In This Issue
LESLIE STEGH, retired records manager at John Deere, recounts the
details of a series of strikes in Waterloo and the organized opposition from
employers. He emphasizes the dispute over workers’ right to collective
bargaining, the efforts by both sides to use local newspapers to sway
public opinion, the relative absence of violence during the strikes, and the
ultimately unsuccessful attempt to organize workers across industries to
achieve a general strike.

KATHRYN A. SCHUMAKER, a lecturer in the Institute for the
American Constitutional Heritage at the University of Oklahoma,
describes the struggle for civil rights reform in Waterloo’s public schools
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Initiated by students seeking more
equitable treatment in their schools, their movement was coopted by a
plan to desegregate the city’s schools that ignored many of the students’
basic concerns.

Front Cover
Workers at Waterloo Gasoline Engine Company were prominent among
the nearly 3,000 workers who participated in a series of strikes in Waterloo
in 1919, the subject of Leslie Stegh’s article in this issue. This photo of a
loading crew in 1920 is courtesy of John Deere.

Editorial Consultants
Rebecca Conard, Middle Tennessee State
University
Kathleen Neils Conzen, University of
Chicago
William Cronon, University of Wisconsin–
Madison
Robert R. Dykstra, State University of
New York at Albany
R. David Edmunds, University of Texas
at Dallas
H. Roger Grant, Clemson University
William C. Pratt, University of Nebraska
at Omaha
Glenda Riley, Ball State University
Malcolm J. Rohrbough, University of Iowa
Dorothy Schwieder, Iowa State University
Contents

321 The Waterloo Strikes of 1919
Leslie Stegh

353 The Politics of Youth: Civil Rights Reform in the Waterloo Public Schools
Kathryn A. Schumaker

386 Book Reviews and Notices

410 New on the Shelves

412 Index
Book Reviews and Notices

386  **ENFY S MCMURRY**, *Centerville: A Mid-American Saga*, by Derek Oden


390  **TIMOTHY B. SMITH**, *Rethinking Shiloh: Myth and Memory*; and **LINDA BARNICKEL**, *Milliken’s Bend: A Civil War Battle in History and Memory*, by Brian Craig Miller

393  **JOHN ZIMM**, ed., *This Wicked Rebellion: Wisconsin Civil War Soldiers Write Home*, by Patrick G. Bass

394  **NORMAN K. RISJORD**, *Dakota: The Story of the Northern Plains*, by Jon K. Lauck

396  **TODD W. NICHOL ED.**, *Norwegian-American Studies*, volume 36, by Dag Blanck

398  **H. ROGER GRANT**, *Railroads and the American People*, by Scott E. Randolph

400  **PETER H. ARGERSINGER**, *Representation and Inequality in Late Nineteenth-Century America: The Politics of Apportionment*, by Mark Wahlgren Summers

402  **KEITH NEWLIN**, ed., *Garland in His Own Time: A Biographical Chronicle of His Life*, by Marcia Noe

402  **GREG OLSON**, *Voodoo Priests, Noble Savages, and Ozark Gypsies: The Life of Mary Alicia Owen*, by Victoria Smith

403  **DAVID VAUGHT**, *The Farmers’ Game: Baseball in Rural America*, by Benjamin G. Rader

405  **GRETCHEN HEIFFNER**, *The Missile Next Door: The Minuteman in the American Heartland*, by Jenny Barker Devine

407  **STE WART VAN CLEVE**, *Land of 10,000 Loves: A History of Queer Minnesota*, by Robin C. Henry

408  **GERALD VIZENOR AND JILL DOERFLER**, *The White Earth Nation: Ratification of a Native Democratic Constitution*, by Mark R. Scherer
THE ANNALS OF IOWA, the State Historical Society of Iowa’s quarterly history journal, was established in 1863, just 150 years ago. Sometimes current readers of the journal are skeptical that articles focusing on, say, the 1970s or 1980s are really “history.” But think of this: When the Annals of Iowa was founded, the state was just 17 years old! The state’s earliest history, then, was only as old as an event from 1996 would be today. Even its earliest white settlement, which was a common subject in the Annals in its early years, went back only another dozen or so years. And yet, as the first editor wrote in introducing the first issue, “Will any one say that [Iowa’s] authentic Annals are too soon begun?”

The Annals of Iowa was established in Iowa City under the auspices of the State Historical Society of Iowa, which published it from 1863 through 1874 and again from 1882 through 1884. During those years the Annals published primarily biographical sketches of prominent political and religious figures along with articles on general territorial and state history; the culture, leaders, and relics of the Indians of Iowa; the military history of the Civil War; the origin and meaning of place names in Iowa; and, especially, histories of individual counties, usually in serial form (the “History of Pottawattamie County,” by D. C. Bloomer, now better known as the husband of Amelia Bloomer, extended over 14 issues, while the history of Polk County had only one installment).

In 1893, after a hiatus of almost ten years, the Annals of Iowa was revived in Des Moines by the Historical Department of Iowa under the editorship of the department’s curator and secretary, Charles Aldrich, who was to edit the journal for the next 15 years. Edgar Harlan took over the duties in 1908 and served until 1937, the longest tenure of any editor of the journal. Much to my surprise, my tenure, editing the journal since 1988, is approaching Harlan’s length of service.
For more than half of the twentieth century (1903–1959), the *Annals* faced competition from the *Iowa Journal of History and Politics*, published by the State Historical Society of Iowa in Iowa City. And since 1920 its scholarly interpretations of Iowa history have been complemented by the State Historical Society's popular history magazine, the *Palimpsest* (renamed *Iowa Heritage Illustrated* in 1996). But for all of the twentieth century, much of the last half of the nineteenth century, and now into the twenty-first century, the *Annals of Iowa* has played a valuable role in preserving, interpreting, and disseminating the history of Iowa. We hope to continue to do so for many years to come, and we appreciate your support.

—Marvin Bergman, editor
The Waterloo Strikes of 1919

LESLIE STEGH

IMMEDIATELY AFTER WORLD WAR I, workers in many industries in the United States went on strike, stimulated by inflation, the end of federal controls over labor relations, and the readjustment to a postwar economic order. At the same time, a renewed vigor in the ranks of organized labor was countered by a determination among industrial leaders to secure complete control over the workplace. Conflicts over wages, work conditions, the eight-hour day, and collective bargaining divided labor and management. The most famous strike of 1919 was by steelworkers nationwide.¹ Readers of Waterloo’s newspapers in 1919 also encountered striking rail workers around the country, the strike at the International Harvester plant in Chicago, gunfire and bombs during a strike in South Bartonville, Illinois, and strikes among meatpackers in Chicago, coal miners in Illinois, actors in New York City, and streetcar workers in Des Moines, Louisville, and Pittsburgh. The results of these mostly failed strikes helped shape a pattern of industrial relations that lasted until the economic dislocation of the 1930s. The strikes in Waterloo in 1919 illustrate the labor unrest of the era and the goals of management.²

The Waterloo strikes were led by the recently organized International Association of Machinists (IAM) Local No. 314. Opposing the new union was an increasingly well-organized group of employers led by the Waterloo Gasoline Engine Company, recently purchased by Deere & Company, the Moline, Illinois, manufacturer of farm equipment. The strikes were characterized by picketing, speeches, parades, a lack of serious violence, and efforts on both sides to use local newspapers to sway public opinion. Labor leaders in Iowa made Waterloo the center of their fight for collective bargaining and union recognition. Collective bargaining was the main issue, but there was also a furor over the related question of “open shops” and “closed shops.”

The machinists attempted to rally other labor unions to their cause to produce a general strike, but they eventually failed. Deere & Company organized employers to oppose collective bargaining and apply pressure to those who seemed willing to submit to labor’s demands.

IN 1914 Waterloo, Iowa, had an estimated population of 35,000. Its major employers were the William Galloway Company, Iowa Dairy Separator Company, and the Waterloo Gasoline Engine Company (WGE). Those three employed most of the factory workers in the city. Waterloo had become a center for the manufacture of dairy and agricultural equipment; at one time, one-fifth of the gasoline engines manufactured in the country were built there. WGE was the largest employer of factory workers and after 1918 was owned by Deere & Company.

Labor organizations had existed in Waterloo since 1902, when electrical workers organized, and most trades were unionized by 1915, with about 5,000 union members in the city. The Central Labor Union, formed in 1903, comprised 32 labor bodies. The Central was affiliated with the Iowa State Federation of Labor and the American Federation of Labor. T. N. Stufflebeam was its leader.

3. “Open shops” are those where labor unions are not recognized by employers as bargaining groups and union members are not employed. “Closed shops” are those where labor unions are bargaining agents and only union members are employed.

president; its secretary-treasurer, Leon Link, was a member of the executive board of the state federation. At the beginning of 1919, machinists were the largest group of non-unionized workers.

Businessmen first created a formal organization in Waterloo in 1884 that evolved into the Board of Trade and Commercial Club. In 1907 another businessmen’s association, the Waterloo Club, was founded. Both were formed to promote and foster civic and industrial growth. The Waterloo Manufacturers’ Association, established in 1919, was made up of companies opposed to the strikers. It evolved in response to strike developments, expanding its membership and hiring a full-time secretary. By November it became the Waterloo Industrial Association. Its goal was to protect the open shop and oppose collective bargaining.


Some employers in Iowa and elsewhere had launched an open shop drive in 1902 to preserve union-free workplaces. Although Waterloo employers did not join that movement, after World War I they did join the uncoordinated but almost simultaneous nationwide drive for the open shop. One of the first struggles that centered on the issue resulted in a celebrated, but failed, general strike in Seattle. The open shop became a major issue in the steel strike of 1919, and local strikes prompted the establishment of open shop associations around the country in 1919. By 1920, the demands of local employers led the National Association of Manufacturers to formally adopt the open shop as one of its policies. By that fall, the “American Plan of Employment” had been endorsed by almost 500 open shop associations in 240 cities across 44 states.

As 1919 began, the IAM’s recent successes had instilled a sense of optimism. It had enjoyed a steady growth in membership since 1911, with a huge jump in 1918, when membership more than doubled. The National War Labor Board had approved the right of employees to bargain collectively. The IAM was in good shape financially, largely because there had been few strikes to drain its resources. Its leadership foresaw potential problems, however, from hostile employers who would not provoke a strike against a healthy union but who were ready to act at the first sign of weakness.

---


9. The IAM had reason to be positive but also had many unmet goals for 1919. One was to continue filling its coffers: leaders wanted to increase the union’s reserve fund from $1 million to $5 million. The IAM anticipated problems for 1919 caused by the end of war-related production and the lack of any federal program to deal with economic readjustment. The influx of returning military
In 1919 management began its assault by reducing wages, increasing hours, and changing working conditions. The result was many strikes by local unions and other labor organizations. It was an era of “industrial warfare,” according to the IAM. In August the International requested that there be no more strikes. By October the union reported that there were more strikes, and strikes threatened, than during any other period in the country’s history. In November more than 30,000 workers were on strike. The impact on the IAM treasury was devastating. By November the strike fund was empty. As a result, the union encountered “considerable dissension, and some dissatisfaction, within our fold.” All of this was crucial for the situation in Waterloo.

From management’s point of view, labor conditions in Waterloo were quiet and workers seemed happy until the end of June 1919, when A. G. Abbey, a national organizer for the IAM, arrived in Waterloo after successfully organizing a machinists’ strike at Clinton, Iowa. He began holding meetings in the streets and making noon-hour and evening speeches outside the factories. This, according to management, stirred a spirit of unrest among workers. Abbey displayed skill as a speaker, although some noted his tendency to exaggerate. A private detective noted that he was “smoothe tongued,” a “strong personality,” and a “very good hypnotist” (he was also an amateur magician who put on shows at the Waterloo Labor Temple). By July 31, about 2,000 of Waterloo’s 3,000 machinists were in the union, Local No. 314 of the IAM.


11. The manufacturers maintained that Abbey was the cause of the strikes. WGE officials began to monitor his activities early on, preparing written reports almost on a daily basis. See Reports to Deere & Company by L. A. Paradise, 7/8/1919–12/25/1919, DA #11836; J. E. Johnson to Walter Brown, 8/8/1919, DA #11855; L. R. Clausen, “The Right of Individual Contract,” a speech to the annual convention of the National Founders Association, 11/19/1919, DA #11870; P. J. Doyle to L. R. Clausen, 8/16/1919, DA #11855; *Courier*, 7/31/1919, 8/8/1919; *Waterloo Times-Tribune* (hereafter cited simply as *Tribune*), 8/6/1919; *Machinists Monthly Journal*, April 1919.
Efforts to organize machine shop workers in Waterloo peaked in July. The workers demanded an eight-hour day, higher wages (usually the equivalent of 10 hours pay for 8 hours of work), time-and-a-half for overtime, changes in working conditions, recognition of the unions, and the right to bargain collectively. Management thought that the labor “agitators” were operating according to a typical, prearranged plan: organize a limited number of workers and “stampede the rest into a strike” with the objective of making Waterloo a “100% union community.”

WATERLOO’S FIRST STRIKE began on July 29 with action against Iowa Dairy Separator Company, one of the largest employers of machinists in Waterloo and considered by Local 314 to be a leader in the effort to crush the unions. A strike followed at William Galloway Company the next day. The labor organizers planned to submit their demands to other shops, “continuing thru the smaller shops employing union machinists.”

13. See “We Demand Justice,” DA #11854.
Negotiations on July 31 at WGE, overseen by Deere & Company’s Leon Clausen, also failed.\footnote{15} The company released a statement to the \textit{Waterloo Courier} that clearly rejected collective bargaining and emphasized the “constitutional” rights of workers and management to negotiate individual contracts.\footnote{16}

Management at the struck businesses, grouped as the Waterloo Manufacturers’ Association (WMA), met daily, formed a united front, and presented their position to the public. They maintained that they were defending an important constitutional right, that of the individual contract. John E. Johnson, spokesman for both WGE and for the WMA, was, according to the \textit{Oelwein Labor Journal}, “the monkey on the stick of the John Deere Corporation.”\footnote{17}

\footnote{15. For the WGE employees’ demands, see DA #11863. The demands included an eight-hour day, a six-day work week, time-and-a-half for overtime, double time for Sundays and holidays, the right to join a union and bargain collectively, the elimination of piece work, equal pay for women, and the establishment of an arbitration procedure. Clausen stayed behind the scenes during the strike. He had joined Deere & Company in 1912, rose rapidly, and eventually (in March 1919) became vice president of manufacturing and a company director. In 1924 he left Deere & Company to become president of J. I. Case Company. Clausen was totally opposed to unions of any type. The individual contract, as far as he was concerned, was the backbone of labor-management relations. He was convinced that unions were the sole cause of strikes during the war and that the absence of strikes at Deere factories was a result of good management of labor relations. Labor agitators caused the strikes at Waterloo and around the nation in 1919, he believed. Clausen recognized employers’ responsibility to treat workers fairly. Workplace justice needed to be provided to individuals in order for the individual employment contract to work as an industrial relations device. It was management’s responsibility to see to it that workers’ earnings went up each year, he believed; each man should “get ahead.” \textit{Cedar Rapids Tribune}, 1/16/1920; Factory Managers Meeting, 10/11–13/1920, DA #37741; \textit{Case Eagle}, October 1965; L. R. Clausen to E. H. Gary, 9/3/1919, DA #11855; L. R. Clausen to A. H. Head, 11/25/1919, DA #11855; Clausen, “The Right of Individual Contract.”}

\footnote{16. \textit{Courier}, 7/31/1919, 9/16/1919; Report to Deere & Company, 7/31/1919, DA #11836.}

\footnote{17. \textit{Oelwein Labor Journal}, 10/15/1919. The \textit{Labor Journal} was started in 1919 and was published twice a month; its editor, Frank Sheeley, was an employee of WGE and chaired the machinists’ strike committee. John Johnson moved to Waterloo in 1900 to become pastor of the First Methodist Episcopal Church but resigned after three years for health reasons and joined WGE as a bookkeeper. He rose rapidly and became secretary and treasurer. He also acquired a financial interest in the company in 1907. He eventually came to own 29 percent of the shares of common stock of WGE. (George B. Miller and Louis Witry}
The manufacturers used the courts to their advantage. On July 31 Iowa Dairy sought and received an injunction from the district court against Local 314 of the IAM, its officers, and specific members. Provisions of the injunction specified that defendants were restrained from “molesting, injuring or damaging plaintiff’s property; from assembling about the plant or factory in large numbers while interviewing or trying to peaceably induce any of the employees to leave their jobs; from compelling or attempting to compel by abusive language, threats, intimidation, force, coercion or violence any of the employees to leave the employment of the company.” The request for the injunction included accounts of violence and threats to keep employees from entering the plant. On August 1 WGE received from the district court a temporary writ of injunction against the IAM (local and national) to prohibit members from entering company property, assembling in large numbers around the plant, or intimidating employees into breaking the written employment contract with the company. Attorneys for the IAM immediately began attempts to have the injunctions lifted.18

From the beginning, officials at WGE pointed to lawlessness at their plant and at the Iowa Dairy plant.19 Representatives of the WMA met with the police chief on August 1. Giving numerous examples of lawbreaking, they maintained that the city was in a state of anarchy. The chief was unsure whether he had enough deputies to handle the situation but agreed to try to enforce the law. Later that day the chief visited the WGE plant and told the strikers that if they violated any laws he would be forced to turn enforcement over to the county sheriff. The chief’s actions did not satisfy company officials because he did nothing to secure the free passage of workers in and out of the plant.20

---

owned the remaining stock. In March 1918 they sold all of their stock to Deere & Company for $2 million.) Johnson became general manager when Deere & Company purchased the business in March 1918. Petition, 6/7/1926, John E. Johnson v. the United States of America, In the Court of Claims, DA #11832; Courier, 8/18/1919, 9/16/1919.


20. Reports to Deere & Company, 8/1/1919, 8/2/1919, 8/3/1919, DA #11836; Courier, 8/1/1919.
On Monday, August 4, WGE rejected demands from the International Brotherhood of Foundry Employes Union No. 113 and the International Molders’ Union No. 459 and distributed a printed explanation to foundry employees.\textsuperscript{21} The company, unwilling to abandon its long-held policies, would not end the employee’s right to individual contracts. It promised good wages (on an individual basis) and urged any employee with a grievance to take it up with management. The statement concluded, “Every man is entitled to and will receive a square deal.”\textsuperscript{22} The molders did not walk out, indicating that they would seek permission from their international before striking. Management’s response was to close the foundry, citing a surplus of castings. Three hundred more workers were put out of work.\textsuperscript{23}

After the mayor suggested that John Johnson, WGE’s chief executive, meet with other businessmen and a committee of employees to try to reach a settlement, Johnson met with the mayor himself on August 4. At their meeting, Johnson rejected the mayor’s proposal, insisting that outside arbitration was not appropriate. Johnson also spoke with Sheriff David B. Henderson, who indicated that he could do nothing to enforce the laws until the city refused to do so. The city’s chief of police, on the other hand, said it was the sheriff’s responsibility to enforce the injunctions.\textsuperscript{24}

On August 5 WGE filed a suit in district court against 16 defendants, including the IAM, its national organizer (Abbey), Local No. 314, and its officers. The suit asked for a judgment of $25,000 against each “as damages for the alleged failure to carry out written contracts of agreement between the company as employer and the men as employees.” The company claimed that it would suffer serious financial losses because it would be

\textsuperscript{21} The unions wanted an eight-hour day, a flat increase in pay to $6 per day, the acceptance of collective bargaining, the right of union membership, and the establishment of a process to arbitrate any disagreements between management and the unions’ shop committees. Unions, like the molders, had existed within WGE, but there was no collective bargaining or closed shop.

