In This Issue

STEVE McNUTT, a doctoral candidate in Language, Literacy, and Culture at the University of Iowa, describes and sets in context the debates on intelligence testing between Stanford’s Lewis Terman and the University of Iowa’s George Stoddard. Stoddard defended the findings of the University of Iowa’s Child Welfare Research station at a time when they were unpopular in part because they challenged prevailing views on intelligence and their relationship to ideas about meritocracy.

PEGGY ANN BROWN, an independent historian in Washington, D.C., provides a lively, informative account of a U.S. agricultural delegation, made up largely of Iowans or people with some Iowa connection, to the Soviet Union in 1955. That delegation, along with a simultaneous visit by Soviet officials to American farms and the many public lectures members of the delegation gave upon their return, helped to reassure anxious Cold War–era Americans that residents of the Soviet Union, like them, desired peace and personal interactions. The delegation helped pave the way for more such cultural interactions in the future.

Front Cover

In one of his many public lectures following his return from a tour of the Soviet Union’s agricultural regions in 1955, Herb Pike, dressed in a robe and hat from Uzbekistan, shows the route he and other participants in an agricultural delegation took. For more on the 1955 agricultural delegation to the Soviet Union, see Peggy Ann Brown’s article in this issue. Photo courtesy of Julie Pike McCutcheon.

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Contents

1  “A Dangerous Man”: Lewis Terman and George Stoddard, their Debates on Intelligence Testing, and the Legacy of the Iowa Child Welfare Research Station
   Steve McNutt

31 Diplomatic Farmers: Iowans and the 1955 Agricultural Delegation to the Soviet Union
   Peggy Ann Brown

63 Book Reviews and Notices

81 New on the Shelves

85 Announcement
Book Reviews and Notices


64  **KENNETH H. WHEELER, Cultivating Regionalism: Higher Education and the Making of the American Midwest**, by Richard S. Taylor

66  **GEORGE C. RABLE, God’s Almost Chosen Peoples: A Religious History of the American Civil War**, by Bryon C. Andreasen

68  **CHRISTIAN MCWHIRTER, Battle Hymns: The Power and Popularity of Music in the Civil War**, by Brian Roberts

70  **EARL J. HESS, The Civil War in the West: Victory and Defeat from the Appalachians to the Mississippi**, by Robert Wooster

71  **DAVID W. BLIGHT, American Oracle: The Civil War in the Civil Rights Era**, by Dan Lewis

74  **JASON EMERSON, Giant in the Shadows: The Life of Robert T. Lincoln**, by S. Chandler Lighty

75  **JERRY L. TWEDT, Land of Promise, Land of Tears**, by Marvin G. Slind

76  **WAYNE A. WIEGAND, Main Street Public Library: Community Places and Reading Spaces in the Rural Heartland, 1876–1956**, by Jean Preer

78  **ATINA DIFFLEY, Turn Here, Sweet Corn: Organic Farming Works**, by Barbara J. Dilly

79  **PHILIP WARBURG, Harvest the Wind: America’s Journey to Jobs, Energy Independence, and Climate Stability**, by Angie Gumm
"A Dangerous Man": Lewis Terman and George Stoddard, their Debates on Intelligence Testing, and the Legacy of the Iowa Child Welfare Research Station

STEVE McNUTT

IN 1886, on a farm south of Indianapolis in Johnson County, Indiana, a traveling salesman of books on phrenology stops for the night. Explaining to the family how phrenologists study the cranium for signs of mental abilities and personality traits, the salesman feels the bumps on the head of each of the Terman family’s 14 children. The twelfth, a boy, approaches when called. Red hair parted down the middle, wearing round glasses, Lewis Terman is nine years old. He is overly aware of being different. For one thing, he likes school more than the other boys. Then there are the feelings of physical inferiority he will recall his entire life. And now someone is about to assess his intelligence. As tests go, the stakes are rather high.

The salesman lays his hands on Lewis’s head, spreading his fingers out wide to grasp his scalp. His touch is light, at times hovering over Lewis’s scalp. Working from Lewis’s forehead up to the crown of his head then down to each ear, he issues an occasional “hmm” that to Lewis’s ears sounds—positive? Still not speaking, the salesman removes a set of steel calipers from his bag. He pinches skin behind ears still resonant with the scratch
of a penciled notation. He repeats the process. More notes and numbers follow, then the moment is over and the salesman grabs Lewis’s frail shoulders and pronounces to the room that when it comes to this boy’s future, he sees “great things.”

Lewis’s older brother buys a copy of the book, which Lewis finds fascinating into his early teens, and it inspires a lifelong love of reading. On his way to a Ph.D. in psychology he will learn French and German so that he can read works of psychology and philosophy in their original languages. As a professor of psychology at Stanford University he will become known as one of the world’s foremost experts on intelligence testing and a vigorous advocate of the idea of intelligence as an unchanging, unitary trait based almost entirely on heredity.¹

On numerous occasions toward the end of his career, Terman will write about the visit, saying it affirmed his own intelligence and gave him confidence that he could do “great things.”² Even though he later dismissed phrenology as pseudo-science, in that moment he had felt the hand of destiny, and it resonated with Terman, a man who would spend his career first advocating, then defending, the idea that environment—society—had little effect on the core intelligence of human beings and, by extension, on the ultimate direction of their lives. The depth of his resistance to the role of environment becomes clear in the story

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¹ The description of this event and its meaning for Terman’s life has been constructed based on several different sources. Of the many references to this story in which he interprets the event Terman writes, “Perhaps I remember the incident so well for the reason that when it came my turn to be examined he predicted great things of me. I think the prediction probably added a little to my self-confidence and caused me to strive for a more ambitious goal than I might otherwise have set. At any rate, I was greatly impressed and for several years thereafter was much interested in phrenology. As my older brother bought a copy of the book, I finally became familiar with its contents and believed in phrenology until I was fourteen or fifteen years old. This was my introduction to the science of individual differences and the diagnosis of personality.” “Autobiography of Lewis M. Terman,” first published in Carl Murchison, ed., History of Psychology in Autobiography, vol. 2 (Worcester, MA, 1930), 297–331. The event is referenced in two biographies of Terman: Henry L. Minton, Lewis M. Terman: Pioneer in Psychological Testing (New York, 1988), 47; and Edwin G. Boring, Lewis Madison Terman, January 15, 1877–December 21, 1956, Biographical Memoirs (National Academy of Sciences) vol. 33 (New York, 1959), 418. The description of “reading the bumps” is based on the common practices of phrenologists.

of his debates with researchers from the “Iowa school” of psychology as defined by the work of the Iowa Child Welfare Research Station (ICWRS), a state-funded project to research child development. Terman’s hereditarian views on intelligence are often portrayed as softening later in life, but that does not appear to be so when his views are examined within the context of his debates with the director of the ICWRS, George Stoddard, a person Terman would deem a “dangerous man.”

BORN IN 1897, twenty years after Terman, in the coal-mining town of Carbondale, Pennsylvania, Stoddard was the fourth of five children. As an adult, he would defend the interactionist position, the argument that environment and intelligence influence one another. Of his own environment, he remembered his
father as the dominant presence in the family, a person who worked as a wrecking-crew foreman for the railroad, eventually giving that up to sell insurance. As one of the youngest children in his family, Stoddard remembered feeling “ornamental”; his older sisters would dress him up as a proper boy and dote upon him. Initially, he disliked school so much that he left during recess of his first day in first grade. At home, his mother advised that he would probably miss something important if he did not go back, but if he wanted to stay he could, since she needed help with chores around the house. To school he returned. In some ways, he never left.³

Raised Methodist, he lived in a world of rules and restrictions—no smoking, drinking, card playing, or reading of comic books. Sundays were spent indoors; he recalled watching from the window with envy as the Catholic kids played baseball outside. Economically, the town was in decline. Stoddard described life in Carbondale as “drab,” the municipal park “fenced in like a cemetery and just as lifeless,” the public library “puny and repulsive”—but life was made tolerable by the boy’s close proximity to woods, hills, lakes, and kind neighbors.⁴

Age 12 marked the onset of Stoddard’s skepticism toward religion. He found “intolerable the wooden answers to burning questions.” With a group of friends he “literally stalked out of the little church school never to return.” At about the same time, he was first exposed to “communal violence linked to irrational dogma” when he witnessed a group of men throwing rocks and bricks through the windows of a Baptist church. The male worshipers confronted the other men, but the police did not respond. Stoddard later learned that the police force was largely Catholic and the mob was made up of Catholics trying to disrupt the sermon of a visiting preacher known for anti-Catholic messages. From this event, Stoddard concluded that religion was a source of violence and division.⁵

Becoming a nominal Unitarian later in life, he sought a spiritual path, reaching beyond “work and play.” In Unitarianism

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4. Ibid., 9.
5. Ibid., 12.
he found “a liberalizing religion devoid of cant.” His early doubts about religion appear as a critical moment that would eventually lead to his criticism of hereditary views on intelligence and intelligence testing. In his view, hereditary thinking and religion were similar: Humans had created God in the same way they created concepts of an all-encompassing heredity in which everything was explained and dictated by genetics.

One other experience may have influenced Stoddard’s hesitation to explain life through genetics. While he was still a child,

6. Ibid., 320–25.
7. Ibid., 329–33.
his eldest brother, Arthur, had left home and lived a hard but adventurous life including travel at sea. Arthur returned home at age 30 with what Stoddard described as an incurable liver illness. He died the day before Stoddard’s high school commencement, at which Stoddard, as class salutatorian, gave the opening address. He was coming to its conclusion when “there swam before my eyes a corpse—my brother’s rosy-cheeked face magically restored to life and intimacy! How long this fantasy lasted I do not know; no one ever mentioned a hesitation in my delivery. But I remember tightly shutting my eyes and, behold, the image floated away and the closing words of my speech came back to me.”

INTERACTIONISTS like Stoddard argued that the “natural” aspect of the hereditarian argument provided a rationale for justifying inequality. The story behind the mechanism used to do so begins with the creation of the Binet-Simon Scale in 1904. Alfred Binet, director of the Sorbonne’s Laboratory of Experimental Psychology in France, and Theodore Simon grounded their work on that of Sir Francis Galton, the founder of the eugenics movement and Charles Darwin’s cousin. The Binet-Simon Scale was designed at the request of the minister of public instruction in France to identify “subnormal” children “unsuited” for a mainstream, mandatory schooling environment. The result was the world’s first test for intelligence. The test attempted to set standards for age-appropriate tasks requiring abilities not taught in school such as judgment, memory, attention, and problem-solving skills. Yet Binet warned against the test’s potential for misuse, calling the notion that intelligence could not be improved a “brutal pessimism.” Nor did he agree that the term intelligence quotient was capable of representing intelligence with a single number—the idea that drove the creation of “IQ.”

The idea that a single number could describe someone’s intelligence was the work of the German psychologist Wilhelm Stern. He proposed the concept of “mental age,” from which he

8. Ibid., 9.
claimed to derive a person’s “intelligence quotient” (IQ), a leap in reasoning that Binet’s colleague Simon called *la trahison*—the betrayal, or treachery — for its redefinition of the test’s results. Neither he nor Binet accepted the equation behind IQ as mathematically valid or used the term, preferring the intentionally vague term “mental level.” Binet was confident that he and Simon had authored a test that could help to identify children of below-average intelligence, but he did not believe that the test measured the “richness of intelligence,” a concept he refused to define or hypothesize about. Even though intelligence testing was a French creation, it became much more popular in the United States than in France. The French preferred to rely on the judgment of experts evaluating individuals rather than cede that role to a test.

After the psychologist and eugenicist Henry Goddard initially translated and introduced the Binet-Simon Scale to the United States, Lewis Terman revised, expanded, and marketed the test as well as the concept of IQ. He produced its numerical scale for assessing intelligence by using the test to determine a “mental age” score. That score was then divided by the test-taker’s chronological age and multiplied by 100.

After producing a few relatively short versions of the test, in 1916 Terman published *The Measurement of Intelligence*, an expanded version that would launch the testing industry. Part test and part manifesto, the book employs every racial stereotype of the era alongside a distrust of teachers, a preference for tests, and a belief in intelligence as a “unitary,” that is, a single, uniform trait. In an inspired move toward co-opting Binet’s work and reputation, Terman dedicated the book to his memory. By then, Binet had died, and his qualifications about his test were soon forgotten, especially in the United States.

In Terman’s explanation of what would become known as the Stanford-Binet IQ Test, we hear a voice that is unequivocal in its worldview.

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10. Ibid., 195, 203.
11. Ibid., 215.
Among laboring men and servant girls there are thousands like them [feebleminded individuals]. They are the world’s “hewers of wood and drawers of water.” And yet, as far as intelligence is concerned, the tests have told the truth. . . . No amount of school instruction will ever make them intelligent voters or capable citizens in the true sense of the word. . . .

The fact that one meets this type with such extraordinary frequency among Indians, Mexicans, and negroes suggests quite forcibly that the whole question of racial differences in mental traits will have to be taken up anew and by experimental methods. . . .

Children of this group should be segregated in special classes and be given instruction which is concrete and practical. They cannot master abstractions, but they can often be made efficient workers, able to look out for themselves. There is no possibility at present of convincing society that they should not be allowed to reproduce, although from a eugenic point of view they constitute a grave problem because of their unusually prolific breeding.14

POPULAR EXCITEMENT about the potential uses of intelligence testing was a product of circumstance. Fears of increasing immigration drove some to want to verify who was worthy of citizenship. It was anticipated that future population and economic growth would rely on immigration. Confronted with a perceived need to rely on the labor of potentially “substandard” people, the hereditarians believed that the country needed to preserve traditional power structures and avenues to privilege for those who were defined as white Americans, in case they became a minority. Intelligence tests painted a gloss of objectivity on the idea of a meritocracy, and the imported Binet-Simon Scale was retrofitted to advance the hereditarians’ goal.15

Growing public interest in and acceptance of the viability of the IQ test was a product of World War I. In the latter stages of the war, the U.S. army began to use a version of the IQ test as a means of sorting recruits. After initial resistance, many politicians and high-ranking military leaders accepted the test, while

seasoned officers resisted, and many simply refused to take it. In practice, the test was poorly administered in large halls where it was difficult for test-takers to hear instructions. As a result, a large percentage of soldiers scored as mentally handicapped. The army objected that, instead of measuring intelligence, the test measured familiarity with a question’s content as well as speed. Nonetheless, the results would be publicized in the popular press after the war as evidence of a crumbling society, feeding debates about the influence of immigrants, people of non-Western European backgrounds, and Communists. Still, the IQ test had gained a foothold as a tool for large-scale institutional use.16

As the IQ test’s popularity increased, so did its number of detractors, who noted several problems related to the army’s questions about what the test was testing. Inventiveness was not rewarded, and some answers were simply arbitrary and confusing. But the main problem was that the questions were highly subjective. The range of acceptable answers was narrow because the norms had been established by administering the test solely to white, middle-class children and using their experience as the basis for defining what qualified as a correct answer. Test questions commonly used illustrations of white, middle-class life, then asked test-takers to interpret the scenes.17 Questions that did not rely on illustrations presented similar problems. The following question, which Terman added to Binet’s original test, exemplifies how IQ tests used questions that read like riddles to evaluate a test-taker’s abstract reasoning skills:

An Indian who had come to town for the first time in his life saw a white man riding along the street. As the white man rode by, the Indian said—“The white man is lazy; he walks sitting down.” What was the white man on that caused the Indian to say, “He walks sitting down.” 18

The answer identified as correct was “bicycle” because the Indian describes the white man as “walking,” meaning he must be observing up-and-down leg movement. The most common incorrect answer was “horse,” which Terman deemed incorrect

because a person’s legs do not go up and down while riding a horse. In addition, the test-taker was supposed to read the question as inferring that the Indian was unfamiliar with the object, and presumably he would not be unfamiliar with a horse.

Critics of this question and others like it observed that while it claimed to test abstract reasoning, it actually measured conformity and familiarity with social norms. The question really tested the degree to which a person viewed an Indian as a primitive unfamiliar with modern technology; it measured the test-taker’s ability to think abstractly not as an Indian thinks but as Terman thought of Indians, that is, to share Terman’s perception of the Indian’s behavior, psychology, and intellect.

Writing in *The New Republic* starting in 1922, the journalist Walter Lippmann and educational reformer John Dewey levied a series of related criticisms at the intelligence-testing community. They identified methodological problems with intelligence tests and warned of the potential outcome for a society that relied on them. Lippmann wrote six articles criticizing Terman’s interpretation of the data, concluding that Terman could not demonstrate that he was testing what he claimed to be testing. The IQ test, feared Lippmann, amounted to an assault on democratic ideals of self-determination likely to evolve into an “intellectual caste system in which the task of education had given way to the doctrine of predestination and infant damnation.”

Dewey added that the IQ’s “abstract and universal idea of superiority and inferiority is an absurdity.”

