalizing the state’s alcohol laws.\textsuperscript{46}

With a considerable war chest now available from the state AFL-CIO, combined with Democratic party resources and the support of farmers and anti-tax backers, Loveless carried the election, becoming only the fourth Democrat elected governor in Iowa since the Civil War. Election results confirm that Loveless won his greatest support in cities of 25,000 to 50,000 population and farm townships. The state’s medium and large industrial cities were now Democratic strongholds, largely accounting for the second-stage gain that James Sundquist describes for the Democratic realignment in Iowa that peaked between 1954 and 1958. Two years later in 1958, similar issues and the same constituencies propelled Loveless to another term as governor and Democrats even took four of the state’s eight U.S. congressional seats. In the state legislature, the Democrats increased their representation in

\textsuperscript{45} Cooney, interview with ILHOP; and Larson, interview with ILHOP.

\textsuperscript{46} Larew, \textit{A Party Reborn}, 53–58.
both the house and senate. For Wapello County, Mincks won a seat in the senate, which he would retain through 1966, while Dean Aubrey and Robert Conner, another UAW Local 74 member, won places in the house. Ottumwa Democrat Gene Glenn took over Mincks’s seat from 1966 to 1974. In fact, from 1944 to 1972, Wapello County Democrats won twenty-one of the thirty total seats contested for the state house.47

Loveless made good on his campaign to repeal the half-cent sales tax increase, and along with increasing state social services and appointing professionals to various state commissions, he then made reapportionment the main focus of his term. In his address to the IFL convention in 1957, Loveless emphasized how urban groups, especially organized labor, must be better represented in state politics. Loveless spoke before the IFL convention every year he was in office, and consistently stressed a similar message underpinned by statistics on the shift in Iowa’s population from rural to urban locations. In his 1957 address, for instance, he noted how the twenty-six less heavily populated senatorial districts contained about one-third of Iowa’s population while the other twenty-four districts comprised about two-thirds of the population. Unless reapportionment occurred, establishment of union shop contracts and improvements in unemployment and workmen’s compensation could not occur. Although

47. State of Iowa, Official Registers, 1945–46 to 1973–74; Larew, A Party Reborn, 58–63; Hahn, Urban-Rural Conflict, 74–85; Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System, 257, 262; and Mincks, interview with ILHOP. Until 1964, representation in the Iowa House was by county. Beginning in 1964, some counties’ representation was consolidated and several urban counties received more representation. This process continued through the 1970s. For the state senate, redistricting was also ongoing after 1964. Wapello County’s rate of support for Democrats was quite comparable to that for counties outside Iowa that were much more urban and industrialized. From 1944 to 1952, Wapello County returned a rate of support for Democratic presidential candidates that was comparable to that returned by the ten strongest CIO counties in the United States: 57, 58, and 47 for Wapello County compared to an average of 59, 56, and 53 percent for the ten counties. This is even more impressive when one considers that with 29 percent of its population defined as rural in 1950, Wapello County had a higher percentage of rural residents than all but one of the ten strongest CIO counties in the country. The ten strongest CIO counties, as identified by Foster in The Union Politic, were Lake and St. Joseph in Indiana; Genessee and Wayne in Michigan; Lucas, Stark, and Summit in Iowa; and Allegheny, Northampton, and Westmoreland in Pennsylvania. See Foster, The Union Politic, appendix 1952A, 219.
not specifically named in this speech, the Farm Bureau, especially, together with the IMA, hoped to blunt the urban shift in reapportionment as much as possible through a proposal referred to as the Shaff Plan, after Senator David O. Shaff of Clinton, that called for a state senate based on population and a house based on area. An attempt by the IFL, the League of Women Voters, the urban press, and the Democratic party to gain reapportionment by making the issue a constitutional convention referendum in 1960 narrowly failed after the IMA and Farm Bureau combined to spend nearly $2 million to campaign against it while the IFL and League of Women Voters spent just $100,000.48

Although 1960 was a disappointing year for Democrats in Iowa, especially for Loveless who lost his race for the U.S. Senate after spending more time campaigning for John F. Kennedy than himself, the election results indicated that cities of over 10,000 population were now solidly in the Democratic camp. Historian Harlan Hahn’s findings indicate that the traditional role of farm townships in casting deciding albeit protest votes for Democrats from the 1930s to mid-1950s was still present after 1958 but less important than the strong support for Democrats in the larger cities. Jack McCoy, as the IFL’s COPE director, also laid the groundwork for Democratic gains in the 1960s by establishing local-level COPE programs that were then integrated with the state’s programs.49

The fruits of the IFL’s political efforts can be seen in the success of Democratic governor, then U.S. senator, Harold Hughes throughout the 1960s as well as in Democratic gains in both the state and national legislature following the IFL’s successful leadership in the reapportionment battle. Hughes initially attracted Herschel Loveless’s attention through his work with the Iowa Better Trucking Bureau. After changing parties at Loveless’s prompting, Hughes successfully ran for one of the state commerce commission seats in 1958. A direct, outspoken, and charismatic trucker turned politician, Hughes won the 1962 gubernatorial election by calling for action on the issues of reapportionment

49. Hahn, Urban-Rural Conflict, 82–84; Larew, A Party Reborn, 68–69; and Proceedings, Fourth Annual Convention, IFL, AFL-CIO, 1959, p. 69, IFL, SHSI.
and liquor by the drink. In addition to weak stands on liquor reform, Republican governor Norman Erbe had irritated urban Democratic voters by standing by while his lieutenant governor, William Mooty, cast the deciding vote in allowing the passage of the Shaff Plan in 1961. During Hughes’s first term, Iowa’s liquor laws were repealed and the IFL filed suit in federal court in Des Moines in 1963, challenging the constitutionality of the Shaff Plan’s reapportionment scheme. The court refused to act on the plan’s constitutionality until after a statewide referendum was held on December 3, 1963. Following a statewide campaign against it by Hughes, organized labor and urban voters in general won an enormous victory when the Shaff Plan was defeated by a margin of 59 to 41 percent. The most overwhelming opposition to the plan came in the seventeen counties containing cities of more than 10,000 population. Wapello, Polk, Woodbury, Linn, and Black Hawk County voters, all home to significant numbers of union members, rejected it by over 80 percent majorities. Farm townships in nineteen predominantly rural counties, in contrast, supported the plan by a 70 percent margin. In a special session of the 1964 state legislature, a new temporary apportionment plan was passed that gave significant increases to urban areas in both the house and senate. A final, more equitable reapportionment plan, mandated by the federal district court in Des Moines, was finally implemented by the state legislature in 1969 and revised by the state supreme court in 1972.50

Having deemed reapportionment “the most important project that the Iowa labor movement had ever undertaken,” IFL executive vice president Jake Mincks, McCoy’s successor as IFL COPE chair, claimed without hyperbole that the Shaff Plan had been defeated because of trade union influence. Certainly labor unionist funding had been vital. Following McCoy’s campaign to make COPE more effective on the local level, the 1962 IFL convention had passed an increase in the per-capita tax, bringing it up to ten cents per member per month. Mincks noted in his 1965

report to the IFL convention that in terms of state and national legislation much had been accomplished. Because of Democratic majorities in the state house and senate—101 of the 124 seats in the house and 35 of the 53 seats in the senate—“we were able to make gains that we hadn’t been able to make in recent years.” Among many improvements, Mincks listed a 25 percent increase in the disability benefits of workmen’s compensation, positive changes in the unemployment compensation formula and waiting period, and passage of a Fair Employment Practices Act. A bill to legalize the union shop made it through the house but was defeated by four votes in the senate.51

In addition to these victories and helped by Democratic control of the state legislature from 1964 to 1968, the IFL and its Democratic allies pushed for and won annual salaries for legislators, encouraged more blue-collar citizens to run for office, and gained a strong workmen’s compensation act, unemployment compensation, Iowa’s OSHA law, and postcard registration during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Although some members among the IFL blamed Hughes for not pushing harder for the union shop bill, a criticism Hughes strongly rejected in his speech to the IFL convention the next year, in 1965 he helped to settle a UPWA strike at the new Iowa Beef Processors plant in Fort Dodge. At the 1968 IFL convention, Hughes cited some of the gains made for working people during his six years as Iowa’s governor, including improvements in workmen’s and unemployment compensation, industrial development, greater school aid, property tax relief, abolishment of the death penalty, improvements in state government organization and planning, increased highway patrol and traffic safety programs, and more state facilities for the mentally ill and physically handicapped. Moreover, even when the 1968

51. In 1948, only 25 of Iowa’s 108 representatives in the House were Democrats. This fell to 12 in 1950 and just 3 in 1952. In 1954, however, there were 17, followed by 30 in 1956, 40 in 1958, 29 in 1960, and 17 in 1962. After a majority following the 1964 elections in the Iowa Senate, Democrats held a majority again in 1966 before tailing off but remaining competitive between 1968 and 1972. State of Iowa, Official Registers, 1945–46 to 1973–74; Proceedings, Seventh Annual Convention, IFL, AFL-CIO, 1962, pp. 4–5, 9, IFL, SHSI; Proceedings, Eighth Annual Convention, IFL, AFL-CIO, 1963, pp. 17–20, IFL, SHSI; Proceedings, Ninth Annual Convention, IFL, AFL-CIO, 1964, p. 1; IFL, SHSI; and Proceedings, Tenth Annual Convention, IFL, AFL-CIO, 1965, pp. 6–7, IFL, SHSI.
elections swept many Iowa Democrats out of state and national legislative offices, the consolidation of the state’s Democratic party organization in the late 1960s and early 1970s helped it to bounce back during the 1970s. After Hughes’s election to the U.S. Senate in 1968, and establishment of a progressive record there, another progressive Democratic, John Culver, a ten-year veteran of the U.S. House, was elected in his place. Culver’s former aide, Dick Clark, was elected to the other Senate seat in 1972. By the mid-1970s, Democrats were also back in control of both houses of the Iowa legislature. Although the Democrats’ power has eroded since the 1970s, Iowa remains a competitive two-party state.52

By the mid-1960s, labor’s political efforts had refashioned local Democratic parties in Iowa’s industrial cities. Paul Larsen recalled how “[the BHLC] was very effective politically in endorsing and financially supporting candidates for the . . . state legislative offices. And as a result of that, we were able to gain a great deal of influence that we had not had with members of the State Legislature from rural areas.” The impact of the BHLC’s political activities “started to show up in the elections of 1958 [when] we started to elect some people locally to the State Legislature for the first time. This improved in 1960 and 1962.” When Black Hawk County went Democratic in 1964 for the first time since before the Civil War “folks down there thought it was the end of the world.” John Cooney was even more blunt about the impact of organized labor on local Democratic politics:

Well, as far as I’m concerned, the Black Hawk Labor Council was the local Democratic party. We put a lot of money into it. We had good representation in this area. We encouraged a lot of people to get mixed into politics that had never thought of doing it, simply because, you know, they were knowledgeable people.53

Cooney also stressed that the BHLC built its Democratic coalition in Waterloo by involving itself in civil rights. Indeed, Waterloo established one of the first Fair Employment Practice

53. Larson, interview with ILHOP; and Cooney, interview with ILHOP. See also Stromquist, Solidarity and Survival, 285.
Commissions in the United States during this period. The BHLC actually built on the antidiscrimination and civil rights efforts of UPWA Local 46 at Waterloo’s large Rath packing plant. Local 46 established its antidiscrimination program in 1950 and especially combated the segregation of African American women in the plant. The local also fought segregation in Waterloo beginning in 1953, and when the BHLC was formed, worked with the county-wide labor council to do the same. Besides the establishment of the Fair Employment Practices Commission, the BHLC started the Martin Luther King Jr. Center for educating blacks of all ages. These anti-discrimination and civil rights initiatives solidified a cross-racial Democratic base in Waterloo.54

Without organized labor’s involvement, Iowa would not have become a true two-party state by the 1960s. Beginning with aggressive local union efforts during the 1940s in Ottumwa and prompted by the Iowa State Industrial Council’s political efforts in the late 1940s and early 1950s, voters in Iowa’s manufacturing centers steadily turned toward the Democrats. Helped by cooperative efforts with sympathetic farmers, Democrats made steady gains in state and national representation after the mid-1950s. Despite its national reputation as a conservative farm state, Ottumwa’s union leaders along with the state’s CIO movement prompted Iowa’s belated participation in the New Deal political transition and established the state’s modern Democratic foundations.