\textsuperscript{22} Notices to Employees, 7/31/1919 and 8/4/1919, DA #11857; Agreements with Labor Unions, 1919, DA #11866.

\textsuperscript{23} Courier, 7/31/1919, 8/4/1919; Tribune, 8/7/1919.

\textsuperscript{24} Reports to Deere & Company, 8/2/1919, 8/4/1919, DA #11836.
unable to fulfill contracts for tractors and engines and that the defendants “conspired and confederated” and were “unlawfully” trying to prevent employees who were under contract from entering the plant. The company claimed that it had the constitutional right to an unobstructed flow of labor into the factory and to contract with workers individually without interference from third parties. Labor leaders reportedly were unaware of what the suit meant. Abbey responded, when interviewed, that he “was much obliged for the compliment but didn’t have the $25,000.”

THE PRESS became increasingly important as both sides tried to influence public opinion. WGE printed a sample employee contract in the Courier and the Tribune. On August 7 the striking machinists issued a statement of their own in the Courier. It said that WGE used a piece-work system, but employees could be com-

pelled to do “day work” for periods of several weeks at a time; when a piece-work employee exceeded the limit set for his machine, the job would be retimed upwards even though employee contracts specified that piece rates were not to be changed during the life of a contract. The union statement claimed that management was unwilling to arbitrate or offer a counterproposal.26

On the same day, the employers issued their own statement in the *Courier*. It said: (1) if the strike lasted for two more weeks the government would take over the plants and operate them; (2) granting the “closed shop” would “sound the death knell” of the plants in six months because none of their competitors in other areas operated with “closed shops”; (3) the continued prosperity of Waterloo depended on the cooperation of the major plants; (4) because of an ongoing slump in demand for agricultural equipment, only half of the workers would be recalled even if the strike ended immediately; and (5) there would be a “long siege” if labor continued to demand a closed shop.27 The statement, which especially emphasized the issue of closed shops, was full of exaggerations and was an obvious attempt to influence public opinion.

After August 7 the employers assumed a lower public profile. In a letter to WMA, Deere & Company vice president Leon Clausen wrote, “It is my opinion that the manufacturers of Waterloo are in a very favorable position because they can and will win the strike if they sit tight and hold together.” He added that manufacturers should be careful not to give union officials “a real cause for action” or anything “the union crowd” could use to gain public sympathy. “The matter of publicity is one that is important. Mr. Abbey should not be given anything which will enable him to break into print just at the present time.” One of the keys to success, Clausen insisted, was to “hold all the manufacturers together, without a break.”28

From the outset, Deere & Company provided direction to the WMA. Clausen believed that the other employers were in-

28. L. R. Clausen to WMA, 8/7/1919, DA #11855; L. R. Clausen to J. E. Johnson, 8/8/1919, DA #11855.
experienced in handling such matters and needed assistance. They wanted to stand together but were not sure what to do. Deere & Company could help, Clausen said, and the situation at Waterloo could be “cleaned up and put on a real basis of stability,” resulting in “the greatest benefit to the individual and the community.”

THE SUCCESSION OF STRIKES at manufacturing concerns came as no surprise, but few observers expected strikes at the city’s laundries. The primary issue was collective bargaining, which management, pressured by the WMA, would not accept. In response, Waterloo Steam Laundry workers struck on August 9; employees at Model Laundry followed on August 11. On August 16 painters at F. M. Michael Paint Company went on strike for higher pay, adding another group to the ranks of the strikers. Abbey’s task was to unite them against an increasingly well-organized body of employers.

As one of their tactics, the manufacturers tried to discredit the labor leaders. They hired a private detective agency to investigate Abbey but were probably disappointed to uncover nothing scandalous about him. Management also received secret reports from union members regarding labor activities, although Local 314 publicly denied that such spies existed. Local attorneys representing WGE sought information for use in expected litigation. Abbey was of particular interest to them.

On August 13 labor organized a large parade with a reported 3,000 participants. The following day labor leaders, including the president of the State Federation of Labor, a member of the

29. L. R. Clausen to J. E. Johnson, 8/15/1919, DA #11855.
30. In addition to the strikes at WGE, Iowa Dairy Separator Co., and William Galloway Co., the employees at the Waterloo Cement Machinery Corp. went on strike on August 2; workers at Novelty Wire Works followed two days later. *Courier*, 8/4/1919.
32. Carleton Sias to J. E. Johnson, 8/4/1919, DA #11855; P. J. Doyle to L. R. Clausen, 8/16/1919, DA #11855. See also Reports on Meetings Held by A. G. Abbey, September 1919, DA #11844; Report on the Strike Situation, 8/24/1919, DA #11842; Flyers, Strike file, DA #11854.
carpenters’ state council, Abbey, and many others who did not want to be identified, met for several hours at the Labor Temple. These leaders reportedly agreed to make Waterloo the focal point for the battle for union recognition and collective bargaining in Iowa. The federation feared that employers in Waterloo were determined to crush the strike and break up the unions. If they were to succeed, all organized labor in the state would suffer. If, on the other hand, the Waterloo strikers were successful in securing higher wages, a shorter work day, and the right to bargain collectively, other employers in the state, the federation maintained, would be less inclined to try to break up unions. As a result, all workers in Iowa were encouraged to raise money for the Waterloo strike fund.33

The employers were also busy. By mid-August the WMA had finished a reorganization to include a broader cross-section of employers, hired a person full time to run day-to-day business, and prepared a public relations attack. The main point they wanted to emphasize was the importance of the individual employment contract; they did not want employees who did not see its merit. In addition, the manufacturers considered it important for the general public to understand and believe in individual contracts. The manufacturers planned a series of ads that, according to Clausen, would “leave no doubt in the mind of the average citizen, as to the viciousness of Union Policies, and to the correctness of our own policies.”34

At the same time, Deere & Company wanted its fellow employers to understand that employers had important responsibilities to their workers: ensuring that all employees received a proper income, helping them understand that the employers were interested in their “individual welfare and success in life,” making promotions available, providing kindly assistance to newly hired people, and assuring workers that the company would remove any individual injustices from the workplace.

33. “Assist Your Brothers,” 9/4/1919, DA #11854 [the date handwritten on this document after the fact is October 4, 1919, but it appears that the correct date is more likely to be September 4]; Tribune, 8/14/1919, 8/15/1919; Courier, 8/15/1919.

34. L. R. Clausen to J. E. Johnson, 8/15/1919, DA #11855; Reports to Deere & Company, 8/19/1919, 8/20/1919, DA #11836.
To make this work, it was pointed out, shop-floor foremen and managers had to understand and support these responsibilities.\textsuperscript{35} That was the approach the WMA wanted to discuss at its meeting on Saturday afternoon, August 16, the most violent day of the strike. That morning strikers had recognized some WGE foremen and superintendents on a streetcar. The strikers surrounded the car, boarded it, and attempted to throw off the employees. A “general melee” followed, with some “personal encounters.” In the afternoon, strikers removed four Galloway employees from a streetcar and tossed one into Blackhawk Creek. In the evening, another Galloway employee on his way home from work was stopped and beaten. The county attorney filed reports, and the sheriff made five arrests for assault and one for disturbing the “public quiet.” Abbey insisted that “we do not countenance forcible methods in gaining our ends,” but he admitted that “it is certain that among 2500 men now out of work because of employers’ unwillingness to arbitrate that there will be a few hot heads who fail to think before they act.”\textsuperscript{36}

The manufacturers decided that the time had come for action to protect workers. They and their attorneys met on Sunday, August 17, and decided to tell the county supervisors that the county would be held liable if they did not protect lives and property. John Johnson met with some of the supervisors at his home the following morning, and they agreed to call a special meeting of the board of supervisors for that afternoon.\textsuperscript{37}

About one hundred people attended the supervisors’ meeting on August 18. The six or so who spoke “dwelt upon alleged law violations committed by strikers.” In what must have been an inflammatory speech, Johnson said the local strikes were part of “a nationwide plan for labor to control all industry” and a local effort to unionize all of Waterloo. He denounced Abbey for having associates in Minneapolis who were “red socialists” and for secretly supporting labor violence while publicly renouncing it. Johnson claimed that there was increasing violence

\textsuperscript{35} J. E. Johnson to WMA, 8/14/1919, DA #11855; L. R. Clausen to J. E. Johnson, 8/15/1919, DA #11855.

\textsuperscript{36} Courier, 8/17/1919; Tribune, 8/17/1919.

\textsuperscript{37} Reports to Deere & Company, 8/16/1919, 8/17/1919, 8/18/1919, DA #11836.
in Waterloo. “If the county board does not grant protection,” he warned, “I fear there will be loss of life.” Many workers went on strike, he claimed, because they had been intimidated; the plants would be able to open soon if ample protection was provided for them. The board unanimously agreed to Johnson’s request to authorize the sheriff to appoint 1,000 or more deputies to maintain order and protect life and property. Right after the meeting, Sheriff Henderson notified sheriffs around the state that deputies would be hired.38

The next day, the Central Labor Union responded to the board’s action with a statement printed in full in the Courier. It pointed out that there were two sides to the controversy: the strikers’ and management’s. The statement was issued to inform the third party involved: the public. It said that no agreement presented to manufacturers called for a “closed shop,” but the manufacturers wanted the public to think so. Manufacturers were trying to gain public sympathy, the statement continued, but they knew that the appointment of the deputies might stir up trouble.39

The Tribune, reporting that the supervisors’ action was unexpected, made an important observation: responsibility for the strike situation had been taken from the city and placed in the hands of the county.40 The manufacturers wanted law enforcement officials to help crush the strike, and the only way to achieve that (barring really serious violence) was to convince the more sympathetic county officials, including the sheriff, to become the main keepers of the peace. WGE “brought pressure” on the sheriff to “keep him in line.” On August 9 management had met with him and “put the matter up squarely to the Sheriff that he must handle the situation . . .; that it was his duty to preserve order and if he didn’t do his duty, we would see that he did.”41 As far as the unions were concerned, the sheriff was a tool of the companies. Company officials, in turn,

38. Tribune, 8/19/1919; Courier, 8/18/1919.
40. Tribune, 8/19/1919.
were convinced that the Waterloo police were sympathetic to the strikers.  

Violent incidents took place on August 19, perhaps precipitated by the supervisors’ action the day before. About 8:00 a.m. some Iowa Dairy Separator Company employees were driving to work when they were attacked. One of the assailants jumped on the car’s running board, struck the driver, and grabbed the steering wheel. The driver lost control of the car, which hit a team of horses pulling a wagon. Two or three pickets from WGE also allegedly beat an office employee of Hawkeye Oil Company.  

In response, the companies placed a large ad in the Courier and Tribune on August 21 that read: “To the Public: In response to repeated inquiries, we will resume operations as soon as our public streets become safe for our workmen who desire to return to work. Under present arrangements this should soon be accomplished.” The employers ran yet another large ad in the Tribune on August 23, an obvious attempt to split the strikers. The ad gave the employers’ version of the origins of the strike:

Local organizers, in accordance with a cold-blooded plan, requested an outside agency to send agitators to their assistance. They came. Business was stopped. Thousands of men were thrown out of their jobs. The rights of peaceful men were trampled upon. Force and violence were employed. Want and distress which always follows idleness made their appearance among our citizens. . . . If the responsibility for putting thousands of men out of work had been placed solely on your shoulders, would YOU have given the word to walk out? . . . Are the men responsible for this condition REALLY interested in YOUR welfare? . . . Is it FAIR to you and YOUR families?  

On that same day management received a report from a paid investigator who painted a gloomy picture: the strikers were going to win because they had the support of the mayor, the police chief, and a growing number of citizens and small businessmen; they were successfully organizing all types of

42. Special Report, 8/24/1919, DA #11842; Special Report, 9/3/1919, DA #11834.  
44. Courier, 8/21/1919; Tribune, 8/21/1919.  
45. Tribune, 8/23/1919.
workers; and they were promised money from the Iowa State Federation of Labor. The state federation’s pledge of $10,000 per week for the strike fund was followed by pledges from local labor organizations around the state.  

The actual number of strikers was not officially reported, but on August 23 the unions estimated that about 2,755 workers were on strike. In addition, about 350 foundry workers were out of work even though they were not on strike, bringing the total to more than 3,100 people unemployed after August 2 because of the strikes.

DESPITE the large number of strikers and the seemingly unfavorable news, WGE leaders met to prepare for the workers’ return to work. They also agreed that no union members would be reemployed. In the future all grievances would be handled without delay “to make it possible for an employee to get better representation thru his foreman than he could possibly get thru a walking delegate or any other third party.” They agreed that all workers were entitled to an adequate wage, and piece rates were discussed. They established an elaborate interview process for returning employees to ensure that only those who realized that strikers had broken their contracts would be rehired; they had to promise not only not to do it again but to stand with the company to prevent a recurrence. If returning employees were able to pass this rigorous test, they would be given a new employment contract to sign, have pensions and benefits reinstated, and receive a physical. They would also be required to sign a form asking why they went on strike and who encouraged them to do so.

On August 24 and 25 the employers placed another ad in the Tribune and Courier offering to reinstate former employees without prejudice “if you talk the matter over with us personally.” Management at WGE believed that workers at all of the plants

46. Special report, 8/24/1919, DA #11841.
47. Arbitration Petition, DA #11840. The unions cited 1,500 workers on strike at WGE, 485 at Iowa Dairy, 350 at Galloway, 75 at Armstrong, 75 at Waterloo Cement Construction Co., 20 at Novelty Wire, and 250 at various laundries.
48. Minutes, 8/22/1919, DA #11847.
were ready to return and would do so when they were no longer afraid of harm from the strikers.

A “fine spirit” pervaded the WMA’s regular meeting on August 25. Sheriff Henderson was commended for his good work. He speculated that there would be no more violence, an opinion that was confirmed by reports from the manufacturers’ “special men.”

The manufacturers’ public relations barrage continued on August 26, as they placed an ad in the *Courier* encouraging strikers to cut out a form that was included and return it to their former employers. The form asked whether the striker had personally voted to strike, whether promises made by strike leaders had been kept, whether, and how much, strike benefits had been received, and whether the striker expected to continue to receive benefits. The ad probably was less an attempt to gather data than it was an effort to get employees to think about their personal situations. The employers placed a second big ad in the *Tribune* and *Courier* (signed by an expanded list of employers) asking why many of Waterloo’s industries were idle. It explained, “For over three weeks the earnest, industrious workers of Waterloo have been held out of employment and have been prevented from earning their pay by the actions of local and outside agitators. The great majority of these workers who have been forced out of employment are not in sympathy with the radical and unsound demands of the self-elected agitators. . . . Violence, threats, and force have temporarily taken the place of the rights of individuals. Waterloo faces a grave crisis.”

On August 27 events seemed to point toward an end to the dissension. The strikers at Bovee Grinder and Furnace Works returned to work under previous conditions, but with an increase in wages. It was the first strike settled since they began on July 29, and the return reportedly had union approval. But Bovee’s agreement to a wage increase brought open criticism from the WMA, which was doing its best to avoid concessions.

51. The amount of the wage increase was not reported. *Courier*, 8/2/1919; Reports to Deere & Company, 8/27/1919, 8/28/1919, DA #11836.
By August 30, WGE was convinced that the strikers’ morale was weakening and that many were ready to return to work.\textsuperscript{52} At that juncture some secret negotiations took place. J. E. Jordan and Harry M. Reed, attorneys for the strikers, met with J. W. Arbuckle, attorney for Litchfield Manufacturing Company. Because Litchfield had not been struck, Jordan and Reed thought that Arbuckle would be a good intermediary to use to approach the other manufacturers. Arbuckle then met with John Johnson, who responded for the employers: each employee would have to return individually under the previous terms of employment and sign a new contract; under no circumstances would there be any negotiations with a representative of the strikers. Johnson further told Arbuckle that if he or the strikers’ attorneys wanted to help they should get Abbey to leave town. Johnson said workers had been content and well compensated before Abbey arrived and began agitating; the door was, and always had been, open to all individuals to negotiate; and the employers felt no ill will towards the vast majority of the strikers.\textsuperscript{53}

In the meetings with Arbuckle, Johnson insisted that the employers were united in their stand against collective bargaining. Arbuckle said that Jordan had indicated to him that the strikers were ready to return to work; some would even be willing to abandon their union membership. Johnson responded that all returning workers would be required to sign individual contracts containing a clause that they would not join a labor union during the life of the contract; future discussions would be fruitless if the workers did not agree.\textsuperscript{54} The manufacturers were sensing victory and were standing united as August ended.

On September 5 the Sibert, Waterloo, and Model laundries all reopened with little turmoil. The WMA tried to force the laundry owners to make no concessions to the workers. Most former employees were on the job; the laundries hired replacements for the workers who remained on strike, which created some tension. More picketers appeared, so deputies were deployed around the laundries in case of trouble. Nothing hap-

\textsuperscript{52} Report to Deere & Company, 8/30/1919, DA #11836.
\textsuperscript{53} Reports to Deere & Company, 8/27/1919, 8/28/1919, 8/31/1919, DA #11836.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
pened, though. Teamsters from one coal company refused to deliver a load to the laundries, but those from another agreed to do so. The laundry owners had been willing to make some wage concessions, but they would not accept collective bargaining. In fact, once they were struck, they demanded that employees give up their union memberships as a condition of employment. Members of the WMA encouraged the laundry owners. One of the owners had been negotiating with Abbey to try to reach a settlement, but the other manufacturers convinced him that he needed to uphold the principles of the WMA because the strike was at a critical point and required the manufacturers to maintain a united front.55

When laundries began reopening with non-union workers, it marked the beginning of the end of the strike. By September 12, work on a reduced scale was proceeding at struck factories, including WGE and Iowa Dairy.56 All workers were former employees who had been required to drop their union member-


56. WGE began producing some tractors from parts on hand; 161 men were at work, up from 100 on August 29. Reports to Deere & Company, 9/8/1919, 9/11/1919, 9/12/1919, DA #11836.
ships and return under pre-strike conditions. There was no interference from pickets, who were reduced in number.57

FROM THE BEGINNING, the strikes’ leaders sought arbitration with the manufacturers, who rejected the process. Labor organized a movement to petition Governor W. L. Harding to appoint an arbitration board. On August 28 Harding, considering the welfare of the community to be at stake, ordered arbitration between the strikers and WGE. The company, however, refused to participate in, or be bound by, arbitration. The refusal, which the newspapers had predicted, came as no surprise.58

The other struck companies followed WGE’s lead and declined to be part of the arbitration process.59 The manufacturers did consider the possibility of participating, but decided that “such action would involve them in at least a moral obligation to be bound by the conclusions of the Board and would set before the public the impression that the manufacturers had participated.”60

The arbitration committee met on September 16 and heard testimony from representatives of the striking WGE workers and their attorneys. The strikers made a variety of allegations. Witnesses stated that there had been no dissatisfaction at WGE until Deere & Company took over and installed the stopwatch system. In general, the witnesses claimed that their paychecks had been going down while the cost of living was going up.61 Deere & Company, from the strikers’ point of view, was the cause of the problem.