Terman responded in a 3,400-word article in *The New Republic*. Using a dismissive and condescending tone, he ignored Lippmann’s questions and, as became his habit, mischaracterized the criticism as asserting that no differences of any kind existed between individuals. Comparing Lippmann’s critique of intelligence testing to William Jennings Bryan’s attack on evolution, he sarcastically agreed with Lippmann, saying it was “high time we penetrated the wiles of this crafty cult.” He then expressed false distress as to the worldwide popularity of his

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views on intelligence. Referring to Germany as being “taken in” by such views, he wrote that if “the German people don’t wake up they will soon find themselves in the grip of a super-junker [landed nobility] caste that will out-junker anything Prussia ever turned loose.” Lippmann, stated Terman, was not intelligent enough to understand intelligence testing. Science, he concluded, should be left to the scientists.21

The reaction was typical of Terman’s response to those who questioned the validity of his tests. In a variety of publications and speeches he stated that the answer to the questions they raised was too obvious to merit an answer. Doubts about social stratification and its roots received similarly superficial treatment in The Measurement of Intelligence. “Common observation,” he wrote, “would itself suggest that the social class to which the family belongs depends less on chance than on the parents’ native qualities of intellect and character.”22 Such statements portray science as a matter of faith; when it suited him, “common observation” was all the proof he required.

Terman’s selective use of evidence is reflected in the explanation he offered as a way to understand his own life. Aside from the chance encounter with phrenology that sparked his passion for reading, growing up on the farm offered Terman little evidence that his success was based in anything but heredity. He could see nothing about his early life that helped prepare him for his future success. He was a sickly child who, at various points in his life, struggled with tuberculosis. He never enjoyed sports or other physical activities. Instead, he developed academic interests along with a competitive and tireless work ethic. Terman concluded that his forebears’ intelligence had never presented itself because they had lacked access to means of (academic) expression.23 Terman also attributed his son’s election to the

23. As his biographers have noted, Terman himself benefited from private loans facilitating his education, from undergraduate through doctoral work, and he also had a spouse who was supportive of his ambitions. Boring, Lewis Madison Terman, 415–61.
National Academy of Sciences to heredity, though neither his daughter nor any of his siblings achieved such notoriety. In using selective individuals from his family as evidence of the inevitable consequences of heredity, Terman disregarded family members who, while biologically related, did not share the same traits as he did. That allowed him to make one of the more nuanced missteps behind hereditarian notions of intelligence: the assertion that group-based classifications can be used to predict with certainty who we become as individuals.

NEITHER STODDARD NOR TERMAN came from extraordinary wealth. Both received an exceptionally high level of formal education for a period when only approximately 10 percent of high school graduates attended college. Politically, both were liberal Democrats. Stoddard was 11 years younger and a true New Deal Democrat, but Stoddard’s upbringing was more privileged than Terman’s and allowed for more diversions, which, by accident rather than design, became vital to his views on intelligence. After working at a bank after graduation from high school, Stoddard enrolled at Penn State. He tried industrial chemical engineering, left for a short stint in the army, then returned to Penn State and mathematics, physics, and other hard sciences. None held his interest, and he repeatedly found himself in the humanities, ultimately settling on a degree in education, followed, in 1923, by a year of graduate study in psychology at the University of Paris with Theodore Simon.

Stoddard had initially intended to study in Germany. The field of modern psychology dates to 1879, when the first formal laboratory of experimental psychology was founded at the Uni-

24. Later in his career, Terman modified his initial view that men were, on average, more intelligent than women. His biographer speculated as to how his earlier notion may have affected his treatment and expectations of his own children, who were routinely given intelligence tests in their youth (as were his grandchildren). Terman devoted much of his parenting energy to his son, Frederick; he had a distant relationship with his daughter, Anna. Frederick would echo his father’s accomplishments; he became a professor of engineering at Stanford and, like his father, was elected to the National Academy of Sciences. Anna, as expected, married and became a mother, living close to home for the rest of her life. Minton, Lewis M. Terman, 257–59.

versity of Leipzig by Wilhelm Wundt. (Wundt would train the American psychologist G. Stanley Hall, under whom Lewis Terman studied). Leipzig, then, was the obvious destination for Stoddard. But German psychologists, motivated by Germany’s slow recovery from World War I and Hitler’s growing power, left for the United States, where many of their former students were teaching. If Stoddard wanted to study with German psychologists, there was no need to leave the United States, and he had already been exposed to many of their ideas; France, by contrast, was politically stable, and its theorists were more appealing to Stoddard, who described them as intuitive and brilliant.26

In Paris, Stoddard encountered Binet’s original work directly. Stateside U.S. students in educational psychology, who knew about Binet’s scale, had less contact with the reasoning behind its creation and its authors’ own caveats about the test and its imperfections. That made it easier for students to become entranced by the seemingly unassailable exactitude offered by the test’s results and thus to come to see evidence of biological determinism as the chief engineer of intelligence.27

After a year of study in France, Stoddard accepted a research assistantship at the University of Iowa. There, he went to work for G. M. Ruch, a professor who had studied at Stanford. Their task was testing the general intelligence of incoming freshmen, but they struggled to find correlations between their results and students’ level of success.28

Stoddard’s dissertation, “Iowa Placement Examinations” (1925) attempted to solve the problem of student assessment. Built on the idea that designing a generalized test able to encapsulate a person’s capacity for building knowledge was a practical impossibility, Stoddard’s solution was two tests: one testing aptitude for learning, the other testing what the person already knew.29 Those tests were more successful at predicting student

26. Ibid., 327.
27. Ibid., 329.
28. Ibid., 39. Stoddard would also coauthor a book with Ruch on testing high school students, for which Terman wrote a long introduction. Through Ruch, Terman offered Stoddard a fellowship if he would transfer to Stanford. It was an offer Iowa could not match, but Stoddard elected to stay in Iowa City.
29. Ibid., 39.
achievement and were eventually adopted by the university. He went on to write a series of tests used throughout the United States as placement exams.

By this stage of his education, however, Stoddard had enough experience with testing to understand its weaknesses. He never developed a faith in a particular test’s ability to quantify an ultimate truth. His awareness of the University of Iowa’s poor initial experience with intelligence tests and his own authorship of other tests would influence how he viewed the rapid adoption of standardized tests of all kinds at all educational levels by those who saw them as tools for bringing order to society.

STODDARD’S GRADUATE STUDIES had begun two years after the founding of the Iowa Child Welfare Research Station (ICWRS) in 1917. Achieving funding for the research station took years of wrangling with the state legislature; psychology was still a relatively new field, and the idea of studying children invited suspicion. Public opinion was swayed thanks in part to newspaper editorials pointing out that the state spent more time and money studying its hogs than its children. As an example of what happens when children are not given adequate educational opportunities, newspaper editors pointed to the recent rejection of “thousands” of “normal” Iowa men as unfit for military service. With victory in the battle for funding, the university turned a series of houses into offices, a preschool nursery, and a library—all dedicated to studying the “normal” child. Lewis Terman was offered the directorship of the program. This story would have had a very different development had he not turned it down.

In Before Head Start, historian Hamilton Cravens describes the ICWRS as possibly the first research institute in the world and certainly in the United States dedicated solely to conducting original scientific research on the development of “normal”


31. The U of I’s Institute of Child Behavior Celebrates Its First 50 Years (Iowa City, 1968).

32. Hamilton Cravens, Before Head Start: The Iowa Station and America’s Children (Chapel Hill, NC, 1993), 104.
children, and the first with a preschool nursery for research purposes.\textsuperscript{33} Throughout its first decade, the ICWRS had limited funds and a small staff, but by 1928 increased state and grant funding allowed it to achieve national prominence. Shortly thereafter, its first director, Bird T. Baldwin, died suddenly.

That same year the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of laws mandating the sterilization of mentally handicapped people, along with laws requiring all citizens to have racial designations listed at birth, thus codifying the “one-drop rule.” The sterilization laws were derived from the 1922 publication of Harry Laughlin’s Model Eugenical Sterilization Law, which relied on the claims of hereditarians.\textsuperscript{34}

In that context George Stoddard took a job he did not want. Stoddard liked to joke that the university president chose him to succeed Baldwin as director of the ICWRS out of simple desperation. Stoddard had never intended a career as an administrator, but in 1928, three years after completing his doctorate in child psychology, with 15 published research articles and as one of the original authors of the Iowa Placement Tests (which attempted to assess learning by grade level), he agreed to a one-year interim term as director of the ICWRS.\textsuperscript{35} Hired as an interim director, he did not behave as one. The research station’s mission quickly shifted from one originally intent on intervention in critically at-risk families to one focused on studying childhood development in a way never before attempted.

Correspondence from that year demonstrates the reputation Stoddard had developed within the university. The dean of the

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 262. Two other institutes, one at Yale, the other in Detroit at the Merrill-Palmer School, also studied child development. (Noting a detail critical to defending the ICWRS, Stoddard would later point out that Iowa was neither alone, nor the first, to demonstrate gains in IQ scores; the Merrill-Palmer School reported gains by its students in 1925 after the first year of attendance. Stoddard argued that the lack of other studies with similar findings reflected the high quality of the researchers at Iowa. \textit{Daily Iowan}, 12/29/1939; Cravens, \textit{Before Head Start}, 97, 101.

\textsuperscript{34} Claude Moore Health Sciences Library, University of Virginia Health System, “Origins of Eugenics,” www.hsl.virginia.edu/historical/eugenics/2-origins.cfm. The “one-drop” rule defined as “black” any individual with any African ancestry (or “one drop” of black blood).

\textsuperscript{35} Cravens, \textit{Before Head Start}, 106.
Gertrude E. Chittenden observes children at play in the Iowa Child Welfare Research Station’s preschool for her thesis research in 1941. Photo from F. W. Kent Collection, University Archives, University of Iowa.

Graduate College, Carl Seashore, wrote to university president Walter Jessup to “join” in recommending Stoddard’s promotion from assistant to associate professor, as his growth had been “rather remarkable.” Seashore made it clear that people in Stoddard’s field were in high demand; he worried that Stoddard might be tempted to look elsewhere.36

Seashore’s effort to retain Stoddard was successful. Under Stoddard’s leadership, work by ICWRS researchers Beth Wellman, Marie Skodak, Ruth Updegraff, and Howard Skeels repeatedly questioned what IQ was and whether it was, as hereditarians claimed, a fixed, unitary trait. Along with Skeels, Wellman authored numerous Iowa studies. In 1932 she wrote the first of many articles on the effects of schooling on intellect. She questioned whether intelligence was innate. One of the ear-

36. Carl E. Seashore to President Jessup, 2/22/1928, Child Welfare Box, University of Iowa Archives, University of Iowa Libraries, Iowa City. The esteem was mutual. Stoddard wrote that Seashore was 40 years ahead of his time in placing performance in the arts and literature on equal footing with other studies. Stoddard, Pursuit of Education, 48. In 1936 Stoddard would succeed Seashore as head of the Department of Psychology and dean of the Graduate College.
lier ICWRS studies had found a greater increase in student IQ scores between the fall and spring semesters, when school was in session, than when it was not in session, implying that improved scores relied at least partly on education.\textsuperscript{37} The hereditarians dismissed the findings, saying that the Iowa researchers were not properly trained and did not understand IQ. This began a pattern in which ICWRS research was rejected by others in the intelligence-testing community.

SEVERAL OF THE ICWRS STUDIES took place at the Iowa Soldiers’ Orphans’ Home in Davenport, Iowa. The lead study was titled, quite transparently, “A Study of Environmental Stimulation: An Orphanage Preschool Project.” Its genesis was a problem facing the Orphans’ Home and its supervising body, the State Board of Control. After settling a lawsuit by an Iowa couple who learned that their adoptive child was mentally handicapped, the Orphans’ Home administrators became concerned about the potential for other parents to adopt a child who might be “feeble-minded.” Motivated by the desire to avoid future lawsuits, they contacted Stoddard to help them determine the level of intelligence of the children in their care.\textsuperscript{38}

The ICWRS researchers found an orphanage comprising several cottages, each housing 30–35 children of the same sex and younger than six years of age. The largest room in each cottage was 15 square feet. One trained adult and three or four untrained teenaged girls were responsible for the children’s care. By necessity, the children lived a rigid, regimented life, isolated from the outside world. Treated as a group with no personal belongings besides a toothbrush (clothing was shared), the children, according to the Iowa researchers, struggled to see themselves as individuals and moved en masse. Many were not toilet trained or capable of washing themselves.\textsuperscript{39}


\textsuperscript{38} Cravens, \textit{Before Head Start}, 175.

\textsuperscript{39} Harold M. Skeels, Beth L. Wellman, Ruth Updegraff, Harold M. Williams, and George D. Stoddard, eds., \textit{A Study of Environmental Stimulation: An Orphanage Preschool Project}, University of Iowa Studies, vol. 15, no. 363 (1938), 10–11.
In 1935, at the center of the ring of cottages, the ICWRS, with the help of state funding, built a preschool costing $7,280 (about $115,000 in today’s dollars). For the next three years, the ICWRS tracked children grouped by age and IQ scores, monitoring the progress of those who attended the preschool and those who did not. All of the children had been at the orphanage for 18–21 months and ranged in age from 18 months to 5 years. The study was a small one of 46 children enrolled in the preschool and 44 whose daily routine remained unchanged.40 The researchers remained skeptical of what the IQ test truly tested but used it nonetheless because it was the commonly accepted standard of the era. They expected the IQs of those attending the preschool to rise precipitously.

Instead, over the three years of the study, they saw inconsistent and modest gains among children enrolled in the preschool. The real surprise was the effect of long residency at the orphanage on those in the control group. Instead of staying static, as expected, the effect “was a leveling one, tending to bring all children [regardless of initial IQ score] to high-grade feeble-

40. Ibid., 37.
mindedness or borderline classification” (IQ range of 70–79). The two children in the control group with the highest initial scores lost 28.5 points, and two others lost 43 and 37 points.\textsuperscript{41} The authors of the study concluded that the preschool’s main effect was to prevent further harm to the children’s scores and, presumably, their psychological and educational development. It was a nuanced difference—the difference between improving children’s developmental potential and protecting them from an environment hazardous to that development.

The results strongly suggested the malleability of intelligence and raised questions about what the word even meant—and the ICWRS researchers had achieved those results by employing the same tool Lewis Terman had used to support the opposite position. Terman’s IQ test was not the ICWRS researchers’ only method of assessment, however; his IQ test and one not associated with Stanford or Terman produced similar results. Additional tests of language and vocabulary showed both groups lagging well behind children of similar ages in Iowa City. Even with the addition of the preschool, the children did not receive enough language stimulation, and they had little access to books and other means of promoting language development.

General information tests produced similar results when their results were compared to those of test-takers in the world outside the orphanage. Nevertheless, the preschool group—despite its modest improvements—always did better than the control group when assessed using intelligence tests as well as other measures. One important area in which the preschool group improved most markedly was in social maturity—a “progressive capacity for looking after themselves”—which was important for placement with an adoptive family. In the area of motor skills (hopping, skipping, climbing ladders, jumping), the preschool children’s scores approached those of Iowa City children.\textsuperscript{42} At the study’s conclusion, the staff was convinced of the preschool’s value even before they saw the report, so all of the children were enrolled in the preschool, playground equipment was added, and the child-to-adult ratio reduced.

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 45, 56.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 180–81.
IN CONTRAST to their dismissive view of critics like Lippmann, the hereditarians took the work of Stoddard and the ICWRS as a direct threat. They feared that “environmentalists” would succeed in demonstrating the role of environmental factors in human development. Such a heretical notion would have consequences. Intelligence testing had reified as “natural” essentialist notions about race, gender, and social class. The research produced by the ICWRS was a threat not just to that idea but also to the entire social structure it supported.

For Terman and other adherents of a strict hereditarian view, if the IQ test did measure intelligence and if intelligence was fixed, the results at the Iowa Soldiers’ Orphans’ Home simply were not possible. Terman worked to ensure that psychologists and the public ignored or dismissed the ICWRS findings. On July 7, 1939, at his behest, Stanford University’s School of Education convened a symposium before an audience of 1,200 teachers and school administrators with the goal of putting to rest questions about the relationship between genetics and environment in determining a person’s intelligence. To address this complex question, Terman and his supporters were allotted an hour; Stoddard, upon arriving in Palo Alto, learned that he would have ten minutes to defend his claim that intelligence was not fixed.43

In his presentation, Terman dismissed the ICWRS studies that found that preschool attendance resulted in higher IQ scores. He reserved special ire for an ICWRS follow-up study on children from the orphanage who had been placed in foster and adoptive homes. Both preschool and control group children with relatively high IQs had been placed; those with lower IQs had not. After placement, individual children from both the preschool and control groups increased their IQ scores the longer they were with their foster or adoptive families, with children who had been in the preschool making more substantial gains. Their IQs eventually came to more closely resemble those of their foster or adoptive parents than of their birth mothers (little was known about the fathers). The children who remained in the orphanage did not make any gains by the end of the project.44

44. Skeels, et al., eds., Study of Environmental Stimulation, 56, 58. The study of adopted children would become a longitudinal study lasting 15 years, with the
At the Palo Alto symposium, Terman responded to the claim that environment influenced individual intelligence by assailing the data, demanding additional proof, and asserting that others had not been able to replicate the results. In argument, nuance failed to hold Terman's interest. Using rhetoric as dichotomous as his science, he mischaracterized the Iowa results into an exaggerated inversion of his own, claiming (falsely) that the researchers believed they had “demonstrated the possibility of almost unlimited IQ control.” Stoddard responded by presenting the data from Iowa as well as other universities, to no avail. In his autobiography, he quoted the symposium’s chairman as confessing after the symposium that “I held Stoddard while Terman beat him.” Neutral observers found Terman rude and believed that he had “made a fool out of himself.”