54. On UPWA Local 46’s antidiscrimination and civil rights efforts, see Bruce Fehn, “‘The Only Hope We Had’: United Packinghouse Workers Local 46 and the Struggle for Racial Equality in Waterloo, Iowa, 1948–1960,” Annals of Iowa 54 (Summer 1995), 200–213. On the BHLC’s civil rights initiatives, see Cooney, interview, ILHOP.
Book Reviews and Notices


Reviewer Brad D. Lookingbill is professor of history at Columbia College of Missouri. Among his research and writing interests are the history of the Great Plains, environmental history, and military history.

My family and I drove across the Great Plains this summer. We paused at a popular restaurant called Simon’s Catch near Elk City, Oklahoma. Its walls were decorated with animal trophies, including the heads of a pronghorn, a bear, and a buffalo. Although seldom seen in the region today, these creatures and many others dominated the North American interior a long time ago.

Dan Flores insists that the wildlife of the Great Plains once rivaled the Serengeti of Africa. Offering personal observations mixed with “big history,” he studies the species native to the grasslands from West Texas to the Upper Missouri River. He recalls Walter Prescott Webb’s classic *The Great Plains* (1931), which contained only a brief section on animals. However, Flores meditates on something other than a Darwinian struggle on the western frontier. Critical of American attitudes toward the great beasts, he posits that “our slaughterhouse on the Great Plains was profoundly immoral” (8).

Flores begins by discussing the prehistoric megafauna of the Great Plains, such as lions, mammoths, cougars, saber-toothed cats, giant sloths, dire wolves, and wild horses. He devotes most of his attention to the pronghorn, coyote, wolf, grizzly, and bison, who survived what paleobiologist Paul Martin called “Blitzkrieg Overkill” between 8,000 and 13,000 years ago. A fine chapter on the nineteenth-century horse trade features reports from military expeditions as well as the correspondence of President Thomas Jefferson. Throughout the book, Flores’s approach to source material is selective yet compelling.

Flores is at the top of his game when analyzing the bison ecology. He contemplates competing narratives about the demise of the bison, giving special recognition to traditional Native American stories of culture heroes. Under optimum conditions, he estimates, the bison numbered in the range of 25 million during the first half of the 1800s. Unfortunately, a study conducted in 1886 indicated that only 1,073 still lived.
While debunking the famous legend that the U.S. military conspired with the federal government to eradicate the herds, Flores highlights the oft-cited words attributed to General Philip Sheridan about “destroying the Indian’s commissary” and traces them to a fabrication by a Texas hide hunter named John Cook. In fact, the army officer actually declared, “I consider it important that this wholesale slaughter of the Buffalo should be stopped” (131). Beset with environmental changes, exotic diseases, and unregulated hunting, the bison barely escaped extinction.

With a lyrical flourish, Flores concludes the book with a sentimental call to “re-wild” the Great Plains. Like many naturalists, he acknowledges that the prairie is as sublime as canyons, mountains, and forests. He touts the ongoing efforts to create parks and preserves, although most have fallen short of artist George Catlin’s vision of 1832. Anyone who has driven across this vast country sees its emptiness, encountering many places in the grasslands that remind the author of “a dustier Iowa, with more than a hint of ammonia, feedlots, and hog farms” (162). Flores hopes that future visitors will encounter a more romantic landscape, where large animals and human beings might play.

My only disappointment in Flores’s book stems from the absence of endnotes, footnotes, or other forms of citation. His bibliography lists 12 pages of published materials but gives no record of archives and collections for further research on the last big animals. Such additions to the book would have made his passionate plea on behalf of this lost world even more noteworthy.


Scholars have recently begun paying long overdue attention to the more than 230 state constitutional conventions held since 1776. Although no conventions have been called during the past 30 years, the longest such gap in American history, they were once held regularly to frame inaugural state constitutions or revise existing constitutions, albeit more often in some states than others. In fact, 14 state constitutions currently require that referenda on whether to call a convention be held at periodic intervals, as in Iowa where a referendum is considered every ten years, most recently in 2010.
In *Frontier Democracy: Constitutional Conventions in the Old Northwest*, Silvana R. Siddali analyzes conventions held from the 1830s to the 1850s in the six states created from the Northwest Territory as well as Iowa. These include conventions in Illinois (1847), Indiana (1850–51), Iowa (1844, 1846, 1857), Michigan (1835, 1850), Minnesota (1857), Ohio (1850–51), and Wisconsin (1846, 1848). Several of these conventions tried to draft inaugural constitutions but were unsuccessful, as when Iowa’s 1844 convention drafted a constitution that was defeated by voters when it became ensnared in debates about the boundary with Missouri. Other conventions were successful in framing inaugural constitutions; for instance, Iowa’s 1846 convention crafted a constitution that was ratified by voters and served as the state’s foundational document for just over a dozen years. In still other cases, conventions made changes of varying significance to existing constitutions, as when Iowa’s 1857 convention framed the state’s current constitution.

Delegates at these conventions addressed a range of topics, including “black people’s rights, banks and paper money, married women’s property rights, the power of the legislature, and the authority of the judiciary” (4). A number of these conventions were reacting to the Panic of 1837 and subsequent failure of internal improvement projects and default on debt payments in a number of states. These developments prompted widespread approval of constitutional provisions barring legislatures from investing in roads, canals, and railroads and limiting legislators’ ability to charter banks and borrow money. Throughout this period, convention delegates also responded to popular pressures to democratize governing institutions by providing for popular election of judges and a wide range of executive officials. In other cases—and this is a particular focus of Siddali’s book—convention delegates were responding to petitions from African Americans and women, “who would certainly never have been permitted to serve as delegates” but nevertheless participated in “parallel reform conferences that met while several of the constitutional conventions were in session” and placed issues of African American suffrage and women’s rights on the conventions’ agenda and occasionally resulted in proposals being submitted for a popular vote, even if they generally did not lead to enactment of constitutional provisions (19).

In analyzing convention debates on these topics—the book is organized thematically, with chapter titles such as “judges,” “land rights,” “places,” “citizens,” “wives,” and “banks”—Siddali explains that *Frontier Democracy* “is primarily a book about conversations rather than about foundational documents” (2). As she notes, “The outcomes of the convention debates represented the difference between a decent, worth-
while, prosperous life and a corrupt, degraded, impoverished existence,” given that “new state constitutions would frame governments, delineate rights, clarify the state’s physical boundaries, and empower all the branches of government” (4–5). But she is less concerned with analyzing what she views as “largely predictable outcomes” than with exploring the “public and private conversations” that took place in and out of the conventions and delving into the “philosophical, spiritual, and political roots” of “northwestern opinions on constitutional matters” (10).

In exploring “the full panoply of the private, public, and political conversations” (18), Siddali draws on transcripts of convention debates, which are available for conventions in these states from the 1850s onward. But conventions called in these states in the 1830s and 1840s chose not to keep transcripts, opting instead to keep a journal of motions, resolutions, and votes, while relying on newspapers to publish the speeches in accounts that attracted a wide readership (60–61). Siddali also goes well beyond these official sources by compiling extensive information on the political experience, education, and wealth of convention delegates. She also examines delegates’ papers and correspondence to gain insight into the convention proceedings, which featured impressive displays of erudition but also “devolved into noisy, chaotic, disorganized messes” and occasionally led to “fisticuffs” (56, 57).

Fronter Democracy is an exhaustively researched account that provides fresh perspectives on several aspects of antebellum northwestern state conventions, most importantly in the attention given to the role of African Americans and women’s groups outside the convention halls in trying to gain a hearing for various issues. As Siddali shows, groups influenced the convention proceedings in part by holding conferences alongside convention proceedings—and with some success, as when members of the Ohio Colored Citizens League held a convention at the same time as Ohio’s 1850–51 convention and “insisted on (and won) a meeting with the convention delegates, a concession that suggests that they were able to participate in the conversation about reforming their state government” (1). Conventions also “received petitions from free black people and from their white supporters” calling for “black rights” and occasionally “proposing suffrage for black citizens” (281). In some states, as in Illinois and Indiana, the principal question at the conventions was whether to permit “black persons to migrate into the state”; but in other conventions delegates took up the question of African American “voting rights” (267), most notably when Iowa’s 1857 convention agreed to submit the question to a popular vote, where it was defeated overwhelmingly. In detailing the various ways that groups secured a hearing and occasional votes on citizenship issues in ante-
bellum Northwest state constitutional conventions and analyzing the resulting debates in and out of these conventions, Siddali has broadened the scholarly focus and made a fine contribution to standard accounts.


Reviewer John P. Bowes is professor of history at Eastern Kentucky University. He is the author of *Land Too Good for Indians: Northern Indian Removal* (2016) and *Exiles and Pioneers: Eastern Indians in the Trans-Mississippi West* (2007).

In *Ioway Life*, Greg Olson focuses on a brief period of critical transitions and transformations in the history of the Ioways. A treaty signed with the federal government in 1836 formalized a cession of their lands in Missouri and arranged for their removal to a reserve in what is now Nebraska and Kansas. Over the next 20-plus years the federal government and its agents sought to alter the Ioway way of life. In short, the federal government wanted the Ioways to become Christian farmers. Despite successful Ioway resistance to such measures, Olson argues, these years before the Civil War laid the foundation for the cultural changes that would occur in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Colonialism is a powerful force. Olson asserts that, although “the accomplishments of the agents and missionaries were decidedly mixed,” the seeds for the success of their overall policies were planted during the years they operated under the auspices of the Great Nemaha Agency.

This book is brief, with only about 135 pages of text, and the chapters are organized more along thematic than strictly chronological lines. Following a short chapter to explain events leading to the Ioway relocation to the reservation on the south bank of the Great Nemaha River, Olson examines the impact of Christian missionaries and their unsuccessful efforts to convert Indians in their first decade on the reserve. As the next chapter demonstrates, the school established by Presbyterian missionaries in the mid-1840s experienced similar failures as a result of weak government support, missionary miscalculation, and Ioway resistance. In the fourth and fifth chapters Olson focuses on politics, first illustrating the transformation in Ioway leadership and then explaining how bureaucratic incompetence and corruption undermined the federal government’s Indian policy on the reservation. This narrative draws to a conclusion with an examination of events that compromised the Ioway reservation, specifically the Kansas-Nebraska Act and federal efforts to institute allotment. The Ioways signed their last treaty with
the federal government in 1861. Since then, they have maintained a smaller reservation that still exists. Yet, as of 1883, a separate Ioway reservation was established farther south in Indian Territory for those who left the Great Nemaha River after the Civil War.

*Ioway Life* contributes to the literature on Ioway history but ultimately misses an opportunity to describe an Ioway perspective on the transformative events of the mid–nineteenth century. In most chapters the narrative focuses on the work, ideas, and failures of government agents and does not provide substantial explanations of Ioway efforts during the same time. To the extent that Ioway resistance shaped events on the reservation, readers will not find a full picture of that resistance over time. The narrative also suffers somewhat from organizational issues. Because the book is structured along thematic lines, events such as the Platte Purchase and the Kansas-Nebraska Act are discussed in some depth twice over. A different narrative framework could have prevented this repetition. In discussing the mid–nineteenth century experience of the Ioways and how that historical period laid a distinct foundation for the following decades, Olson has explored an important topic. The book as written, however, does not always do enough to support the argument the author wants to make.


Reviewer Bryon C. Andreasen is a historian at the LDS Church History Museum, Salt Lake City, Utah; he was formerly research historian at the Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library, Springfield, Illinois.