60. Reports to Deere & Company, 9/16/1919, 9/17/1919, DA #11836.
61. Courier, 9/16/1919.
Deere & Company had, in fact, realized early in 1919 that the labor situation at WGE was “ripe for some difficulty.” Management thought that the situation would be corrected by relying on the individual contract, discontinuing the practice of cutting piece rates, and adding Deere & Company sick benefits, insurance, and death and disability benefits. But the company had experienced serious quality control problems prior to the strike, the plant did not have a good purchasing program, and recordkeeping was shoddy, resulting in disrupted production. Accumulation of an excessive inventory of tractors forced a reduction of the work force from about 1,600 to about 1,100 in March. Management had even considered closing the plant temporarily in April. Instead, production was cut. The way those drastic changes were handled created an environment in which “outside organizers” could influence the employees.62

The arbitration board’s report, completed on September 17, reflected some of these problems. It pointed out that the findings might have been different if the company had been willing to participate, but the evidence that was presented indicated that the company was at fault for the strike. Wages were inadequate, the company had broken contracts with workers, and it was indifferent to grievances. The issue of a closed shop had nothing to do with the strike, in the arbitrators’ opinion. The report concluded, “The cause of this strike, from the evidence submitted, seems wholly due to grievances that should have had sympathetic consideration on the part of the employer.” The board urged the factory to reopen, allow workers to “return on terms of self-respect,” settle grievances, and establish easier “avenues of access to the business office.” The board invited management to meet with the workers to discuss the issues.63

WGE had known all along, as had everyone else, that the board’s decision would not be binding, so there was no reason to participate. Although the arbitration board downplayed the issues of collective bargaining and closed shops, they were cru-

cial to the employers. In fact, the most important area of disagreement between labor and management was the question of collective bargaining. Management opposed it adamantly. The WGE statement released on July 31 clearly rejected it. The laundry owners were willing to make wage concessions, but would not accept collective bargaining. Once they were struck, they demanded that employees give up union memberships as a condition of employment.

The question of closed shops versus open shops was even more divisive. On August 7 the factories’ position statement published in the Courier had claimed that to grant the closed shop would be to “sound the death knell” of the plants in six months. The Central Labor Union responded on August 19 with its own statement: no agreement presented to the manufacturers called for a closed shop, but the manufacturers wanted the public to think so.64

The reactions to the arbitration board’s report were predictable. The Central Labor Union formally endorsed it while John E. Johnson said there was nothing in the report that required a response from the company. He also pointed out that the factory was running and open to any employee who wanted to return to work under prevailing conditions. The WMA decided to support the decision to provide no rebuttal.65

ONE OF THE NOTEWORTHY THINGS about the strikes was the relative lack of violence even though the possibility was real and each side had tried to use the threat of it to its advantage. Management, at least at WGE, expected it.66 Incidents took place from the beginning. The streetcar brawls of August 16 caused real excitement as did additional physical encounters on August 19. Those events prompted big ads in the Tribune and Courier on August 21 and 26 in which the manufacturers claimed that the streets were unsafe for workers trying to get to their jobs. The violence and intimidation, they claimed, was caused

64. Courier, 8/8/1919, 8/19/1919; Special Report, 8/24/1919, DA #11842.
66. J. E. Johnson to Leon Clausen, 8/9/919, DA #11855; Johnson to Walter Brown, 8/8/1919, DA #11855.
by a few agitators, some from outside the community. On September 19 the sheriff reported that men carrying suitcases, under Abbey’s control, were to arrive the following week to get into the plants to blow them up; WGE officials, to their credit, did not believe that local labor leaders would use such tactics. In reality, there was not much violence, but the criminal proceedings that resulted attracted considerable attention and were used by the machinists’ union to try to mobilize public support.

There were several trials, some relating to alleged violations of the injunctions and others the result of arrests for violence. The significance to both sides was that the proceedings were of great interest to the public. An example was the trial of Clair Bloomfield in early September in municipal court. An Iowa Dairy Separator Company employee, he was charged with assault and battery on a foreman, who had been driving his car pool when attacked by a group of men. Bloomfield was accused of jumping on the running board of the car and attempting to drag the foreman from the car. Harry Reed, J. E. Jordan, and J. C. Murtagh, attorneys provided by the machinists’ union, represented Bloomfield; Abbey, acting in an advisory capacity, was seated with the lawyers. Evidently Murtagh’s speech to the jury was a fiery one, containing his opinions about organized labor and the strike situation, because when he finished, the spectators, mostly strikers, “broke into cheers, hand clapping, shrill whistles and cat calls, while the more excitable stamped their feet and threw their hats in the air.” The case was turned over to the jury at 4:30 p.m., and the guilty verdict was returned at 7:05. When court reconvened the next day, Bloomfield was sentenced to the maximum: $100 and costs or 30 days in jail. He did not, by its make-up, have an unsympathetic jury; the testimony made it clear that he was guilty. The strike leaders used the trial as an opportunity for Murtagh to speak stirringly about the strike, and the trial was covered extensively in the newspapers.

Some of the same individuals were involved in legal proceedings resulting from violations of the injunctions that the

68. Report to Deere & Company, 9/19/1919, DA #11836.
manufacturers had secured. Three had been arrested for contempt of court as well as for assault after the August 16 streetcar incidents. The trials provided Murtagh and the union’s other lawyers another forum to speak for labor’s cause; they did not bother to dispute the fact that the injunction had been violated. The proceedings against these men began in mid-August and finally concluded at the end of September, when they pled guilty to contempt. An attorney representing WGE demanded a jail term for the offenders. When the judge imposed a $50 fine as sentence, another attorney for the company demanded that the offenders go to jail until their fines were paid. F. H. Mulholland, a Toledo, Ohio, attorney, provided by the IAM, convinced the judge, however, to allow the men some time to raise the money, since, he pointed out, “As a rule men who have been on strike for over eight weeks do not carry $50 about in their pockets.”

It was October before the legal wrangling over the various assault, illegal assembly, and injunction violation charges ended. It was clear from the testimony that the strike really had been quite peaceful. It was also obvious that the newspaper coverage had kept the community well informed about what was going on in the courtrooms.

WORKERS began returning to work in increasing numbers after September 19 at all of the plants while others continued to try to reach a settlement with the employers. The WMA kept pressuring members to hold firm, pointing out that the workers who had remained loyal and on the job considered it unfair to negotiate with the strikers. The group also insisted that none of the returning workers be union members, and all were required to sign individual contracts. Although the WMA considered bringing in strikebreakers at that juncture, reports that they were receiving indicated that the strikers considered their cause lost and were ready to return to work on any terms.

By late September, things were dismal for the strikers. The machinists’ union advised them that there were no more funds

70. *Tribune*, 9/30/1919; *Courier*, 8/19/1919.
available for use in the court battles that were taking place. F. H. Mulholland, the IAM’s attorney, reportedly said that the strike was lost and that he was leaving town. Foundries at Bovee Grinder and Furnace Works, Headford Foundry, Interstate Foundry, and WGE were all running on a limited basis. The WMA continued efforts to get employees, especially teamsters, to sign individual contracts.  

Once it became clear that the strike was ending, Deere & Company, unhappy with the leadership provided by John Johnson and Lou Witry, announced management changes at WGE. Allen Head replaced Johnson as general manager on October 1, and Witry was relieved of his duties as manager of factory operations.  


73. Waterloo Gasoline Engine Co. Report Year Ended October 31, 1919, DA #2659; *John Deere Magazine*, November 1919; Minutes, Waterloo Gasoline
By mid-October workers were returning to all of the plants as fast as they could be handled; union leaders reportedly were encouraging them to do so. Pickets appeared to be on duty only to qualify for strike benefits. The coal and ice companies were successful in forcing individual contracts on their teamsters. By October 20, when Abbey left to get some rest, the manufacturers were satisfied that the strike was over. They did not think Abbey would return. Pickets were almost completely absent by October 27; only a very few of the “radicals and old-timers” attended the morning strikers’ meetings. WGE readjusted wage rates upward on November 3; by then, management had met individually with all employees.74

By mid-November, the strikes were over and the reorganization of the WMA into the Waterloo Industrial Association was complete. Membership was open to any industrial or commercial business employing five or more people. Mayor R. C. Thompson resigned in mid-November in the wake of a furor involving women and a party. He was replaced by T. E. Leeper, an alderman who, from management’s point of view, could “be depended upon to enforce the laws in a forcible and fair manner.” The Central Labor Union sent a letter to other labor organizations in the state instructing them to cease mail contributions to the strike fund. By mid-December, all plants were operating with full work forces. Organized labor was beaten.75

THE WATERLOO STRIKES of 1919 failed for several reasons. First, the strike fund was insufficient. Several non-striking unions made pledges: Illinois Central Railroad workers, Rath Packing Company employees, printers, barbers, city firemen, and teamsters. Money was also pledged from other sources: the Salvation Army, the Cedar Rapids Federation of Labor, and labor organi-

---

izations in Oelwein. But pledges were not always met. By mid-September, the strike fund was low, with demands for benefits exceeding revenues, and by the end of the month it was empty. By October, Local 314 and the Central Labor Union had split as the Central determined that the machinists’ strike was lost. Local 314 remained officially on strike into the spring of 1920, with about 30 “old men” refusing to return, but the local was in debt and defeated.76

The inability of Local 314 to mobilize a broader spectrum of Waterloo’s workers also helps explain why the strike failed. The machinists instigated the strikes, but in order to succeed they needed the total support of the Waterloo Central Labor Union. That support was lukewarm at best. When the Central Labor Union, and then the Iowa State Federation of Labor, withdrew all financial support, the machinists were left standing alone, and their strike failed. The only glimmer of hope came when the laundry workers went on strike. Leon Clausen correctly believed that they went on strike as part of the attempt to institute a general strike.77

One of the striking machinists’ objectives, and ultimately their only real hope for victory, was to organize a general strike. On July 31 C. H. Milnes, business agent for Local 314, predicted that there would be “a general sympathetic strike affecting every concern in the city employing union labor,” and Abbey thought Waterloo was “ripe” for a general strike. The success of a general strike depended on the support of the Central Labor Union. But on July 31 its president, T. N. Stufflebeam, doubted “that at this time a general strike would hasten the conciliation.” By August 7 it was clear that the Central Labor Union would not call a general strike. According to Stufflebeam, “Should a general strike be called and the strikers fail to win, Waterloo would suffer the consequences. Every union man in the city probably would move where labor conditions are

77. Clausen, “The Right of Individual Contract.”
more equitable. And the town would be flooded with foreigners and hoodlums.”

The success of a general strike in Waterloo depended in large part on what the 1,200 workers at Illinois Central Railroad would do. But rail workers nationwide were involved in a labor dispute involving the federal government, and they needed the approval of their international union to strike, so they did not join the Waterloo strike. In August there had been unsuccessful attempts to organize retail store clerks, cooks and waiters, bakers and confectioners, and “servant girls.” Members of the local Typographical Union were not willing to strike. Auto mechanics had no interest in organizing or striking since they already had better conditions and wages than those demanded by the unions. The same was true of Rath Packing Company employees. A strike by motion picture machine operators was averted when owners of the six theaters agreed to increase wages. When teamsters went on strike in mid-September, they were immediately fired; thereafter all teamsters were required to sign individual contracts.

By August 29 Stufflebeam reportedly was ready to work to end the strike. He claimed that the Central Labor Union had opposed the strike from the start, blaming it on Abbey and the machinists’ local. On September 17 a resolution advocating a general strike came up again at a Central Labor Union meeting but was voted down almost unanimously. The Central Labor Union’s failure to endorse a general strike hurt the machinists’ cause: they had to stand alone against the city’s powerful employers.

While labor in Waterloo was unable to present a united front, the employers did, thanks largely to the leadership of Deere & Company’s WGE. After the workers struck on July 31, the company released a statement printed in the newspapers that re-

remained the foundation of the employers’ position.\textsuperscript{81} It clearly rejected collective bargaining and emphasized the “constitutional” rights of workers and management to negotiate individual contracts. On August 4 Leon Clausen explained to John Johnson how Deere & Company wanted the strike situation handled. All efforts to ensure law and order should be supported aggressively, but otherwise the company should adopt a passive stance. The shops were to be kept open with those people who were willing to work; should no one report to work the doors would be locked and watchmen hired. No replacement workers were to be hired. The statement issued on July 31 was to remain the official, and only, position. The employers’ business policies were not subject to arbitration by any third party. “We will stand for our rights as employers and citizens regardless of the length of time it takes to establish those rights —whether it is one month, six months, one year or five years, and it will do no harm to have everybody in Waterloo understand this.”\textsuperscript{82}

Prior to the strike, WGE employees had been required to sign a contract. It defined what the company would do: pay a specified hourly wage or a price for piece work (and not reduce them during the life of the contract), furnish employment as steadily as conditions permitted, comply with principles and rules as posted in the shops, pay one-quarter of the cost of the Sick Benefit Fund, and pay compensation for any work-related injuries according to Iowa law. The employee, in turn, was expected to “faithfully serve” the company during the period of the contract (unless prevented by illness or quitting), not join any “concerted action” to change hours, wages, or working conditions, preserve and care for company property, comply with principles and rules as posted in the shops, and accept compensation for any work-related injuries according to Iowa law.\textsuperscript{83}

Once WGE employees went on strike, Deere & Company began considering changes to the contract. By the time workers

\textsuperscript{81.} Courier, 7/31/1919.  
\textsuperscript{82.} L. R. Clausen to J. E. Johnson, 8/4/1919, DA #11855.  
\textsuperscript{83.} For a sample contract, see DA #11863.
began returning, it had the wording perfected. There were significant changes. The company agreed that it would pay all costs for employees under the Deere & Company Death, Disability and Pension Fund (in addition to the one-quarter of the Sick Benefit costs). The employee’s commitments remained the same except for a major addition: “That he is not now and will not become a member of a labor union or similar organization while in the employ of the Company.” 84

The unbending opposition of the manufacturers, led by Deere & Company, to collective bargaining was the ultimate cause of the failure of the strikes in Waterloo in the fall of 1919. There was no record of success in long strikes in Waterloo, and there was no union tradition of enduring short-term personal hardships in return for long-term gains. As long as the strike fund provided a livelihood, the strikers stayed off their jobs. Organized labor had a problem that the IAM and the manufacturers no doubt, recognized: if strikers did not succeed in reaching their goals within about four weeks, they had a tendency

84. Drafts and the final version of the contract are in DA #11863. Deere & Company was slow to give up using individual contracts as the basis of its labor relations. In fact, not until 1939 did it begin dropping the clause requiring employees to pledge to not join any “concerted action” to change wages or other conditions of their contracts. Not until the World War II era did collective bargaining replace individual contracts at most Deere factories, including the one in Waterloo. Moline Dispatch, 8/24/1939. For an overview of Deere & Company industrial relations, see Wayne G. Broehl, John Deere’s Company (New York, 1984).
to give up. Had the strikes’ organizers been able to generate enough support to organize a general strike, they might have been able to break the united front presented by management.

As a result of the strike, employers realized that they needed to deal fairly with workplace complaints to prevent future demands for collective bargaining. Deere & Company saw that some managers were unwilling or unable to adapt, so they were replaced. The company formalized its industrial relations policies and procedures in 1920 based on two cornerstones: employees must be treated well, and the open shop had to be maintained.

A major depression devastated the farm equipment industry shortly after the strikes ended in Waterloo. Deere & Company and its factory at Waterloo survived, and later thrived, continuing to fight against collective bargaining. Not until 1942, when Deere & Company’s Waterloo employees chose the United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implements Workers (CIO) to represent them (with the first collective bargaining contract signed in 1943), did a new era of industrial relations begin in Waterloo. By then the struggle of 1919 had been long forgotten.

86. See Deere & Company Factory Managers Meeting, 10/11–13/1920, DA #37741.
The Politics of Youth: Civil Rights Reform in the Waterloo Public Schools

KATHRYN A. SCHUMAKER

ON FRIDAY NIGHT, September 13, 1968, the East High School Trojans of Waterloo, Iowa, opened their football season against the St. Joseph Chargers of Westchester, Illinois. The game was played at Sloane Wallace Stadium at West High School in Waterloo, an all-white school on the predominately white side of town. East High, which all of the city’s black high school students attended, had no stadium to house its top-ranked team.¹

During the halftime lull, police officers attempted to arrest a young African American man outside the stadium. When the young man resisted arrest, students in the stands took notice and poured outside the gates. Black students scuffled with police for the remainder of the game. Groups of students argued with police, who tried to control them with mace and clubs.²

After the game’s end, more chaos erupted across the Cedar River on the east side of town, where almost all of the city’s Af-

Members of the University of Chicago Social History Workshop and participants in the University of Michigan Graduate Student Conference on the Long Twentieth Century read and provided many insightful comments on early versions of this article. I am especially grateful to Mark Bradley, Matt Briones, Jane Dailey, Chris Dingwall, Adam Green, Matt Lassiter, Amy Lippert, Sarah Miller-Davenport, Emily Remus, Emily Romeo, Jim Sparrow, Katie Turk, and Sarah Weicksel.

2. Des Moines Register, 9/14/1968.
American Americans lived. Someone started a fire at a lumber company that quickly engulfed its mill and three nearby homes. At East High, another person poured gasoline and then threw a match through a classroom window. For hours, police officers skirmished with groups of young men. When the violence finally ended around midnight, seven police officers were wounded and thirteen young people had been arrested. The next day, the streets were deserted except for hundreds of National Guardsmen who patrolled the city’s east side on foot with bayonets and in Jeeps and trucks stocked with smoke bombs.³

Civil disorder was not new to Waterloo; the summer before, another confrontation between a police officer and African American youths had sparked disorder that lasted several days. At the time, the editor of the Waterloo Courier commented to the New York Times, “We get calls from other newspapers and they all ask, ‘What are they doing rioting out there in the cornfields?’”⁴ Young people in Waterloo were not, in fact, rioting in any cornfields, but the editor’s statement indicates how “urban” problems were considered to afflict only big cities in far-off states. Yet in the late 1960s, even in places that looked very much like Waterloo, young people expressed their grievances and frustrations through instances of civil disorder.