No complete copy exists of Stoddard’s ten-minute response in Palo Alto, but the record does contain some revealing excerpts. Mulling over the twists of the debate over the previous years, Stoddard announced that he was not going to fuel Terman’s arguments by offering statements Terman would then misrepresent. In unraveling the claims of hereditarians, he said, having followed “the devious course of many a colored yarn, I shall not

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children tested at 2, 4, 7, and 14 years old. Begun by Howard Skeels, the report, when published in its final version in 1949 by Marie Skodak, became known simply as “Skodak and Skeels” and as “the most famous and most controversial adoption study in psychology’s history.” Charles M. Locurto, Sense and Nonsense about IQ: The Case for Uniqueness (New York, 1991), 37–38. Its implications found expression in public policy in John F. Kennedy’s New Frontier, Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs and War on Poverty, the 1984 Equal Opportunity Act, Job Corps, Vista, and Community Action Programs, including Head Start. Over the years, as with Terman’s critique of the orphanage preschool and its related studies, Head Start, part of the ICWRS legacy, has had its efficacy questioned. Some studies find that the gains demonstrated by children upon completing the program disappear after two or three years in school. Head Start’s defenders point out that it is a service project, not a research program (unlike the ICWRS studies, which blended the two). Each program is unique and not designed with program evaluation as a primary goal, so combining what are sometimes quite different programs obscures differences in design and effect while forgetting to treat children as individuals. A more important question: Even if post–Head Start gains disappear after the children enter school, what happens to those children in school?

undertake to supply the woof to anybody’s warp.” Even so, the child, he said, is plastic; intelligence tests are imperfect and irrational. Many of the test questions relied on familiarity with cultural norms and thus their results measured cultural differences. They have value, said Stoddard, but more as measures of environmental influences than of intelligence. Terman, afterward, wrote to a friend that Stoddard was a “dangerous man.”

Terman would fail in his efforts to prevent the ICWRS studies from gaining public attention, yet even when they did the ideas were often incorrectly portrayed as a question of nature versus nurture rather than emphasizing an interactive relationship between environment and intelligence, of nature and nurture working in concert. An article in early October of that year in the *Salt Lake Tribune* was one of many reflecting this common misinterpretation. Citing the Iowa studies, it encouraged parents to get their children tested. IQ could be raised, the article claimed, because environment had more to do with intelligence than heredity. The first assertion accurately reflected the Iowa findings, but the second was stretched even more by the declaration that “geniuses can be made as well as born”—a significant leap from Stoddard’s koan-like equivocation that “the child can only be what he could have become.”

Stoddard, in assessing the hereditarians and how they co-opted Binet’s test, wrote that Terman and others simply did not respect the qualifications Binet made about the limits of his test. A primary concern of Stoddard’s was that IQ tests relied on the thinnest of evidence. The test used by Terman to identify genius in high school students consisted of the following: a vocabulary test requiring a mastery of only 13,500 words; a visualization test involving folding paper, cutting holes, and predicting how many would be revealed upon unfolding; repeating digits in forward and reverse order; explaining text that Stoddard described as “elementary”; and answering questions about how to measure pints of water.

47. Ibid.
48. Ibid., 59–60.
In addition, Stoddard was confounded by the hereditarians’ habit of protecting the test at all cost. Having asserted that the IQ test did measure intelligence, and that intelligence was fixed, they evaluated the results based on whether those results conformed to the expectation that a person tested repeatedly would consistently produce identical scores. When scores were inconsistent, Stoddard said, the hereditarians’ were more concerned to protect the test’s reputation than to understand the student.

The confusion is this: if we find some external physical “reason” for poor test performance, we tend to discount the testing; if the “reason” remains obscure, locked up in the internal mechanism of the organism, we tend to accept the results as bona fide. . . . Neither test constructor nor clinician hesitates to say that a child’s brightness has remained static when the IQ is constant; when he finds the IQ inconstant, particularly if the change is radical, then what has changed is something other than brightness!51

IN THE LATTER STAGES of Terman’s career, his views on intelligence reveal some inconsistencies. Biographers, as well as many textbooks on the history of psychology, quote Ernest R. Hilgard’s 1957 obituary of Terman in which Hilgard implies that Terman eventually modified his hereditarian position on IQ and intelligence. In the obituary, Hilgard quotes a passage from Terman’s 1932 autobiography: “the major differences between children of high and low IQ, and the major differences in the intelligence test scores of certain races, as Negroes and whites, will never be fully accounted for on the environmental hypothesis.” In the margin of Terman’s personal copy, notes Hilgard, Terman penciled in, “I am less sure of this now (1951)! And still less sure in 1955! — L. M. T.”52

At several points in his 1937 revision of the Stanford-Binet test, Terman’s analysis became less adamant in tone and conclusions than it had been in previous publications. For example, he notes that the mean values of differences between correlations of IQ scores with social class are too small to be significant.53

51. Stoddard, The Meaning of Intelligence, 89.
53. Minton, Lewis M. Terman, 152.
Certainly, this sounds like someone retreating from a central tenet of biodeterminism—the notion that social class is determined by heredity. Such moments invite questions about what Terman truly believed and suggest someone in conflict over deeply entrenched ideas. Thus, sympathetic observers argue that Terman modified his previous views.

In his published writing, however, Terman never expressed the degree of doubt found in the margins of his writing. Minton argues that a desire to protect his professional reputation impeded his willingness to openly question his position. Supporting Minton’s conclusion was Terman’s reaction to the ICWRS’s publication of *A Study of Environmental Stimulation: An Orphanage Preschool Project*. Even after the publication of Terman’s more reserved 1937 revision of the Stanford-Binet test, he continued to attack—in print and in public and without reservation—the Iowa interactionists’ findings on intelligence.

A letter from Terman student Florence Goodenough reflects the hereditarians’ attitudes about the Iowa researchers. In the letter, sent to Leta Hollingworth, a researcher Terman respected despite views on intelligence less reliant on heredity than his own, Goodenough expressed her opinion of Beth Wellman. “The time had come,” she wrote, “for letting the Iowa people know something about how the land lies.” Terman, she wrote, believed that Wellman intentionally tried to deceive readers of her reports, while Goodenough believed that she had deceived herself. She compared Wellman to “a religious fanatic who hears the wings of angels in every rustle of the dishtowels on the family clothes line.”

After the symposium in 1939, Terman successfully marginalized the ICWRS’s interactionist position. He continued to target Stoddard and the ICWRS whenever possible, managing to halt the momentum for a national nursery school program that Stoddard had advocated for most of the decade. It advanced as far as a speech at the White House, then died. The economic realities of the Great Depression played a role, but

Terman made its dismissal easier by arranging to have his symposium speech circulated among the right hands in official Washington. In language that does not sound like someone reconsidering his position, he would later boast of his success in “turning the tide” against Stoddard’s wishes for “moron nursemaids.”

While Terman believed that IQ tests demonstrated the insignificance of environmental factors, the Iowa researchers, led by Stoddard, advocated the opposite position, that IQ tests demonstrated the significance of environmental influence and should be used as indices of social change. (They would be, but not until the 1960s.) The public and academic tides were with the Iowa researchers, and the shift in perceptions of intelligence in the ten years between 1928 and 1938 can be partly credited for growth in support for New Deal legislation. Throughout the period, the number of children in the workforce had reached its highest historical levels because of economic stress and Social Darwinist theories that validated variable treatment of children based on social rank. But by 1938, after many failed attempts, passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act mandated federal standards for child labor practices and signified critical changes in perceptions of a child’s place in society.

The changing perceptions of childhood development also affected the relative emphasis on formal education and its availability. One of the many ways this was manifested was in levels of high school enrollment. Before 1920 only a small percentage of children attended public high schools; by 1930 half did; and ten years later enrollment rose to two-thirds.

The mainstream psychological establishment had, from the outset, found Binet-derived scales "not sufficiently self-critical"; by the beginning of World War II, the hereditarian notions of Terman and others in the intelligence testing community had increasingly fallen out of favor.\textsuperscript{60} Complicating the question of what Terman truly believed, and raising the question as to whether the tenor of the debate between the two groups pushed both to take more extreme positions than they actually held, was Terman’s own statement in the 1940 \textit{Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education} that the environment could not be “regarded as a matter of small consequence.”\textsuperscript{61}

STODDARD would leave Iowa in 1942 to become New York State’s Commissioner of Education. A year later, reflecting on the debates over the meaning and testing of intelligence, Stoddard called fascination with the hereditarian idea of intelligence bad science that offered a false solution to society’s ills. He argued that the belief in intelligence as determined solely by biology, easily tested for and quantified as a single number and offered as a nearly singular explanation for human behavior, invited too much confidence in our ability to engineer a better future through a narrow lens focused on genetics and the brain. In \textit{The Meaning of Intelligence}, a nearly 500-page rebuttal to the hereditarians, Stoddard, referring to the cerebral cortex as “our luxury of luxuries,” remarked,

It takes no frontal tumor to knock out the brain. The abscesses of fear, magic, and murderousness serve equally well and are more readily distributed. . . . For the most deadly and universal mental afflictions, starting from the impact of man upon man, it is necessary to postulate healthy tissues, in order that the phobia may take hold. . . . All the tumors the world has ever known have not been so destructive of human beings and human aspirations as single-purpose concepts like witchcraft, divine right, original sin, heresy, racial superiority and might makes right. . . . Why is there such an ongoing interest in defining, measuring, and labeling racial characteristics? Very likely the doctrine of racial inferiority . . . constitutes

\textsuperscript{60} Carson, \textit{The Measure of Merit}, 181.
\textsuperscript{61} Minton, \textit{Lewis M. Terman}, 168.
a social need for millions of white persons who cannot otherwise escape the unpleasant outcomes of their own actions and attitudes.\textsuperscript{62}

In 1945 Stoddard was hired as president of the University of Illinois, where he would gain a reputation, according to Charles Shadduck, a friend and professor in the English Department, of being generous and highly social but also someone who did not suffer fools. Stoddard himself would not have disagreed with such an assessment. He described himself as someone often absorbed within his own thoughts who could thus appear even deafer than he actually was. “Though hard-of-hearing at the best of times,” he wrote, his abstraction “imparts an air of remoteness or indifference to the speech of others.”

It can become a source of unintentional rudeness but, I think, not of malice. My inner satisfactions relate to this ambivalence. I cannot pretend to be a hail-fellow-well-met, a hearty, grinning slapper of backs. I am guilty of the cold eye and the dour look. If persons bore me, I probably show it, although a bore by definition is the last one to notice. On the other hand, I am apt to “take fire” and display an emotionally tinged response. At such times I become compulsively articulate. The hardest stance for me is to remain cool to what I regard as original and exciting, or, on the other hand, to what strikes me as stupid, corrupt, or malicious. My most intense pleasure is to be in touch with a warm creative person who represents what human nature is or could be.\textsuperscript{63}

When Stoddard was hired, the \textit{Illinois Alumni News} described him as “charming” and “highly-recommended.” Reporting on Stoddard’s forced resignation seven years later after he displeased the university’s politically conservative board of trustees, \textit{Time} magazine described Stoddard as hot-tempered, with a reputation among state legislators for being “anything but diplomatic.”\textsuperscript{64} A typical “Stoddard story” from his years at Illinois recounts his reaction to a state legislator announcing in the press that there were “fifty red communist pinkos at the university.” Stoddard responded by sending the legislator a sheet of paper with blank lines numbered one to fifty along

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{62} Stoddard, \textit{The Meaning of Intelligence}, 470–71.
\item \textsuperscript{63} Stoddard, \textit{The Pursuit of Education}, 330–31.
\item \textsuperscript{64} “Education: The Final Arrow,” \textit{Time}, 3/8/1953.
\end{itemize}
with a note asking him to please supply the names. Shadduck described the exchange as a “typical Stoddard response to dealing with a vicious idiot.”

With the arrival of GIs home from World War II and the new GI Bill’s support for them to attend college, the university’s enrollment doubled in Stoddard’s first year to more than 23,000. He oversaw a period of tremendous growth in the size and quality of the university, but after the election of a new, more politically conservative board of trustees, the outspoken and proudly liberal Stoddard became, in their view, an elitist easterner who wanted to create the “Harvard of the Midwest” and thus someone who should be regarded with suspicion. Once again, he was, in short, “a dangerous man.”

He lasted for seven years, from 1946 to 1953. A year before his dismissal Stoddard had become embroiled in a public dispute with Andrew C. Ivy, the university’s vice-president and a popular physiologist who had begun producing and popularizing Krebiozen, a drug that he claimed could cure cancer. It was derived from horse and cattle serum given to Ivy by two brothers in Argentina who never produced a powder testable by a third party. After a year of delays, Stoddard, relying on advisers including the American Medical Association, ordered Ivy to stop using university facilities to produce and administer the drug. For this, Stoddard was accused of infringing on academic freedom. His somewhat imperious nature in dealing with the state legislature was cited as another reason for his dismissal by the board of trustees who, led by former football star Red Grange, produced a 6–3 vote of no confidence.

Reports at the time and since noted the political and cultural forces behind the decision. Stoddard’s politics were well-known, as was his association with UNESCO and his image as an internationalist, an identity that made some uncomfortable. Stoddard was well liked on campus, where he was seen as a “scholar-president.” He was a hero especially to the young faculty who, in many cases, had been recruited from out of state, an unpopu-

65. Charles Shadduck, interview by Katherine Corcoran, 10/23/1978, tape 1, box 2, University of Illinois Archives, University of Illinois Library, Urbana, IL.
66. “Education: The Final Arrow.”
lar move in the eyes of the legislature and board of trustees who feared the influence of “radicals.”

Stoddard was right about Krebiozen, which was never demonstrated to offer an appreciable benefit (“horse piss” was one blunt description of the substance), although it did have numerous side effects. Ivy evaded criminal charges, but his reputation would remain that of a charlatan and media hound. Stoddard’s reputation suffered from association with the scandal, and he had to defend himself in an 11-year court battle with Ivy, in which Stoddard was eventually exonerated.

The university apparently preferred to forget the Stoddard era. No buildings bear his name, nor are there memorials or book collections in his name in the library. Hundreds of portraits line hallways and rooms in the university’s student union memorializing administrators, members of boards of trustees, professors, and famous alumni. So numerous and identical in size that they seem to blend into one identical image, they are the sort of paintings thousands pass without a glance, yet even among them Stoddard is conspicuously absent.

For someone who counseled General MacArthur on occupation strategies after World War II, helped found Parents magazine, and served on the board of UNESCO, among other duties, his forced resignation was a humiliation. His career continued as dean of the School of Education then chancellor and vice-president at New York University, with interludes sponsored by the State Department to postwar South Korea, where he evaluated educational needs. In Iran, he advised the Shah on the creation of a College of Education in the University of Tehran, a plan that died with the Shah. Stoddard then played a long-running role advocating the development of public television. A New York Times obituary noted his tenure at Illinois and the Krebiozen controversy but did not mention his stewardship of the Iowa Child Welfare Research Station or his debates with Lewis Terman over intelligence testing.

It was at the University of Iowa, however, where he did some of his most important work as a defender of academic freedom—the principle he was accused of subverting at Illinois—and as an advocate and defender of unpopular ideas at a time when public opinion favored the hereditarian position of biological determinism. His voice was not a solitary one, but for a critical period it was a persistent and high-profile voice defending research that delivered a deep psychological shock to prevailing views on intelligence and their relationship to ideas of a meritocracy.
ON A BALMY SEPTEMBER EVENING in 1955, 1,500 people crowded into a high school auditorium in Sioux City, Iowa, to hear Whiting farmer Herb Pike describe his recent visit to the Soviet Union. Pike had been part of a 12-member U.S. delegation that had just spent 32 days traveling nearly 10,000 miles across the Soviet Union to inspect Soviet farms while 12 Soviet officials were touring U.S. farms. Pike’s Sioux City talk was the first of more than a hundred lectures he would give over the next several years. Recalling the Soviets’ friendly welcome, Pike assured his audience that he had seen neither starving people nor preparations for war—chief concerns of Americans fearful of Soviet aggression.