In 1840 the Dumville family emigrated from England to the United States. They purchased land in west central Illinois in a small new settlement in Macoupin County. In 1842 Thomas Dumville died, leaving his wife, Ann (age 46), and daughters Elizabeth (13), Jemima (11), and Hephzibah (9) in financial straits. They lost their land and moved to the small county seat, Carlinville. Ann’s meager income proved insufficient, prompting the girls to seek employment away from home. Elizabeth married a farmer, John Williams, and eventually moved to Poweshiek County, Iowa. Jemima and Hephzibah went north 50 miles to the more substantial city of Jacksonville, Illinois. There, Jemima taught primary school (later moving to nearby Lynnville), and Hephzibah worked as a domestic for the family with whom she boarded. Both girls attended the local
Methodist female college off and on as circumstances permitted. The separation of mother and daughters instigated over a decade’s worth of correspondence, the surviving portion of which today is archived at the Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library in Springfield, Illinois.

The Dumville Collection consists of 117 letters, 100 of which are included in this volume. They are presented chronologically, beginning in June 1851 and ending in December 1863. The excluded letters were deemed “less informative” by the editors (xii). Moreover, in several letters they deleted passages they considered “extraneous, repetitious, fragmentary, or otherwise of little use in telling the story” (xii). They also added punctuation and paragraphing for ease of reading. This methodology may raise eyebrows among some documentary editing purists. Original spellings are retained, however. As the editors themselves suggest, “Scholars who want to use the letters as primary sources should of course consult the originals” (xii). But certainly the volume provides convenient, time-saving access to the collection for the purpose of learning what is there.

In the opening chapter, the editors quickly review the Dumville family story up to the point where the surviving correspondence begins, and they provide brief character profiles of Ann and her three daughters. Then they identify, discuss, and provide context for six topics they believe are particularly illuminated in the letters: religion (particularly the attitudes of Methodists), education, social mobility, politics, the Civil War, and gender roles. The rest of the book consists of five chapters presenting the letters in roughly two- or three-year increments, with helpful chapter introductions that update family happenings and provide context on such things as cholera epidemics, technological innovations, growing tensions over abolition, and the Lincoln-Douglas rivalry.

These letters are valuable in that they provide the voices of nineteenth-century immigrant women working their way toward middle-class respectability in a society transitioning from frontier settlements into small-town agrarian communities that seek stronger connections to the market economy. The letters reveal a surprising degree of political awareness among working women of the time.

Students of Iowa history will be particularly interested in the 13 letters sent from Elizabeth’s isolated farm in Poweshiek County, dated from January 1855 through July 1863. Elizabeth was “barely literate, if at all” (4). Her husband, John Williams, wrote all of the letters but one, the last being written by their very literate 12-year-old daughter Margaret. Their six wartime letters are replete with anguished references to rife Copperhead sentiment in the area.
A brief concluding chapter nicely recaps the correspondents’ stories beyond 1863 and summarizes the importance of the letters in documenting how one set of women “transformed themselves from immigrants to Americans” and how “they progressed from rural poverty to ownership of homes and farms” (167)—a perspective that can sometimes be hard to document.


Reviewer Nicole Etcheson is the Alexander M. Bracken Professor of History at Ball State University. She is the author of *A Generation at War: The Civil War Era in a Northern Community* (2011); *Bleeding Kansas: Contested Liberty in the Civil War Era* (2004); and *The Emerging Midwest: Upland Southerners and the Political Culture of the Old Northwest, 1787–1861* (1996).

Does a river divide or unite? In the postrevolutionary period, Congress created territories northwest and southwest of the Ohio River. The Northwest Ordinance forbade slavery, but the peculiar institution flourished south of the river. So it would seem that the river was a border dividing the middle of the country. But migrants from south of the Ohio traveled down the river and settled on its northern banks. Residents on both sides of the river shared many values, including racism. And there was no clear division during the Civil War between Union and Confederate. In the free states, proslavery Copperheads protested the federal government’s prosecution of the war while, south of the river, many slaveowners opposed secession, and men from Union slave states fought to suppress the rebellion.

Bridget Ford and Christopher Phillips grapple with these complexities in their respective books. Ford examines Cincinnati and Louisville to understand the Ohio-Kentucky border. Phillips’s “Middle Border” includes not just the Ohio River states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Kentucky but also Kansas and Missouri. Both authors complicate our understanding of the sectional, cultural, and political bonds and divisions in the region.

Ford uses Abraham Lincoln’s reference to the “bonds of Union,” a phrase with religious as well as political overtones in the mid-1800s, as a springboard to understand the communities north and south of the
Ohio River. Lincoln saw slavery as promoting discord, but Ford emphasizes that residents in the region worked to preserve ties between free and slave states and thus hold the Union together.

In Ford’s borderland, religion is as much a divisive issue as slavery. She opens with the “collision” between “supercharged Protestantism” and “Catholic fervor” (3). Among those Protestants were black congregants who formed their own Methodist and Baptist churches. All of these religious groups battled, sometimes literally, for the soul of the west. Anti-Catholic riots took place in both cities. Such conflict is well known, but Ford also details how Protestants and Catholics drew closer. Catholics adopted evangelical oratorical techniques while Protestants, white and black, sought to build architecturally and aesthetically impressive church buildings akin to those that housed Catholic worship. Both Protestants and Catholics valued “novel forms of pious expression” (64) that emphasized personal connections to the divine.

The Ohio River was an imperfect division between slavery and freedom in the antebellum period. Blacks found employment on the river but faced the danger of kidnapping into slavery. Race riots as well as nativist violence convulsed Cincinnati while blacks in Louisville experienced the everyday brutality of slavery along with a spectacular lynching of slaves accused of murder. Despite these realities, African Americans in the region built community, resisted the push for colonization, and protested Ohio’s black laws and the federal fugitive slave law. Ohio African Americans even got public funding for schools for black children while Louisville made its public schools tuition free. Blacks used their ties to whites to advance a black agenda. Many blacks worked in personal service as dressmakers, barbers, and hairdressers to white clients who then might attest to black respectability and worthiness to remain in the United States. Outbreaks of violence, such as the 1857 lynching, might encourage emigration, but most free blacks condemned efforts to send them to Liberia and fought the colonization movement that was popular among whites north and south of the river.

Despite Ford’s efforts to find links across the river, she concedes that “alienation” surfaced in the Methodist and Baptist schisms of the 1840s (203). These divisions also involved breaks between black and white churches. Ohio became wedded to free soil politics at the same time that Kentucky strengthened its protections for slavery. The Civil War, however, which should represent the highpoint of division, caused Unionists in Cincinnati and Louisville to forge bonds. Protestants and Catholics, blacks and whites, all worked to support the troops. Louisville Unionists even came to accept that emancipation was necessary to preserve the government.
Ford reaches the Civil War only in the final chapters of her book; Christopher Phillips reverses the emphasis, spending only the first few chapters on the antebellum period and the bulk of his book on the Civil War itself. Phillips also acknowledges the many commonalities between the two regions, arguing that they formed a more cohesive whole than postwar memory allowed, but he focuses much more on the internal conflicts within the region.

Phillips shows that the North-South “binary” (9) is a creation of the postwar period. In the antebellum period, midwesterners demonstrated differing varieties of antislavery and proslavery sentiment. To be antislavery was not necessarily to be nonracist or an abolitionist and to be proslavery did not necessarily mean support for secession. The postwar period erased such distinctions in favor of a narrative in which the Loyal North included all the free states, obscuring antiwar and antiemancipationist sentiment in the Lower North, and the Lost Cause myth of an idyllic plantation society and support for secession took hold even in Unionist slave states such as Kentucky.

Before the war, midwesterners, even those in free states, accommodated slavery through their shared racism, but the crisis decade of the 1850s increased sectionalism. For the war years, Phillips describes the futile efforts at neutrality by the border slave states, the wartime contests for civilian loyalty, the crucial role of emancipation in destroying the prewar accommodation on slavery and race, the guerrilla war and homefront dissent, and the postwar struggle to secure or overturn the results of the war. Throughout this narrative, Phillips pays due attention to the experiences of African Americans and women.

Phillips demonstrates an often masterful combination of synthesis of existing scholarship and extensive primary research. Each chapter begins with a microhistorical piece that examines the experience of a person or place and establishes themes to be pursued in the larger chapter that follows. Some of these smaller set pieces are quite gripping, including the accounts of slaves making salt in Illinois and Kentucky Shakers struggling to deal with first Confederate and then Union occupations.

In covering such a vast amount of material, mistakes are inevitable. Phillips says that the Indiana and Illinois legislatures provided in their state constitutions for allowing unfree labor in those states in violation of the Northwest Ordinance. Both constitutions were written by conventions. Illinois’s 1818 constitution provided for future indentures; Indiana’s 1816 constitution did not. Phillips then says that Indiana’s Supreme Court did not address “involuntary servitude” in its rulings through the 1820s (30, 32). In fact, the Indiana Supreme Court ruled against indentured servitude in the case of Mary Bateman Clark in 1821.
Phillips overstates when he says that “most historians hold that the Ohio River was a clearly defined and static demographic and political boundary between North and South and, by its distinctive cultures, an extension of the Mason-Dixon Line” (7). There has been too much recent work challenging the Ohio River as a boundary by scholars such as Kim Gruenwald, Stanley Harrold, and others to present that as the consensus of current historians. Their theses require both Ford and Phillips to downplay antebellum conflict. In her introduction, Ford acknowledges Elizabeth R. Varon’s *Disunion: The Coming of the American Civil War, 1789–1859* (2008). Varon analyzed the rhetoric of disunion and its eventually destructive effect. In addition, Stanley Harrold’s recent *Border War: Fighting over Slavery before the Civil War* (2010) illuminates the violent struggle over slavery that often occurred in the same region Ford and Phillips cover. Ford—and Phillips in his early chapters—are more interested in how the Union held together in a border region where freedom and slavery were in constant contact, but Ford’s in-depth analysis nonetheless reveals formidable conflict within each city and between the states on the opposite sides of the river. Both are valuable works. Phillips’s book will clearly be a seminal study of the Midwest during the Civil War and a work that scholars will be turning to—either for enlightenment or to challenge—for a long time.


Reviewer Franklin Yoder recently retired as an academic adviser at the University of Iowa. His Ph.D. dissertation (University of Chicago, 1999) was “A Rural Kaleidoscope: Property, Mobility, and Ethnic Diversity in the Middle West.”

In a research field dominated by studies of German, Irish, and other northern European immigrant groups, Caroline Brettell’s examination of a French Canadian settlement in northern Illinois offers a new perspective on nineteenth-century ethnicity and immigration in the Midwest. By bringing the analytical tools of an anthropologist to this work, Brettell adds a layer of complexity that provides a rich and detailed look at this small French immigrant settlement.

Studies of immigration and ethnicity generally focus on groups and pay little attention to specific individuals within those societies. This
book has the added elements of a strong charismatic leader, religious division, and a clash between an established religious hierarchy and a renegade church leader—the Roman Catholic church and Charles Chiniquy. As Brettell states, her study examines “the significance of charismatic leadership in processes of social and religious change” (2).

The French settlements in northeastern Illinois faced many of the same challenges that confronted most midwestern immigrant communities. Occupational choices, marriage patterns, and educational systems reflected the tensions between immigrants and established settlers as immigrants sought to maintain their culture and way of life. However, in St. Anne and other local French Canadian settlements, immigrants dealt with an internal choice that created tensions and strife—the decision to be Catholic or to be Protestant.

Religion is a dominant theme in this study. However, unlike many ethnic communities where religion served as a common rallying point that helped maintain an ethnic identity, religion in the French Canadian settlements also drove a wedge within the group. As a result, these settlements offer a fascinating opportunity to compare two groups with the same French roots who came to embrace two different religions. Brettell provides excellent data and analysis to illuminate how different religious choices led to marked differences in political preferences, occupational choices, birth rates, and land transfer patterns.

The central figure in this analysis—Charles Chiniquy—presents a complex and convoluted picture. To some, he was a saint, a visionary, a caring leader who stood against an institution riddled with corruption and greed. To others, he was a charlatan, a demagogue, and a troublemaker who preyed on the weak and vulnerable. As becomes clear when current residents in St. Anne were questioned about Chiniquy, he remains a controversial figure even today.

When Chiniquy led several families of French Canadians out of the Catholic church and out of Canada, he committed two major sins—leaving Canada and leaving the Catholic church. The ensuing conflicts were amplified by the close familial and ethnic connections among the various factions within this small, closely connected ethnic community. Those conflicts give credence to Freud’s “narcissism of small differences,” when seemingly insignificant disagreements are never so intense as when they are present within a largely homogenous group.