CIVIL DISORDER and the threat of disorder were common during the late 1960s. The Kerner Commission noted that in 1967 there were nearly 70 instances of civil disorder in cities with populations of less than 100,000.⁵ Although the scale and length of the Waterloo disorder of 1968 did not come close to rivaling those in Newark or Detroit during the summer of 1967, which lasted for days and ended with dozens of deaths, the same frustrations instigated disorder in those large cities. Waterloo’s smaller scale allows for a close analysis of how the dis-

⁵. According to the Kerner Commission, out of a total of 160 total instances of disorder in 1967, 37 occurred in cities with fewer than 50,000 inhabitants and 30 occurred in cities that had between 50,000 and 100,000 inhabitants. National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (New York, 1968).
ruptions of 1968 reverberated well into the next decade and illuminates the influence of youth politics on the city during those years.

Before 1968 Iowans had attempted to address the problems of racial discrimination and segregation in their state with a series of voluntary efforts. The civil disorder of 1968 spurred a coalition of residents, white and black, to coalesce around the need for further reform. What those reforms would entail remained a point of constant contention among students, parents, school administrators, and other residents. Through the debates of the following years, dismantling racial discrimination in the schools was at the forefront of community concerns—and it was pushed there by student activism.

After the national civil rights victories of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, implementation of the reforms those laws demanded remained an important and pressing problem. Scholars have neglected to analyze that process, focusing instead on a declension narrative of the post-1965 United States in which the nation became attuned to the efforts of civil rights activists in the North only when civil disorder and the rise of Black Power jolted its cities. That literature marries the urban crisis with the history of civil rights, and identifies suburbanization as key in unmaking the New Deal coalition of the 1960s. According to that narrative, segregation in northern schools was most often a product of residential segregation, which was amplified by white flight to the suburbs. Robert Self’s *American Babylon* most forcefully frames the post–civil rights era within a metropolitan schematic with the indelible image of the “white noose” created by a mass white exodus from cities to suburbs. The black freedom struggle in the North, with its focus on access to jobs, the amelioration of poverty, and fair housing, was doomed by broader phenomena shaping the American landscape during the 1960s and 1970s, especially deindustrialization and white flight to the suburbs. Those factors contributed to the political influence of a resurgent conservatism, which further foreclosed possibilities for civil rights reforms during the

White opposition to busing, perhaps demonstrated most notably in Boston, turned desegregation into a hot-button political issue at the expense of the children involved. Although suburbanization and the urban crisis profoundly shaped American politics in the second half of the twentieth century, that paradigm places a backlash to the racial liberalism of the 1960s at its center and ignores the complicated process that Americans faced in dealing with the changes in daily life wrought by the civil rights movement. Such a reliance on the macro-history of the era leaves out subtler transformations occurring in Americans’ everyday lives. I argue that the late 1960s and early 1970s were also shaped by the new expectations created by the civil rights movement’s successes—particularly the vision of equal schooling held by young people, who conceived of antidiscriminatory measures that would dramatically change the way children were educated and treated in schools. Those young people were emboldened by the new moral legitimacy given to civil rights reforms, and they demanded to be heard.

This telling of the story of the late 1960s shows how civil disorder was not just a symptom of a full-blown urban crisis but was also part of a larger struggle in the schools for what black students saw as their rights to equity in education and freedom from discrimination. Importantly, students in Waterloo were far less interested in desegregation than they were in implementing what they saw as a new standard of race relations between school administrators, teachers, and students. Inspired and empowered by the civil rights movement’s successes in the


mid-1960s, Waterloo students asserted their own conceptions of racial equality and educational equity and, in the process, won concessions from the local school district. At the same time, the school board turned to school desegregation as a practical way to prove its commitment to racial equality in the schools. Shrinking enrollments turned school desegregation into a policy choice made when it became apparent that a realignment of school attendance zones would be necessary. White opposition to busing arose in Waterloo as the school board voted for a comprehensive desegregation plan, but opponents were ultimately not able to halt the implementation of the school board’s plan.

IN 1968 Waterloo was a deeply segregated city with roughly 75,000 inhabitants and a growing African American population. Waterloo’s economic base was in farm equipment manufacturing and agricultural products processing. The major employers in the city during the 1960s were the Rath meatpacking plant and a large John Deere factory, which both employed unionized black and white workers. In 1970 a full third of the city’s workers were engaged in manufacturing jobs—far more than in any other single sector of the local economy. During the early to mid-twentieth century, the plants drew African American migrants from the South, who appreciated the factories’ well-paying jobs and the promise of escape from the oppression of the Jim Crow South. By 1970, 9 percent of the city’s inhabitants were black, and Waterloo was home to the third-largest African American population in the state behind Des Moines and Davenport. African Americans were concentrated in five of the city’s neighborhoods, all of which were on the northeast side of the Cedar River.9

The civil rights struggle in Iowa dated back to the nineteenth century. In 1868, a century before the student protests at East High School, Iowans voted in favor of five amendments that erased references to race in its state constitution. The amendments extended the franchise to African American men and lifted a ban on their service in the state militia. They also struck

African American workers were drawn to relatively well-paying jobs at the Rath meatpacking plant in Waterloo. Photo from Labor Collection, State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City.

the word white from considerations of state census enumerations and legislative district apportionment. Historically, Iowa legislatures and courts were liberal in protecting the civil rights of the state’s inhabitants—if only in word and not in deed. Civil rights statutes had been a part of Iowa state law since the late nineteenth century, but they proved difficult to enforce. Segregation developed despite the state’s image as a pioneer of racial liberalism.

After years of sometimes violent white resistance to the public education of African American children in white schools in the state, the Iowa Supreme Court ruled against segregation in public schools in 1868, stating that for the state to permit segregation “would be to sanction a plain violation of the spirit of our laws [and] tend to perpetuate the national differences of our people and stimulate a constant strife.” The ruling, which declared that “all youths are equal before the law,” was remarkable not just for its condemnation of school segregation nearly 90 years before the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education (1954), but it also marked a departure from supreme court decisions in other states that upheld segregated schools elsewhere in the nation. Despite the court’s plain language striking down de jure segregation in Iowa schools, residential segregation ensured that the tradition of sending children to schools in their neighborhoods would create and maintain school segregation.  

Efforts to end housing discrimination culminated in a minor victory in the late 1960s. In 1967 the state legislature passed a fair housing amendment to its civil rights bill, but an individual filing a claim had to submit a $500 bond—an amount roughly equivalent to $3,500 in 2013. That provision created a significant obstacle for complainants—and not just because it required the deposit of a large sum of money; anyone found to have filed a false complaint would lose the bond. The fair housing law demonstrated the difficulties that plaintiffs in discrimination cases faced, and it indicates why cases were rarely pursued. In

12. Clark v. Board of Directors, 24 Iowa 266 (1868); Roberts v. Boston 59 Mass (5 Cush.) 198 (1850); Schwalm, Emancipation’s Diaspora, 198–200. The state legislature also enacted a public accommodations law in 1884 after the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the federal law in the Civil Rights Cases. McDaniel, “Trying Iowa’s Civil Rights Act in Davenport,” 235–38.

1968 only nine individuals filed complaints about housing discrimination with the state’s Civil Rights Commission.\footnote{Iowa Civil Rights Commission, \textit{Third Annual Report: 1969} (Des Moines, 1969), www.state.ia.us/government/crc/docs/annual69compliance.html.} With the alleged victims of discrimination shouldering the burden of proof, prosecuting such cases could be expensive and ineffective. By the time the young people at East High rebelled in 1968, the state had a century-long history of racial discrimination and segregation existing alongside some of the nation’s most liberal civil rights laws.

As was the case in cities across the nation, local residential segregation in Waterloo created racial segregation within the city’s schools. In 1963 Waterloo’s African American children attended 11 of its 40 public schools. Eighty-one percent of the city’s white children attended schools that were at least 90 percent white, and many schools had no black students at all.\footnote{Minutes, Waterloo Commission on Human Rights, 9/7/1967, folder: Waterloo Commission on Human Rights, 1967, box 22, Merle Fleming Papers, Iowa Women’s Archives, University of Iowa Libraries, Iowa City.} Even though African Americans made up a relatively small percentage of the city’s population, one elementary school had a student population that was 99 percent black, two had populations that were approximately 50 percent black, and another had a student population that was one-third black. In 1967, the year before the disturbances at East High erupted, African American students made up about one-fifth of that school’s population of 1,700. There were no black students at West High on the other side of town, the site of the football game.\footnote{USCCR, “School Desegregation in Waterloo,” 6.}

YOUNG AFRICAN AMERICANS in Waterloo targeted the ways that racial discrimination in the public schools permeated the curricula and interpersonal relationships. In late August 1968, just weeks before the disturbances, Terri Pearson, an honors student at East High, and her younger sister Kathy handed a list of grievances to the school’s principal, Lawrence Garlock. The students’ decision to create and present a petition reflected a tradition established by other student protests of the 1960s, including Students for a Democratic Society’s 1962 Port Huron
Statement and the demands supplied by students advocating the establishment of ethnic studies departments on college campuses. The Pearson sisters’ list enumerated a number of complaints, including demands for a course in black history, integration of the entire social studies curriculum, and the hiring of more black teachers and counselors. Students also wanted permission to establish a black student union. These demands reflected a desire to change the everyday experiences of black students at East High and align them with what the students believed was a proper set of antidiscriminatory mores that should govern student and teacher behavior.  

The petition was the first indication that the autumn would be long and difficult at East High, with black students committed to the cause of civil rights reform. Garlock acknowledged the complaints but refused to agree to any immediate changes. When he assured the young women that a faculty committee would look over the list, Terri Pearson informed him that other black students did not want to continue to wait for action. A delayed response, she said, might come “too late.” Concerned that Pearson’s words portended trouble, Garlock wrote her a letter a week later, warning that any disruptions might result in suspension or expulsion of the involved students. He again assured her that a special committee would review the grievances “in a few weeks” and stated that any disruptive behavior “would be unfortunate as any grievances might be settled in a more reasonable fashion.”

At noon on Monday, September 9, a handful of young black men entered East High School and demanded to meet with Garlock. At the same time, someone set off the fire alarm, evac-

---


uating students and teachers from the building. After it was declared a false alarm, the group of young men returned, accompanied by several black students from East High. They spoke to a teacher and, echoing the concerns presented by Terri Pearson a few weeks earlier, demanded that black history be integrated into East High’s social studies curriculum. A teacher tried to assuage them by promising that a community meeting to discuss the proposed black history course would be held the next day after school. At the meeting, students, parents, teachers, and administrators could air concerns about the school’s curriculum and discuss possible solutions. The crowd dispersed for the afternoon, but the seriousness of black students’ concerns was clear.19

Publicly East High’s administrators denounced the confrontation at East High while they quietly began to take action to subvert further disturbances. The following morning, Tuesday, September 10, the superintendent and principal met with a group that included black parents and current and former students to discuss potential curriculum changes. Despite the principal and superintendent’s resistance to offering concessions to the students, the young men present were vocal about their desire to see East High treat black students more fairly. The school’s director of instruction was present, as were East High parent and NAACP member Ada Tredwell, former East High student Charles Derden, and several current students. Although the curriculum committee did have a revamped plan for the school’s social studies curriculum that integrated more African American history, Derden insisted that students would prefer an elective course focused solely on black history.20 The committee tentatively agreed to curriculum reform as a concession to the students.

The committee also decided to cancel the mass meeting scheduled for that afternoon, fearing that they would not be able to control the tone and tenor of the discussion. The students present at the meeting in the morning vehemently condemned the decision. “We’re not fooling around anymore,” warned one

young man. “We’re going to get what we want. . . We’re going to be at East High and there better be a meeting.” Another agreed, adding, “Don’t have any police over there. I know those kids. If there are police, there will be trouble.” The students were angered by the committee’s decision; they demanded to be taken seriously and have their grievances heard. In warning the committee that canceling the meeting could lead to trouble, these young people brandished the most powerful weapon they had: adults’ fears of youths’ indifference to authority—and their willingness to cause trouble if they considered it necessary.21

The students’ warnings proved convincing. Despite the administrators’ attempts to avoid confrontation at the school, they could not simply dismiss a protest so large and determined. At 3:05 p.m., students were informed that school was dismissed and that all students except those on the football team should leave the building immediately. A crowd of nearly 100 young men and women gathered outside; some were students, and some were not. Garlock attempted to placate the protesters by reminding them that East High’s curriculum techni-

cally did have a course on African American history—though the school had never hired anyone to teach it, ostensibly because they could not find anyone qualified to do so.\textsuperscript{22} The crowd eventually disbanded, but students did not waver from their promise to use disruption as a means to wrest power from the administration and school board.

The protests continued the next day. On Wednesday, 40 students walked out of class in support of the proposed curricular changes. After dismissing school early, the Waterloo school board met in an emergency session to discuss the course of action they would take to prevent the situation at East High from escalating. At the meeting, Jimmie Porter, the father of an East High School student, gave the school board another list of grievances created by students. The board promised to consider the grievances and agreed to appoint an African American to its curriculum committee. The board also canceled classes on Thursday and Friday but decided not to reschedule the fateful football game between East High and St. Joseph’s.\textsuperscript{23}

The East High administration, the school board, and the local newspaper all sought to delegitimize the actions of the protesters by arguing that they were criminals and not members of the community. Scoffing at the idea that the protests were a legitimate form of speech, Superintendent George Hohl attempted to discredit them by accusing “outsiders” of stirring up trouble. “This is a group of young adults not in a position to tell professionals who have worked on the problem for months whether it should be integrated or not, because, I submit, they know very little, if anything, about it,” Hohl told the \textit{Waterloo Courier}. Hohl blamed student protests at colleges across the nation, claiming that the student movement and the New Left—not legitimate grievances by the students themselves—were responsible for the unrest in Waterloo. He did warn that, although East High students had been innocent bystanders, “with outsiders coming in, violence could erupt.”\textsuperscript{24} The local newspaper reported that the police department had identified the protesters as “militants

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Waterloo Courier}, 9/11/1968.
\textsuperscript{23} School Board Minutes, 9/12/1968.
\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Waterloo Courier}, 9/10/1968.
and agitators,” and the paper listed the names and criminal records of seven of the young male participants; all were between the ages of 17 and 21, and all resided in Waterloo, but none were currently students at East High.25

The young people who protested at East High that week were not outsiders. They included current and former students whose complaints were rooted in their personal experiences of discrimination at East High. Their grievances indicated frustration with student-teacher interactions. The students demanded, for example, that “teachers and counselors shall not discourage students of any race from attending the college of their choice” and not “interfere with the personal lives of the students.” Students complained that teachers would break up groups of black students standing in the halls but allow white students to congregate freely. They also charged that teachers actively discouraged interracial dating, even calling parents of white students to inform them that their daughters were dating black students.26 The students demanded that teachers “who do not feel they can treat or teach black students as equals to white students” resign or be fired.27

In comments at the mass school board meeting on Friday afternoon, Charles Derden was particularly vehement that teachers not discourage black students from applying to the schools of their choice. Derden, a pre-law student at the University of Iowa, had been East High’s valedictorian in 1965. He claimed that discriminatory actions by white teachers and counselors had persisted for years. During his senior year at East High, Derden recalled, he had received letters from universities across the nation. “I was told to go to the State College of Iowa because I ‘could not compete’ in those schools.” “I went to the University of Iowa,” Derden stated, “because I didn’t believe everything that the white man told me about myself. But if I hadn’t believed any of it I would be in a better school today.” Derden’s commitment to protest in Waterloo did emanate in part from his activism at the University of Iowa, where he was also involved in agitation to estab-

27. School Board Minutes, 9/13/1968.
lish a black studies department. But his complaints also arose from his own experience in the Waterloo schools. He returned to Waterloo to provide his organizing experience and participate in the protests at East High in solidarity with current students.28

In an attempt to prevent the situation from escalating, the school board met again on Friday afternoon, just hours before the football game’s kickoff—and the disorder that would ensue. The board agreed to capitulate to some, but not all, of the students’ demands. At the crowded meeting, which attracted 300 community members, board president Sydney Thomas read aloud the 12 grievances and answered each one with a statement from the school board. The board acknowledged the lack of black teachers in the school system and assured the audience that the schools would continue to work toward hiring African American teachers. The board also reaffirmed its commitment to offering a separate course in black history, although it claimed that it was delayed because of the school’s unsuccessful attempts to find and hire qualified African American teachers. It also assented to the students’ request that they be called Afro-American or black—not Negro. The board refused to permit students to form a black student union, even though students promised that the organization would be open to both black and white students who wanted to join. Betty Jean Furgerson, an East High graduate and the leader of the Black Hawk County Head Start Program, stated, “The events leading up to this tragedy stem from the fact that the black students at East want a course in black history. They are asking for relevant education. The kids feel that they need it, and I’m proud they do. The whole thing grew up because nobody listened to what was being said.”29

Jimmie Porter, an East High parent, reiterated the students’ frustrations with the school board’s patronizing attitude. Porter demanded that the board take the students’ grievances seriously. “You’re not talking with kids,” Porter stated at the Friday afternoon hearing. “You’re talking with a man. . . . We came here with good intentions to work these problems out and come to a quick solution,” Porter told the board. He added, “I don’t trust

any of you and you don’t trust me.” Porter was a prominent figure in Waterloo’s black community. He had arrived in Waterloo in 1948 from Mississippi, hoping to find a job in the John Deere factory and an escape from Jim Crow. He was, as he put it, “looking for the promised land.” What he found disappointed him. Whites in Waterloo had, in his words, “domesticated” the black population. Segregation was not the law, as it was in the South, but whites in Waterloo had perfected informal methods of establishing white supremacy. Years later Porter observed, “I pretty well knew where I stood in Mississippi, and here I had to be told and reminded.”

The school board held another mass meeting on Monday, the first following the civil disorder at the football game. Once again, young people came to the meeting to articulate their demands. Terri Pearson again requested permission to form a

black student union, which she said would “promote better understanding between black and white students at East High and better understanding between the students and the faculty.” It would also serve to “encourage more participation from black students in the total activities of East High and to encourage black students to strive for higher scholastic achievement and prepare themselves to compete in our world today.” The board refused the request, claiming that the club was racially discriminatory. When board members expressed exasperation with the frequency of meetings, Dwight Bachman, a senior at the nearby University of Northern Iowa, warned that things would only get worse if the administration did not act soon. “If you say this is not our matter we have plans for you that will not make you very comfortable,” warned Bachman. When pressed to explain what he meant by those “plans,” Bachman replied that he and others would show up at every school board meeting until they got what they wanted.  

THE CIVIL DISORDER that began at Friday’s football game was fed by the growing frustrations that young African American men and women in Waterloo felt in the face of discrimination and segregation within the community. Confrontations between young men and police officers were endemic to black life in Waterloo; members of the black community perpetually complained of police brutality, and even the mayor admitted that police-community relations were toxic. The previous summer, the death of a young man, Eddie Wallace Sallis, in the city jail had aroused suspicion and concern that police brutality had been a factor. On May 31, 1966, Sallis and another young man, Howard Calvin Saunders, had been arrested in Waterloo on suspicion of being involved in a break-in. In the early morning hours of June 1, officers claimed that they had found Sallis hanged in his jail cell. “How could a man hang himself in jail if he is wearing only jeans?” asked Anna Mae Weems, an NAACP member and packinghouse worker at Rath. Sallis’s death was ruled a suicide, although many suspected foul play.  