Under Josef Stalin’s regime, few Americans had traveled to the Soviet Union since World War II. With the Soviet premier’s death in March 1953, Soviet leaders, especially Communist Party chairman Nikita Khrushchev, had begun to promote a policy of “peaceful coexistence.” As a result, more Americans were able to obtain visas. In 1953 and 1954, 101 private American citizens received permission from the Soviet government to travel to the Soviet Union; the number increased to several hundred in 1955, and by 1959 had climbed to 10,000. President Dwight Eisenhower viewed Soviet interest in exchange visits
favorably, but State Department secretary John Foster Dulles was reluctant to promote cultural ties, concerned that Soviets would have a propaganda advantage.¹

More than Winston Churchill’s “riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma,” the Soviet Union aroused fears of nuclear war and the spread of Communism. Soviet support for North Korea in the Korean War, coupled with Senator Joseph McCarthy’s charges of Communist influence in the United States, continued to affect American opinion of the Soviets. Yet, as the massive, mysterious nation began to emerge from its self-imposed isolation, many Americans were eager to know and understand its people and policies.

The 1955 agricultural delegations were designed to contribute to such mutual understanding. News reports of the agricultural exchanges, and lectures by Pike and his fellow delegates—including four Iowans—provided contemporary images of the Soviet Union. In speeches throughout Iowa and across the country, the delegates shared observations, opinions, and photographs and boasted that they had shown their hosts that Americans did not have horns—an expression Soviets had repeatedly used about themselves to welcome the delegation. Their talks offered firsthand insights on the closed country and helped generate more hopeful interest in the Soviet Union and its people, as did the simultaneous tour of U.S. farms by 12 Soviet officials. Historian Walter L. Hixson calls the 1955 agricultural delegations “a breakthrough in East-West exchange.”² J. D. Parks adds that although “no one assumed . . . that exchanging two dozen farmers was going to bridge the ideological gap separating the two nations . . . it was a start, and a promising one.”³

2. Hixson, Parting the Curtain, 104.
THE IMPETUS for the agricultural exchange was a *Des Moines Register* editorial by Lauren Soth on February 10, 1955. Soth was responding to a January 25 speech by Nikita Khrushchev before the Central Committee of the Communist Party in which he had praised the U.S. feed-livestock economy.4 Khrushchev disputed studies that claimed that “only a narrow belt . . . of the Soviet Union was suitable for corn growing.” He asserted that by increasing corn production in the Ukraine and elsewhere, and by launching the New Lands program in Kazakhstan and Siberia, the Soviets could increase feed for livestock, following the U.S. “corn-hog” model.5

Writing in what he later called “an idle and somewhat sportive mood,” Soth invited Russians to Iowa for “the lowdown,” promising to hide none of the state’s “secrets.”6 In turn, Iowans could visit the Soviet Union to share their farming know-how. Soth claimed no diplomatic authority but thought such visits had the potential to ease tensions. He doubted that either the Soviets or the U.S. government would allow such visits, even if they would make sense. To Soth’s surprise, Khrushchev was interested. A Tass correspondent stationed in New York had cabled Soth’s editorial, reprinted in the *Christian Science Monitor* on February 19, to Moscow. Two weeks later, Ambassador Charles Bohlen wired Secretary Dulles that *Agri-culture* (the Soviet Union Ministry of Agriculture newspaper) supported the exchanges.7

Caught off guard the following day at a press conference, President Eisenhower responded affirmatively when asked if he supported a visit by Russians to inspect Iowa’s corn and hogs.

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6. Lauren Soth, “A Little Editorial—Big Results,” Lauren K. Soth Papers, RS 16/03/54, University Archives, Special Collections, Iowa State University Library, Ames (hereafter cited as Soth Papers). It was common practice in 1955 to refer to all residents of the Soviet Union as “Russians”; where this article refers to “Russians” (as in the March 2, 1955, press conference with Eisenhower below), that is the term that was used by participants.
7. Telegram, Bohlen to Secretary of State, 3/1/1955, Central Decimal File 032 (Tours), Dept. of State, Record Group 59, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD (hereafter cited as NA).
Reiterating his position that Russians did not want war any more than Americans, Eisenhower concluded that he “couldn’t imagine anything better than to have . . . their agricultural people visit our agricultural people.” By asking the question, Fletcher Knebel, a reporter for Cowles Publications, the company that published the *Des Moines Register*, had compelled the president to end the official silence on the proposed Soviet visit.8

The State Department was less enthusiastic than Eisenhower about Soth’s invitation. At the same time, Ambassador Bohlen warned that Soviet newspapers were labeling the State Department’s reticence as proof that the real Iron Curtain existed in the United States, not in the Soviet Union.9 Given these circumstances, State Department officials advised that the time was psychologically ripe for an exchange, if the *Des Moines Register* agreed to sponsor the Soviets’ visit and an exchange could be ensured.10

On March 10 the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs formally requested the U.S. view of an agricultural exchange, citing its support.11 Behind the scenes, State Department officials worked to resolve the difficulties involved in such a project. When the Attorney General rejected the *Des Moines Register* as sponsor, the State Department approached Iowa State College (ISC), which agreed to help with technical arrangements.12 Finally, on

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9. Telegram, Bohlen to Secretary of State, 3/3/1955, NA.

10. Memo, Robert Murphy to the Under Secretary re Visit to the United States of Soviet Corn-Hog Specialists, 3/8/1955, NA. Writing to an associate, Soth complained, “As I expected, the cautious boys in the State Department are carefully saying nothing and sounding as though they are afraid of the idea.” Soth to Robert E. Kennedy, Chief Editorial Writer, Chicago Sun-Times, 3/3/1955, Soth Papers.

11. Translation of Soviet Note No. 21, 3/10/1955, NA.

12. James H. Hilton, president, Iowa State College, to John Foster Dulles, 3/31/1955, NA. In 1959 ISC became Iowa State University. To date, I have not been able to locate any information on why the Attorney General rejected the *Des Moines Register* as a sponsor.
April 22, the State Department instructed the American Embassy in Moscow to inform the Soviets that a farm delegation could enter the United States during the summer. The one caveat was that the Soviet delegates must agree to submit to the fingerprinting required under U.S. law for non-official visits.\textsuperscript{13} Less than two weeks later the State Department revised its position on fingerprinting. Embassy staff had convinced Washington that, given the importance of the exchange, an alternative should be offered: if the Soviets were unwilling to comply with the U.S. policy, the government could authorize official visas and eliminate the need for fingerprinting. Eager to study U.S. farming firsthand, the Soviets agreed to send only officials, eliminating the need for fingerprinting but confirming American cynics’ views that the Communist government would never allow real farmers to visit the United States.\textsuperscript{14}

PUBLIC RESPONSE to Soth’s proposal reflected the range of popular opinions on the Soviet Union, with Americans intrigued by or fearful of (or both) a visit by Communists. Newspapers across the country carried wire stories about the exchange, often reporting that Soth had originated the idea. Most commentators focused on the Soviet visit to the United States, mentioning the American delegation only in passing, if at all. Individuals soon queried government agencies for details and volunteered their services as delegates.

To some Americans, Khrushchev’s praise of America’s corn and hogs merely obscured the agricultural crisis facing the Soviet Union. To them, Soth’s suggestion was thus irresponsible—sharing farm knowledge was akin to aiding an enemy who would become stronger and hence more of a threat. Although concerns over another world war—trending upwards since World War II—had dropped slightly by early 1955, 64 percent of Americans believed that there would be a major war with the

\textsuperscript{13} Telegram, Herbert Hoover Jr., Acting Secretary of State, to American Embassy, Moscow, 4/22/1955, NA.

\textsuperscript{14} See, among other communications, telegram, Walworth Barbour, Department of State, to the American Embassy, Moscow, 5/3/1955, NA. These arrangements saved the Soviets the need to protest the fingerprint requirement, which applied to citizens but not to government officials.
Soviet Union “sooner or later.” At the same time, more than half of respondents familiar with the Soviet term “peaceful coexistence” thought it was a good policy for the United States. In the two years since Stalin’s death, many Westerners sensed a slight thaw in the Cold War.15

Soth’s proposal reflected that optimism: knowledge of Iowa’s good life, he wrote, “can only benefit the world and us. . . . It might even persuade [the Soviets] that there is a happier future in developing a high level of living than in this paralyzing race for more and more armaments.”16 Soth and others repeatedly reassured naysayers that American agricultural expertise was already freely available to Soviets through journals and technical bulletins.

Newspapers and magazines weighed in on the value and feasibility of the exchanges. To the Washington Post, “an invitation to the Russian farmers, who have already indicated willingness to come, would seem to be imperative to enlightened diplomacy.” The New York Times reflected on the Iron Curtain label flung at the United States by Soviets and advised admitting the farmers.17 The Des Moines Register proclaimed, “No Iron Curtain Needed Around Iowa,” speculating that State Department underlings feared the taint of Communism should they support the tour.18

For Iowans, the debate had an immediacy that surpassed any abstract musings in the national press. The Soviets were coming to their towns, farms, and front porches. In the Marion Sentinel, former Cedar Rapids Gazette editor Verne Marshall complained of American gullibility, calling the proposal impressive “only to those who still believe the Communists will not bite the hand that feeds them.” A week later Gazette publisher Ralph Young fired back that farmers might make better

18. “No Iron Curtain Needed Around Iowa,” Des Moines Register, 3/4/1955. The fear was rooted in charges that “the State Department has been said to have been infiltrated by Communists,” an obvious reference to Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy’s hunt for Communists.
diplomats than Washington insiders and that a firsthand view of American freedom and standards could be a powerful incentive for change.¹⁹ For the Waterloo Courier, offering technical assistance to Soviet farmers was akin to providing strategic war materiel. Parsing the implications, it concluded that such assistance could be justified “only on the grounds that the more personal and friendly contacts there are among people the less the likelihood of war.” The Cedar Rapids Gazette was similarly unimpressed. Blaming collectivization for destroying farmers’ pride, it judged the visits futile until Soviets agreed to restore free enterprise.²⁰

By April 29, Soth could count 42 editorials from across the country supporting his proposal and 4 against. In 113 letters-to-the-editor collected by Soth, the percentage of unfavorable responses was higher but still less than half. Out of 56 received to date from Iowans, only 16 opposed the exchange and 7 were neutral.²¹ Emotions ran high in the letters. Correspondents voiced concerns about the potential harm of allowing Communists into the country. To some, food was “as much a weapon as munitions.”²² The trip was called a propaganda trap, and Soth was variously dumb, naïve, or treasonous. Writers either worried about Soviet spies or advised others “not to be afraid of their own shadows.” A national Gallup poll found that 62 percent of midwesterners thought a Russian delegation to the United States was a good idea, compared to 55 percent across the country; among U.S. farmers, support dropped to 49 percent.²³

Eisenhower and the departments of State and Agriculture soon heard from constituents. Farmers from North Carolina, Texas, Washington, and Oklahoma, among other states, were eager to join the delegation. Most wrote directly to Dulles or

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²². See, for example, L. S. Forrest, “Reader Opposes the Plan; Says Food Is a Weapon,” Des Moines Register, 3/4/1955.

Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson, although some requests were passed on by members of Congress. By mid-May, State Department officials reported that the number of citizens expressing interest far exceeded the number of anticipated delegates. Protestors also chimed in, concerned about Soviets entering the United States. A petition signed by several hundred Cedar Rapids residents protested the potential for “espionage and . . . endanger[ment].” A New Yorker worried that farm visits would be the “the perfect opportunity for them to leave us a legacy of bacteria which would ruin our crops and soils” and suggested instead sending technical materials “by the car load.”

THE STATE DEPARTMENT repeatedly emphasized that the American delegation to the Soviet Union would have no official status. To underscore the point, the department announced that a nongovernmental committee would choose the delegates — effectively removing itself from political pressure as well as the thankless job of sifting through letters.

In early June the Agriculture and State departments asked land-grant colleges and national farm organizations to nominate potential delegates. Colleges were asked to identify their best candidates, detailing their qualifications and justifying their inclusion. Nominees should be competent in specific areas, such as wheat, corn, livestock, irrigated cotton, soils, agricultural machinery, or agricultural research. Additional qualifications included analytical ability; farming experience; good

26. Telegram, Secretary of State to the American Embassy, Moscow, 5/19/1955, NA.
27. Nominations were solicited from the National Farmers Union, National Grange, National Council of Farmers Cooperatives, and the American Farm Bureau Federation. True D. Morse, Acting Secretary of Agriculture, to James Patton, president, National Farmers Union; Herschel D. Newsom, master, National Grange; Homer L. Brinkley, executive vice president, National Council of Farmers Cooperatives; and Charles Shuman, president, American Farm Bureau Federation, 6/3/1955, Foreign Relations 5, Entry 17, Record Group 16, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
physical condition; and being native-born American with “sober, mature, and well-balanced personalities.” The yet-to-be-named selection committee would not discriminate on the basis of color, creed, or ethnic origin and was interested in “various age groups from different economic strata.” Nevertheless, because the trip would be unofficial, delegates would be expected to pay their own costs, estimated at the time at $2,500 (approximately $20,000 in today’s dollars).28

Three weeks later the Agriculture Department (USDA) announced the selection committee: J. Stuart Russell, farm editor, *Des Moines Register*; Homer L. Brinkley, executive vice president, National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, Washington, D.C.; and Russell I. Thackrey, executive secretary, Association of Land-Grant Colleges and Universities, Washington, D.C. They met in Washington, D.C., on June 21 and 22 to make their selections. Soth had already begun lobbying the Agriculture Department for an all-Iowa contingent. His editorial had specifically suggested sending Iowa farmers, and he believed the exchange could be a showcase for ISC faculty.29

On June 22 the State and Agriculture departments jointly announced the delegation. The committee selected Soth; Herbert W. Pike, farmer, Whiting, Iowa; John Marion Steddom, farmer, Grimes, Iowa; Ralph Ainslee Olsen, farmer, Ellsworth, Iowa; Charles J. Hearst, farmer, Cedar Falls, Iowa; W. V. Lambert, dean of the College of Agriculture, University of Nebraska; D. Gale Johnson, associate professor of agricultural economics, University of Chicago; Asa V. Clark, farmer, Pullman, Washington; Ferris Owen, farmer, Newark, Ohio; John M. Jacobs, farmer, Phoenix, Arizona; and J. M. Kleiner, distributor of agricultural products, Nampa, Idaho. Despite the apparent geographical diversity of the selected delegates, five resided in


29. Lauren Soth to Gwynn Garnett, Director, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, USDA, 6/1/1955, Soth Papers.
Iowa and four more had an Iowa connection by birth, education, or both. With international experience and past service as the Department of Agriculture’s research director, Lambert was appointed to lead the delegation.30

The five Iowa delegates had spent most of their lives in the state. Soth, age 44, had been born in Sibley. After earning a bachelor’s degree in agricultural journalism from ISC in 1932, he taught at the college for 14 years and received a master of science degree in agricultural economics in 1938. Soth served as an army major in Korea and the Philippines during World War II. By 1955 he had been working as an editorial writer for the Des Moines Register for seven years and had been promoted to editor of the editorial pages the previous year.31

Charles Hearst had already participated in one international agricultural mission. In 1947 he had toured Europe with an Iowa Farm Bureau group investigating the food situation and the Marshall Plan’s potential to address war-torn countries’ needs.32 Hearst, 51, lived near Cedar Falls all his life, farming Maplehears, the family’s 580-acre cattle-hog farm. He graduated from Iowa State Teachers College and had served as county Farm Bureau president and a member of the county board of education.

After graduating with a degree in animal husbandry from ISC in 1923, Ralph Olsen returned to his hometown of Ellsworth to raise hogs and cattle on 940 acres. Olsen, 54, was an active proponent of cooperatives. In 1955 he was director of a local grain marketing cooperative and president of both a regional cooperative soybean processing association and the Iowa Institute of Cooperatives.33


31. The June 22, 1955, joint news release provided brief biographical statements on each of the delegates. Additional information on Soth is from Current Biography 1956 (New York, [1956?]), 594–95.


33. Frank Robotka, ISC, to J. K. Stern, American Institute of Cooperation, 6/14/1955, Ralph A. Olsen Papers, RS 21/7/55, Special Collections, Iowa State University Library, Ames (herafter cited as Olsen Papers).
Also a leader in farm organizations, delegate Marion Steddom, 53, raised a thousand hogs per year on his 400-acre farm near Granger. Steddom had been named an Iowa Master Swine Producer in 1943 and was president of the Iowa Swine Producers Association. In 1922 he had completed a two-year agricultural course at ISC. He had spent seven years working for the USDA on barberry eradication in Iowa.34

Whiting native Herb Pike farmed 700 acres of the family farm, producing corn, hogs, and soybeans. Pike, 44, had studied at ISC, earning a bachelor’s degree in agriculture (1933) and a

master’s degree in economics (1939). Before his stateside service in World War II, he had worked as a farm manager and an insurance company appraiser. Like Steddom, he had earned distinction as an Iowa Master Swine Producer.  

The Iowa connection ran strong among the other delegates. D. Gale Johnson, 39, the University of Chicago professor, had been born in Vinton. Both his bachelor’s and doctorate degrees in agricultural economics were from ISC, where he had taught from 1938 to 1944. Arizonan John Jacobs, who turned 58 during the tour, was originally from Johnson County, Iowa; and Lambert had taught genetics at ISC from 1923 to 1936.