In addition to issues of assimilation and ethnic identity, this book raises the question of where historians should focus attention—on the broad middle or on the fringes? What do we learn by examining a small settlement that by all accounts is an anomaly? Do the extremes help us understand the middle by offering sharp contrasts and keeping us aware
that the middle is never the complete picture? At the very least, this examination of French Canadians in northern Illinois reminds us to be wary of painting with too broad of a brush.


Reviewer James E. Klein is associate professor of history at Del Mar College in Corpus Christi, Texas. He is the author of *Grappling with Demon Rum: The Cultural Struggle over Liquor in Early Oklahoma* (2008).

In *We Are What We Drink*, Sabine N. Meyer provides a nuanced examination of the campaign to ban alcohol in early Minnesota. The stance individuals took on the liquor question was determined by religion, economic class, ethnicity, gender, and civic identity. The latter, she argues, is a product of the former factors, but also of place, citing St. Paul as an example—that city’s civic identity influenced residents’ stance on liquor. She also studies the staunchly dry position of Bishop John Ireland and the split that created between Irish and German Catholics. While the temperance issue shaped Irish and German ethnic identities in Minnesota, it also created a public identity for Minnesota women, who previously had been relegated to the home.

Meyer begins with the early European settlement of Minnesota by fur traders and the raucous reputation earned by early St. Paul, originally named Pig’s Eye after a local liquor dealer. The 1850s temperance movement saw middle-class reformers, relocated from New England, attempting to civilize the Minnesota wilderness. They failed to curb St. Paul’s liquor industry because it was a part of residents’ civic and masculine identity.

By the late nineteenth century, Irish Americans, aspiring to middle-class status, remade their ethnic identity by adopting abstinence as a badge of respectability. German immigrants, from the distinct regions of Prussia, Saxony, Westphalia, Bavaria, and others, instead used opposition to temperance (based on a devotion to the concept of personal liberty) as a shared trait to create a unified German American culture. As their initial social standing was higher than that of Irish Americans, they saw no need to emulate the middle-class expression of respectability—opposition to alcohol. Rather, they viewed the temperance movement as an attack on German American culture.

St. Paul, influenced by the prominent position of German American brewers and by residents’ devotion to the notion of joie de vivre, opposed and resisted liquor regulations, pitting the city against the state
government and contrasting that city with its twin settlement, the more refined Minneapolis. Residents of the Twin Cities internalized these different identities, thwarting effective liquor regulation in St. Paul and further differentiating the two municipalities.

The temperance campaign provided women with a rare opportunity to enter the previously male public sphere of society. Minnesota’s Woman’s Christian Temperance Union, the vehicle for this entrance into public affairs, redefined gender roles and emboldened women for the subsequent woman suffrage campaign. Irish American men, notably Bishop Ireland, accepted women into the temperance campaign as they gained middle-class status.

Minnesota received mixed results from a high license campaign in the 1890s and adopted county option in 1915. As a result, 51 of 86 counties went dry. American entrance into the Great War branded the German American liquor stance as unpatriotic, dooming efforts to stave off the growing prohibition campaign. The war, specifically women’s extensive work in support of it, also convinced male officeholders to support woman suffrage.

Sabine extensively cites a rich temperance literature yet charts her own course in explaining dry success and wet failures in Minnesota. She builds on Joseph Gusfield’s work on status anxiety in explaining the Irish abstinence campaign. Her discussion of local civic identity as shaping and being shaped by the temperance campaign represents a new direction in liquor studies, one that warrants further examination. She asserts that ethnicity, religion, and place shaped the civic identity of St. Paul as much or more than economic class, although she accepts Roy Rosenzweig’s characterization of the saloon as a working man’s club. She notes that Irish Americans of all economic classes joined abstinence organizations, although social elites typically led these groups. She also notes that German American businessmen organized the wet opposition to temperance but gives little attention to the working-class culture that formed in saloons. Her acknowledgment that temperance leaders typically were middle class also suggests that economic class factored into the liquor issue in addition to ethnicity, religion, and place. She asserts that Minnesotans’ varied stances on liquor shaped their identities. Building on Claude Fischer’s contention that the food we eat shapes our sense of self, Sabine argues convincingly that we are what we drink (or choose not to drink).

Reviewer Carlos A. Schwantes is St. Louis Mercantile Library Professor of Transportation Studies at the University of Missouri–St. Louis. He is the author of Coxey’s Army: An American Odyssey (1985) and “Soldiers of Misfortune: Jack London, Kelly’s Army, and the Struggle for Survival in Iowa” (Annals of Iowa, 1983).

During the spring of 1894 Americans were fascinated by their new national “soap opera” popularly known as Coxey’s Army. For most of the past year as the United States suffered through the most devastating economic depression it had yet experienced, the news had been uniformly bad. But here was something new and even entertaining: during the six weeks that Coxey’s Army marched from northern Ohio to Washington, the unscripted drama captured newspaper headlines and the nation’s attention as Americans wondered each day what would happen next.

At one level, the daily details of the march as published in newspapers across the United States offered comic relief from the grim news of the depression: it was a dramatic performance that featured a colorful and often comedic cast of characters. But Coxey’s Army was also interesting for the same reason that television contests capture their audiences today—because their outcomes are uncertain. The serious side of the march by the unemployed was captured in a single question: What would happen once Coxey’s unprecedented “petition in boots” reached Washington and sought to present to Congress its proposal for depression relief? Adding to the national foreboding were the many copycat armies that sought to rendezvous with Coxey in the District of Columbia and add their number to his 200 or so marchers headed to Capitol Hill. Among the best known of the other protest groups was Kelley’s Army, which had the good fortune to have as its chronicler the future novelist Jack London, who kept a diary as he plodded across Iowa.

For his retelling of the Coxey saga, Benjamin F. Alexander has done an impressive amount of research, combing through every conceivable source for information. Still more impressive is how the author places the saga of Coxey’s Army in its historical context as a chapter in the history of American reform and among the key events that defined the Gilded Age. Readers of Coxey’s Army will find that Alexander has woven together a satisfying blend of colorful narrative and serious analysis of how yesterday’s seemingly crackpot proposals later became a favored solution to massive unemployment such as took place during the Great Depression of the 1930s.
Interestingly, there is one source that neither Alexander nor I knew about when we wrote our respective books on Coxey’s Army: an unpublished autobiography written by Coxey’s grandson titled “82 and Still Counting.” A couple of years ago a Coxey descendant mailed me a copy of the thick manuscript. The document is interesting for the personal details it provides about “The General” from the perspective of a close family member. The author recalled, for example, that, as a boy, if he met his grandfather while walking down the streets of Massillon, Ohio, the family’s home town, the old man usually failed to recognize him, Coxey’s mind apparently being focused instead on his many ideas. Indeed, Coxey provided the philosophical impetus behind the march on Washington, but it was his California sidekick, the ever colorful Carl Browne, who turned the event into a lively spectacle beloved and occasionally manipulated by journalists eager to sell newspapers.

Alexander’s distillation of the details of the march and its leading personalities together with a thorough examination of its long-term significance makes for good reading and a worthy addition to John’s Hopkins University Press’s Witness to History book series. In addition to his highly readable text, Alexander thoughtfully includes a detailed map of the route of Coxey’s march, a variety of pictures, detailed notes, and a list of suggestions for further reading.


Reviewer Elizabeth Raymond is professor of history at the University of Nevada, Reno. She has written extensively about a sense of place in the American West and Midwest.

Prairie Visions is a project in historical revival, reintroducing early work by a writer who is not today well known, and reimagining the landscape of the Iowa prairies as they were first being broken. The book re-publishes articles by Iowa author Hamlin Garland that first appeared in American Magazine in 1888. According to biographer Keith Newlin, these articles were Garland’s first published prose works. Later, somewhat reconfigured, they formed the basis of Boy Life on the Prairie, published by Macmillan in 1899 and frequently reprinted. This earliest version of Garland’s boyhood sketches, however, appears here for the first time since 1888. Garland was an important regionalist writer at the turn of the century, perhaps best known for his short story collection Main-Traveled Roads (1891). In that volume he realistically depicted the drudgery
and tedium of the farmer’s existence, a theme that is apparent in the *American Magazine* articles as well.

The six articles in the series focus on the seasonal round of farm work and especially the ways boys participated. While Garland recounts the exhausting demands of cultivating, planting, harvesting, husking corn, and threshing wheat, he also describes the utter freedom and delight of herding cattle or haying on the open prairie that was then still accessible in Mitchell County. He begins with “The Huskin’” in late September and moves through “The Thrashin’” in October and November. He largely ignores winter, when youngsters were presumably occupied with school, ending during “The Voice of Spring,” about mid-March. The year continues with “Between Hay an’ Grass” in early May and “Meadow Memories” of summer haying and thunderstorms. The articles end with “Melons and Early Frosts,” which records the work of plowing for the next crop amid the cold November rains.

The accounts are keenly descriptive and richly observed. The mechanics of corn husking and stacking hay are described at length, with a running commentary on the intermittent ways boys participated in the work. Garland clearly recognizes the differences between the boys’ labor, grueling as it sometimes was, and that of the hired men and farmers. He writes also with an awareness of how alien these things will be to most of his readers, as suggested by his indifferent attempt to render the local dialect in his titles. The editor provides useful annotations of some of the more arcane farm equipment and methods that Garland describes.

The articles are accompanied by a series of 40 contemporary photographs by Jon Morris that depict both farm fields and prairie landscape but do not allude to the work so exhaustingly recounted by Garland in the sketches themselves. They reflect instead the quiet beauty and expansive landscape that Garland also recorded in the *American Magazine* articles. Morris made all the images in Mitchell County, Iowa, where the Garland family was living when the author had the experiences described in the book. A list of plates at the end of the volume identifies the images, but they appear in the text accompanied only by quotations from other Garland works, which sometimes have a relatively obscure relationship to the particular image. The photographs are alternately illustrative and evocative but necessarily depict a landscape far different from the one Garland encountered in the 1870s, when he lived there.

Hamlin Garland scholars will appreciate *Prairie Visions*, informed by Newlin’s graceful introduction to Garland’s themes and method; but it will be of interest as well to a broader readership that includes scholars of nineteenth-century midwestern childhood or farming methods and general readers interested in how one perceptive observer understood his
and his family’s place in the opening of the western prairies. Ultimately, *Prairie Visions* depicts the hard work that produced modern Iowa.


Reviewer John J. Fry is professor of history at Trinity Christian College, Palos Heights, Illinois. An authority on the life and works of Laura Ingalls Wilder, he is also the editor of *Almost Pioneers: One Couple’s Homesteading Adventure in the West* (2013).

Laura Ingalls Wilder’s eight Little House books provide fictionalized accounts of Wilder’s childhood in Wisconsin, Kansas, Minnesota, and South Dakota. They became instant best-sellers when they were published during the 1930s and 1940s, and they remained popular for the rest of the twentieth century, especially when the television series *Little House on the Prairie* aired from 1974 to 1983. It is unclear whether the books are as popular now as they were during the twentieth century, but there is still publishing interest in Wilder. During the past ten years there have appeared new biographies (Pamela Smith Hill’s *Laura Ingalls Wilder: A Writer’s Life* [2007] and Sallie Ketcham’s *Laura Ingalls Wilder: American Writer on the Prairie* [2015]), her final previously unpublished work (*Pioneer Girl*, edited by Hill [2014]), and a memoir of engagement with the books (Wendy McClure’s *The Wilder Life* [2011]). Now William Anderson, the foremost living authority on Wilder, has edited this collection of over 400 letters Wilder wrote between 1894 and her death in 1957. The volume is a worthy addition to the body of Wilder’s work.

The letters are arranged in strict date order and divided chronologically into six chapters. Each chapter begins with an overview of the events in Wilder’s life during that period. Anderson has added a descriptive title to each letter, usually using words from the letter itself. Most letters also have a brief introduction that provides background on the correspondent and/or the context of the letter.