The protests and civil disorder elicited a harsh reaction from the city’s police department, which promised to “deal head-on with the problem that faces our community with strict enforcement and by taking strong action for which we have full support of our city administration.” Other residents were more sympathetic to the students’ complaints and acknowledged the existence of discrimination and inequality in the city.33

Although some were more supportive of the students than others, most residents recognized that the instances of civil disorder were symptoms of the persistence of racial discrimination and the culmination of years of discontent within the city’s black neighborhoods. Teachers at East High released a statement that declared, “The East High School faculty feels that the present situation at East High is only a part of a national social condition. They also feel that the entire Waterloo community is responsible and must be involved.”34 The school board released its own statement on the disturbances at East High that chastised students who had contributed to the disruption while calling for community self-examination. Denouncing the “tragic lawlessness” of the instances of civil disorder, the statement nevertheless declared,

The events of Friday night seem to indicate that the underlying problem in Waterloo is more than a problem of educational policy, and is one which will require the efforts of the total community to resolve. . . . From this point, it is the responsibility of all of the citizens of the City of Waterloo and of the Waterloo Community School District to restore an atmosphere of calm and reason.35

The faculty and school board’s statements underscored the agreement that although they did not necessarily condone the method of students’ protests, their complaints were not necessarily illegitimate. Others outside the schools agreed. Twenty-two Methodist ministers from Waterloo signed a statement that blamed the violence on “sicknesses long neglected” and proclaimed

34. School Board Minutes, 9/16/1968.
that “massive healing must take place to prevent recurrences of the same.”

In the following months, conversation in the city continued to use the civil disorder as a touchstone for a plan for community action, although the focus of those efforts shifted in crucial ways. Whereas the students’ grievances emphasized the need to empower African American students and break down barriers to equal opportunity, the solutions sought by the school board turned to desegregation, placing segregation rather than inequity at the center of the debate. Although students had provided the impetus for reform, the board opted for school desegregation, even though it had never been a part of students’ demands.

The students succeeded on a number of issues, particularly on the inclusion of black history in East High’s curriculum and the hiring of two black teachers by mid-October. In late November, the school board unanimously approved a resolution to create a citizens advisory committee made up of a “representative” group—in other words, a coalition that included whites and African Americans—who would “study the problems . . . in connection with providing all children in the school district with maximum educational opportunities, particularly the problems resulting from a concentration of black children and culturally deprived children in certain schools.”

Problems within the Waterloo schools arose primarily from segregation and minority concentration, according to the board, an assertion that shifted concern to the makeup of the student body, not the quality of teacher-student relations or the schools’ curricula.

THE DISTURBANCES at East High and in Waterloo’s black neighborhoods set in motion a series of actions by local and state authorities that would profoundly shape school policy—although not necessarily as the students had intended. In the week following the incidents, the county attorney announced that he would convene a grand jury to investigate the violence and arson. The grand jury’s task was to issue indictments for any crimes committed during the disturbances. It did not, how-

---


ever, indict any person for any crime. In an unusual move, the grand jury unofficially indicted the community as a whole for its role in creating an atmosphere that led to civil disorder. According to the grand jury, “It is the present finding of the grand jury that our schools be geared toward the present society. . . . It is the obligation of the public school system to take a giant step in that direction by eliminating de facto segregation at once.” The report concluded, “The grand jury recommends immediate integration at the elementary level.” A year later, the grand jury released another report, documenting the changes that had been implemented in the community and recommending desegregation at all levels.38

Mayor Lloyd Turner denounced the grand jury’s report. It placed all of the blame for the disturbances, he complained, on “the shoulders of whites.” Turner accused the grand jury of not giving enough credit to the city’s and state’s civil rights reforms, and he pointed to the new fair housing law as evidence of progress in race relations. He failed to mention the housing law’s prohibitive bond provision.39

Discussions of the potentially negative effect of segregated schooling on children were not new to the board or the city, but the civil disturbances made the issue seem more urgent. The year before, the school board had identified racial segregation as a problem in its schools but refused to accept any blame for its existence and refrained from proposing any mandatory solutions. The 1967 report of its newly formed Advisory Committee on Equal Education Opportunity emphasized the need to reduce the segregation of African American students in a few schools, although the committee restated the board’s “conviction that it has not at any time allowed practices which would artificially establish or maintain segregation or discrimination, whether ethnic, religious, or racial.”40 It was no secret that African American

---

children attended just a few of the city’s schools, but the school board would not admit that it was the fault of the state or the school district.

Despite its previous unwillingness to admit fault in the segregation of Waterloo’s schools, the school board did vote in the spring of 1969 to enact a policy of open enrollment for the following school year. That policy allowed a student to transfer to any school of his or her choice as long as the transfer promoted a “favorable” racial balance.\(^{41}\) Dissatisfied with the board’s tepid policy, parents presented 200 letters in support of “the principle of total integration,” demanding decisive action in May 1969.\(^{42}\) While the school board voted to commit itself to “the elimination of the heavy concentrations of minority group and disadvantaged” students in Waterloo schools and to “develop plans to achieve this end” in the fall, it remained committed to the idea that the schools would be desegregated voluntarily through open enrollment. The chair of the school board emphasized that he believed that only a voluntary plan would gain full community acceptance. Dr. Robert Harvey, the board’s sole African American member, disagreed that full support was desirable. “If the policy is to work, some people will have to be bused who don’t want to be bused,” Harvey concluded. White parents would be reluctant to send their children to schools on the city’s east side, so the burden of desegregation would remain on black children and parents. The rest of the board disagreed with Harvey, the only member in favor of a mandatory busing plan.\(^{43}\)

The board continued to push a voluntary policy by reorganizing the city’s most segregated school. Grant Elementary School, a school with a student population that was 99 percent black in 1967, would be reconfigured as an integration academy in the fall of 1970. It would become a magnet school that would house the Bridgeway Project—a school modeled on the Martin Luther King Jr. Laboratory School in Evanston, Illinois, which attracted white students to a previously mostly black school by providing the kind of cutting-edge pedagogical innovations

---

41. School Board Minutes, 4/7/1969.
Students in an integrated classroom at Waterloo’s Grant Elementary School pose for a class picture. Photo courtesy Reasby family.

found in laboratory schools. The central idea behind the creation of such schools was that districts could persuade—rather than force—white parents to send their children to desegregated schools. It was an effective idea. When Grant School opened in the fall of 1970, it had a nearly perfect fifty-fifty balance of African American and white children. The Bridgeway Project was able to draw white students to a school that in previous years had had almost none, although it also displaced half of the black children previously enrolled at Grant who had to transfer to other schools. With few other white students choosing to transfer to schools with high concentrations of black students, the burden of desegregation was placed on the shoulders of African American children, just as Harvey had predicted.

By 1970, voluntary school desegregation had failed, except at Grant School, to create meaningful change. Only 30 African American students attended West High, and none attended Orange High. Almost all of the district’s African American high school students remained at East. Efforts were more successful


at the elementary level, with African American students enrolling at all but 8 of the city’s 30 schools. In theory, this was a victory for voluntary desegregation. A comprehensive look at the city’s schools told another story—one that the school board did not want to see. Between 1967 and 1970, although black students were no longer isolated in a small fraction of the city’s schools, the percentage of students at schools that already had high concentrations of black students did not decrease; in many cases it actually increased. Such was the case at City View Elementary, which went from 86 to 90 percent black over the span of three years. The percentage of black students at Frances Grout School increased from 23.5 percent to 32.2 percent; Hawthorne Elementary’s black population also increased by nearly 10 percent to 52 percent. The percentage of black students at Longfellow and Roosevelt Elementary increased incrementally; both continued to have disproportionate percentages of black students. The percentages at Logan Junior High and East High School also increased, from 30 to 35 and 21 to 23 percent, respectively.\footnote{47. “Comparison Showing Changes in Minority Group Distribution, 1963–1970,” School Board Minutes, 10/2/1970.}

In other words, as voluntary desegregation programs were implemented, not only were schools that had previously been all white increasing their percentages of black students, but so were schools that were already highly segregated. As the proportion of African American students in the district steadily increased between 1967 and 1970, both segregation and desegregation increased.

Desegregation was once again pushed onto the school board’s agenda in late 1971. A new series of civil disturbances in the spring meant that the board could no longer simply rely on token desegregation. In November 1971 the state Department of Public Instruction (DPI) released a report on segregation in Waterloo schools that recommended immediate desegregation. The report, the culmination of a half-year investigation by the DPI, reignited the debate over desegregation and inflamed criticism of the school board’s lackadaisical policy. The NAACP threw its support behind immediate implementation of the state proposal. “There has been too long a delay, and it is the respon-
sibility of the members of the Board of Education to act,” Robert Wright Sr., regional director of the NAACP, told the board. “Failure to act would be indefensible.” Yet the board, on a 4 to 2 vote in December, defeated a motion for immediate desegregation.48

The state’s report also sparked organizing by parents who opposed mandatory busing but who had previously been silent on the issue of voluntary desegregation. Within a week of the issuance of the report, more than two thousand parents attended a meeting of the newly formed Neighborhood Schools Association (NSA). “I’d like to say thank you to the state Department of Public Instruction and the school board for their help in the membership drive,” the organization’s president joked at the meeting.49 The NSA styled itself as “a new organization whose sole purpose is to strive to preserve the traditional neighborhood school concept.” Fearing that the school board would impose mandatory busing to achieve meaningful desegregation, the organization sought to discourage sitting school board members from voting for desegregation. At the same time, the NSA campaigned for candidates who claimed to oppose any form of busing.50 NSA members devoted themselves to attending school board meetings en masse to prove their anti-busing mettle to the school board.

While some white parents were organizing on the side of neighborhood schools, the local teachers’ union, the Waterloo Education Association (WEA), made an open-ended commitment to the principle of total integration. Although it did not go so far as to endorse a busing plan, the WEA stated that teachers did “recognize the need for and the advantages of a completely integrated public school, and thereby committed themselves to helping formulate any program that would bring this about.” The WEA argued that socialization across the color line was essential for the positive development of all children in the city and was necessary for full participation in American life. The WEA’s newly established Human Relations Commission stated,

“The purpose of the Human Relations program for the Waterloo Education Association is to try to achieve now what the original ‘melting pot’ was supposed to do when this country was settled. To do this it will be necessary for people to get to know and become more involved with each other.”\textsuperscript{51} The WEA echoed the sentiment of others that school segregation was bad not just for African Americans but for everyone. In the organization’s statement, the color line was the primary problem and desegregation of schools its most effective solution.

At the next meeting of the school board in January, Dr. Harvey once again pushed the board to take a firm stand on desegregation. He presented ten recommendations to accomplish “total integration” and end the voluntary desegregation system, including hiring more black teachers, principals, and administrative personnel and implementing more forceful measures to eradicate racism in the schools. Harvey also recommended the purchase of new materials for classrooms and libraries that integrated African American history. The League of Women Voters issued a statement in support of total integration, stating, “We do believe that the adoption of a workable plan is urgently needed for the goal of quality and equal education for Waterloo children—both black and white.” Despite the support of a growing coalition—the WEA, the League of Women Voters, and the NAACP—the board voted down the measure.\textsuperscript{52}

In the following weeks more organizations joined the WEA, the NAACP, and the League of Women Voters in support of Harvey’s proposal for mandatory desegregation. The Waterloo Women’s Civic Club denounced the board’s vote on the issue. The organization’s president accused the board of giving false reasons for delaying action. “We are forced to believe that sincere honesty is not being demonstrated in this matter of school integration,” she wrote in a letter to the president of the school board. Parents of the children enrolled in the Bridgeway Project at Grant School submitted a letter that was also read at the meeting, stating their support for further desegregation in the city. “We . . . have experienced the value of quality education in an
integrated setting,” the statement read. “Because of this experience we strongly urge the Board of Education to rapidly expand this kind of educational opportunity throughout the entire system.”

Chastened by the overwhelming community response but still reluctant to act, the board approved a measure to “give careful thought and study to the ten proposals of Dr. Harvey” and discuss them again at the next meeting. The board agreed to redraw the high school boundaries, a move that would transfer some black students from East High to the newly built Central High School and slightly increase the number of African American students at West High.

The board’s actions failed to address any other facets of racial discrimination in the schools, and so ignited more community controversy just a few months later in the spring of 1972. In late May, Alice Hayes, a speech teacher at West Junior High School—a school that had had no black students before the start of open enrollment—read her class a story, “Little Brown Koko and the Preacher’s Watermelon,” as a part of her class’s unit on “dialect.” The story described Koko’s “little wooly head” and his “nice, good, old, fat, black Mammy”—tropes that relied on nostalgic depictions of slavery. An African American student in the class, upset by the racist portrayal of blacks in the story, complained to the vice principal, who failed to address the issue with Hayes. A group of concerned parents then met with the district’s school and community relations coordinator, but that meeting, too, failed to result in any substantial action.

The incident threatened to send the city into disorder, as had student protests at East High four years prior. The following week, approximately 30 parents walked into Alice Hayes’s classroom and refused to leave until she was fired. “Any teacher that can teach this kind of thing shouldn’t be allowed to teach in this system or even state,” one appalled parent stated. The school’s principal, Joseph Doyle, sent Hayes home for the day, but the parents refused to leave unless she was dismissed from

her position. When Doyle balked at their request, they insisted that he also be fired, accusing him of implicitly condoning Hayes’s actions. Two days later, 150 black parents and children entered the Waterloo School District Administration Building, demanding an audience with the superintendent. The group entered Superintendent George Diestelmeier’s office and presented him with a list of demands. When Diestelmeier attempted to leave, it became clear that he would have to walk on or over parents and small children in order to get out. The parents and children held the superintendent in his office for five hours before an injunction forced them to leave.56

While Diestelmeier sat with the parents, the school board met in an emergency meeting at an elementary school. The board voted to support the administration’s current policies; Harvey, still the lone African American member of the board, voiced his displeasure by abstaining from the votes. The next day the school board met again, this time voting to reinstate Hayes. Not every board member approved of the decision. Reverend Gamb, the only other board member besides Harvey who favored forced desegregation, accused the other members of being “hell bent on inflaming the situation.”57

While African American parents kept their children home from school to protest the school board’s failure to act, approximately 100 white students staged a walkout in support of Hayes. The controversy over Alice Hayes became increasingly heated in the following week as protests spread out into the community and elicited a violent response. Frustrated by the board’s actions, the protesters who had been ejected from the superintendent’s office regrouped and began boycotting the city’s shopping center, Logan Center Plaza. They announced that they would picket the plaza until the school board acquiesced to their demands, hoping that the boycott would pressure the business community into influencing the board’s decisions. Boycotters and white shoppers accused each other of assault. One white man was arrested for attacking picketers with a wrench, and a white woman called the police after she claimed that protesters knocked her to the

Politics of Youth

379

ground. Concerned that the situation might escalate into wide-
scale civil disorder, the city set up a “rumor control” phone line, and the U.S. Department of Justice sent a field representative to Waterloo to help the city control the crisis. 58

During the summer of 1972, the school board and various pro- and anti-desegregation forces in the community were at an impasse. In July the NAACP filed a lawsuit accusing the school district of deliberately segregating the schools, but still the board did not budge. 59 What ultimately ended the standoff was something that few anticipated: demographic change.

WITH FEWER CHILDREN in Waterloo schools, the school board faced the need to close schools. Enrollment statistics for the 1972–73 school year showed a significant decrease in the number of children enrolled in Waterloo public schools. 60 Fewer students meant that the district would receive less funding from the state. The superintendent and school board realized that the district would not be able to pay its bills in the upcoming year. Projections for the next five years anticipated a loss of 3,000 public school students in the district due to demographic change. 61

Federal funds for desegregation through the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972 provided a way for the district to ease the process of school reorganization with minimal financial commitment from the district. Persuaded by the numbers, in February 1973 board president James Sage wrote an open letter to the other members of the board calling for complete desegregation. “We cannot continue to rear our children in a community which has so much distrust and fear between the races,” Sage wrote. “If we want new industries and business to come and provide jobs for our children in the future, we are going to have to realize that the community must attempt to solve the racial feelings that have developed, otherwise the community will ‘wither away.’” 62 The Neighborhood Schools Association

60. Waterloo Courier, 10/12/1971.
shared Sage’s ideas in principle, agreeing that distrust and fear must be the target of community action. The point of disagreement, NSA head Harold Getty noted, was the place where this battle must be fought. “We do not agree with his suggestion that the school district is the only institution that should attempt the task of social change since no one else does,” Getty wrote in response to Sage’s open letter. The district’s financial situation may have changed the minds of board members, but the NSA remained firmly opposed to mandatory desegregation.

Larger demographic shifts were primarily behind the declining enrollment in Waterloo’s public schools. In Waterloo the total public school population was decreasing while the percentage that was African American was increasing steadily. The Waterloo Community School District lost more than 1,200 white students in just four years—7.5 percent of its entire white student population. The increase in the number of African American students was less dramatic than the declining number of white students, as there were about 85 more black students in the system in 1973 than in 1969. The loss of white students was due at least in part to the aging of the white population. Between 1956 and 1966, Iowans’ birth rate fell by nearly a third. The shrinking enrollment of white students in Waterloo’s public schools was not due to large-scale white flight from the city or the schools, as Waterloo’s population was actually growing during these years, not declining. Nor can general city population increases be wholly attributed to the in-migration of African Americans. And there is no evidence that the decline was caused by large-scale enrollments in parochial schools, as the


decline in white student enrollments began before the student unrest in 1968.\textsuperscript{67} At the precise moment that the Waterloo school district sought to implement integration, it was undergoing a dramatic shift in the population of those very schools.

These trends were evident not only at the local level; they were indicative of a larger trend in Iowa that created an age gulf between the white and black populations. Statewide, in 1970 the median age of African Americans was 21.1, whereas the median age of whites was 29.0. The median age of black men was even lower, 20.3, versus 27.6 for white men.\textsuperscript{68} In Waterloo, this shifting population could be seen in the ages of schoolchildren. The school population peaked in 1967, with roughly 19,700 children enrolled in Waterloo public schools. The projected school enrollment for 1976 was just 16,272, and almost all of the loss was in lower grades. While the number of high school students in Waterloo remained fairly constant, fluctuating by only a few dozen throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, the number of elementary school children dropped dramatically, from a high of 11,388 in 1967 to only 9,682 in 1973.\textsuperscript{69} An increase in parochial school enrollment during the early 1970s also contributed to the phenomenon, although not by enough to account entirely for declining enrollment in Waterloo public schools.\textsuperscript{70} Given these trends, compounded by the influx of new African American children, it is not surprising that segregation was rapidly increasing in Waterloo schools during this period. It is also likely that the prominence of school issues in community debates during this period had much to do with this dramatic change. The white population of Waterloo was increasingly older, while its young population was increasingly African American.