On July 6, the USDA announced the final delegate, William E. Reed, 43, dean of the School of Agriculture at North Carolina Agricultural and Technical College in Greensboro. A Louisiana native, he had earned a master’s degree in soils science at ISC in 1941 (and a doctorate from Cornell University). Reed was the only African American delegate. By 1955 he had served as a Foreign Service Officer in Liberia.

The delegates had less than a month to prepare for their July 12 departure. The farmers in the group finished midsummer chores and made arrangements for the rest of the season. Delegates applied for passports and Soviet visas. Lambert flew to Washington to finalize the itinerary while delegates debated which type of camera was best and whether they would even be allowed to take photographs (they were).

On July 11 and 12 the delegation gathered in Washington for briefings with officials from the State and Agriculture departments. While such discussions were not unusual for international travelers, a news conference was out of the ordinary, as was the vodka toast at the Soviet embassy—the latter a fore-

35. Monona County, Iowa: Monona County History (1982), 371.
36. Agriculture Department, Press Release, 7/6/1955, Hearst Papers. Reed’s inclusion was most likely the result of a conversation between American Embassy Chargé d’Affaires W. N. Walmsley and African American journalist William Worthy, who was visiting Moscow. Worthy recommended that the delegation include a Negro, as he was often asked about the “race problem” in the United States; Telegram, Walmsley to Secretary of State, 6/28/1955, NA. As dean of a land-grant college, Reed had nominated a local Farm Bureau employee, but the committee instead asked him to participate. Interview by D. W. Colvard, 2/14/1980, William and Mattye Reed Collection, Smithsonian National Museum of African American History and Culture, Washington, DC.
shadowing of what soon would become routine. Pledging that the delegates would keep their eyes and minds open and their “ears unplugged,” Lambert listed the delegation’s goals for reporters. Its primary objective was to evaluate Soviet agriculture—its progress, techniques, potential, research, and marketing. The remaining goals—meeting and sharing with Russian farmers and planting “a few seeds of understanding and good will”—would become equally important.37

In Washington the group was joined by two journalists. The State Department had originally argued that reporters’ presence might restrict American access. Reporters wanted in, however, and NBC broadcaster Irving R. Levine forced the issue. Levine prowled the halls of the State Department, determined to get approval. Stonewalled, he sent a telegram to Khrushchev; the party chairman okayed his visa before State had even authorized the exchanges. Once Levine’s success was known, the State Department approved Moscow-based correspondents from the New York Times, the International News Service, and the United Press, and the Soviets acquiesced.38

The second U.S.-based journalist was farm broadcaster Herbert Plambeck from WHO-Des Moines. In May Plambeck had begun lobbying the State and Agriculture departments to be included in the delegation. Disappointed to be excluded, he applied for a visa as a correspondent. On July 7, he wrote in his journal that he had “given up on the idea,” but the next day recorded a hectic schedule as he learned that his visa had at last been approved.39 (Soth, who wrote occasional articles during the trip, participated as a delegate and waited until after the tour to prepare in-depth commentaries.)

On July 12 the twelve delegates—plus Levine and Plambeck—traveled to New York to catch a flight to London. From there they flew to Helsinki and then on to Moscow for the start

38. Moscow-based American reporters covering parts of the tour were Charles Klensch (International News Service), Kenneth Brodney (United Press), and Welles Hangen (New York Times).
of their 32-day tour. Arriving in the Soviet capital, they spent a few days visiting the usual tourist sites: the All-Union Agricultural Exhibition, Bolshoi Ballet, and a nearby collective farm. Over the next five weeks, the delegates would visit Soviet regions that had been closed to Westerners for more than a decade.

THROUGHOUT MAY AND JUNE, U.S. and Soviet officials had negotiated the Americans’ itinerary in the Soviet Union. The American delegates wanted to visit the Ukraine, the Kuban, Uzbekistan, and the new lands area of Kazakhstan and western Siberia, and the Soviets agreed to include those regions in the itinerary. The Soviets also gave permission for Horace J. Davis, an economic officer and agricultural specialist at the American embassy in Moscow, to accompany the group. (Prior to the delegation’s tour, Davis had seen only one farm, a collective near Moscow.) Soviet officials repeatedly assured the embassy that delegates would be allowed to see what they wanted to see.

With Intourist, the Soviet travel agency, making transportation and accommodation arrangements, embassy staff requested enough surface travel to allow close observations. Background briefings had familiarized delegates with the differences between the state and collective farms and machine tractor stations they would visit. In 1955 the Soviet Union had 89,000 collective farms, averaging 15,300 acres each. Created from consolidated estates and peasant farms after the 1917 Russian Revolution, the collective farms paid workers based on the success of crops; equipment was shared by neighboring collective farms and stored and maintained by the country’s 9,000 machine tractor stations. The 5,000 state farms averaged 38,100 acres and paid workers a flat salary.40

On the evening of July 18, the delegates left Moscow by train for the eastern Ukraine. Arriving at Kharkov in the early afternoon, they were met by several thousand cheering residents. Lambert greeted the crowd with words that would be repeated throughout the tour: “This exchange of delegations is the beginning of stronger friendship and an interchange of ideas between

our two great countries.”41 Delegates began the pattern they would follow in each region: visits to state and collective farms as well as to a factory, park, or research institute. Everywhere they went friendly crowds shouted warm greetings and pressed close to see their first Americans.

At the Lenin’s Course Collective farm outside Kharkov, women farm workers gave delegates floral bouquets, a friendly gesture that proved mandatory at each of the nearly three dozen farms the delegates visited. Opening ceremonies often included the presentation of a salt cellar and a loaf of bread, traditional welcoming gifts for important guests. While look-alike bouquets and oversized bread loaves indicated that the gatherings might be less than spontaneous, the delegates and other western observers believed that the friendly curiosity was genuine.42

42. After a similar welcome outside Krasnodar, Levine observed workers climbing into trucks for the 30-mile trek back to their factory; he concluded
The delegates proved courteous guests, sitting down to massive meals and toasting peace, friendship, their hosts, and even reporters. The Soviets often provided mealtime entertainment. Perhaps not surprisingly after a dozen toasts, the hosts and guests serenaded each other—the Soviets singing the “Volga Boatmen” and the Americans offering “Home on the Range” and the “Iowa Corn Song.” Despite hours spent socializing, the delegates took detailed notes on each of the farms and research institutes they visited.

Their next stop was the Dnieper River hydroelectric station near Zaporozhe and a look at farms irrigated by the plant. The delegates then flew to Odessa, a northern Black Sea port. Arriving in a storm, they were thanked by the welcoming party for bringing the rain, a worker adding, “This will help our harvest, and I mean corn.”

In Odessa the group spent several hours at the All-Union Lysenko Institute of Plant Selection and Genetics. The Americans linked Trofim Lysenko’s theories on heredity to Soviet difficulties to produce hybrid corn varieties. Lysenko had argued that heredity could be altered by “educating the plant” to grow in a new environment, thus allowing certain species to become more suitable to Soviet conditions (a view that meshed well with Stalin’s theories). Although Lambert thanked the institute for its “important research,” he told staffers that U.S. botanists had rejected these theories.

On the 8,500-acre Budenny Collective Farm outside Odessa, the delegates inspected their first workers’ homes. The small sandstone buildings were clean and neat but lacked floors or in-

that their enthusiasm was genuine even if their appearance was not impromptu. Script draft beginning “The unique tour of the American farmers,” undated, Irving R. Levine Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.


door plumbing. After a big midday meal, they visited a family who proudly displayed their home. Because the women had prepared dinner, the delegates felt obligated to eat again. They then returned to Odessa for a farewell meal presented by the Ukrainian Ministry of Agriculture.45

The unrelenting hospitality began to take its toll. The combination of too much food and alcohol caused upset stomachs that confined some delegates to their hotel rooms. The lengthy midday meals also cut into the time available to inspect the farms. Joking at first about expanding waistlines, delegates soon complained to the Soviet officials accompanying the tour.46

46. Olsen’s recitation of a Ukrainian dinner is typical: “caviar from sturgeon and salmon, two kinds of sardines and three other kinds of fish, cold roast beef, chicken, cheeses, tomatoes, cucumbers, hard-boiled eggs, onions, two kinds of bread, butter...pastry with ground beef...clear hot soup...broiled beef filet and small buttered potatoes...ice cream and a fancy three-layer burnt sugar cake.” Ralph Olsen, “Here’s Bill of Fare that Faced Americans in Russia,” Cedar Rapids Gazette, 8/3/1955.
A reprieve from the excessive banqueting came as the delegates sailed across the Black Sea from Odessa to Novorossisk. Along the way they stopped at Yalta, site of the 1945 meeting between Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt. There they spotted anti-American billboards depicting Uncle Sam ready to wage atomic warfare, which the Soviets nervously allowed them to photograph. Ten thousand cheering people jammed the docks at Novorossisk as the delegation tried to disembark. The delegates conceded that they were beginning to feel “more like heroes than plain dirt farmers.” The group was intent on focusing on the farms and avoiding the prolonged meals, which were estimated to have taken up a third of their time.⁴⁷

Treated to another lengthy lunch—complete with champagne—at a vineyard near Novorossisk, the delegates were in no mood for another grape farm the next day. As Horace Davis reported later, the Soviets always gave excuses for why itinerary changes were impossible. On July 31, Soth and Johnson faced down their Soviet handlers, determined to choose which farms they would see. They were finally allowed to split into two groups—one going to the champagne vineyard and the other allowed to make two unscheduled visits to farms between Novorossisk and Krasnodar. Their surprise forays revealed farms less successful than the others they had toured.⁴⁸ At Krasnodar, a crowd estimated at 10,000–20,000 met the delegation. They again split into two groups to maximize their observations.

As the group explored farms in the North Caucasus foothills area, agriculture took priority, with the delegates happily munching sandwiches between visits. Freed from the niceties imposed by previous farms’ hospitality, they began to ask more questions and speak freely about the shortcomings they witnessed. Observations often focused on the farms’ large workforces. To farmers used to working the land with the aid of one

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or two hired men, the sight of dozens of workers in the fields proved curious. They were also both amazed and disturbed by the large number of women engaged in heavy labor on farms and in factories.49

After visiting Stalingrad and farms in the Volga Valley region, the delegation flew to central Asia. Near Tashkent, Uzbekistan, they visited irrigated cotton farms just 200 miles from China’s border. With their tour coming to an end, the group flew to Alma Ata in Kazakhstan. Despite efforts to shorten time in the western regions to allow for more study of the new lands, the delegates were allotted only a few days there. One group explored farms in Akmolinsk, while the other headed to Rubisovsk in Siberia, where the delegates likened workers to

49. Plambeck reported that at least 60 percent of the farm laborers they had seen were women, owing both to labor policies and the loss of working-age men during World War II. Herb Plambeck, “U.S. Visitors to Soviet Union See Many Women Laborers,” Christian Science Monitor, 8/17/1955.
America’s western pioneers. While voicing concerns about the area’s climate and low rainfall, the delegates concluded that the virgin lands could produce the grains crops Khrushchev desired.

The flight back to Moscow was more than 1,300 miles. There the delegates presented their observations and recommendations to Soviet agriculture officials. Among their concerns was the excessive use of farm labor and lack of incentives for workers. Specific suggestions included planting sorghum and legumes rather than corn in areas of insufficient rainfall, and using terracing and contour plowing to combat erosion. Rural adult education, particularly for women, was stressed as a means to improve living conditions and family and home management. Not surprisingly, the delegates encouraged future exchanges of farmers, scientists, technical specialists, and students.50

Soth also reiterated the delegates’ grievances. Sweetening his criticisms, he complimented Soviet hospitality and arrangements that had allowed them to see the country’s major agricultural regions. Soth again complained about the fixed schedule. He reminded the officials that they had failed to provide the promised statistical information necessary to better appraise the visited farms as part of the whole system. One petulant Soviet official claimed that the tour was not an “ironclad one that you had to follow blindly.” Speaking extemporaneously, the minister of state farms offered a few rough agriculture statistics, admitting that 1955’s grain harvest was expected to fall short of its goals. He accepted the Americans’ criticisms and promised that if they returned in two years “they would find that many of their suggestions had been implemented.”51

After visiting 25 collective farms, 9 state farms, 4 machine tractor stations, 2 hydroelectric plants, and assorted factories and research institutes, the delegates were ready to head home. They had gathered information on Soviet agriculture in regions usually off limits to Westerners and had successfully served as goodwill ambassadors.

51. Ibid.
AS THE AMERICANS concluded their journey, the Soviet officials’ U.S. tour was also winding down. Their travels had taken them from Iowa to Nebraska, South Dakota, Minnesota, Illinois, Michigan, and California. Headed by First Deputy Minister of Agriculture Vladimir M. Matskevich, the group included experts in economics, scientific research, and farm machinery, as well as officials representing state and collective farms and machine tractor stations. They were—in the words of New York Times reporter Harrison Salisbury, recently returned from six years in Moscow—some of the “most influential men in the Soviet Union.”

ISC officials were determined to show the Iowa way by taking the Soviets to family farms. For two weeks, the Soviet delegation toured farms around the state. They ate meals with farm families, inspected their fields and livestock, and, in Jefferson, slept in families’ homes and attended their churches.

Unspoken parallels between the delegations appeared in the press—as much a factor of human nature as journalistic zeal. Curious, cheering crowds met the visitors. Charles Hearst tried out a tractor in Pereshchepino while Aleksandr Ezheviski drove one in Polk County. The “Iowa Corn Song” and “Volga Boatmen” were heard in the Ukraine and in Cedar Rapids. Russians tried on Indian headdresses in South Dakota; Americans modeled silk robes in Kazakhstan. Meals were a central motif in stories of both delegations: in the United States, picnic suppers of fried chicken, mashed potatoes, and lemonade replaced the lavish banquets washed down with vodka served to the American delegates.

Differences emerged, too. Obliging guests, the Soviets could change their schedules at will and break off on separate expeditions. American journalists outnumbered the Russian delegates eight to one in Iowa; only five reporters followed the Americans in the Soviet Union, although the group’s numbers swelled with Soviet press, officials, interpreters, and Intourist staff.

Throughout their stay Soviets commented on American friendliness and hospitality. Unlike their counterparts, they came face-to-face with protestors—one picketing their visit, another protesting Iowa racism—their presence reinforcing the freedoms the Soviets’ hosts were heralding. Likewise, the absence of State

and Agriculture department employees—with the exception of interpreters who were, unfortunately, unfamiliar with agricultural terms—underscored the independence of American farmers.

Matskevich later commented in a Soviet journal that the Soviet officials had come to learn about hybrid corn, machinery, and livestock production. Delegates saw practices they would apply to Soviet agriculture, such as hybrid seed and hog production and labor-saving devices. Declining to detail American shortcomings, he attributed U.S. advances to its escape from the ravages of war. What made the deepest impression, he said,
were the farmers and researchers themselves: “ordinary men and women of America who want peace . . . to pool experience, to do business.”

THE AMERICAN DELEGATES returned home as minor celebrities. Wire service reports had ensured that their photos, stories, and quotes would run in both national and small-town newspapers (often coupled with news of the touring Soviets). Fresh from their trip, Ralph Olsen and Gale Johnson appeared on the televised *American Forum*, interviewed by then Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz and Hershel Newsome of the National Grange. Lambert was grilled on *Meet the Press*. The top story was the delegates’ finding that there was no agricultural crisis in the Soviet Union. Reporters questioned the validity of such a conclusion based on a short guided tour; the delegates remained steadfast in their assessment. They also acknowledged their primary role as goodwill ambassadors. Pike endured an in-depth inquiry by *U.S. News and World Report* interviewers, whom he met in Berlin before returning home. The September 19 issue of *Life* ran an eight-page feature on the exchanges, including delegates’ photos and Lambert’s critique.

During the tour, several Iowans had sent home dispatches describing their adventures. Affiliating with wire services offered a way to begin to recoup the tour’s high costs, which ultimately averaged $3,000 per delegate. Hearst reported for the Associated Press, earning $300 for two stories. Pike authored his own stories during the tour for KVTV in Sioux City, sending letters and Polaroid pictures by airmail to the station.

Once home, the delegates were swamped with lecture requests. Talks included their slides of the tour, supplemented by

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photographs and a film provided by the Soviets. Lambert distributed a film produced by the University of Nebraska that he sometimes used in lieu of personal appearances. As private citizens, the delegates could speak their minds, using their own experience, education, and knowledge to interpret what they had seen. The State Department distributed background information but did not try to directly influence what the delegates reported. Lest the delegates forget, however, State Department fact sheets repeatedly stressed that the Communist Party dictated all policies as the Soviet Union’s “master, teacher, and supervisor.”

Everyone—local farm bureaus, colleges, churches, Kiwanis and 4-H clubs, state and national associations—wanted to hear from the delegates. Altogether, the Iowa delegates presented more than a thousand lectures over the next several years. Their schedules reveal nearly daily entries for speeches around Iowa and into neighboring states. The delegates assured listeners that they saw no impending food crisis or preparations for war. Emphasizing their friendly reception, they showed slides of the people and farms and explained how Soviet agriculture functioned.