For those interested in how the Little House books were written, this book provides 100 pages of correspondence from Wilder to her daughter, Rose Wilder Lane, between 1936 and 1940, when Wilder was writing several of the Little House books and Lane was editing and revising them for publication. The letters provide a window on the lively collaboration between the two women. At times Wilder, who was used to being able to tell her daughter what to do, had to accept Rose’s advice about writing. There were also occasions, however, when Wilder refused
to budge, and it is clear that her instincts were correct. The efforts of both women combined to make the Little House books memorable.

Other groups of letters are also fascinating. For instance, Wilder wrote to her husband while she took trips to California in 1915 and 1925. Letters from the first trip were published by HarperCollins as *West from Home* in 1974, but letters from the second are published for the first time here. Imagining Wilder at 58 years old riding in a Buick through the mountains of Colorado, Nevada, and California is a treat. There are also multiple letters from Wilder to her literary agent and editors; she argues for more royalties, thanks them for the work they do, and shares news. Finally, the book reproduces dozens of letters she sent to fans of the books who wrote to her. During the last years of her life, she wrote to hundreds of these correspondents.

One wonders if the correspondence could have been organized differently to bring similar letters together. The chapters are also of uneven length; the shortest is only 22 pages, the longest is over 150. Finally, it is unclear why the correspondence between Wilder and Lane is divided into two different chapters.

These are minor concerns, however. This book is a must-read for Wilder scholars and for anyone who loves the Little House books.


Reviewer Matthew J. Margis recently earned a Ph.D. in history from Iowa State University. His dissertation focuses on the National Guard’s development as both a social and military organization during the Progressive Era.

During World War I, a young corporal from Iowa personified the role of “embedded journalist” decades before that term existed. In August 1917 the U.S. Army officially drafted the National Guard into the American Expeditionary Force, and the Third Iowa Infantry Regiment became the 168th U.S. Infantry Regiment as part of the newly created 42nd Infantry Division. Francis Webster enlisted in the Iowa National Guard shortly after the United States declared war on Germany. He served as a bugler in the Third Iowa Infantry Regiment’s machine gun company. In addition to drawing illustrations about life in the trenches for publication in an Iowa newspaper, Webster maintained an extensive correspondence with his family and friends, and he kept a detailed diary. For _Somewhere Over There_, Darrek Orwig painstakingly edited Webster’s letters, diary, and artwork.
Somewhere Over There follows Webster’s journey from his enlistment in the Iowa National Guard until his untimely death in October 1918. Orwig’s edited version of Webster’s writings and drawings offers valuable insights into an American soldier’s life during World War I. Like thousands of other young men, Webster gave up his civilian life to serve his country in the trenches. His story reflects broader trends related to the World War I combat experience. Furthermore, Webster’s service record closely mirrors the Great War’s general combat narrative, and his artwork provides interesting and often humorous glimpses into the daily life of a National Guardsman who fought in the trenches, witnessed the horrors of modern warfare, recovered in hospitals from exposure to poisonous gas, and suffered a mortal wound during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. This book recounts Webster’s experiences through his own words, illustrations, and private collection of watercolors within a historical framework.

Overall, Orwig does an excellent job of providing background information from both primary and secondary sources. Readers will appreciate the ways he introduces each chapter and provides historical context throughout the narrative. Orwig also meticulously transcribes Webster’s writings in chronological order and uses Webster’s own illustrations to give life to his words. Although the editor includes insightful letters Webster wrote to his family, he leaves out numerous letters between Webster and his friends and former fiancée. Orwig also omits letters written to Webster from his parents and brother. These omissions are understandable because including them would vastly increase the length of the book, but they could provide deeper looks into Webster’s personality.

This book will be of interest to anyone looking for an American soldier’s firsthand account of the daily life of an American soldier during World War I, as well as one soldier’s political ideology and social sensibilities. As primary sources, Webster’s letters, diary, and artwork are valuable for scholars looking to expand their collections or their own studies. Webster’s story will also appeal to anyone interested in Iowa history. Webster spent his formative years in Iowa, graduated from Des Moines College, and served as a school superintendent in Deloit, Iowa, prior to enlisting in the National Guard. Webster carried a rural Iowa mentality with him into the war, and his letters and diary reflect his background. Webster’s artwork also appealed directly to an Iowa audience and often contained elements of Iowa pride and humorous illustrations. Ultimately, this work offers a glimpse into the life of a National Guardsman during World War I, and the book places Webster’s narrative in the larger context of American involvement in the war.

Reviewer H. Roger Grant is Kathryn and Calhoun Lemon Professor and Centennial Professor of history at Clemson University. A prolific author of books and articles about railroad and transportation history, his most recent books are Railroaders without Borders: A History of the Railroad Development Corporation (2015), and Electric Interurbans and the American People (2016).

The Henry County Historic Preservation Commission, sponsor of Abandoned Towns of Henry County and Unincorporated Towns of Henry County, has created a third title that deals with the history of this southeastern Iowa county, specifically its transportation history, covering four core areas: water, roads, railroads, and aviation. This product of the collective efforts of the Henry County organization is a charming review of its countywide transportation past. Although coverage is a mishmash of original documents, remembrances, and commentaries and not always structured chronologically, the book offers a good picture of how residents shattered the tyranny of distance, providing a microcosm of Hawkeye State transport history.

Water never became a practical local option. The only stream of importance was the Skunk River, a shallow waterway that emptied into the Mississippi River near Burlington. Yet during the frontier period discussions took place about making this stream navigable for steamboat traffic. But it would require the costly construction of a slack-water canal system, something that had been successful on several other midwestern streams.

Roads became the sensible response. Prior to the Good Roads movement after 1900, public roads were almost universally poor. Still, the county in the 1850s claimed an all-weather plank road that linked Mount Pleasant with Burlington. Although area enthusiasts proposed similar wooden roads, they never became much more than paper projects due to their high construction and maintenance costs. Then, as automobile and truck ownership expanded, better roads appeared. Not only were the principal routes marked, but in the 1920s some were paved, including a bizarre privately financed highway known as the Coleman Road. Ultimately, much better highways served the county, highlighted by the recent upgrading of U.S. 218, the “Avenue of the Saints.” As major roads improved, county residents also benefited from intercity bus operations, mostly between the 1930s and 1950s.

The Railway Age did not miss Henry County. By the end of the nineteenth century, steel rails served virtually every community. The Chicago, Burlington & Quincy eventually dominated, with its historic
main line slicing through the county on an east-west axis. The Peoria, Illinois, stem of the Minneapolis & St. Louis also served the northern part of the county. But as early as the 1930s line abandonments began, resulting from increasing highway competition, eventually leaving only the high-density Burlington main line to serve the county with freight and Amtrak service.

Resilient to the water transport, aviation never gained much local importance. There were early balloon ascensions and aerial “barnstormers,” entertainment that morphed into pleasure flights and commercial agricultural services. Landing strips appeared, the most notable being development of a small, modern airport in Mount Pleasant after World War II.

The historic preservation commission has created an unusual type of localized transportation work. Readers should enjoy its efforts. Perhaps this approach will inspire others to consider a similar study of their county’s transportation heritage.


Reviewer Scott E. Randolph is assistant professor of business administration at the University of Redlands in southern California. His research and writing have focused on railroads during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era.

Much like its prairie neighbors to the west, railroads made Illinois. Chicago remains the most important railroad hub in North America, and the railroads that traversed the state provided the critical infrastructure that linked the commodity crops of the Great Plains; the coal, dairy, and manufacturing of the Midwest; the timber and international trade of the Pacific Coast; and the cotton and timber of the South with the markets, specialty manufacturing, ports, and capital of the Northeast and New England. Simon Cordery chronicles this relationship from the 1830s to the present with an emphasis on the period prior to 1945. Readers familiar with the two volumes on Iowa railroads in the Railroads Past and Present series produced by Indiana University Press will find much to enjoy in this volume on railroading in Illinois. Like other books in the series, *The Iron Road in the Prairie State* is intended for railroad enthusiasts and general readers rather than for an academic audience. The book is well documented, but the author does not attempt to break new ground in his analysis, concentrating instead on providing a concise and eminently readable survey of the topic.
This is a solid example of traditional, institutional railroad history. Author Simon Cordery possesses a detailed command of the extensive literature on the subject, as his endnotes reveal, and has a particular talent for concise and effective descriptions of the complex financial and organizational histories of the many railroads that served Illinois. Particularly well executed is his narration of the early twentieth-century financial manipulations of the Rock Island lines by the Reid-Moore syndicate, perhaps the most egregious of the stock-watering, “robber baron” stories. Cordery lays out clearly the effects of this chicanery on the company’s long-term well-being. Likewise, his extended discussion of the life cycle of passenger service in the state, spread throughout the book, is detailed and sympathetic. He does not neglect the state’s many interurban railways and smaller carriers, such as the Chicago Great Western, but devotes the majority of the book to the largest regional and transcontinental systems.

The experiences of the passengers, investors, shippers, and citizens whose lives the railroads touched are largely absent from this institutional history. Cordery does dedicate one chapter to railroad labor, but the discussion focuses entirely on the nineteenth century and is generally sympathetic to the viewpoint of management. There are passing references in later chapters but no substantive development of the experience of railroad workers after 1900 aside from a discussion of the 1922 shop workers’ strike. In a state where by 1900 some 5 percent of workers labored for the railroads, more attention to their experience would have broadened the book’s usefulness. For instance, a discussion of the massive reduction in the state’s railroad labor force that began after 1960 as a consequence of mergers and the rapid demise of passenger services and branch lines would have provided important local context for the larger tapestry of railroading nationally.

Given the otherwise even-handed chronological coverage of the period through 1945, the dizzying changes faced by the railroads in subsequent decades receive comparatively little discussion. The rapid changes in Illinois railroading after the Penn Central and Rock Island bankruptcies receive only a few pages despite being, in turn, the largest corporate bankruptcy to that date and the largest railroad liquidation of all time. There is no discussion of the emergence of new regional and short-line railroads in the wake of those bankruptcies, or of the Staggers Rail Act, the creation of Conrail, or the merger wave of the 1980s and 1990s. A more robust discussion of those changes and the resulting line abandonments that ensued would round out the book’s usefulness for those interested in the contemporary railroad industry. Railroad history in general desperately needs a more contemporary emphasis.
The volume contains a fine selection of black-and-white illustrations, although the photo reproductions are generally too light. The images favor less well-known photographs from the collections of institutions such as the Library of Congress, Lake Forest College, and the Center for Railroad Photography and Art. Maps are interspersed throughout, an important visual aid in a state with a bewildering number of railroads and routes, especially at the turn of the twentieth century. A follow-up map showing the remaining routes at the time of publication would have been a nice addition.

Overall, these minor complaints notwithstanding, this is a useful addition to the series. It will be of interest to those who possess even a passing interest in the railway industry.


Reviewer Thomas Gubbels is associate professor at Lincoln University. He is a former senior historic preservation specialist with the Missouri Department of Transportation who has written extensively on Missouri’s highway system.

Travelers along Interstate 35 through Iowa rarely slow down enough to notice the landscape around them. However, if drivers left the interstate and instead traveled along U.S. Highways 65 and 69, they would encounter a roadside that still has much in common with early to mid-twentieth-century Iowa. The first true “inter-state” highways were not established in 1956 by the National Defense Highway Act or in 1926 by the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads. As Lyell Henry vividly recounts in The Jefferson Highway: Blazing the Way from Winnipeg to New Orleans, beginning in 1915 local Iowa officials and business leaders began to map out, mark, and create an all-weather highway across the state and the entire nation. Their creation, the Jefferson Highway, transformed the countryside and represented the achievement of a uniquely progressive vision that helped Iowa move forward into the twentieth century.

Henry begins his book by analyzing the core values shared by the men who created the Jefferson Highway Association (JHA), the organization responsible for the creation of this early twentieth-century trail system. Good roads advocates such as Edwin Meredith and Thomas McDonald called on Iowans to join them in an effort to improve the state’s roads and connect them to the outside world. Although some highway advocates may have been motivated by personal profit, most Iowa supporters of the Jefferson Highway, Henry argues, shared a
common vision of an all-weather highway traveling from Winnipeg to New Orleans as a concrete monument to progressive improvement. Within 20 years of its creation, the JHA had replaced a confusing, haphazard system of dirt roads with a mostly paved highway crossing the entire nation “from Pine to Palm.” Supporters saw the Jefferson Highway, marked with a series of colorful blue and white signs, as a north-south counterpart to the better-known Lincoln Highway. The Jefferson Highway was ultimately absorbed into the federal highway system in the 1920s and 1930s, and today the federal government no longer officially recognizes a “Jefferson Highway.”