Faced with declining enrollment, increasing segregation, and recurrent protests within Waterloo’s public schools, the school board began considering potential plans that would close schools, create a more efficient use of classroom space, and alleviate the increasing segregation of black children in city schools. The

\textsuperscript{68} Iowa Development Commission, 1972 \textit{Statistical Profile of Iowa}, 34.
\textsuperscript{69} “Waterloo Community Schools Enrollments,” folder 1, box 1, James Sage Papers.
plans were introduced at a board meeting on March 12, 1973. All of the plans involved boundary changes, but the most popular was Plan A, which proposed pairing and combining schools with high and very low percentages of African American students and closing three of the city’s oldest elementary schools. Plan A aligned elementary and junior high school attendance zones with those of the new high school zones so that groups of students would move together through the new system and not be scattered as they transitioned from elementary to junior high schools, and then from junior high to high schools. It also minimized the need for busing, as a third of the students who would be reassigned remained within walking distance of their new schools. The plan required the addition of only five buses to the district’s existing fleet of sixty.71

The board planned a vote on the proposed plans on April 5, 1973. Because of the large turnout, the school board meeting was held at West High School—the same place, nearly five years earlier, where unrest had broken out at the football game with East High and forced city residents to acknowledge and address problems of the city’s youth: racial discrimination and segregation in schools. Six hundred people showed up at the school board meeting, many bearing signs voicing opposition to desegregation.

Consensus from community groups who supported desegregation coalesced in support for Plan A. A local doctor read a statement in support of Plan A, which stressed that schools should be the crucible of American democracy. “The concept of an open society is a cornerstone of our national conscience. . . . Forced isolation breeds fear and is a burden and threat to all of us. It is with this goal of an open and just society that we urge you to adopt Plan A. It is a small but positive step toward helping this community regain its health and self respect.”72 The local branch of the American Association of University Women likewise applauded Plan A’s attack on a “closed society.” According to AAUW President Cecile Powers, the organization sup-

ported “educational programs essential to a democratic society” through “programs directed toward improved intergroup and interpersonal relations necessary in an ethnically pluralistic society.” The League of Women Voters, the Waterloo Education Association, and the Title VII Advisory Committee all joined in support of Plan A.73

The Neighborhood Schools Association disapproved of all the reorganization plans, although the organization offered no alternative solutions to the funding crisis. It was joined by the tepid opposition of the Waterloo Council of PTAs, which expressed concern about the school board’s apparent neglect of parents’ “negative feelings toward forced busing of their children.” The NSA and the PTA council suggested that the board continue to discuss the issue and create more advisory councils. Their position was bolstered by the support of more than 500 citizens who opposed all of the plans, as they all required the closing of Lafayette School. Even though desegregation would only incrementally increase the number of children being bused within the Waterloo school district, Lafayette School parents believed that “it would be mass murder to expect our children to cross a four lane highway . . . to attend a school.” One white mother, who had five children in city schools, accused the school board of attempting to “sell the children of the Waterloo School District into the slavery of statistics for Federal Aid.” Growing support for desegregation and school reorganization led the opposition to resort to increasingly inflammatory comments about the fate of white children in a desegregated school system.74

Despite the mother’s admonition not to “hang another millstone around the necks of our children,” the protestations of the opposition groups went unheeded. On April 5, 1973, the board voted 4 to 3 to approve Plan A. Even in the face of grassroots mass resistance by white parents, the school board refused to discard desegregation as a necessary complement to school reorganization. After the vote was taken, half the parents in at-

tendance got up and walked out in protest, chanting “Freedom! Freedom!” and “Let’s have another Pontiac!” (referring to the efforts of white parents in Pontiac, Michigan, to oppose desegregation efforts there in a movement that made national headlines when Klansmen bombed 13 school buses that were to be used in the city’s new desegregation plan).\textsuperscript{75}

The approval of Plan A marked a watershed moment. It indicated that the school board had finally committed to substantive reform. Those who opposed desegregation wrote vitriol-filled letters to Sage and the superintendent, threatening their lives and, in one case, labeling them “yellow-bellied bastards.”\textsuperscript{76} Despite the continued protests against busing, once the plan was approved, the school board remained committed to its desegregation plan. Although Sage lost his seat in the fall’s school board election, the new NSA-endorsed members did not block the implementation of Plan A.\textsuperscript{77} After years of struggle, racial reform in the schools was finally codified in school board policy.

THE SUCCESS of the desegregation plan masked what had been lost in the course of turning protest into policy. Although students had initiated school reform, the results looked little like what they had imagined in 1968. Young people got the attention that they demanded, but that only partially achieved their goals. Their radical ideas could have dramatically reshaped schools for all students in the city, making education more democratic and equitable across lines of race and class. The struggle over the schools threatened traditional sources of authority, including the school board and East High’s administration, and brought children into the decision-making process for the first time. The civil disorder of the autumn of 1968 effectively turned attention toward the young people’s complaints, but it also turned the debates away from the specific demands of the students and toward a more community consensus-oriented solution: desegregation.


\textsuperscript{76} Anonymous letter to George Diestelmeier, 5/17/1973, folder 1, box 2, James Sage Papers.

School desegregation became a panacea designed to cure the ills of racial discrimination in Waterloo schools. It was a public policy that could signal the city’s commitment to an integrated “open” society, but it failed to address many of the ways that racial discrimination continued to affect life for African American children in the city. The democratic process of implementing desegregation made the issue itself one that was inflected with the basic idea of community. That process became a proxy for debates about life in a democratic society. Civil disorder led to the creation of a plan for school desegregation, which in turn ignored many of the students’ basic requests and flattened ideas about race, rights, and civic belonging. The local nature of the implementation of civil rights reform allowed individuals more power in the formation of policies, but it also brought more competing voices into the debate. As residents of Waterloo debated the benefits and drawbacks of desegregating their schools, the discussion shifted from one that centered on restorative justice for black children to one that emphasized the benefits of desegregation for all children and the city itself.
Book Reviews and Notices


Reviewer Derek Oden is associate professor of history at Del Mar College. A native of Centerville, he earned a Ph.D. in history from Iowa State University. His primary area of research and writing is farm hazards and farm safety.

The opening lines in Enfys McMurry’s book, Centerville: A Mid-American Saga, introduce readers to a consistently vivid and engaging tale of a southern Iowa community. She writes, “He waited for a killing frost. Then, on a late fall day in 1846, forty-four-year-old surveyor Jonathan Stratton moved through the blue-stemmed prairie grass, the dried seed clusters of asters and goldenrod, the hazel brush and the trees in Iowa’s newest county, the twenty-ninth, the one they’d named Appanoose” (11). She then proceeds across approximately 500 pages (excluding notes) to skillfully paint equally rich and textured word pictures to create a sweeping history of a county seat town from its establishment in the 1840s to the community’s involvement in World War II.

McMurry’s commitment to her subject matter is obvious throughout this enlightening investigation of 100 years of midwestern community life. Her artful word craft joins her familiarity with her subject based on her personal connection to the town—she has taught English and humanities for many years at the Centerville campus of Indian Hills Community College—to offer an eclectic study with particular emphasis on the community’s connection to national trends and events.

She begins by describing the experience of the town’s founders, the community’s participation in the Civil War, and the dramatic economic growth of the late nineteenth century. She chronicles how the town blossomed with the arrival of the railroads, the emergence of a thriving coal-mining industry, and the influx of diverse groups of immigrants. Along the way, readers will be pleased to find intriguing sections about the Underground Railroad, the Jesse James Gang, and commercial development. She also includes an examination of early twentieth-century intellectual trends such as eugenics and rising concerns about crime. She consistently weaves such national themes into the town’s social and cultural context, demonstrating how the town’s residents were influenced by a wide range of historical phenomena.
McMurry’s work is particularly effective in using details gleaned from newspaper articles to connect readers to the lives of Centerville residents. Many individuals appear repeatedly as they participate in community life and then fade from view as one generation gives way to another. For instance, readers will become familiar with banker D. C. Bradley, who paved the first section of sidewalk in front of his mansion, proudly drove one of the community’s first automobiles, and was a key investor in interurban railway projects. They will also learn of his death as his family’s economic prospects soured after the nation and the town descended into the throes of the Great Depression.

The author’s careful review of the local press produces some surprising local connections to well-known national figures and events. Readers learn that silent movie star Norma Talmadge visited Centerville to shoot a movie and former Centerville resident Oscar V. Payne was a crucial contributor to the development of the Thompson machine gun. World War II photographer John Buscemi, who was killed during the battle for control of Eniwetok atoll in 1944, also hailed from this seemingly typical southern Iowa town.

For these and many other reasons, readers will find much to love in Centerville: A Mid-American Saga. Nevertheless, some may find limitations in the book. A few topics could have been more fully analyzed or supported. For instance, while discussing the prevalence of coal mine accidents, McMurry gives the impression that the community’s coal mines were less dangerous than those in other regions, but provides little supportive data. Additionally, her work would have benefited from a more careful consideration of studies such as John Mack Faragher’s Sugar Creek: Life on the Illinois Prairie and Thomas Morain’s Prairie Grass Roots: An Iowa Small Town in the Early Twentieth Century. A deeper consideration of the topic’s historiography would have undoubtedly provided a richer interpretive framework for this otherwise deeply engaging book.

Despite such criticisms, anyone seeking a lively and highly readable discussion of a midwestern community will find McMurry’s book both useful and pleasurable. A general audience will especially gain a greater appreciation for those “ordinary” places many contemporary Americans can so easily ignore. Many forget that such small communities played a more prominent role in our national life before the exodus from rural and small-town America was so fully felt. McMurry’s work is a gift not only to the residents of Centerville but to any midwesterner who chooses to read this delightful study. She convincingly shows us how such fascinating pasts are hidden underneath seemingly ordinary places and realities.
THE ANNALS OF IOWA


Reviewer Bill R. Douglas lives and works in Des Moines, where he studies the religious history of Iowa.

If one doubts the transformation of the institutional American Roman Catholic Church in the past 25 years from Vatican II–style community to reassertion of hierarchy, one need only set side by side these two volumes about the Archdiocese of Dubuque on the occasions of its 150th and 175th anniversaries. It is not just the starkness of the Seed/ Harvest volume contrasted with the lavish, slick, coffee table look of Archdiocese of Dubuque. Nor that the former was published and printed in Dubuque and the latter published in France and printed in China. The key is in the fine print on the last page of the latter book, where the first six chapters are acknowledged as an “edited” version of the former book.

To discover the extent of the editing, compare Sister Jane Coogan’s original take on Archbishop John Hennessy with the bowdlerized version. Sister Coogan wrote,

Many AMERICAN bishops have had their roots in Ireland. . . . These were men who found themselves at home in the New World, who saw its needs and problems. . . . Then there have been IRISH bishops. . . . These took as their role model the bishops of Ireland, and patterned their American years on them. Fortunately, their numbers are few. . . .

What are the earmarks of IRISH bishops . . . in America? Usually they were educated on the continent and well beyond the education level of the people they served; they led lives apart and aloof from those people and from the less-advantaged clergy. Their word was law, and diocesan matters solely their affair. . . .

In any case, the career of John Hennessy shows many characteristics of the IRISH bishop ordained for America, in contrast to the AMERICAN bishop with roots, like his, deeply embedded in the old sod.

And here is the edited version:


The career of John Hennessy shares many of the characteristics of the type.

If we read only the latter version, we might wonder what that type is.
understood the American culture of equality and Irish-born bishops with no such sensitivity has been airbrushed, as has her critique of the first archbishop. The removal is all the more astonishing because other authors are allowed their critiques of archbishops. David Salvaterra makes a judicious contrast between the two Archbishop Keanes, one deeply immersed in the “Americanist” heresy of finding value in American democracy, and the other charting a course away from worldly snares. William Wilkie baits us with: “The new archbishop [Francis Beckman], like a classic tragic hero, had a fatal flaw that in the end was his undoing.”

*Seed/Harvest* also contains an admirable chapter by Thomas Auge, the dean of Dubuque historians, on Mathias Loras, and subsequent chapters that seemed unsubversive to the irrendentist project. Neither volume acknowledges the novels of Robert Byrne (as Garry Wills does lefthandedly in *Bare Ruined Choirs*), or even Mathias Hoffman’s historical novel *Young and Fair Is Iowa* or the missionary work of Ron Hennessey in Guatemala. Even when critical, both books are more about the archbishops than the archdiocese; they are primarily top-down history with some nods to social history.

Valuable information does appear in an update chapter, “Three Decades of Benedictine Leadership,” in *Archdiocese of Dubuque*, and it also includes summaries of local parishes and religious orders and organizations not covered by *Seed/Harvest*. I had not realized, for example, that Guatemalan Nobel Prize winner Rigoberto Minchu was present in Postville in protest following the 2008 INS raid. For those looking for current history, or whose coffee table is bare, *Archdiocese of Dubuque* will do. For a reliable history of the archdiocese, without having to check for expurgations, *Seed/Harvest* should remain on the bookshelf.


Reviewer David Bernstein is visiting assistant professor of history at Denison University. His Ph.D. dissertation (University of Wisconsin, 2011) was “How the West Was Drawn: Maps, Indians, and the Construction of the Trans-Mississippi West.”

Published for the first time, this collection of 39 maps of the Missouri River from the mouth of the Gasconade River in Missouri to Fort Pierre in present-day South Dakota offers the viewer some of the earliest recorded visual depictions of the region. Printed at 85 percent of their
original size of 16 by 24 inches, these large black-and-white reproductions allow scholars and map enthusiasts to follow the route of Lieutenant Gouverneur Kemble Warren and his party up the Missouri River as they noted the vegetation, sand bars, tributaries, bluffs, islands, towns, and native villages along their route.

As the compilers note in their introduction, many sections of the river depicted have since been dammed or heavily channeled, making the publication of these manuscript maps a boon to scholars trying to make spatial sense of contemporary travelers’ accounts. The maps also provide descriptions of the botany along the river, frequently noting specific plant species, as well as a variety of human-made features such as Indian villages, thus offering a unique record of the ecological and cultural landscape. Readers of the *Annals of Iowa* will be particularly interested in the depiction of Sioux City, which, according to Plate 10, contained only eight buildings at the time of the expedition. These maps are for more than just researchers, however; anyone interested in the history of the Missouri River or cartography can be transported as they follow Warren’s dotted line up the river.


Reviewer Brian Craig Miller is associate professor of history at Emporia State University, book review editor of *Civil War History*, and editor of The Civil War in the South series. He is the author of *The War is a Punishment on the Nation: An Iowa Soldier Endures the American Civil War* (2012) and *John Bell Hood and the Fight for Civil War Memory* (2010).

The chaos of a Civil War battlefield was daunting. The swirls of smoke and haze clouded the field of vision of the soldiers and officers who charged forward. The thundering roar of artillery, combined with the cacophony of musket shots, deafened the men engaged in battle. Horses and men scrambled from place to place. No wonder so many battles are filled with misinformation and misremembering of specific details. Thankfully, over the past decade Civil War historians have been actively using memory to unravel the sometimes contradictory and often entangled details of battle. Thus, any memory study of a major Civil War battle, as seen in these two new and thought-provoking
books, is a welcome addition to the growing literature of memory and war.

On April 6 and 7, 1862, two massive armies clashed along the banks of the Tennessee River by a tiny church called Shiloh. More casualties accumulated at Shiloh than in all of America’s previous military conflicts combined. The battle remains dominant in our memory of the Civil War, especially with iconic places like the peach orchard and bloody pond and the death site of Confederate General Albert Sydney Johnston. However, as historian Timothy Smith argues, only four major books have appeared on the battle (compared to Gettysburg, which seems to have a new one every week). Furthermore, we have forgotten and misremembered crucial details about the famous battle, which Smith tackles in his collection of nine essays accompanied by numerous useful maps.

Smith examines a wide variety of topics. He surveys the terrain at Shiloh and describes how the roads, fields, and forests shaped where the heaviest fighting took place throughout the two days. Other essays cover the death of Albert Sydney Johnston, the march of Lew Wallace, Mississippi secession delegates who fought at Shiloh (which seems out of place), and the civilian population’s interaction with the federal government during the creation of the battlefield. The volume appropriately concludes with pieces on how the New Deal shaped the battlefield and the legacy of the film shown in the park’s visitor center.

The most provocative section of the book seeks to diminish the importance of the famed Hornet’s Nest, which Smith does not see as the critical juncture of the battle. “The soldiers themselves stated as much, the position of troops does not support the idea, and the casualties and burials firmly argue against such a notion,” he argues (61). The de-emphasis of the Hornet’s Nest also results in an essay that diminishes the actions of Benjamin Prentiss, the Union officer long lauded as the hero who saved the day at that critical spot. The argument presented here runs counter to the traditional understanding of the battle. Furthermore, other primary sources counter the evidence presented here. More work needs to be done on the Hornet’s Nest before it vanishes from its prominent perch in Civil War memory.

Unfortunately, all of the essays here have been previously published in other magazines or journals, with only minor revisions from time to time, so those familiar with Smith’s work will not learn anything new. For readers interested in the history of Iowa, there are only casual references to the Iowa men who fought at crucial stages in the battle. There is no extensive discussion of the Iowa monument, located near the visitor center, which, in my opinion, is one of the grandest on
the battlefield. The book would have benefited from a deeper examination of the monuments, which play a critical role in the construction of memory. For anyone interested in the battle and its legacy, however, Smith’s collection is certainly worth exploring.

While many have at least heard of Shiloh, the same cannot be said for Milliken's Bend, a ferocious engagement on the west bank of the Mississippi River on June 7, 1863, a site now underneath the river. Civil War narratives rarely mention the conflict, even though it was an important engagement for African American troops, who composed the majority of Union forces at the battle. At Milliken’s Bend, black soldiers fought with such tenacity that reports of their participation, combined with similar reports from Fort Wagner and Port Hudson later that summer, helped eradicate the racial stereotype that black men could not handle their blue uniform. The battle also produced a heap of controversy, as accusations fervently stated that Confederate forces executed black Union soldiers. Linda Barnickel’s exhaustively researched book helps rescue this important battle from being merely a footnote in the history of the Civil War.

In addition to providing lots of solid details about the battle, Barnickel has framed her study through a much larger cultural examination of the men who fought, the civilians who resided in the region, and those residents’ impressions about slavery. Many white Southerners feared that the Civil War would unleash a massive slave rebellion; a culture of fear permeated the Louisiana residents along the west bank of the Mississippi. The Confederate soldiers who participated in the battle also grew up in a culture of violence that established a racial order through a violent pattern of keeping African Americans in a subordinate position. Barnickel also points out the inherent racial problems in northern society, particularly the view that African Americans could not handle military service. Yet the tenacious fighting came at a heavy price, as accusations flew after the battle that black Union soldiers had been executed. Barnickel examines how Union leadership could use reports of black executions to recruit other black men for a revenge mission or use them to shut down the prisoner exchange system. The author admits the difficulty in discerning the truth about whether or not executions took place, as post-battle accounts and memories directly conflicted with one another, and the records of what happened to the captured black Federal soldiers vanished. Nevertheless, it is hard to completely deny the reports that indicated some executions, which creates a persistent historical mystery.