“Communism seems to be working for them even if I don’t like it,” declared Marion Steddom on his return home. As head of the Iowa Swine Producers Association, Steddom was in high demand with swine farmers and county and state associations. By July 1956, he had given 168 lectures in 16 states. In his journal, Steddom had reflected on the damage war had done in the Soviet Union and its impact on the Soviet people. On July 27 he wrote, “Wherever we go in Russia the same questions by the man on the street, do you think there is going to be another war? War has an even more terrible meaning for the people of Russia than it has for the people of [the] United States (if that is possible). War has been a reality. Cities blown to pieces, whole communities evacuated. People leaving all their personal possessions to the invaders. Families separated and perhaps never reunited.”


Unashamedly opening his lectures with “a little flag waving,” Ralph Olsen spoke of his gratitude at being an independent farmer and for having the opportunities he and his audience shared. Olsen reported that curiosity had driven his decision to participate; he would have given his right arm to participate but “instead saved his arm and paid $3,000.” In his American Forum appearance, Olsen reiterated that the Russians did not have a current food shortage. He spoke admiringly of the Soviet education system’s ability to easily disburse information to young people, although he assured his interviewers that he was not enthused by its other aspects. As he became further removed from his interaction with the Soviet people, Olsen became more critical. Describing the individual plots of land provided to farmers, he reported that many did not take advantage of them —either from transportation difficulties, time constraints, or because “the workers are just plain lazy.”

Another prolific speaker among the Iowa delegates was Charles Hearst. His wife, Gladys, fielded invitations during his absence, notifying correspondents that September lectures had been scheduled before he left; by September, he was booked through February. Hearst’s audiences ranged from Iowa farm bureaus, Rotary clubs, and extension offices to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce World Affairs Forum and an agricultural meeting of the American Bankers Association. A member of the chamber’s Foreign Policy Committee, he spoke of his concern that the small Communist Party could dictate policy when so many people were friendly toward America. “Of course the places we visited were carefully selected and advanced preparations made,” lectured Hearst. “But no government, no matter how tyrannical or despotic can order and get the kind of friendly curiosity . . . that we received so often.” He detailed farms they visited—with particular attention to the corn crops—as well as workers’ assignments, salaries, and housing.


A day after leaving the Soviet Union, Herb Pike shared his experiences in a wide-ranging *U.S. News and World Report* interview. Despite having just completed six weeks of intense travel, Pike gave detailed and thoughtful responses to a range of questions requiring both observation and opinion. The editors repeatedly asked about the food crisis and war preparations, but Pike did not take the bait. He conceded that the Soviets’ diet was monotonous but saw no one undernourished. To Pike, the farms’ regimentation was reminiscent of his time in the army: everybody following orders and too many bureaucrats. Impressed with the progress being made, he saw that the people lacked the individual freedoms that “‘decadent’ Capitalism”
allowed and advised promoting democracy by emphasizing citizens’ rights.\footnote{What’s Wrong with Russia’s Farms,” U.S. News and World Report, 9/2/1955, 28; Herb Pike, “Russia was an eye-opener,” Town Journal, Sept. 1955, 32–33, 88–89.}

Pike wrote about his experiences for the Town Journal and Doane’s Agricultural Digest and lectured throughout the Midwest. His views remained consistent over the next several years in speeches and articles. Pike spoke passionately about the need for young people to pursue challenging coursework, particularly in light of a Soviet system that rewarded similar efforts. Two years before the reaction to Sputnik revitalized American science education, Pike urged students to take courses in physics, engineering, and foreign languages.\footnote{Pike, “Russia was an eye-opener”; Herb Pike, “Special Report on Farming in Russia,” Doane Agricultural Digest, 9/15/1955; Speech transcripts, Pike Papers.}
Like Pike, Lauren Soth immediately reflected on the tour experience in the press. In 12 hard-hitting articles penned in West Berlin and wired to the *Des Moines Register*, he detailed Soviet agriculture’s progress and shortcomings, interactions with Soviets, the country’s poor sanitation and safety, lack of consumer goods, women workers, Communism, and thought control. Soth pulled no punches in his close scrutiny of Soviet life. Perhaps to overcome the relative lightheartedness of his original editorial or out of frustration at being denied free movement, he provided detailed assessments that are unrelenting in their criticism: the Soviet workers’ paradise as a “cruel jest”; the importance of remembering Soviet brutalities in the face of glad handing; the “paralyzing sameness” of proffered entertainment; “the machinery of party indoctrination and control . . . in fine working order.” In later speeches and articles, Soth continued to provide in-depth analyses of Soviet agriculture and life but toned down some of his harsher observations. Outlining shortcomings ranging from inefficiencies and lack of incentives to outdated theories and long-distance decision-making, he emphasized the importance of sharing American know-how and its potential influence on the Soviet system. Soth’s tour articles appeared in *Chemurgic Digest*, *The New Republic*, and the *Illinois Banker*, among others.62

In 1956 Soth won the Pulitzer Prize for Editorial Writing for his invitation to the Russian farmers. Some correspondents and newspapers continued to voice their disapproval of the exchange, however. Among the backhanded compliments was the *Mason City Globe-Gazette*’s response: “We have a limited enthusiasm for anything which seems to be providing a crutch to history’s illest-odored political philosophy, Communism. But that doesn’t detract a whit from our pride in the honor Lauren Soth has brought to our state.”63


Broadcasting from London on the return trip to the United States, Herb Plambeck reported that the group had “a million memories” of the “fast, rugged, sleep-defying trip.” He took seriously his role as a representative of farm reporters, offering films and broadcasts to stations around the country on his return. By December 1955, Plambeck reported, he had shared tapes with more than a thousand radio stations, given 85 talks to an estimated 45,000 listeners, and written articles for *Kiwanis International* and various farm publications.64

AS THE AMERICANS toured Moscow, Eisenhower met in Geneva with British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, French Prime Minister Edgar Faure, and Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin; Khrushchev was part of the Soviet entourage, his active presence signaling his growing importance. On the agenda were German reunification, disarmament, atomic energy, and cultural exchanges. Propelled by the “spirit of Geneva,” the leaders debated the issues to be ironed out by their foreign ministers in an upcoming meeting. In October and November they reconvened in Geneva. Again the subject of East-West contacts was raised. On October 31 Secretary of State Dulles announced that the United States would no longer require special validation to travel to the Soviet Union; with a passport and visa, Americans were free to visit behind the Iron Curtain. A day later the Soviets proposed a second agricultural tour of the United States. Because the Soviets knew that it would be impossible for the U.S. government to organize a second tour in one week as proposed, State Department officials believed that the Soviets wanted to make the U.S. government appear to be “blocking popular demands” by U.S. citizens for increased exchanges. The State Department thus instructed the Geneva contingent to use the request to illustrate the “difficulties of hit and miss programs.”65

For the many Americans who volunteered their services or suggested similar exchanges, the 1955 agricultural delegations offered hope that peaceful coexistence could be a reality as they

connected with Soviets through professional interests. Others were simply intrigued. Physicians, plumbers, businessmen, chambers of commerce, and Tupperware Party hostesses proposed trips before controls were lifted. Among those who traveled to the Soviet Union in the fall of 1955 was Roswell Garst of Coon Rapids. First Deputy Minister of Agriculture Vladimir M. Matskevich, who had headed the Russian delegation to the United States, had been impressed with Garst’s 2,300-acre farm and invited him to visit the Soviet Union. Garst sold hybrid corn seed to the Soviets and met with Khrushchev, who would later visit Garst’s farm in 1959.66

Horace Davis, the embassy attaché, believed that the information gathered on farms and machine tractor stations was “highly significant,” although “knowledge of the overall” agricultural system remained small.67 In six detailed confidential reports released over the next eight months, he reviewed his and the delegates’ many pages of notes. Both Davis and the embassy praised the caliber of the American group. Among the delegation’s successes was their “favorable impression” on Soviets and “superb job selling America and the American way of life.” Weighing the pros and cons, the embassy concluded that the exchange had been worthwhile from an American standpoint.68 The delegation had seen regions that had been closed to most Westerners since World War II.

While the State Department shared Davis’s reports with the FBI and CIA, anecdotal evidence suggests that the CIA may have taken an active role in intelligence gathering during the tour. NBC reporter Irving R. Levine always suspected that there was at least one CIA plant in the group.69 A 1956 letter from Marion


67. Memorandum, Horace J. Davis to Chargé d’Affaires, 9/21/1955, NA.

68. Foreign Service Despatch from the American Embassy, Moscow, to the State Dept., 3/25/1956, NA.

Steddom to the Internal Revenue Service may confirm his assumption. Steddom asked the IRS to allow a tax deduction for costs incurred as a delegate, citing his contributions to his country and the losses he took during harvest season. Although he could not divulge the details, he wrote that he and others were asked to collect vegetation “daily for later chemical analysis in order to determine the location of the places where Russia was testing the atom bomb.”

A recollection by Pike’s daughter may corroborate Steddom’s story. Nine years old in 1955, she distinctly recalls that before her father left, an important visitor from Washington arrived at their Whiting farmhouse in a two-seat convertible—a rare sight in the rural town of 700—for a private meeting with her father. Later she learned that the visitor had asked him to collect for analysis flower samples from the bouquets presented at each farm.

A first-person CIA report on the delegation’s observations, dated September 23, 1955, was delivered to the White House on November 4. Although the report is anonymous, the opening paragraphs nearly match the lead of Gale Johnson’s September 4 New York Times magazine article. Whether someone plagiarized Johnson’s article or he wrote the report himself is unknown.

70. [Marion Steddom] to the IRS, 7/26/1956, Steddom Papers. FOIA requests to the CIA and IRS to confirm Steddom’s claim have thus far been unsuccessful. However, a recently released document indicates early CIA interest in the delegation. Memorandum of Conversation, 3/14/1955, NA.


73. In March Johnson had broadcast a “pessimistic appraisal” of Khrushchev’s corn-planting program for Radio Liberty, an anti-Communist radio station sponsored by the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism; a 1971 U.S. Senate investigation confirmed that the committee had been covertly funded by the CIA for the past 18 years. New York Times, 3/14/1955, 4; ibid., 1/24/1971, 1. The CIA report also includes paragraphs identical to those in another article by Johnson: “Observations on the Economy of the U.S.S.R.” Journal of Political Economy 64 (1956), 185–211. Johnson continued teaching at the University of Chicago until 1998, authoring more than 300 books and articles. For Johnson’s contributions to economics, see John M. Antle and Daniel A. Sumner, eds., The Economics of Agriculture, vol. 1, Selected Papers of D. Gale Johnson, and vol. 2, Papers in Honor of D. Gale Johnson (Chicago, 1996).
Ultimately, the delegation’s importance rests not with the specific information collected but with the insights delegates provided to a curious, if nervous, American public. Like themselves, the Soviets met by the delegates desired peace and personal interactions. In speeches throughout the country, the Iowa delegates provided a new awareness of the Soviet Union for Americans hungry for reassurance as well as facts. The delegates’ assurances that Russians did not have horns helped spark a growing interest in what was behind the Iron Curtain, and their tour proved an early step in establishing East-West contacts. Three years later, in 1958, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Lacy-Zaroubin Agreement, which formally covered media, scientific, cultural, and tourist exchanges.

Analyzing the exchanges between U.S. and Soviet scientists, performers, and educators that followed Stalin’s death, historian Yale Richmond writes that such contacts must be given credit for contributing to the collapse of the Soviet Union.\(^\text{74}\) As one of the earliest exchanges, the 1955 American agricultural delegation to the Soviet Union helped pave the way for future contacts and formal agreements between the two nations.

\(^{74}\) Yale Richmond, *Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Curtain* (University Park, PA, 2003), 1–2.

Reviewer Thomas D. Thiessen is retired from his position as archeologist with the National Park Service’s Midwest Archeological Center, Lincoln, Nebraska.

This is the third published volume of the original journal kept by the German prince Maximilian Alexander Philipp of Wied-Neuwied, who, with the artist Karl Bodmer and huntsman David Dredoppel, traveled through much of the United States in 1832–1834. A trained naturalist, Maximilian recorded extensive notes about the flora and fauna he observed, as well as the landscape through which he traveled and especially the native cultures he encountered west of the Mississippi River. The resulting daily journal was the basis for his famous book, Reise in das Innere Nord-Amerika (Koblenz, 1839–1841), published after his return to Germany. Later editions appeared in French and English, but all three versions are condensed from his original journal, which contains much information not available in the published works. The original journal, translated into English, has been published in three volumes over the past six years. This final volume details his brief visit to Fort Union on the Missouri River in western North Dakota, the winter spent among the Mandan Indians at Fort Clark, his rapid descent of the Missouri in the spring and early summer of 1834, and his subsequent travel through the eastern United States and return to Germany.

The skillfully edited book contains hundreds of editorial footnotes that identify persons and places and the zoological, botanical, and other natural features Maximilian encountered. Also presented are the marginal and interlineated notes that the prince wrote in his journal. The prince’s numerous drawings from the journal are reproduced as facsimiles, often in color. Persons with professional or avocational interests in the flora, fauna, and native cultures of the northern and central plains region, in particular, will find much of value in this final volume of Prince Maximilian’s journals.

Reviewer Richard S. Taylor is the retired chief historian for the Historic Sites Division, Illinois Historic Preservation Agency. His publications include Western Colleges as “Securities of Intelligence and Virtue”: The Towne-Eddy Report of 1846 (1980).

Does the Midwest possess a distinctive regional culture worthy of study? Kenneth H. Wheeler thinks so and sets out in Cultivating Regionalism to identify and describe a distinctive cluster of typically midwestern attitudes and practices that he believes were fostered by the many small liberal arts colleges that proliferated across the region’s landscape in the nineteenth century. He does not presume to describe the regional culture as a whole, only certain important features of that culture hitherto neglected by scholars. The book draws on his 1999 dissertation but bears little resemblance to that work. Wheeler deserves credit for performing the arduous task of carefully selecting portions of his dissertation, supplementing them with further research, and reorganizing the whole into a concise, clearly written, and well-developed book.

Neither midwestern culture nor the small religiously affiliated liberal arts colleges with which Wheeler concerns himself have fared particularly well among historians. The analytical utility of place generally and region in particular has seemed trivial to scholars obsessed with race, class, and gender. Even those cognizant of regionalism as a useful category have preferred New England or the South to the Midwest. Some have doubted that a coherent midwestern culture exists, while others have criticized the region for what they perceive as its mind-numbing blandness and provincial conformity. Even those who have recognized the region’s remarkable diversity have ignored its particularity by dismissively characterizing it as a microcosm of America. But since the 1990s there has been a small yet unmistakable upsurge of scholarly interest in regionalism exemplified by Regionalism and the Humanities (2008), edited by Timothy Mahoney and Wendy J. Katz, and Indiana University Press’s The American Midwest: An Interpretive Encyclopedia (2007). Cultivating Regionalism makes a fine addition to that growing literature.

Historians have tended to describe the small nineteenth-century liberal arts colleges founded by religious denominations and local boosters in what is now the Midwest as projections of New England culture. Wheeler thinks not. He argues that they were fundamentally
home-grown institutions propagating indigenous values. Far removed from national centers of power and wealth, western college founders capitalized on state legislatures eager to grant charters and plunged into a democratic environment largely unfettered by tradition to create institutions nicely tailored to their small-town and rural constituents.

The manual labor programs that proved short-lived in the tradition-bound East and aristocratic South survived in western colleges long enough to integrate farming into student life, which fostered an anti-elitist producer ethic and laid a foundation for the later emergence of scientific agriculture as an academic discipline. Coeducation flourished in the West prior to the Civil War, providing opportunities for women and promoting egalitarian attitudes. Wheeler argues that midwestern colleges disseminated “a culture of usefulness” grounded in Protestantism’s drive to reform society and “a mostly middle-class emphasis on practical and productive labor for the common good” (54). He finds that western students were older, poorer, and more pious than their eastern and southern counterparts. Receptive to political diversity, they grew accustomed through their literary societies to wrestling with ideas and settling their differences democratically through debate, making them less likely to riot than students in other regions. Not surprisingly, midwestern liberal arts colleges were, by the close of the nineteenth century, producing more scientists than schools in any other region, which Wheeler traces to a pragmatic, hands-on empiricism and respect for scientific inquiry, again indigenous and traceable to the small colleges. He even speculates that midwestern culture flowered at the beginning of the twentieth century into “a common heartland consciousness” (89) that inspired the writers, social reformers, and scientists of the Progressive era.

Readers put off by the rather boosterish tone and thesis-driven character of Wheeler’s work should keep in mind that he claims only to be recovering certain neglected aspects of the region’s history, not to be telling the whole story, and that is a worthy undertaking given the contempt that many scholars have heaped upon the Midwest and its small colleges. Yet Cultivating Regionalism is thoughtful and suggestive rather than conclusive given the author’s heavy reliance on evidence drawn from what might be called the antebellum educational establishment of Congregationalist, Presbyterian, and Methodist colleges. His important insights deserve further testing relative to the smaller denominations and ethnic schools to which he devotes only passing attention and the Catholic institutions that he neglects entirely. Finally, his depiction of the early liberal arts college with its evangelical ethos
as democratic and science-friendly seems a bit overdrawn. Students of American religion, including Amanda Porterfield, Tracy Fessenden, and John Lardas Modern, are raising serious questions about Nathan Hatch’s evangelicalism-as-a-democratic-movement thesis, which has reigned triumphant for several decades and is built into Wheeler’s argument. And while the hands-on empiricism of the natural philosophy (science) taught in the old-time colleges may have inspired inventors and explorers, it drew on an understanding of moral and physical reality as divinely created, mechanical, and law-governed that ruled out the kind of open-ended skeptical inquiry upon which modern science depends.