Although the Jefferson Highway technically no longer exists, segments of the original roadway, along with many structures and buildings from the early twentieth century, can still be found throughout Iowa. In the second half of his book, Henry presents a turn-by-turn tour of the Jefferson Highway. As he traces the route of the highway, he vividly describes roadside features from the early twentieth century, including historic hotels, cafés, barns, and other structures that are still extant. Henry clearly shows that while it may no longer officially exist, people can still travel along and experience the original Jefferson Highway. Perhaps someday a GIS program or detailed online map of the original Jefferson Highway route will be created as a supplement to Henry’s book to guide travelers interested in driving the Jefferson Highway through Iowa and beyond.

Overall, The Jefferson Highway marks an important contribution to the history of Iowa in the early twentieth century. Although faced with a dearth of official sources (official records of the JHA no longer exist), Henry delved into contemporary magazine and newspaper accounts to create a vivid portrait of the process by which the Jefferson Highway came into being. He also makes excellent use of historical maps to uncover the original route of the Jefferson Highway, including several unpaved segments that are still accessible today. His detailed descriptions of historic buildings and structures also contribute to the field of commercial archaeology by showing how the changing character of roadside attractions and accommodations reflected changes in twentieth-century life.

The one quibble that may be had with Henry’s arguments is his claim that progressive optimism rather than potential profits motivated the creators of the Jefferson Highway. Local leaders and road boosters outside Iowa often fought desperately to ensure that their communities would be included along the marked route of the Jefferson Highway. As a result, numerous spurs were added to the trail, and the highway failed to take the most direct course possible across the nation. Contem-
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temporary magazines and newspapers may have featured lofty language, but the harsh battles over the highway’s route indicate that economic gain also played a role in the creation and routing of the Jefferson Highway. Henry rightly concludes that further research into the Jefferson Highway is needed to trace the efforts to mark and construct the route within the other states through which it passed. Such research should build on the solid foundation laid by Henry and someday lead to a comprehensive history of the Jefferson Highway.


Reviewer Michael F. Magliari is professor of history at California State University, Chico. His work on rural radicalism includes “Populist Historiography Post Hicks: Current Needs and Future Directions,” *Agricultural History* (2008); and “The Populist Vision: Modern or Traditional?” *Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era* (2009).

The meteoric rise of the North Dakota Nonpartisan League (NPL) is one of the most astounding episodes in the annals of American radicalism. Within two years of its sudden appearance in 1915, the angry wheat farmers who flocked to the NPL seized command of North Dakota’s Republican Party and captured control of the state government in Bismarck. Over the next six years, from 1916 to 1921, three-term Governor Lynn J. Frazier and his supporting cast of NPL legislators implemented nearly every plank in their visionary platform, a document that combined the most appealing reforms previously championed by North Dakota’s Populist and Socialist parties.

As an economic satellite of Minneapolis and St. Paul, North Dakota had always been subordinate to powerful corporate interests based in Minnesota’s Twin Cities. Along with the Northern Pacific, the Great Northern, and two other domineering railroads, Twin Cities banks, flour mills, and grain elevators monopolized the marketing of all wheat grown in the region. Statehood in 1889 had done nothing to change that; neither had the struggles of farmer-owned cooperatives sponsored by the Grange, the Farmers’ Alliance, the Farmers’ Union, and the American Society of Equity. All fell short, as did the efforts of those who opted for radical third-party politics in the Populist and Socialist movements.

The NPL emerged out of those earlier agrarian crusades. Aiming to liberate North Dakota’s wheat growers from the stranglehold of corporate monopolies, the NPL called for the establishment of state-owned banks, flour mills, and grain elevators. It also demanded a state-run sys-
tem of grain grading, publicly funded hail insurance, and tax exemption for farm improvements. All this, and much more, was signed into law by Governor Frazier following the epic legislative sessions of 1917 and 1919.

The amazing spectacle of an ostensibly Republican administration implementing a Populist-Socialist program resulted from the NPL’s defining strategy. In 1907 North Dakota adopted the direct primary system, which enabled voters to nominate the candidates that their respective parties fielded for public office. For frustrated Socialists and former Populists who had concluded that third parties were hopeless causes in America’s formidable two-party system, direct primaries created opportunities for radical outsiders to move indoors. Nominally “nonpartisan,” the North Dakota NPL effectively constituted a new third party that mobilized like-minded Republicans, Democrats, and Socialists to vote as a bloc in the state’s GOP primaries. The stunning results triggered a rapid expansion of the NPL among farmers throughout the American West and the Canadian Great Plains.

The dramatic story of the Nonpartisan League has been well told by numerous historians, including Theodore Saloutos, Elwyn Robinson, Edward Blackorby, Larry Remele, and, most notably, Robert Morlan, whose _Political Prairie Fire: The Nonpartisan League, 1915–1922_ (1955) remains a classic. Their accounts, however, focus almost exclusively on North Dakota. While understandable given North Dakota’s centrality in the NPL saga, there has long been a need for a book-length examination of the NPL as a national, or even international, movement. After all, as Michael Lansing points out in his new work, the NPL at its peak claimed nearly 250,000 members in 13 states plus the Canadian provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan. Between 1917 and 1923, the NPL maintained a national headquarters in St. Paul from which it launched vigorous recruiting drives that tested the appeal and adaptability of the NPL beyond its home turf. However, despite winning some impressive victories in state legislative races, particularly in Minnesota, Montana, and Idaho, nowhere did the NPL come close to matching its achievements in North Dakota.

The reasons remain unclear. Regrettably, Lansing never delivers on his promise to provide a “North American” coverage of the NPL. His concentration remains squarely centered on North Dakota, and he offers only scattered, uneven, and cursory glimpses of NPL activities in other states and provinces. For no single locale does he conduct the complete and systematic analysis of existing economic and political conditions required for a persuasive explanation of NPL performance.

The shortcomings of his book are well illustrated by his skimpy treatment of Iowa, where the NPL failed to take hold, despite winning
the support of James Pierce, the influential editor of the *Iowa Homestead*, and enrolling 15,000 members in 1918. Why the NPL subsequently faltered in a state that would soon send Smith Brookhart to the U.S. Senate remains a mystery that Lansing cannot convincingly explain in the scant two pages he devotes to the Hawkeye State. In the end, Lansing has disappointingly little new to say about his fascinating topic, either in Iowa or anywhere else in North America.


Nearly three-quarters of a century after Franklin D. Roosevelt’s death historians are still struggling to make sense of the New Deal. Was FDR’s reform program more success than failure? Did it possess any coherence at all or was it just a hodgepodge of programs slapped together hurriedly to confront a frightening economic collapse? Did its implementation signal a decisive break with the political economy that had prevailed in the United States since its founding in the eighteenth century? Was it simply a form of corporate liberalism, as New Left revisionists insisted, that substituted modest changes to forestall radical alterations at a time when a thoroughgoing transformation seemed possible? Or, somewhere in between, was it a “halfway revolution” that established a new liberal consensus suitable for an essentially cautious population seeking a modicum of change to preserve an essentially healthy economy temporarily thrown off its game? In *The Great Exception*, Jefferson Cowie presents another possibility and offers a fresh, original look at a perennial historical conundrum.

The Andrew J. Nathanson Professor at Cornell University’s School of Industrial and Labor Relations and the author of several books on twentieth-century U.S. history, Cowie uses a wide lens to examine the meaning of the New Deal. He shows how government policies of the 1930s charted a new course and how those departures differed significantly from what followed after the 1970s. Reflecting the book’s title, he posits that the reforms crafted during the Roosevelt administration constituted a singular exception to the manner in which government operated before and after the crises of the Great Depression and World War II. The remarkable expansion of the federal government’s role in
American life, notably to the benefit of workers and their families, transformed economic institutions, altered class relations, commenced the realignment of the nation’s two political parties, and raised important questions about traditional values. Most important, the nation thrived as never before during a brief era of equity that spanned the immediate post–World War II decades. Wages rose to unprecedented levels, trade unions thrived, consumerism scaled new heights, economic inequality declined, and economists spoke glowingly of capitalism’s triumph. If white male industrial workers fared better during those years than women and minorities who remained consigned to the margins of the economic system, residual gains undeniably brought the benefits of American prosperity to all wage earners. And the legal breakthroughs of the 1950s and 1960s began to dispel the barriers that had cordoned some groups off from the societal mainstream. Yet for all its profound influence, the author maintains, the New Deal failed to establish a permanent welfare state. Even during the halcyon days of the postwar era, the New Deal edifice rested upon a fragile foundation. The beneficial changes engendered by the path-breaking legislation of 1935–1938 amounted to a temporary respite from less salutary traditions in the nation encompassing race, social class, immigration, individualism, and culture. Historic constraints resurfaced, and the inherent weaknesses of the New Deal coalition mounted during the 1970s. In this view, what has been dubbed the Reagan Revolution might better be termed the Reagan Restoration.

More extended historical essay than monograph, The Great Exception is a sophisticated reinterpretation of a crucial period in American history that readers will find as helpful for contextualizing recent developments as for understanding the events of the 1930s. Clearly written and cogently argued, the book should engage historians, journalists, and all readers interested in comprehending the nation’s current situation—and in forecasting its future. The author’s view of the New Deal as a great exception to the conservative politics that held sway during most of the twentieth century in the United States suggests that the imminent return of a period when collective economic rights flourished seems unlikely. The resurgence of the values and ideas triumphant throughout most of the nation’s history, dormant for a large portion of the last century, has resulted in what Cowie sees as a new Gilded Age of economic inequality and unrestrained individualism. Resurrecting the ethos of the New Deal, which he believes led to a golden age of social responsibility and economic security in the United States, will be possible only if the American people comprehend the influences that first created and later undermined the celebrated reform period.

Reviewer Brian Q. Cannon is professor of history at Brigham Young University. His publications include Remaking the Agrarian Dream: The New Deal’s Rural Resettlement Program in the Mountain West (1996).

In this stimulating study of New Deal America, theater scholar Ann Folino White explores protests, exhibits, and a theatrical play about the supply and price of food. White distinctively interprets her historical evidence, drawn from careful research in 11 archives, through the lens of performance studies. Although the book does not focus on Iowa, it offers detailed case studies of midwestern protest movements and examines reactions to government food policies that affected Iowans.

White begins by scrutinizing theatrical elements in exhibits sponsored by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) at the 1933–34 Chicago World’s Fair. One exhibit titled “The Shadow of Surplus” attributed low farm income to agricultural surpluses, essentially blaming farmers’ success as producers for their low income. That exhibit was replaced after a few months partly because the fair’s assistant administrator believed it was overly negative. The replacement exhibit celebrated the income-boosting impact of production controls instituted by the New Deal.

Next, the author analyzes a milk strike organized by the Wisconsin Cooperative Milk Pool in 1933. When strikers stopped milk trucks and forcibly dumped their contents to drive up prices, local deputies and the National Guard deployed tear gas. White highlights performative aspects of the strike, including publicity leading up to it and the presence of thousands of spectators. Strikers billed themselves as the heirs of the American Revolution and melodramatically vilified processing corporations that profited from the low milk prices farmers received. News reporters resorted to stock, opposing portraits of strike organizer Walter Singler and Governor Albert Schmedeman. Singler was valorized as a skilled orator and athlete while the governor was depicted as small and weak. Descriptions of the weapons—tear gas and nightsticks for the state and rocks for the protestors—“spectacularized the repressive power of the state” (103). The evidence presented supports White’s interpretation, but it comes from only three newspapers. Using competing newspapers from Madison and Milwaukee might have enabled the author to uncover a more varied media treatment of the strike.
In another richly textured, provocative case study that documents the leadership of an important Michigan activist, Mary Zuk, White analyzes a meat boycott organized by women in Hamtramck in 1935 to protest New Deal inflationary policies. White pinpoints theatrical and rhetorical elements of the protest, arguing that the women shrewdly adopted the persona of “housewives” who needed inexpensive meat to satisfy their husbands’ nutritional needs. Meanwhile, opponents dismissed the protest as pure theatrics, or “fake.”