Barnickel concludes her study by looking at racial violence in eastern Louisiana during Reconstruction and the memory of the battle
in the modern era. Historians mostly ignored the battle until the 1980s, but the National Park Service has helped resurrect the battle in modern memory through film, museum exhibits, and the Mississippi African American monument at Vicksburg National Military Park.

Readers interested in Iowa history will benefit from a lengthy discussion of the Twenty-third Iowa regiment, which participated in the battle. The author criticizes Union Commander Ben McCulloch’s claim that the Iowans did not exhibit any courage during the battle. The appendixes include a list of casualties for the regiment and a brief biographical sketch of the unit.

The book is an excellent example of the importance of persistent research, following every lead and overturning every stone where an important fact might be hidden. The author admits that more work remains to be done on Milliken’s Bend, but her book serves as a benchmark reminding us of the loss incurred by forgetting critical moments in history.


Reviewer Patrick G. Bass is professor of history at Morningside College. His research and writing have focused on the Civil War.

In 1867 the Wisconsin Historical Society (WHS), courtesy of collector Edwin B. Quiner, came into the possession of ten scrapbooks full of clipped letters sent to Wisconsin newspapers from soldiers and others at the front. In 2010 the society digitized these approximately 10,000 missives, making them available gratis online. As indicated in WHS Deputy Director Michael Edmonds’s able foreword to *This Wicked Rebellion*, the original set of sources is tantalizing, much used—and problematic: no one knows how much different newspapers altered these 10,000 letters before printing them.

*This Wicked Rebellion* is a print selection of these letters, edited and organized by John Zimm, a WHS employee. Zimm has arranged his chosen subset by six primary themes, interspersed with subthemes, with a slight emphasis on the darker sides of the conflict. Zimm’s stated criteria for selection are laudable: he includes lesser known letters, offer divergent views, shorn of flowery prose, revealing the variety of experiences of the people of Wisconsin during the Civil War. In particular, his chapter devoted to Wisconsin letters about slavery, emancipation, and race is interesting and well ordered; the chapter titled “War is Hell,” about wounds and sickness, is also gripping.
Yet there are frustrating elements to Zimm’s collection. The intended audience is unclear: the editor explains words and situations that scholars understand, but leaves underexplained other matters that popular audiences may misunderstand. His editorial remarks are enlightening when provided, but too often he leaves the contexts surrounding the letters vague, perhaps because those contexts are virtually unknowable. Some newspapers redacted letters more thoroughly than others, removing individual names, place names, unit designations, and the like for reasons that are unclear now. Some discussion of these newspaper variations and their origins would have been useful. Almost always, readers are left wanting more information. I also wished that the editor would have followed more closely one of his stated selection criteria: the emergence of a distinct Wisconsin identity in the selected letters. Indeed, although many letters refer to particular places in the state, and the Iron Brigade makes many appearances, the bulk of the letters lack a noticeable midwestern flavor, and most could have originated from almost any Northern state. Letters that include ideas and attitudes showing stronger local perspectives about national affairs, or about surrounding states and their denizens, or about Wisconsin state partisan political dynamics, would have added much.

Despite these frustrations, This Wicked Rebellion provides a model that scholars in all states, including Iowa, should pursue: the construction of a large set of Civil War letters drawn from one state arranged by well-chosen themes that would reveal the nature and evolution of local ideals, priorities, prejudices, and attitudes about major issues between 1860 and 1865.


Reviewer Jon K. Lauck is the author of Prairie Republic: The Political Culture of Dakota Territory (2010) and the forthcoming The Lost Region: Toward a Revival of Midwestern History.

Historians, to a much greater extent than other scholars, tend to get better with age. Decades in the archives and accumulated learning and research often yield insightful and broadly gauged works from historians working late in their careers. Such is the case with Norman K. Risjord, who specialized in early American history for decades at the University of Wisconsin. In later years Risjord turned with special vigor to the American midlands. He has now made a major impress-
sion on midwestern history. First with Wisconsin: The Story of the Badger State (1995) and then A Popular History of Minnesota (2005) and later with Shining Big Sea Water (2008), a study of Lake Superior, Risjord probed the core of the American Midwest. Now he has taken the next logical step; in Dakota: The Story of the Northern Plains, he looks to the land just west of Minnesota. This roughly sequential collection of works represents an impressive succession of scholarly endeavor. Risjord has tapped the vein of scholarly energy that once helped Frederick Jackson Turner, from his post at the University of Wisconsin, give life to the story of the American Midwest.

In keeping with his earlier works on Wisconsin, Minnesota, and the exploration and trading history of Lake Superior, Risjord’s Dakota is heavily tilted toward the early history of what would become the states of North and South Dakota. Risjord’s front-loading of the story results in an intense focus on the early plains Indians and the French explorers of Dakota. The Verendryes, for example, receive extensive attention, as one would expect from a historian who is keenly interested in the early development of the Great Lakes trading enterprises that defined early Wisconsin and Minnesota. Risjord effectively explains the tripartite development and expansion of Dakota from the Red River of the northeast, the confluence of the Missouri and Big Sioux Rivers in the southeast, and the Black Hills in the west. For those interested in the foundational moments of the Dakotas, then, Risjord’s history is first rate.

Dakota is a general survey. As a result, Risjord does not delve deeply into his topics, which befits the broad treatment he intended. The book does not reach much beyond the 1920s and essentially ends with a highly readable review of the construction of Mount Rushmore. It is not heavily documented and tends to rely on older interpretations of certain events. The treatment of the Dakota Boom and the movement for statehood in the Dakotas, for example, largely follows Howard Lamar’s Dakota Territory (1956) and fails to incorporate more recent research highlighting the heavily midwestern, democratic, religious, and agrarian tendencies of Dakota’s settlers. Risjord also neglects the tensions between the settlers committed to forming new communities in Dakota and the fleeting machinations of federal appointees. These observations should be read, however, in the context of recognizing Risjord’s larger goal, which is to offer new readers a general treatment of Dakota history and an entry point into a world foreign to many Americans.

Risjord is to be commended for his greatest accomplishment in Dakota, which is to fully integrate the story of the exploration and
settlement of the oft-neglected northern plains into the wider epic of
the founding and growth of the American Midwest, especially the
Dakotas’ links to the commerce fostered by the Great Lakes and the
later melding of the plains’ agrarian economy into the railroad net-
works of the Midwest. Iowa was an important link in this chain de-
velopment given that many Dakota settlers originated in Iowa and
that Sioux City, which connects northwest Iowa to southeast South
Dakota, was a frequent point of embarkation for Dakota settlers.

Risjord’s *Dakota* is a welcome addition to the short list of survey
treatments of the Dakotas, which includes George Kingsbury’s *History
of Dakota Territory* (1915), Herbert Schell’s *History of South Dakota* (1961),
and Elwyn Robinson’s *History of North Dakota* (1966). Risjord’s *Dakota*
should be seen as both a serious survey of the neglected story of the
American midlands and a justification for a greater number of more
detailed treatments of the American Midwest and its development
within the broader story of American history.

Northfield, MN: Norwegian-American Historical Association, 2011. x, 195 pp. Illustrations, notes. $34.95 hardcover.

Reviewer Dag Blanck is a historian and university lecturer at the Swedish Institute
for North American Studies in the English Department at Uppsala University in
Sweden and director of the Swenson Swedish Immigration Research Center at Au-
gustana College, Rock Island, Illinois.

The Norwegian-American Historical Association (NAHA) in North-
field, Minnesota, has published the thirty-sixth volume of its *Norwegian-
American Studies*, a venerable series, begun in 1926, by a venerable his-
torical association established the previous year. Over the years NAHA
and its publications have played a significant role in the study of Nor-
wegian and Scandinavian immigration to North America. Editor Todd
W. Nichol and NAHA are to be congratulated for continuing the series
with the current volume, the first after a hiatus of a decade.

Volume 36 includes seven essays on a variety of topics; contribu-
tors include scholars from both the United States and Norway. The
lead article by Norwegian historian Jens Eldal is a closely argued study
of church architecture in Norwegian America. Eldal examines the
roots of the design of Norwegian American churches: To what degree
were they influenced by architecture in the homeland and to what de-
gree did they adjust to prevailing American norms? A careful exami-
nation of Holden Lutheran Church in Goodhue County in southern
Minnesota, which was supposed to have retained many of its Norwe-
gian traits, shows that it was also significantly influenced by American building traditions associated with other established Protestant traditions. The church thus represents an interesting fusion of European and American patterns.

This theme of how Norwegian ethnic traits and cultural patterns interacted with those of American society at large, creating something new, and in this case, particularly Norwegian American, can also be found in other essays in the volume. Two contributions deal with historians of Norwegian background who devoted some or all of their academic careers to examining, and at times exalting, Norwegian America. O. M. Norlie (1876–1962), an early historian of Norwegian America, focused on documenting various aspects of the complicated history of Norwegian American Lutheranism. Paul Knaplund (1885–1962) represented a less filiopietistic and more critical school of historians. Both articles emphasize the role the writing and writers of history played in the growth of Norwegian American identities during the early twentieth century. Similarly, Carol Colburn and Laurann Gilbertson’s illuminating and precise examination of clothing styles, in particular work clothing, among Norwegian immigrants in the Midwest, successfully uses photographs to show a tendency to continuity of tradition for work or “functional” clothes.

Gary Olson’s micro study of Sioux Falls, South Dakota, a city with a long history of a major Norwegian presence, uses the 1880 census to show that Norwegians were the city’s largest foreign-born group and were active in all the social strata of Sioux Falls society, from laborers and maids to merchants and local politicians. Norwegian in-migration began during the so-called Dakota Boom in the 1880s, which brought Norwegians from Norway and from other areas of the Midwest to the Dakotas. The analysis complements earlier work by Odd Lovoll and David Mauk on Norwegian urban life in large and medium-sized cities.

Two literary contributions round out the volume. Marv Slind introduces us to Elias Molee (1845–1928), a son of Norwegian immigrants born in Muskego, Wisconsin, who lived and worked in Iowa, Wisconsin, and Minnesota before moving to the state of Washington in 1900. Molee had literary and cultural interests and aspirations and is best remembered for his (failed) attempt to promote the universal language Alteutonic. The final piece is a short story by O. E. Rølvaag, “Grandma and Her Story,” first published in 1905 in the St. Olaf College student newspaper. According to the introduction by Todd Nichol, Rolvaag had written it for an English class during his sophomore year, nine years after arriving in the United States. The story
anticipates some of the themes in Rølvaag’s later writings, such as *Giants in the Earth*, and shows that his style and command of the English language were already well developed at this early stage of his life in America.

Volume 36 of *Norwegian-American Studies* is a welcome addition to the literature on Norwegian American history. We can hope that we do not have to wait for a decade for the next installment in the series.


Reviewer Scott E. Randolph is assistant professor of business history and ethics at the University of Redlands. His Ph.D. dissertation (Purdue University, 2009) was “Playing by the Rules: Markets, Manipulation, and the Meaning of Exchange in the American Railway Industry, 1900–1918.”

This well-illustrated volume from the prolific H. Roger Grant takes readers on a journey through the intimate relationship that Americans shared with the railway industry during its Golden Era from 1830 through World War II. Concentrating on the Midwest, the Great Plains, and the South, Grant discusses how railroads sat at the center of the American experience by exploring four themes—trains, stations, communities, and legacy—in vivid detail.

Grant’s first organizing theme is trains. He ranges widely, always providing memorable stories to illustrate his points. Riding trains is central to this theme. Grant includes debates over Sabbath operations, the history and sociology of hoboing and booming, and an extensive discussion of troop trains and their equipment. He does not neglect the running trades or the reasons why, for many employees, “workin’ on the railroad” was a way of life pursued from childhood. Riding trains was utterly normal, but at the same time fraught with the unexpected, as Grant notes in discussing accidents, robberies, fashion shows, and memorials at line side graves.

In the section on stations, Grant takes us inside the social life of the railroad depot. The buildings themselves were sources of civic pride—or effort if residents believed that they deserved better. The station was often the center of community interaction, and station employees often served as the unofficial town aides-de-camp tasked with knowing everything worth knowing. While citizens treated the station as civic space, depots, especially in rural communities, also served as homes for railroad employees, as Grant discusses in some detail.
In the section on communities, Grant covers topics as diverse as town layouts and settlement, the agitation for railroad service, celebrations for first trains, fights over county seats, pleas for better depots, and the peculiarities of “railroad towns.” Despite their necessity in the pre-automobile age, railroads also often became the locus of community concerns over safety, sexuality, and civic pride. Grant makes plain how the rhythm of community life revolved around trains, train time, and railroad work.

The final theme, legacy, is handled most briefly. Grant notes how railroad development provided town names across much of the country, and railroad terms became ubiquitous in vernacular English and humor. The largest portion of this section is devoted to a brief history of railroad enthusiasts, industry scholars, and their organizations and museums. Many of the latter are nearly as old as the industry itself. Brief discussions of memorial markers, art, photography, film, and the rails-to-trails movement are offered up as additional evidence for Grant’s argument for the centrality of the railroad to the American experience.

As Grant notes in his introduction, this is not a cultural history, but rather a social history. His prose, honed over nearly 40 years, is crisp and lucid. Scholars will find nothing new in the book; like many of the books in Indiana University Press’s Railroads Past & Present series, its intended audience is the informed, but casual, railroad enthusiast. That audience will find much to enjoy, especially Grant’s seemingly endless supply of local anecdotes, culled from newspapers, letters, and official papers. He leans heavily on research he has completed for other projects, as avid readers of his scholarship will quickly note. However, Grant does not ignore relevant recent scholarship. Informed readers familiar with the work of Amy Richter on gender and the railways, Eric Arnesen and Theodore Kornweibel Jr. on race and railroads, and James W. Ely on railroads and the law, among others, will note their influence at appropriate sections in the text. Grant does not include notes, so the casual reader will be largely unaware of the depth of his reading and research.

The book leans toward the nostalgic, and there is little discussion of the often tumultuous and unhappy relationship between railroads and the American people. The fierce struggles over unionization are mentioned only briefly, as are the tirades of the populists. When Grant discusses the American people, he means them individually and amorphously, not their institutions, governments, or organizations. His decision to treat these topics lightly is understandable given the constraints of space and audience, but it does diminish the scope of the book.
As befits a historian who has written widely on Iowa railroads, this volume contains much for readers interested in the state’s rich railroad history. For example, the frontispiece image is of a depot in What Cheer, Iowa. The state, with its dense railway network, could not but play a significant part in telling the social history of the railroads and America. The state’s major carriers, such as the Rock Island and the Burlington, feature prominently; and its many obscure short-lines, such as the forlorn Iowa and Southwestern Railway, get their due as well. Little of the Iowa material is new, yet the book is still a worthwhile addition to the library of Iowa railroad readers.


Reviewer Mark Wahlgren Summers is professor of history at the University of Kentucky. His books include Party Games: Getting, Keeping, and Using Power in Gilded Age Politics (2004).

As Otto von Bismarck would have said, if he had thought of it, “People appalled by watching sausages being made will feel better watching a legislature passing an apportionment measure.” Readers certainly will feel that way after reading Peter H. Argersinger’s Representation and Inequality in Late Nineteenth-Century America. An appealingly appalling chronicle of the major parties’ shenanigans in the 1890s, it details how far Democrats and Republicans were willing to twist and bend district lines to thwart the people’s will.

Argersinger is not new to the field. Over the years, his articles have shown how much lawmakers’ manipulations could distort “the value of the vote,” and how election laws could keep third parties off the ballot or cut down the “outs’” totals. Thanks to his work, our understanding of what parties did to tilt the playing field has been tremendously enhanced. Representation and Inequality makes a walloping contribution to that understanding for the 1890s.

Concentrating on states in the Midwest—Ohio and Michigan a little and Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Iowa a lot—Argersinger shows how, as the political equilibrium of the 1880s began to shift toward a Democratic advantage, both parties strove to seal it by redrawing the electoral maps in egregious ways and using the court system as never before to get the results they wanted. Each side seemed to operate on the principle, “Do unto others as you would expect them to do to you—and make it stick.” The result was a tumultuous series of legislative
sessions in which, Argersinger contends, apportionment issues stirred more heat than even currency or ethnocultural issues. In Indiana, debates turned into fights, with pistols drawn and chairs broken up to provide clubs; at one point, partisan armies threatened to carry the Hoosier state into civil war. Having been beaten in two gerrymanders of their own before losing the state, Wisconsin Democratic leaders were shocked—shocked!—that district-rigging would leverage a minority of voters into a majority of seats, until the free silver rank and file took control over the party. Unable to rule, quite capable of ruining, those same leaders dropped their lawsuits and let the Republican gerrymander go through. That fall, 91 of 100 seats in the legislature went for the GOP. In any state, Republicans would scream at “a gerrymander rotten beyond precedent”—and crave one just like it. They got their wish, too. If Democrats came out winners in the early 1890s, Republicans paid them back with interest after 1893.

*Representation and Inequality* gives painful insight into how readily partisanship trumped principle. In one state, Republican lawmakers vowed that they would never vote for their party’s steal. Nor did they. They absented themselves, allowing their party to squeak through. Editors shouted their outrage, until their side performed the same way, whereupon they built bulwarks of excuses around statutory monstrosities.

Argersinger’s thorough mining of the sources puts his work beyond challenge, and readers will find it long enough. But he could have made it five times as long: the same trickery characterized Connecticut, New York, and many other states. Coming to grips with reality, he might have tried some flights of fancy, imagining how, in purely representative bodies, a fair apportionment might have made a difference in policy. Suppose Wisconsin or Indiana had devised seats to give all parties, not just the top two, their fair statewide share of the vote. Taking what we know about how each party voted on liquor legislation, tax policy, railroad regulation, or the like, and knowing what subjects came up in each session, what would have passed that failed, failed that passed? Which legislatures would have had a different party in charge, and by what margin? Which U. S. senators would not have been elected, because their parties lacked the working majority to make it happen? What-if’s can reveal just what we missed by the creative cartography.

One could have asked a thousand other things of this excellent book, indispensable reading for the Gilded Age’s political historians—including a much cheaper price and a lot more illustrations, or one, even. Argersinger has taken on enough states to get the point across;
the line has to be drawn somewhere. Representation and Inequality represents the best in political history.


Reviewer Marcia Noe is professor of English at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga and editor of MidAmerica. She is also senior editor of The Dictionary of Midwestern Literature.