Reviewer Bryon C. Andreasen is a research historian at the Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library & Museum. He has written several articles about religion during the Civil War.

Historians have written hundreds of volumes discussing the origin, course, and outcome of the Civil War. But the “absence of virtually any reference to religious forces in the standard Civil War narratives is remarkable,” suggests award-winning Civil War historian George C. Rable, adding that this “would have struck those in the Civil War generation as very odd” (396). Indeed, Rable’s thesis rests on the proposition that for many nineteenth-century Americans God’s intervention in human history was an unquestioned verity of life. Thus, “many people on both sides of the conflict turned to religious faith to help explain the war’s causes, course, and consequences” (9). This religious worldview provided a providential narrative that “offered ways to give all the bloodshed some higher and presumably nobler purpose” (9).

This book is an ambitious comprehensive religious history of the war covering both the North and the South, the battle front and the home front, soldiers and civilians, clergy and laity, men and women. Rable provides a cross section of denominational and theological perspectives that reaches beyond the dominant voices of the evangelical Protestant denominations and their ministers and theologians to include Catholics, Jews, and others. But the book is much more than just a wartime history of the churches.

Rable begins by reviewing the religious state of America going into the war, noting that religious faith had provided no cross-sectional
solution for the divisive slavery issue. Although religion was not a cause of the secession crisis, it “added a moral and often uncompromising intensity” to it. (49) The book chronicles how the war quickly developed beyond a purely political and military contest into a religious one as well—testing the spiritual character and commitments of individuals and the theological convictions of both lay church members and the clergy while fomenting controversy both within churches and in the body politic over the proper relationship between church and state as many churches became politicized.

The war as a test of faith for individuals is an important theme for Rable, one that is sometimes neglected in other studies. In letters between soldiers and their loved ones, in private journals and other expressions of personal sentiment, in wartime literature, in church records of various sorts—he searches for evidence to gauge shifting levels of religiosity in a population buffeted on every side by carnage and death. He examines common soldiers and their officers, battlefront caregivers both male and female, men and women on the home front in their homes and collectively in benevolent associations both religious and secular—and generally finds a wartime reaffirmation of religious faith in both the North and South. “It was sometimes amazing to see how talk of despair, declension, and judgment could so quickly turn to words of determination, revival, and vindication,” he writes (272).

Rable’s overarching point that recognition of God’s sovereignty and a belief in divine providence remained constant and survived the war is further illustrated in closing chapters on Lincoln’s murder and its aftermath. Indeed, Lincoln fares better than Confederate President Jefferson Davis in Rable’s estimation as he compares the seriousness with which each president confronted the war’s spiritual dimensions. Rable shares the view of most historians of American religion that Lincoln’s providential understanding of the war, as articulated most famously in his Second Inaugural Address, was more profound than that of most clergy and theologians of his time.

God’s Almost Chosen Peoples is the product of prodigious research in all manner of primary source material. It also reflects the scholarship of the past two decades by historians of American religion such as Harry S. Stout, Charles R. Wilson, Mark A. Noll, Richard Carwardine, and others who have focused increasing attention on the Civil War. Endnotes and bibliography consume almost 30 percent of the book’s pages. It will be the reference of first resort on religion and the war for the foreseeable future. However, even though Rable writes lucidly, the book may prove to be a formidable read for the uninitiated.

Rable quotes from several published diaries and letters of Iowa soldiers and from a handful of wartime sermons published in Iowa.
But he provides no analysis specific to the wartime experience of the state. Students of Iowa history may well ponder whether religious forces have been adequately addressed in the state’s Civil War narratives. Rable’s book is a source for topics that can be more thoroughly explored within an Iowa context, and it provides a broader national perspective with which Iowa’s experience can be compared.


Reviewer Brian Roberts is associate professor of history at the University of Northern Iowa. He is the author of American Alchemy: The California Gold Rush and Middle-Class Culture (2000).

The experience is not uncommon. It is the weekend at a college, perhaps a school in the South, perhaps one in Iowa. Toward evening, students and professors make their way across College Avenue or University Street, going to the library, a game, or a favorite hangout. Suddenly they are scattered by a massive four-wheel-drive truck. As the machine roars by there are the standard sounds and sights: the “rebel yell” from the cab; the Confederate battle flag embossed on the rear windshield; the receding notes of a horn that plays “Dixie.” According to Christian McWhirter, the experience would be a testament to the lasting power of music from the American Civil War.

During the war, McWhirter argues, popular music was both a “weapon” and a “cultural tool.” Songs encouraged men to enlist and motivated them to fight and die. They expressed sectional hostilities and served as vehicles for the war’s causes. They even allowed for a few antiwar messages. And so Americans of the time took songs very seriously. At the beginning of 1862, for example, the popular Northern singing group, the Hutchinson Family Singers, passed behind Union lines to give a series of concerts and buoy the spirits of the troops. During their first concert, they sang a song with lyrics by the poet John Greenleaf Whittier, lyrics that specifically named slavery as the cause of the war. Some in the crowd hissed; others came to the singers’ defense. For a moment it looked like a brawl would break out. The next day the order came down from the top, from, it seems, General George McClellan himself: the Hutchinsons were banished from the Union lines. Here, McWhirter’s focus on music succeeds not just in providing a different approach to the Civil War but in telling a new story. As this
story shows, slavery was always the war’s cause, even if recognition of that fact had to be suppressed.

Another story provides insight into the war’s transition from memory to politics. Here, McWhirter’s focus is on turn-of-the-century arguments about the best-known Confederate anthem. “Dixie,” he notes, was a controversial choice in this regard. First, it was by a Northerner, the Ohio-born minstrel Dan Decatur Emmett. Second, it was a “blackface” song, a tune with largely nonsensical lyrics in a stage version of black dialect. For years Southerners tried to improve on the song. The most concerted effort came around 1900, when a faction in the United Daughters of the Confederacy proposed a new version with lyrics that were pro-South and anti-Yankee. Ultimately the effort failed: Confederate veterans preferred their old camp favorite and stood against the changes. Yet the effort did succeed in politicizing the song: “Dixie” became a musical signifier for the Confederate “Lost Cause,” “states’ rights,” and rural anti-intellectualism.

Between these anecdotes, which succeed in grounding music in lived experience and in telling new stories about the war and its effects, McWhirter largely resorts to ground covered elsewhere. Northern men joined the Union army to the strains of an enlistment song, “We Are Coming Father Abraham.” Southern men responded to “The Bonnie Blue Flag,” enlisting, as one of the song’s verses had it, to preserve their “property.” In Union and Confederate camps, men passed the hours by singing: they belted out blackface ditties like “Zip Coon”; they laughingly shouted the comic song “Goober Peas;” they harmonized on sentimental favorites such as “Just Before the Battle, Mother.” Battlefield anthems motivated men to fight. For Union soldiers it was “John Brown’s Body”; for Confederate troops it was “Stonewall Jackson’s Way.” Meanwhile, civilians sang songs to support the troops, vent grief, or even question the war, songs such as “The Homespun Dress,” “The Vacant Chair,” and “When This Cruel War Is Over.”

Battle Hymns is a welcome addition to the historiography of the Civil War and the music of the period. Much of the book is standard stuff. But there is new ground here as well. Popular music, McWhirter suggests, allows for the expression of controversial topics and forbidden subjects. Accordingly, it sheds new light on the eradication of slavery as a popular cause of the war. It also reveals how the causes of the Confederacy remained alive and made their way into the cultural mainstream. Indeed, as anyone who has seen and heard the roaring truck with the rear-window battle flag and the horn that plays “Dixie” can attest, the South’s “Lost Cause” has both lived on and gone national.

Reviewer Robert Wooster is Regents Professor of History at Texas A&M University–Corpus Christi. He is the author of American Military Frontiers: The United States Army in the West, 1783–1900 (2009) and The Civil War Bookshelf: 50 Must-Read Books about the War Between the States (2001).

Author of acclaimed Civil War books on the rifle musket, trench warfare, Pickett’s Charge, the crater at Petersburg, Union soldiers, and individual campaigns, historian Earl J. Hess sets his sights even higher in the present work, a history of the war between the Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi River. “Union victory in the Civil War began in the Mississippi Valley” (318), insists Hess, who attributes Northern success not to its material advantages but to better generalship, higher morale, and development of a logistical system capable of transporting and supplying large armies over an area larger than France, Switzerland, and the Low Countries combined. The result is a well-researched and intelligent narrative that is essential to understanding America’s bloodiest conflict.

Events on the battlefield eventually settled the war. Hess offers a lively account of the region’s most familiar battles and campaigns—Forts Henry and Donelson, Shiloh, New Orleans, Corinth, Perryville, Stones River, Vicksburg, Meridian, Chickamauga, Chattanooga, Knoxville, Atlanta, Franklin, Nashville, and Sherman’s March to the Sea. In addition, Hess follows Sherman’s (and later John Schofield’s) veterans as they marched through the Carolinas. What really sets this book apart, however, are its thoughtful discussions of logistics, occupation duties, the cotton trade, guerrillas, and refugees. Particularly in the west, argues Hess, “Civil War armies ate their way to either victory or defeat, devouring resources like swarms of locusts and depriving friends and foes alike of their means of living” (xiv). Union generals, with Sherman and Grant in the fore, grasped this reality much better than their Confederate counterparts, and the ability of their troops to combine foraging with rail and river supply lines enabled them to penetrate the Southern heartland.

Sharply differing from recent efforts to link the North’s increasingly destructive methods to the activities of pro-Confederate guerrillas, Hess makes a convincing alternative case. Almost from the beginning, Union and Confederate soldiers alike scoured the surrounding countryside to supplement their army rations, avoiding and ignoring the efforts of their officers to prevent them from doing so. Moreover, Hess
points out that men bearing guns often take what they want from unarmed civilians. Finally, Union generals came to understand that only by living off the land could their armies overcome logistical shortages and undertake the operations, as Sherman put it, necessary to “illustrate the vulnerability of the South” (251).

As large numbers of Iowans and midwesterners served with the Union armies of the Tennessee, the Cumberland, the Gulf, the Mississippi, and the Ohio, *The Civil War in the West* has much to interest readers of this journal. Hess emphasizes, for example, the economic and psychological importance of the Mississippi valley to residents of the Old Northwest. Abraham Lincoln understood these regional sensibilities much better than did his fellow Kentuckian Jefferson Davis.

Finally, the extensive attention Hess devotes to the challenges of occupying huge chunks of Confederate territory and dealing with thousands of black and white refugees highlights the North’s wartime achievements between the Appalachians and the Mississippi. Victory in the west, as he demonstrates, was hardly inevitable; rather, it stemmed from the North’s more creative use of technology, superior resource management, recruitment of thousands of black Southerners to the Union cause, and development of policies that enabled them to occupy and control immense chunks of hostile territory while at the same time assembling field armies large enough to defeat the enemy.


Reviewer Dan Lewis has a doctorate in American Studies and has taught American literature and U.S. history at several community colleges in Virginia. He is the director of Educational Programs for the Virginia Community College System.

In his study of Civil War memory, David W. Blight examines how the historical subjects of slavery and emancipation were marginalized during the Civil War Centennial in the context of the civil rights era. Blight examines the works of four prominent American writers in the mid-twentieth century—Robert Penn Warren, Bruce Catton, Edmund Wilson, and James Baldwin—“because they represent divergent backgrounds, genres, and points of view” (8). *American Oracle* provides a rich and probing analysis of the writers’ “literary and historical meditations on the Civil War during its Centennial years” (252). For the distinguished author and meticulous researcher of the award-winning *Race and Reconciliation: The Civil War in American Memory* (2001), the
Centennial must have been a bitter disappointment because with few exceptions it romanticized and sentimentalized the sectional conflict at the expense of obfuscating a central thesis in the historian’s scholarship: that race has played a pivotal role in defining American history over the past 150 years.

Blight finds much to admire in the Civil War works of poet and novelist Robert Penn Warren, but he is hard pressed to explain why the southern author was reluctant to showcase the problematic relationship between the Centennial and the struggle for civil rights for African Americans in the 1960s. *Wilderness: A Tale of the Civil War* (1961), a haunting novel about a German immigrant who comes to the United States during the New York City draft riots of 1863, is an “allegory about the quest of humans for self-knowledge and freedom” (46). In his extended contemplation of the different meanings of the sectional conflict, *The Legacy of the Civil War* (1961), Warren, as portrayed by Blight, was an ambivalent and conflicted artist who satirized “Southern racists” (66), defended “authentic nobility in the Confederate war effort” (67), and “spent many pages railing against the dangers of radical abolitionists” (70). Blight provides ample evidence that *Wilderness* and *Legacy* offered an alternative viewpoint to the “moralistic nostalgia of the Centennial” (51), but he fails to demonstrate that the author’s writings were specifically informed by the “civil rights struggle of his own time” (64).

Blight’s misgivings about the Centennial are tempered by Bruce Catton, a midwesterner, journalist, and gifted storyteller who wrote popular narrative histories of the conflict that resonated with readers seeking an escape from the Cold War. In *The Coming Fury* (1961), *Terrible Swift Sword* (1963), and *Never Call Retreat* (1965), Catton “harnessed a good portion of those millions of Americans who still knew the Civil War as intimate family history, who had absorbed its lore from parents and grandparents” (108). Nevertheless, Blight saves some of his harshest criticism for the writer who had been selected to serve on the Civil War Centennial Commission: “Catton almost always wrote about the Civil War with a sense of the epic, and of romance and an appeal to the nostalgic, as well as his own brand of realism” (82). Blight takes Catton to task for neglecting to include African Americans in his histories and concludes that their absence in Catton’s works was “a perfect representation of mainstream America’s broad ignorance of the African American experience generally” (115).

Blight writes more favorably of the literary critic and northeasterner Edmund Wilson, the author of *Patriotic Gore* (1962), who completed a lengthy volume on Civil War literature in the midst of the Centennial:
“The book endures because of the unprecedented literary history it presented at the time of the Centennial” (145–46). Even as Blight applauds Wilson for introducing readers to a plethora of writers who had been ignored for decades, he blasts the writer for “his apparent Southern sympathies” (149) and his marginalization of African American writers. And Blight is incensed by Wilson’s position on the war. A fervent antiwar intellectual, Wilson believed that there was nothing redeeming about the Civil War. “Wilson had long since decided,” Blight observes, “that the Civil War had, in the long run, not really been worth it” (179).

For Blight, it is James Baldwin, the Harlem-born African American intellectual and prolific writer of novels, plays, and essays, who provided an eloquent and impassioned counterpoint to the Centennial: “Baldwin made himself into an alternative African American voice responding to the cacophony and orthodoxy of Centennial popular culture” (187). He articulated his dismay about America in *The Fire Next Time* (1963), an essay that Blight contends was the author’s “attempt to hurl Jeremiah’s thunderbolt down on his countrymen in their slumber” (224). Baldwin’s work was not only a call to action for blacks and whites to address racial inequality in the 1960s but was also a cautionary tale about the ‘spiritual wasteland’ that Americans risked creating in their crisis over civil rights” (228). Unfortunately for Blight’s portrayal of Baldwin as a spoiler of the Centennial, “Baldwin only occasionally wrote directly about the Civil War; his subject, rather, was America’s enduring dilemma with race and its searing effects on his own life” (187).

It is striking that Blight does not devote more of his analysis to the actors and the activities surrounding the Centennial. He often refers to the Centennial but offers no focused discussion of the subject. In effect, his marginalization of the Centennial mirrors the elision of slavery and emancipation in the writings of the four writers.

At the heart of Blight’s disenchantment with the Centennial is his assumption that emancipation is the defining legacy of the Civil War and that it should have been the touchstone for writers examining the conflict in the midst of the civil rights era. Gary W. Gallagher provides a compelling argument in *The Union War* (2011) that “the focus on emancipation and race” in Civil War scholarship in the past 40 years “suggests the war had scant meaning apart from those issues” (4). It is telling that Blight’s analysis of the Civil War writers of the 1960s shines the most when he holds his ideological judgment about race in abeyance as he marvels at the many ways the Civil War was represented in the writings of Warren, Catton, Wilson, and Baldwin.

Reviewer S. Chandler Lighty is an assistant editor with the Papers of Abraham Lincoln.

Independent historian Jason Emerson’s biography of Robert T. Lincoln (1843–1926) is the first full-length study of President Lincoln’s son in more than 40 years. As the title, Giant in the Shadows, suggests, the son has languished under his father’s glorified stature. Emerson argues that Robert “should and must be recognized for his independent achievements” (3). His accomplishments included service as Secretary of War (1881–1885), U.S. Minister to Great Britain (1889–1893), president of the Pullman Car Company (1897–1911), and stewardship of his father’s papers and legacy.