White next examines a 1939 demonstration in which 1,300 Missouri sharecroppers protested New Deal limitations on cotton production that unintentionally incentivized landlords to evict sharecroppers. Critics alleged that the protests were a charade organized by unions; others identified the demonstration as authentic “human drama” (155). White detects artifice and sleight of hand behind the protest, pointing out that the participants received provisions by night “in a manner analogous to masterful stage management,” thereby allowing the protestors to continue their “performance” (172).

A final case study involves the Federal Theatre Project’s (FTP) play *Triple-A Plowed Under*, which premiered in 1936. White surveys the 26 scenes, which dramatized protests, including a meat strike, a milk strike, and the unionization of sharecroppers.

White argues that participants in these protests and productions demonstrated “sophisticated understanding of theatrical traditions” and carefully incorporated “theatrical elements from casting to dialogue to props to scenery” (4). They employed “theatrical strategies” in their “representation” of grievances and viewpoints, as did their opponents (13). She admits that even the most carefully scripted protests could spin out of control, though.

For historians, this interpretive approach works best in cases where memos or internal correspondence allow White to document organizers’ motives and strategies, as is the case in the USDA’s World’s Fair exhibit and the FTP play. Unfortunately, documentation of the plans and aims of the milk, meat, and sharecropping protesters is sparse. As White observes, acting is “intentional” and strategic in its “dissembling” (125); it is a carefully calculated performance. White vacillates between suggesting that the roles and props adopted by protesters reflected intentional acting and acknowledging that they might have constituted “unconscious performance” (125). Similarly, she is unable to determine whether the media hype leading up to the Wisconsin Milk Strike was “intentional or not” (78). Thus, White’s book demonstrates that analyses of politics and protests through the lens of performance studies can be both wonderfully suggestive and highly conjectural.

Reviewer Paul Emory Putz is a doctoral candidate in history at Baylor University. His research focuses on urban Protestant reform movements in Iowa, Nebraska, and Kansas during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, addressing intersecting themes of religion, region, race, class, urbanization, and consumer culture.

Coming 50 years after Herbert Gutman’s essay “Protestantism and the American Labor Movement: The Christian Spirit in the Gilded Age” in the American Historical Review, The Pew and the Picket Line represents a full flowering of Gutman’s suggestion that historians pay more attention to the religious lives of working people. To be sure, some historians in the intervening years—such as Ken Fones-Wolf, who writes the foreword to this book—have heeded Gutman’s call. But more often than not, labor and religious historians have operated on separate tracks. With The Pew and the Picket Line, Christopher Cantwell, Heath Carter, and Janine Giordano Drake bring together an impressive group of (mostly) younger scholars in an attempt to demonstrate that “there is not a history of religion in America that is not also a history of labor . . . [and] there is no history of labor in America that is not also a history of religion” (12). Along with linking labor and religious history, this volume’s ten essays emphasize the contingency and complexity of working-class religious life. Puncturing broad claims about the relationship between Christianity and working people—for example, the notion that religion served as a form of social control imposed on the laboring masses, or that the working classes turned to religion out of desperation—the essayists refuse to make any overarching claims about working-class religious life except to say, “It depends” (13).

Collectively, the chronological focus of the essays ranges from the early nineteenth century through the 1970s. The majority, however—six of the nine—are set in the years following the Great Depression. The emphasis on place is another shared characteristic; eight are historical case studies set in a specific city or region. And, as the title of the book makes clear, all of the essays focus on Christianity. Despite these shared themes, the book covers a wide range of people and places. Three essays (by Erik Gellman, Alison Collis Greene, and Kerry Pimblott) give substantial attention to African Americans; a fourth (by Matthew Pehl) includes them within the narrative. Latinos/as are primary subjects for Brett Hendrickson and Arlene Sánchez-Walsh. And places stretching from Rhode Island to California and Detroit to San Antonio are given prominence.
Scholars interested in the Midwest will be pleased to see four essays connected to the region. Matthew Pehl looks at Detroit autoworkers in the 1950s, exploring how the experience of industrial work shaped their religious practices. Kerry Pimblott uses Cairo, Illinois, to show how Black Power activism relied heavily on the town’s black churches. Erik Gellman also highlights the religious dimensions of Black Power activism, examining the 1960s life of Chicago’s Urban Training Center for Christian Mission. Jarod Roll, on the other hand, looks at a more rural setting: the mining town of Galena, Kansas, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He explores the “belief world” of the town’s miners and how their faith in the myths of capitalism shaped the development of Pentecostalism. Dan McKanan’s essay is somewhat connected to the Midwest as well: it provides a close reading of the popular fiction of George Lippard (a Pennsylvanian) and Ignatius Donnelly (a Minnesotan). But McKanan’s piece is largely devoid of a sense of place, striking a bit of a discordant note compared to the other essays in the book.

Essay collections have a negative reputation in some quarters; they can be perceived as superfluous or incoherent, lacking thematic unity. But *The Pew and the Picket Line* is an example of a collection done right. With an outstanding introductory essay on the historiography of religion and labor by Cantwell, Carter, and Drake, along with cutting-edge research throughout the rest of the book, this collection should be essential reading for historians of American religion and labor. With substantial attention given to communities in Illinois, Kansas, and Michigan, it should also be of interest to scholars of the Midwest.


Reviewer Breanne Robertson is a historian at Marine Corps University. She has published two articles in the *Annals of Iowa* (2011 and 2015) about New Deal murals.

*Thomas Hart Benton: Discoveries and Interpretations* provides a retrospective look at art historian Henry Adams’s career-long fascination with Missouri muralist Thomas Hart Benton (1889–1975). One of American Regionalism’s “Big Three,” along with Grant Wood and John Steuart Curry, Benton painted narrative scenes of midwestern history, mythology, and modern life that resonated with Depression-era audiences; in December 1934 he became the first American artist to appear on the cover of *Time* magazine. Yet Benton also regularly defied expectations and provoked critics with candid depictions of controversial subject
matter, such as the lynching of an African American at the Missouri State Capitol, and incendiary rhetoric about the art world establishment. In 1935 Benton famously swapped insults with American modernist Stewart Davis in the pages of *Art Front*, and he was later fired from his teaching post in Kansas City for making derogatory remarks about the curators at the Nelson-Atkins Museum of Art.

Adams began working on Benton in 1986, when he joined the Nelson-Atkins Museum of Art as curator of American art. Among his earliest exhibitions for the Kansas City museum was a major retrospective of Benton’s work to commemorate the centennial of the artist’s birth. The landmark show helped to restore popular and, albeit more slowly, critical appreciation for Benton’s homegrown modernism, which fell out of favor after World War II. Since that time, Adams has authored three book-length studies on Benton: *Thomas Hart Benton: An American Original* (1989), *Thomas Hart Benton: Drawing from Life* (1990), and *Tom and Jack: The Intertwined Lives of Thomas Hart Benton and Jackson Pollock* (2009). This latest volume features 13 essays drawn from previous public lectures, unpublished writings, and hard-to-find articles in popular magazines and small-run exhibition catalogs.

According to Adams, the collection reflects a historical moment when Benton and his art stood “at odds with the approved direction of modern painting toward ever-greater abstraction and with an art world that was rigidly controlled by critics and dealers in New York” (ix). The 54-page introduction, titled “Playing with Fire: The Risks and Rewards of Studying Thomas Hart Benton,” presents a meandering narrative that integrates Benton’s biography with Adams’s professional development against an evolving field of study. Prominent scholars and critics appear both as heroes and villains, and Adams employs provocative language to describe his decades-long struggle to bring acclaim to Benton’s art. He asserts that “even today, to some New York art critics [Benton] is still the number-one bad boy of American art, a kind of apostate, even a Satanic figure, because of the way he turned his back on modern art” (3).

Now a professor at Case Western Reserve University, Adams seems still on a campaign to overturn critical aspersions that cast Benton as a bigoted, reactionary, and antimodern artist. Adams tracks the precipitous rise and fall of Benton’s career through individual case studies covering topics ranging from country music to art market fakes to representations of race and place. Despite their varied tone and approach, the essays cohere around several key arguments. First, Adams aims to rehabilitate popular assumptions about Benton’s political views by discrediting his adversaries, highlighting his ethnically and racially diverse social circle, and demonstrating a steadfast antifascist agenda
in his teaching and his art. Second, Adams strives to situate Benton alongside such Missouri cultural luminaries as Mark Twain and George Caleb Bingham, arguing that Benton has been unfairly vilified for following a similar approach to local subject matter and popular culture. Finally, Adams maintains that Benton translated the expressive color and pulsating rhythm of Synchromism, an avant-garde style of American modernism, into representational form and regional subject matter. It is in this same commitment to rhythm that Benton’s influence can be discerned in the paintings of his most famous pupil, Abstract Expressionist Jackson Pollock.

Adams is at his best when he allows his breadth of professional experience to guide his analysis. In addition to university teaching and museum work, Adams has consulted for galleries and auction houses; the essays derived from these activities—his in-depth study of Benton’s artistic activities at Martha’s Vineyard, his insightful analysis of Benton’s technical process in drawing and printmaking, and his illuminating discussion of authentication and connoisseurship—not only add to our understanding of Benton, but also make a meaningful contribution to a scholarly field that too often excludes dealers, collectors, and other actors and aspects of the art market. Nevertheless, the desire to present a collection of essays that can each operate independently has resulted in a volume that is both longer and more repetitive than necessary. Typographical errors are also frequent enough to be distracting.

Written over the course of three decades, the book is less a reinterpretation of Benton’s art than it is an album of scholarly snapshots that tell the story, in aggregate, about the intellectual journey of a single scholar within the changing field of art history. As Adams himself explains, it was precisely because “attitudes about Benton and his art are going through a dramatic shift; the old animosity toward his work seems to be fading” that the time had arrived to assemble his writings on Benton for publication (x). As this backward-looking impetus for the collection suggests, some chapters seem outdated in methodology and in argument, particularly when compared to the rapidly expanding literature through which contemporary readers can learn about Benton and his art. Interested readers will want to supplement Adams’s book with the exhibition catalog American Epics: Thomas Hart Benton and Hollywood (2015), which contains essays by prominent art historians and covers much of the same ground as Adams’s book. Other publications of note include Erika Doss’s Benton, Pollock, and the Politics of Modernism (1991), Justin Wolff’s biography Thomas Hart Benton: A Life (2012), and Leo Mazow’s award-winning Thomas Hart Benton and the American Sound (2012).

Reviewer Thomas Leslie, AIA, is Pickard Chilton Professor in Architecture at Iowa State University. His research and writing have focused on the integration of building sciences and arts both historically and in contemporary practice.

Residents of Iowa’s cultural, economic, and political capital take for granted an astonishing array of architecture. Since Benjamin Franklin Allen commissioned Chicago architect William Boyington to design Terrace Hill in 1869, Des Moines residents have hired leading architects, many of whom have done some of their best work there. This tradition has also inspired a parallel history of home-grown design excellence, creating a collection of buildings and a culture of architectural practice that is the equal of any comparably sized city in the country.

David Gebhard and Gerald Mansheim’s Buildings of Iowa (1993) catalogued Des Moines’s notable buildings for the Society of Architectural Historians’ Buildings of the United States series, but a focused history of Des Moines’s architecture has been lacking. Chicago-based architectural writer and journalist Jay Pridmore has risen to the task with Des Moines Architecture and Design, 12 essays that thematically document the city’s best—and best-known—buildings while providing a succinct narrative of the city’s development itself.

Beginning with Terrace Hill, Pridmore shows how the city established a tradition of high-minded civic and residential design, how influences from Chicago’s 1893 Columbian Exhibition found fertile territory here, and how civic classicism was challenged by both Prairie Style and Modernist ideas. Throughout, progressive clients, a thriving economy, and visionary city government allowed some of the Midwest’s finest architects to shape Des Moines.

But the city’s own designers soon equaled these works. Proudfoot and Bird produced classical monuments that were matched by commercial buildings of exceptional quality from Liebbe, Nourse, and Rasmussen. Homes around Grand Avenue matched the splendor and quality of the Midwest’s larger cities, and Des Moines’s investment in architecture was extended to its religious buildings; Pridmore devotes one essay to the acropolis of church buildings overlooking the city’s financial center known as “Piety Hill.”

Only after World War II, however, did Des Moines gain internationally recognized architecture. The Art Center’s original building by Eliel and Eero Saarinen (1948) inspired other institutions in the city to seek out world-class architects. Drake University hired the younger Saarinen in 1949 for buildings that are among his most thoughtful
works. Drake and a local bank hired Mies van der Rohe in the 1960s, and the Art Center continued its patronage by hiring I. M. Pei and, in the 1980s, Richard Meier. Again, these were joined by local work of similar quality. Chick Herbert, Ray Crites, and Brooks, Borg, and Skiles all combined international modernism with pragmatism and restraint; if it is possible to realize a modest monumentality, Herbert’s Civic Center (1975) toes this delicate line with grace and power.

Pridmore’s approach is admirable for its ability to show that these buildings were not isolated drawing-board exercises but rather were the result of social, financial, and cultural connections that were fostered by Des Moines’s tightly knit business and civic community. He explains these buildings gracefully and legibly, and his choice of themes is apt, covering nearly every aspect of the city’s design history. Readers may wish for more emphasis on the vernacular, as Pridmore’s emphasis is on the monuments and mansions that exemplify the city’s outstanding moments and characters. And scholars may regret the absence of footnotes, which might have inspired others to delve more deeply into some of the building histories that Pridmore tells so lucidly. Finally, any reader contemplating a driving tour will need some supplemental research to place these buildings into geographical context; the city’s relationship to its rivers and its hinterland has influenced parks and infrastructure that could have formed an additional essay or map.

Still, Pridmore has written what will deservedly be the standard history of the city’s architecture. It will be a vital source for any student of the city, and it lives up to the rich legacy of built work produced there over the last 150 years. Gebhard and Mansheim’s guidebook will still find a place in the back seat of any windshield historian’s car, but it has, after 20 years, found a worthy companion that ties its catalog of Des Moines’s buildings into readable, enlightening, and richly elucidating essays.


Reviewer Catherine Stewart is professor of history at Cornell College. She is the author of Long Past Slavery: Representing Race in the Federal Writers’ Project (2016).

Eric Bennett’s Workshops of Empire has an ambitious agenda: to prove that the writing programs that flourished in the wake of World War II, particularly at the University of Iowa and Stanford University, were the result of Cold War objectives. Bennett aims to identify the various intel-
lectual, artistic, and ideological currents that contributed to the emergence of MFA programs. But he has an even more audacious goal: to historicize and, by so doing, expose how today’s creative writing programs continue to “reflect the intellectual shape and the institutional form of the creative writing programs of the early Cold War” (172). There is an irony at the heart of Bennett’s argument that he doesn’t want readers to miss, namely, that programs that strove to inculcate a literary style that espoused humanist values of individualism in order to challenge totalitarian group think, instead squelched individual expression.

Bennett strives to differentiate his work from Mark McGurl’s groundbreaking *The Program Era* (2009), which established the study of creative writing programs as an essential part of American literary history. *Workshops of Empire* brings something new to this emerging field by unearthing and persuasively documenting how the genesis of writing programs like Iowa’s and Stanford’s cannot be understood without examining their role in the Cold War and their directors’ commitment to using these programs as another front for fighting an all-consuming battle against totalitarianism and communism. Bennett firmly establishes both Paul Engle and Wallace Stegner as cultural cold warriors, although he is less successful in making his larger claim that their agendas directly shaped the writing produced by numerous graduates, many of whom went on to establish their own writing programs.

Bennett argues that Engle’s and Stegner’s approaches were grounded in the New Humanism, a conservative literary movement predicated on a rejection of modernism and its moral relativism. The New Humanism dovetailed neatly with Cold War fears of totalitarianism, mass culture, and atomic warfare, elevating the stakes of literary production as both an antidote and a weapon. This led private institutions, such as the Rockefeller Foundation, to underwrite programs like the Iowa Writers’ Workshop and literary journals like the *Kenyon* and *Sewanee* reviews. It also enabled the entrepreneurial Engle to secure donations from Cold War funding sources by arguing that the writing program was an effective means of combating anti-American attitudes.

In the book’s strongest chapter, Bennett examines Engle and his directorship of the Iowa Writers’ Workshop. Bennett’s métier is biography, and his skillful weaving together of archival evidence yields a portrait of Engle as simultaneously likeable, sympathetic, funny, and impassioned. Even as Engle changed his writing and politics to fit the prevailing mood, from 1930s fellow traveler to postwar anticommunist, he strikes one as sincere in his passions.
Bennett is not a historian, however. He struggles to move between larger historical trends and the localized histories of the writing programs. Broad swaths of history are glossed in such a manner as to prove meaningless and unhelpful to readers: “Rapid changes touched everybody and divided the forward-looking from the backward-glancing. Was the future the solution or the problem? Was the nation halfway to salvation or farther from it than ever before?” (18). Bennett wishes to destroy the canard that MFA programs were apolitical, removed from larger forces such as Cold War fears and strategies, but he winds up reiterating another one—that of a Cold War consensus. He relies on ill-defined terms such as “Cold War agenda” and “Cold War intellectual consensus” without explaining or identifying whose agenda was being carried out. Bennett ignores the scholarship that proves the very idea of a Cold War consensus was another fiction, albeit a politically useful one. As scholars such as Alan Brinkley have documented, this “consensus” was an illusion, particularly when it came to intellectuals and writers. Writers were more often the target of Cold War apparatus than its beneficiaries. However, Bennett only touches on this briefly when he discusses Engle’s dismaying encounter with Red Scare allegations in 1952 that led to the cancellation of an invited lecture at Marshall College.

_workshops of empire_ is not recommended for general readers, as it is challenging in both its prose style and its assumptions. However, it will certainly prove of interest to researchers of Iowa history for its treatment of the Iowa Writers’ Workshop and the intriguing use of archival evidence from the Paul Engle Papers at the University of Iowa, a collection that deserves further study.


reviewer david r. mcMahon is professor of history at kirkwood community college, iowa city campus. much of his research and writing have focused on iowa’s sport history.

often described as the most successful coach in collegiate history, dan gable earned the right to impart life lessons. the architect of one of the most dominating dynasties in collegiate sports—coaching the university of iowa hawkeyes to 15 national wrestling titles, his views on life and how to succeed are worth considering. fortunately for gable, he found an eager partner in scott schulte. published by the university of iowa press, a wrestling life is an easy read but rather light fare for an academic press. it has merit in sports literature if only for what it ignores.
For aficionados of wrestling and fans of Gable, of whom there are many, much here will be familiar. Movingly, he discusses the tragic incident that fueled his manic ambition to become the embodiment of amateur wrestling. His eldest sister, Diane, was murdered by a classmate in 1964 in the Gable family home. His family already had troubles, but this tragedy compelled Gable to become the hyper-focused athlete of legend and the popular cultural icon we know him to be.

At times, Gable can be preachy. For this he will be forgiven by those who idolize him. Sport historians, however, would like to know more than Gable’s life lessons. What scholars would like to know he does not seem very interested in telling. At an event in Iowa City to celebrate the publication of the book, Gable criticized Nolan Zavoral’s *A Season on the Mat* (1997) for not conforming to his expectations, although it is a more revealing book than *A Wrestling Life*. There are hints in this book (and in that book launch talk) of a darker history. For example, there is the abandoned run for governor prompted by Karl Rove and Gable’s admission that the drive to win made him unable to comment on the tragic events that unfolded around him in Munich in 1972.

Anyone familiar with the history of Iowa wrestling has heard the rumors of wild and reckless behavior by his wrestlers—drinking and fighting their way through Iowa City—as the program rose to prominence. I would like to know more about that—again, something hinted at during the memorable evening that launched the book. Historians are often interested in things historical figures are unwilling or unable to talk about.

*A Wrestling Life* is a revealing choice for an academic press. Clearly, the publishers hoped that this book would sell, and no doubt it has. Gable’s website advertises the book along with motivational speaking engagements. *A Wrestling Life* is an obvious example of how academic presses have been forced to appeal to larger audiences. If this helps the cause of academic publishing, so be it. But there is more to know about the history of Iowa wrestling than is revealed in this book.
Announcements

THE STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF IOWA (SHSI) announces a grant program for the 2017/2018 academic year. SHSI will award up to ten stipends of $1,000 each to support original research and interpretive writing related to the history of Iowa or Iowa and the Midwest. Preference will be given to applicants proposing to pursue previously neglected topics or new approaches to or interpretations of previously treated topics. SHSI invites applicants from a variety of backgrounds, including academic and public historians, graduate students, and independent researchers and writers. Applications will be judged on the basis of their potential for producing work appropriate for publication in The Annals of Iowa. Grant recipients will be expected to produce an annotated manuscript targeted for The Annals of Iowa, SHSI’s scholarly journal.

Applications for the 2017/2018 awards must be postmarked by April 15, 2017. Download application guidelines from our website (iowaculture.gov/about-us/about/grants/research-grant-authors) or request guidelines or further information from:

Research Grants
State Historical Society of Iowa
402 Iowa Avenue
Iowa City IA 52240-1806
Phone: 319-335-3931
e-mail: marvin-bergman@uiowa.edu

THE IOWA HISTORY CENTER at Simpson College is pleased to congratulate Seth Hedquist as the 2016 recipient of our prize for the outstanding master’s thesis in Iowa history. His award-winning thesis, “The Chronicles of Agrimusic,” was completed at Iowa State University.

The Center now seeks nominations for the outstanding master’s thesis in Iowa history for 2017. Selection will be based on
contribution to the knowledge of Iowa history, originality of the subject matter or methodology, use of sources, and written expression. Nominees must have completed their master’s degree between July 1, 2016, and June 30, 2017.

The winner will be announced in the fall of 2017 and will receive a $1,000 cash prize and an award plaque. Three copies of the thesis and a brief letter of nomination from the thesis advisor, which must include contact information for the nominee, should be submitted to Bill Friedricks, Director, Iowa History Center, Simpson College, 701 North C Street, Indianola, IA 50125. Application deadline is June 30, 2017.

For further information, contact Linda Sinclair, (515) 961-1528 or linda.sinclair@simpson.edu.
Contributors

JERRY HARRINGTON recently retired as marketing public relations manager for DuPont Pioneer, Johnston, Iowa, following a career at several Iowa newspapers and three public relations agencies in Cedar Rapids, Iowa; Rochester, New York; and Milwaukee, Wisconsin. He received a B.S.S. from Cornell College and an M.A. in history from the University of Iowa. He recently completed a book, *Crusading Iowa Journalist Verne Marshall: Exposing Graft and the 1936 Pulitzer Prize*, and is currently working on a biography of Harold E. Hughes.

KEITH OREJEL is a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Missouri. He received his B.A. from the University of California, Berkeley, and his Ph.D. from Columbia University. He is currently working on a book project that examines the economic and political transformation of America’s rural heartland after World War II.

The State Historical Society of Iowa

The Annals of Iowa is published quarterly by the State Historical Society of Iowa, the Historical Division of the Department of Cultural Affairs of the State of Iowa. The society operates from two centers, Des Moines and Iowa City. A museum, research library, state archives, special collections, community programming, historic preservation, and membership programs are located at 600 East Locust Street, Des Moines, IA 50319, phone 515-281-5111. Publications, a research library, and special collections are located at 402 Iowa Avenue, Iowa City, IA 52240, phone 319-335-3916. The society also operates several historic sites across the state.

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Submissions

The Annals of Iowa invites the submission of articles on Iowa history and on subjects concerning the nation and the Midwest with an Iowa focus. State, local, and regional studies of political, economic, social, cultural, intellectual, institutional, ethnic, religious, material culture, archeological, and architectural history are welcome. The Annals also reviews significant books on related topics. A detailed set of editorial guidelines is available on request. All correspondence concerning editorial matters should be addressed to:

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