This biography’s unifying theme is Robert Lincoln’s strong sense of honor and duty in private and public life. As the scion of a future president, Lincoln studied at Phillips Exeter Academy and Harvard University. After graduation in 1864, he joined General Grant’s staff, resigning after his father’s assassination. As he became the head of the family, the financial and emotional well-being of his widowed mother and younger brother became Robert’s responsibility, so he became a Chicago lawyer. After an interrupted courtship, he wed Mary Harlan, daughter of Iowa Senator James Harlan, with whom he had three children. Despite this connection to Iowa, this biography gives only passing mentions of family trips to Mount Pleasant.

Robert’s concern for his family’s honor and privacy led him to jealously protect his father’s papers; he “planned to weed out anything purely personal” in the manuscripts (159). He permitted very few biographers access to the material, and when he deeded the papers to the Library of Congress he restricted their public use until 21 years after his death. Lincoln’s sense of familial duty also led him to institutionalize his mother in 1875. Robert is sometimes vilified for this episode, but Emerson depicts him as a son deeply concerned for his mother’s psychological and financial welfare.

Although not politically ambitious, Robert yielded to civic duty’s call. As Emerson explains, “No honorable man could refuse his party or deny his duty to his country if called to serve” (256). President Garfield selected Robert as Secretary of War, in part, to appease an influential faction of the Republican Party. Once in office, Robert confided to a friend, “I prefer practicing law to performing my duties here” (222). Robert also did not solicit the appointment as Minister to Great Britain but accepted it for reasons of “honor and duty” (304). Some
Republicans promoted him for vice president in 1884 and president in 1888, but he dissuaded supporters from sending him to the “gilded prison” (297).

Emerson’s depth of research, with endnotes and bibliography covering 180 pages, is impressive. Yet one might question whether Robert Lincoln’s achievements merit a 421-page biography. In Emerson’s own words, Lincoln’s time as Secretary of War was “a record of unexciting administrative duties,” and his tenure in Britain “was not extraordinary” (236, 334). Emerson believes that Robert Lincoln deserves to be mentioned in the same breath as “Carnegie, Rockefeller, Morgan, and Pullman” (421), but that contention is not effectively supported. Emerson’s attempts to interpret favorably labor and race relations during Robert’s presidency of the Pullman Company are also not entirely persuasive. He credits Robert with being simultaneously concerned with “the company’s bottom line” and also “the health and well-being of his employees” (364). All things considered, Emerson has produced a definitive, informative, and engaging biography of a man often marginalized because of his father’s status. It will appeal to Lincolnphiles, but also to students, scholars, and lay readers of Gilded Age and Progressive Era history.


Reviewer Marvin G. Slind is professor of history and head of the History Department at Luther College. His research interests focus primarily on Norwegian immigration history. He is the translator and coeditor of Linka’s Diary: An Immigrant Story in Word and Pictures (2008).

Land of Promise, Land of Tears is a historical novel that traces the lives of a Norwegian immigrant family through much of the year 1869. Ole and Helena Branjord and their children settled near Fairview (now Story City). Their experiences illustrate the rapid developments in American—and Norwegian American—society following the Civil War. While their story is generally told in the third person, there are also short sections that comment on events from the perspectives of different characters in the novel. The result is a moving account of the ordeals of pioneer life, such as the difficulties of harvest work, food preparation and preservation, personal tensions within the immigrant community, disease and health care, and immigrants’ religious concerns (including controversies that contributed to the splintering of the Norwegian Lutheran church into many disparate synods). In his
concluding notes, Twedt relates the fictional characters to the historical figures from whose lives the story is drawn.

The novel is based primarily on a number of regional and local histories, as well as stories preserved by the author’s own family (which included the historical Branjords). Twedt also consulted more broadly focused works related to immigration history, as well as the Vesterheim Norwegian-American Museum in Decorah. Land of Promise, Land of Tears provides a clear description of the kinds of hardships Scandinavian immigrants experienced when they settled in Iowa. The creation of Norwegian American society involved a complex mixture of old and new, Norwegian and American. The difficulties of that process are described well in this novel.

Main Street Public Library: Community Places and Reading Spaces in the Rural Heartland, 1876–1956, by Wayne A. Wiegand. Iowa and the Midwest Experience. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2011. xi, 244 pp. Illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. $25.95 paper.

Reviewer Jean Preer is professor emerita at the Indiana University School of Library and Information Science–Indianapolis. She is the author of Library Ethics (2008).

Combining traditional historical research with an analysis of library accession records, Wayne Wiegand examines public library development and collections in four rural towns in the upper Midwest, an area known for its active civic life. The communities shared similar demographics but enjoyed distinct identities. Sauk Centre, Minnesota, was the birthplace of Sinclair Lewis; Osage, Iowa, named for its pioneer settler, Orrin Sage, was the boyhood home of Hamlin Garland; Lexington, Michigan, attracted the summer tourist trade; and Rhinelander, Wisconsin, supported manufacturing, attracted immigrants, and elected a socialist mayor. Using a wealth of local records, Wiegand provides detailed accounts of each community, exploring the dual role of the library as a source of reading matter and as a public space.

Beginning his study in 1876, Wiegand depicts the various ways public libraries got their start. In Sauk Centre and Lexington, local literary associations provided impetus and collections for public libraries. Local philanthropists played an important role. In Osage, Orrin Sage deeded land to cover construction of the Sage Public Library and created an endowment to cover operating expenses. In Lexington, the daughters of Charles H. Moore used their inheritance to build a library in his honor. Sauk Centre, Osage, and Rhinelander
all built Carnegie libraries. Rhinelander had a professional librarian beginning in 1902; in the others, library directors often lacked library training.

Wiegand has two larger objectives. In an introductory chapter, he takes issue with what he describes as the librarians’ faith in the public library as essential to the creation of an informed citizenry. Drawing on library accession records, Wiegand argues that public libraries, in fact, provided popular fiction and responded to user demands for entertainment rather than enlightenment. Wiegand depicts this response to popular taste as an example of “the user in the life of the library,” that is, users affecting library policy and practice, in contrast to “the library in the life of the user,” a more top-down management approach. Wiegand’s work, a rather short volume given the scope of the topic, is at once a fascinating library history and a frustratingly one-sided interpretation of his findings.

The tension between what experts perceive as literary excellence and what users desire for their reading pleasure pervades public library history and professional practice. While libraries are justified by their educational potential, their continued support depends on usage, most often circulation statistics. Because the libraries Wiegand studied emphasized the educational aspect of the library’s mission, he depicts philanthropists, reformers, and especially professional librarians as the villains in the case. Using what they learned in library school, he argues, librarians sought to impose books recommended by experts and to apply national standards that were at odds with the individual identities and predilections of local communities. Wiegand does not include contrary examples of how the library profession sought to respond to library users. From John Cotton Dana’s 12 Rules of Reading (“Read enjoyable things.”) to Helen Haines’s principles of book selection (“Represent all subjects that apply to community conditions and reflect community interests. Give preference to an inferior book that will be read over a superior book that will not be read.”), librarians themselves negotiated between literary taste, board dictates, and community preferences. Wiegand does not mention that librarians rejected the recommendation of the Public Library Inquiry, conducted by social scientists in the late 1940s, that public libraries collect serious and controversial works and let readers buy popular fiction at newsstands, feeling that it was contrary to the democratic responsibility of the library to meet the reading needs of the entire community. Wiegand refers to, but does not explore, Lester Asheim’s 1953 article contrasting selection and censorship. Writing in opposition to censorship, Asheim, in powerful language that actually supports Wiegand’s argument,
expressed confidence in the intelligence of readers to make choices about what to read.

In his concluding chapter, Wiegand draws from his database of library accessions to see whether the four libraries studied acquired works of serious literature, popular fiction, series books, or banned or controversial works. With small book budgets and dependent on donations, library collections before 1956 did not grow according to plan. Nonetheless, Wiegand’s comparisons of library holdings against lists of best sellers and challenged books are often intriguing, although it is hard to draw conclusions about motives in particular cases. What his findings show is great variety in book selection that reflected not only the local communities but also the historical roots of the library and the philosophy of the librarian in charge. Iowans may read more about Osage in Christine Pawley’s Reading on the Middle Border and would be interested, as well, in the work of Forrest Spaulding and the Des Moines Public Library in actively supporting community forums in the 1930s and adopting its own Library Bill of Rights in 1938.

Atina Diffley’s autoethnography is a personal story placed in an ethnographic context. Diffley presents organic farming as a cultural innovation based on the same values of hard work, risk taking, determination to succeed, creativity, extended kinship relations, spiritual connections to the land, specialized knowledge, and neighborhood networks of traditional family farming agriculture. But she explains how urbanization and industrial systems threaten those relationships and the land. In the story of her life, Diffley argues that organic farming works to sustain marriage, family, neighborhood, and community relationships. Organic farming not only keeps body and soul together, but it also works to save soil fertility, balance water use, dignify labor, harmonize plant, animal, and insect populations, and provide fresh, nutritious, and delicious fruits and vegetables for local consumers.

But this testimony does not present organic farming as a romantic escape from urban alienation. Iowans intrigued with organic farming
need to read this book. They can learn about the trials and tribulations that come with dealing with midwestern weather, maintaining farm equipment, managing soil fertility, addressing insect infestations, marketing, getting up at 3:00 a.m. during harvest, and the art of timing—when to plant and when to pick to get the best yields and the best flavor. They can learn about the highly intimate soil and plant knowledge organic farming requires, as well as business strategies, government regulations, and the politics of organic farming that make for organic farming success. Iowa farmers thinking of going organic will appreciate this book. Iowa consumers will wish more of them would.


Philip Warburg’s Harvest the Wind is an argument for whole-heartedly pursuing wind energy in the United States. The environmental lawyer and advocate briefly lays out the history of the modern wind industry, which had its first “big wave” in the United States in the 1980s, about a decade after it emerged in Denmark, the world’s wind energy leader. In both countries wind went from a type of soft-energy-appropriate technology to being as high-tech as any other big utility. Unlike Denmark—and now China—the U.S. has not had given wind power consistent governmental support, but in recent years wind has moved to the forefront of green energy technologies. Warburg explores a wide range of issues, including how the U.S. industry compares with the rest of the world; how midwestern communities like Newton, Iowa, and community colleges like Iowa Lakes are on the cutting edge of this burgeoning industry; how turbines are transported and assembled; and what obstacles are impeding the industry’s growth.

Warburg has studied the issue well and provides an excellent introduction to wind. Readers used to more scholarly books, however, should keep in mind the author’s agenda. He presents two sides of several issues, but the objections of wind opponents are sometimes brushed aside too easily. He repeatedly shows how there is more than enough wind power to meet the country’s projected energy needs. However, when residents object to turbines in Kansas’s Flint Hills, he incorrectly implies that the permanent environmental impacts of the construction (the service roads and concrete slabs) are no worse than
the area’s annual prairie fires (142; compare Julie Courtwright’s *Prairie Fire: A Great Plains History*). Considering that much of the wind energy produced goes to faraway states, Warburg never explains why such a beautiful area needs to be a wind farm site. Overall, though, the author gets across his point that wind power is an exciting field that can help the environment by drastically reducing carbon emissions and assist rural people by providing jobs and profits from a cutting-edge, sustainable industry.
New on the Shelves

“New on the Shelves” is a list of recent additions to the collections of the State Historical Society of Iowa. It includes manuscripts, audio-visual materials, and published materials recently acquired or newly processed that we think might be of interest to the readers of the *Annals of Iowa*. The “DM” or “IC” at the end of each entry denotes whether the item is held in Des Moines or Iowa City.

**Manuscripts**

Burson, Aaron E. Diary, January–February 1864. 1 vol. Civil War diary kept by Burson (Warren County), who served with Co. F of the 39th Iowa Volunteer Infantry. DM.

Cooper, Henry Booth. Papers, 1861–1908. ¼ ft. Civil War papers of Lt. Henry B. Cooper (Knoxville), who served with Company E of the 8th Iowa Volunteer Infantry. The collection includes a roll book of the Knoxville Rifles, Cooper’s manuscript account of the Battle of Shiloh, a hand-drawn map of Georgia, and proceedings of the fourth annual meeting of the National Association of Shiloh Survivors. DM.


Gorman, John J., Msgr. Papers, 1934–ca. 1993. ½ ft. Papers of Monsignor Gorman, who was the assistant (1936–1969) then successor (1969–1974) to Msgr. Luigi Ligutti at the Assumption Church of Granger, Iowa; managed the Granger Homestead Association; served as a global missionary; and was a chaplain for the Mitchellville Women’s Prison. DM.


Riccio, Francis (Frank). Papers, 1942–1945. ½ ft. World War II diary, documents, photographs, and ephemera of Riccio (Des Moines), who served with the 184th Army Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion during World War II. DM.

Spurgeon, Otis. Papers, 1914. 3 documents. Campaign platform, handbill, and letter of this independent candidate in Iowa’s 1914 U.S. Senatorial race; his political literature emphasized his defense of the First Amendment. DM.

Youngs, Richard (“Dic”). Papers, 1959–2008. 3 ft. Materials related to the career of Youngs, popular disc jockey at KSO and KIOA radio stations (Des Moines), whose career spanned from the 1960s through the first decade of the 2000s. Includes radio Top 40 song surveys and other promotional materials, programs from Iowa Rock and Roll Reunions Youngs hosted, candid and publicity photos of Youngs and many of the entertainers and public figures he promoted, and scrapbooks. DM.

Audio-Visual Materials

Anderson, Adrian D. 23 black-and-white photographs, ca. 1956. Photos of Anderson and students of Rey Ruppe’s University of Iowa classes, taken during field trips to archaeological sites in the state (Toolesboro Mounds, Phipps site, O’Regan bench) and in the lab of the State Archaeologist’s office. Anderson was assistant state archaeologist, coordinator for implementation of National Historic Preservation Act programs in Iowa (1971), and administrator of the State Historic Preservation Office. DM.

Rehder, Denny. 190 black-and-white 35mm negatives, 5 contact sheets, ca. 1984. Interior and exterior photos of Iowa’s first State Historical Building in Des Moines, taken by Rehder for use in promotional materials to raise funds for a new building. DM.

Published Materials


*The Fine Print: Works from the Collection of Morningside College*. Sioux City: Sioux City Arts Center, 2012. 35 pp. IC.


Getting Hitched: Weddings in Small Town Iowa: A Decade by Decade Stroll Down the Aisle. Slater: Slater Area Historical Association, 2012. 60 pp. IC.


Ingrid’s Tales: A Norwegian-American Quaker Farming Story, by Rebecca J. Henderson. Santa Fe, NM, 2012. xii, 413 pp. IC.


Twelve Moons: A Year with the Sauk and Meskwaki, 1817–1818, by Tom Willcockson and Elizabeth Carvey. Rock Island, IL: Citizens to Preserve Black Hawk Park Foundation, 2012. 52 pp. IC.

Wind and Prairie, by Jin Lee. Sioux City: Sioux City Art Center, 2011. 71 pp. Exhibition catalog of photographs of the land between Chicago and Bloomington, Illinois. IC.
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PEGGY ANN BROWN is an independent historian in Washington, D.C. Dr. Brown conducts research for authors, lawyers, and museums at the Library of Congress and National Archives. She holds a doctorate in American Civilization from George Washington University, where she was a Library of Congress fellow, and a B.S.J. from the University of Kansas. Her current research focuses on reporters on the 1955 American agricultural delegation to the Soviet Union.

STEVE MCNUTT is a doctoral candidate in Language, Literacy, and Culture at the University of Iowa, where his dissertation research explores the uses of writing in a juvenile diversion program in Iowa City. In 2007 he received an MFA from the University of Iowa’s Nonfiction Writing Program. His writing has appeared in a variety of publications, with one of his essays listed as notable in the Best American Essays anthology for 2011.
Announcement

THE IOWA HISTORY CENTER is pleased to congratulate Mr. Garret W. Wilson of Iowa State University as the 2012 recipient of its prize for the outstanding master’s thesis in Iowa history. His award-winning thesis is titled “The Collapse of the Iowa Democratic Party: Iowa and the Lecompton Constitution.”

The center now seeks nominations for the outstanding master’s thesis in Iowa history for 2013. Selection will be based on contribution to the knowledge of Iowa history; originality of the subject matter or methodology; use of sources; and written expression. Nominees must have completed their master’s degree between July 1, 2012, and June 30, 2013.

The winner will be announced in the fall of 2013 and will receive a $1,000 cash prize and an award plaque. Three copies of the thesis and a brief letter of nomination from the thesis advisor, which includes contact information for the nominee, should be submitted to Bill Friedricks, Director, Iowa History Center, Simpson College, 701 North C Street, Indianola, IA 50125. Application deadline is June 30, 2013.

For further information, please contact Linda Sinclair, (515) 961-1528 or linda.sinclair@simpson.edu.
The State Historical Society of Iowa

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