Hamlin Garland, a Pulitzer Prize–winning author who grew up on farms in Mitchell County, Iowa, was known in the early twentieth century as the dean of American literature. Keith Newlin notes in his introduction that despite having written eight volumes of autobiography, Garland excluded much about his life; moreover, he lacked the critical distance to use appropriate principles of selection and emphasis. This volume remedies those problems by offering a variety of documents—letters, newspaper columns, and excerpts from books and speeches written by his family, friends, colleagues, and notable acquaintances such as Sinclair Lewis, Theodore Roosevelt, and William Allen White—that present a kaleidoscope of perspectives on Garland. From them we learn that Garland was often a too-earnest and humorless advocate for his many causes and an unsociable man who was disliked by some of his neighbors. On the other hand, many of these documents also offer evidence of Garland’s generosity and helpfulness to younger writers.

Keith Newlin, the foremost Garland scholar working today, has done a masterful job of selecting and editing these documents, each of which is introduced by a headnote that contextualizes the document, the writer, and his or her relationship to Garland and is followed by endnotes that provide further explanation and context. The book usefully complements Newlin’s earlier biography of Garland and provides the fullest picture to date of one of the major nineteenth-century chroniclers of midwestern rural life. This book is an essential purchase for Garland scholars as well as for scholars of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century American literature and history.

Voodoo Priests, Noble Savages, and Ozark Gypsies: The Life of Mary Alicia Owen, by Greg Olson. Missouri Biography Series. Columbia: University

Reviewer Victoria Smith is associate professor of history and ethnic studies at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. She is the author of Captive Arizona: Indian Captives and Captive Indians in Territorial Arizona, 1850–1912 (2009).

At the academic level, this book engages several lines of inquiry. It explores the life of Mary Alicia Owen, a Vassar-educated folklorist, and her sisters Ella, a geologist, and Juliette, an artist and ornithologist. All three unmarried academic females called St. Joseph, Missouri, home their entire lives during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The author, Greg Olson, examines the published folklore and fiction of Mary Owen and places her in the context of the academic struggle between folklore as anthropology and folklore as literature. He also connects the upper-class Owen family to the history of St. Joseph and explores the society that fashioned their lives.

Iowans, especially those interested in river towns born as ports of departure for an expanding American West, will find in Owen’s life and work archetypes for their own historical pioneers: a wealthy, educated, and influential unmarried woman suspended between her privileged upbringing and an insatiable curiosity about the characters that peoples her world; the displaced natives, bereft of homelands, never quite sure if the land they lived on was really theirs; African American elders in their shantytowns, caught between the antebellum slavery of their youth and the marginal freedom of emancipation; and tales of encounters with Romani gypsies who wandered the frontier river towns of the American West. Owen interacted with them all, yet carefully maintained the class and racial boundaries that separated her from her subjects. Despite determination and an inquisitive mind, Owen could never quite surmount the social perceptions that bound her.


The history of baseball in America has been told almost exclusively as a city and as a professional game. David Vaught seeks to rectify this lacunae by offering a history of rural baseball—the game played by farmers and the residents of small towns. The supremacy of the city game’s history arose in part, Vaught contends, from the effort of base-
ball scholars to demolish the myth of the game’s origins in the countryside, in the tiny, bucolic town of Cooperstown, New York. In doing so they neglected to examine the widespread playing of baseball-like games in the Cooperstown area during the antebellum era. Once they demonstrated the error of the Cooperstown legend, they proceeded to tell the remainder of baseball’s history as if rural baseball hardly existed. No one can deny that the main historical focus has been urban and professional baseball, yet Vaught argues that rural imagery nonetheless occupies a huge place in our memory of the game. Simply witness the continuing popularity of the movie *Field of Dreams* (1989) or, for that matter, the epic poem “Casey at the Bat” (1888).

In seeking to redress the balance, Vaught offers a set of discrete essays that examine the game in specific places and at specific times. Much of *The Farmers’ Game* concerns the sport’s economic, social, and cultural context. Hence, the reader finds that baseball in early nineteenth-century Cooperstown intertwined with conflicts arising over the area’s increased democratization; that the transition in the late nineteenth century from wheat to fruit farming touched off a “baseball epidemic” in the Putah Creek neighborhood of California; that the popularity of baseball in late nineteenth-century rural Texas can be attributed to the arrival of European immigrants and to the production of cotton; that the surfacing of superstar Bob Feller in Iowa in the 1930s is comprehensible in the context of the rise of the “modern American farmer”; that the decline in the popularity of baseball in southwestern Minnesota corresponded to the decay of its small towns after World War II; and that Gaylord Perry’s rise to stardom in the 1960s and 1970s can be understood as a “case study of a quintessentially southern, authentically rural icon of popular culture” (125).

Vaught’s chapter “The Making of Bob Feller and the Modern American Farmer” is of special interest to Iowans. Unlike previous accounts of Feller, Vaught carefully reexamines the “farm-boy-makes-good” narrative, one promoted by William Feller (Bob’s father) and by Bob himself. According to this myth, the Fellers were traditional rural folk whose loyalty to agrarian ideals propelled Bob into baseball stardom. Instead, based on research in local land and court records and newspaper reports, Vaught finds that William Feller was an exceptionally shrewd and successful “modern” farmer. He made smart business decisions—such as when and how much to invest in land and equipment and when to plant wheat rather than corn. William likewise went about systematically preparing his son for a career in professional baseball. Indeed, William even built Bob his own baseball field, the equivalent of the “Field of Dreams,” and Bob himself was
almost as good at baseball entrepreneurship as he was at throwing the “heater.”

For those interested in baseball’s place in local history, whether in rural or regional terms, this is an extraordinarily good book. Vaught’s narrative rests on an enormous amount of research in primary sources, including records found in county courthouses and stories in small-town newspapers, as well as on published secondary accounts. Well written and researched, it offers a convincing set of stories about the role of baseball in the history of the American countryside.


Histories of the arms race during the Cold War typically focus on the technological, scientific, or military aspects of atomic weapons. In The Missile Next Door, historian Gretchen Heefner offers an intriguing new take on how ordinary citizens in the Midwest interacted with missile installations on their farms and ranches. Based largely on oral histories with South Dakota ranchers and activists, a lively and engaging narrative provides an intensely human account of daily life alongside weapons of mass destruction. As policymakers designed ever more destructive weapons, those who housed the missiles on their land did not necessarily protest the rationality of the arms race, but they did express deep concerns about their rights and freedoms, the environment, and the viability of the agricultural economy.

During the late 1950s, the Eisenhower administration adopted the concept of “mutually assured destruction,” or the deterrence of war through a buildup of atomic weapons. When intercontinental ballistic missiles became the weapon of choice, policymakers came to believe that the Soviets would be deterred from attacking the United States by distributing thousands of missile installations staggered throughout the American countryside rather than concentrating missiles in one vulnerable area. Senators and state boosters vied for these installations in their home states in order to reap the economic benefits, leading the air force to favor prevailing political winds over geography when selecting missile sites.

Residents of small towns and even larger urban centers welcomed military spending as a much-needed boost to the local economy. In
addition to providing jobs at locations such as Ellsworth Air Force Base near Rapid City, South Dakota, missile installations also required significant upgrades to roads, electrical systems, and the general infrastructure that for so long had been wanting on the High Plains. Less enthusiastic, however, were the farmers and ranchers who learned that the federal government wanted two acres of their land for each actual installation. Few objected to the militarization of their land, but they fiercely protested their inability to negotiate prices or designate the exact two acres. One unfortunate family found itself living just a few hundred feet from the installation, well within the blast radius should the missile fire. In South Dakota, ranchers formed the Missile Area Land Owners Association in order to collectively address their concerns. They met with limited success, but they did rouse the support of mainstream agricultural organizations like the Farm Bureau. Their efforts represented a muted unease with the Cold War that departs from the usual story of American compliance with the possibility of nuclear Armageddon.

By the 1980s, the nuclear freeze movement united activists from a variety of ethnic, cultural, political, and religious backgrounds. Furthermore, protests against the militarization of the countryside and nuclear war grew in strength alongside the very real hardships of the farm crisis, when thousands of farm families were displaced by economic conditions. It is here, in the analysis of the peace and anti-nuclear movements of the 1980s, that Heefner falls short of providing a deeper exploration of how these movements had such a profound meaning for a countryside in crisis. She tends to focus on localism and conservatism while neglecting the fact that the populist impulse remained strong in South Dakota throughout the twentieth century. Also, there is little explanation of whether the protests actually worked to convince anyone in the federal government to alter missile programs. It is clear that grassroots efforts convinced policymakers to back down on the construction of MX missile sites in Utah, but it is not clear whether activists were successful elsewhere. It seems that the end of the Cold War was the primary impetus for the missiles’ removal by the early 1990s.

This minor criticism aside, The Missile Next Door is extremely well researched and contextualized within the state, federal, and global frameworks that altered the lives of those with missiles quite literally in their back yards. Most social histories of this era use government publications, books, films, and other print materials without much thought as to how the intended audience responded to them. Heefner moves beyond rhetorical analysis to seek out lived experiences that
are infinitely more complex and enriching. She not only has made a significant contribution to our understanding of how ordinary Americans experienced the Cold War, but she has produced a rare gem that accommodates both serious scholars and casual readers.


Reviewer Robin C. Henry is associate professor of history at Wichita State University. Her first book is *Criminalizing Sex, Defining Sexuality: Sexual Regulation and Masculinity in the American West, 1850–1927* (forthcoming).

The urban Northeast and California coast monopolize most of gay/lesbian and queer studies. In recent years, scholars of sexuality have begun exploring queerness in the Midwest. This new wave of scholarship fills in many gaps in the history of sexuality but also presents a more complex image of gender relations in the region. Stewart Van Cleve’s book, *Land of 10,000 Loves*, adds to this new literature in a way that is useful for scholars and interesting for general readers. While focusing mainly on the Twin Cities, Van Cleve explores the presence of queerness from the early settlers through the present day, uncovering and presenting—in many cases for the first time—a long-hidden history of queer life in Minnesota.

Van Cleve bases his work on the extraordinary Jean-Nickolaus Treeter Collection, housed at the University of Minnesota. This 40,000-piece collection includes archival materials and oral histories from all over the world, the United States, and Minnesota. What comes of this project is a wide-ranging book—part narrative, and part treasure trove of long-forgotten people, places, and events—that catalogs the development of queer history in Minnesota, with a focus on the emergence of gay community and civil rights movements between 1950 and 2000. While important for local queer history, this book also raises important questions about inclusion and exclusion, in terms of both sexuality and region.

The book easily divides into two sections. In the first three chapters, Van Cleve discusses the rise and fall of locations of queerness. In the early settlements and Native American communities, it can be difficult to know exactly what queer life means. By the twentieth century, Minnesota’s gay men and women had carved out public space in places such as the Emporium department store, the Nicollet Hotel, and the Women’s City Club—places to meet other gay men and women, host costume parties and drag balls, and begin to create a gay cul-
ture in the Twin Cities. That community remained private, however, with event information traveling by word of mouth in order to circumvent morality codes and avoid arrests. Because of its underground existence, the gay community remained vulnerable to larger citywide changes, such as urban renewal projects that eliminated meeting places in the mid-twentieth century, all but burying the community’s early history in piles of rubble, high rises, and cloverleaf highways.

The mid-twentieth century brought a new sense of political and civic action designed to make the community less vulnerable and to secure a voice in the cities’ changes. In the second half of his book Van Cleve traces the rise of gay activism and activity that addressed housing, anti-homosexual city ordinances, marriage, and the health issues brought on by HIV/AIDS. The activist organizations and cultural touchstones—everything from Pride parades and bath houses like The Locker Room to the North Country Bears and the Christopher Street treatment center—that grew out of the late twentieth century demonstrate that queer life not only existed but thrived in the Midwest.

Van Cleve’s book lacks the high level of analysis that queer history academics produce, but he does provide an excellent place for Minnesotans, as well as other midwesterners, to learn about the diverse and rich queer history that exists in their region. This is a heavily researched, well-written book, and a great addition to our ever-increasing understanding of queer history in the United States.


Reviewer Mark R. Scherer is associate professor of history and chair of the history department at the University of Nebraska–Omaha. He is the author of Imperfect Victories: The Legal Tenacity of the Omaha Tribe, 1945–1995 (1999).

Hundreds of Native American nations operate under the terms of tribal constitutions enacted in the aftermath of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934; only a handful have reshaped those documents in recent years to better reflect their own cultural and political values. In 2009 the White Earth Nation of Anishinaabeg Natives (perhaps more familiar to outsiders as the White Earth band of Chippewa or Ojibwe) became one of the few Indian groups anywhere, and the first in the state of Minnesota, to take that important step in furtherance of its sovereign autonomy.

This slim but valuable volume presents the text of the White Earth Nation’s new constitution, along with insights from two of the key par-
participants in the drafting, deliberation, and ratification of that historic instrument. Tribal member Gerald Vizenor, a historian at the University of New Mexico who became the principal author of the White Earth constitution, offers an extended essay that provides important context for the motivations and goals of the tribal convention that produced it. Historian Jill Doerfler of the University of Minnesota carefully chronicled the convention’s progress and presents a series of articles she published contemporaneously in the tribal newspaper as the process unfolded. The net effect is to provide a compelling behind-the-scenes perspective on the creation of the White Earth constitution that will be instructive to anyone who is interested in the perplexing but always stimulating topic of indigenous self-government. Few issues are more significant to residents of the Great Plains and the American West.
New on the Shelves

“New on the Shelves” is a list of recent additions to the collections of the State Historical Society of Iowa. It includes manuscripts, audio-visual materials, and published materials recently acquired or newly processed that we think might be of interest to the readers of the *Annals of Iowa*. The “DM” or “IC” at the end of each entry denotes whether the item is held in Des Moines or Iowa City.

Published Materials

*Note:* Once per year, in the Fall issue, we list separately in this section all of the books processed since the last such listing about specific locales (towns or counties), schools, and churches, listed alphabetically by town or school name. Full publication data will be included for local and school histories; only the names of churches and the years covered will be included for church histories.

Local Histories


School Histories

Cerro Gordo County. *Seventy-fifth Anniversary History of Lime Creek District School No. 3, Cerro Gordo County, Iowa*, by J. L. Otzen. N.p., 1946. 8 pp. IC.


Luther College. Transformed by the Journey: 150 Years of Luther College in Word and Image, by Wilfred F. Bunge, with Mary Hull Mohr and Dale Nimrod. Decorah: Luther College Press, 2011. viii, 301 pp. IC.


**Church Histories**

Atlantic. First United Presbyterian Church, 1869–1969. IC.

Colfax. Colfax United Methodist Church, 1868–1968. IC.

Cosgrove. St. Peter Church, 1890–2011.

Earlham. Early Chapel Christian Church, Dedication, 1966. IC.

Milford. Little Sioux Lutheran Church, 1871–1996.

Mount Etna. Mount Etna Methodist Church, 1852–1977. IC.

Sioux City. Grace United Methodist Church, 1888-1988. IC.

Spencer. First English Lutheran Church, 1892–1992. IC.

Stanhop. Grace United Methodist Church, 1889–1989. IC.

Windham. St. Peter Church, 1861–1890. IC.
EACH ISSUE of *The Annals of Iowa* brings to light the deeds, misdeeds, and accomplishments of our predecessors and shows how they fit into the intricate mosaic of Iowa’s past. Its in-depth articles will satisfy even the most serious explorer of Iowa’s past.

Anyone with a serious interest in Iowa history will gain valuable perspective from the pages of the *Annals*. Give it as a gift to a friend or relative. Check to see if your public, school, or academic library subscribes; if they don’t, encourage them to do so or, better yet, donate a subscription.

☐ Annals of Iowa Subscription   ☐ New ☐ Renewal ☐ Gift*
☐ One year, $24.95
☐ Two years, $44.95
☐ Three years, $64.95

Name ____________________________________________________________

Address __________________________________________________________

City ____________________ State _________ Zip ____________

Make check payable to the State Historical Society of Iowa and return with this coupon (or a photocopy of it) to:
Subscriptions
State Historical Society of Iowa
402 Iowa Avenue
Iowa City IA 52240

☐ Please send information on membership in the State Historical Society of Iowa.

*For gift subscriptions, write the recipient’s name and address on this form, and include your name and address on the back or on a separate sheet of paper. Also indicate how you would like your gift card signed.
Index to Volume 72


Across God’s Frontiers: Catholic Sisters in the American West, 1850–1920, reviewed, 284–86

Acuff, Drucie Bower, 209
Acuff, Fred, 231; photo of, 211
Acuff, Glen, 201–2, 208–12, 230–31; photos of, 211, 230
Acuff, Lloyd William, 209
Acuff, Maude, 202, 208–12, 215, 229–31, 235; photos of, 211, 230

African American history course, 361, 362, 364, 366

African American student union, 361, 368

African Americans, 42, 122–60, 252, 353–85

agricultural diplomacy, 31–62

Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 258

Always Put in a Recipe and Other Tips for Living from Iowa’s Best-Known Homemaker, reviewed, 189–90

American Association of University Women, 382–83

American Association to Promote the Teaching of Speech to the Deaf, 111, 115–16

American Instructors of the Deaf, 115, 118

American Oracle: The Civil War in the Civil Rights Era, reviewed, 71–73

Anagnos, Michael, 97, 99–100, 103

Anderson, Douglas Firth, book review by, 179–80

Anderson, Kristen, book review by, 175–76

Andreasen, Bryon C., book review by, 66–68

Arbuckle, J. W., 339

Archaeology of Minnesota: The Prehistory of the Upper Mississippi River Region, reviewed, 281–82

Archdiocese of Dubuque, 1837–2012: Jesus Alive Through 175 Years, reviewed, 388–89

Argersinger, Peter H., book by, reviewed, 400–2

Bachman, Dwight, 368

Baker, S Zebulon, article by, 122–60

Baltimore, MD, 239–40, 242

The Bark River Chronicles: Stories from a Wisconsin Watershed, reviewed, 195

Barker, Ethel, book by, reviewed, 293–94

Barnickel, Linda, book by, reviewed, 390–93

Bass, Patrick G., book review by, 393–94

Bates, Milton J., book by, reviewed, 195

Battle Hymns: The Power and Popularity of Music in the Civil War, reviewed, 68–69

Bauer, Arnold J., book by, reviewed, 161–65


Beardsley, Jessie, 119

Becker, Philip, Jr., 152

Beers, Glenn, 215, 227, 228

Bell, Alexander Graham, 111, 116

Bennett, Bernie, 141; photo of, 141

Bennett, Henry G., 129–30

Benson, Ezra Taft, 38

Bergman, H. D., 134, 137, 139, 156

Bergman, Marvin, review essay by, 274–80

Bergstrom, A. J., 150

Bernstein, David, book review by, 389–90

Berrier, Galin, book review by, 286–88

Beyer, S. W., 132–33

Big Eight Conference, 157

The Big Empty: The Great Plains in the Twentieth Century, reviewed, 304–6
The Big Roads: The Untold Story of the Engineers, Visionaries, and Trailblazers Who Created the American Superhighways, reviewed, 192–94
Big Seven Conference, 135–37, 156–57
Big Six Conference, 133–35
Big Ten Conference, 132
Binet, Alfred, 6, 7, 22
Binet-Simon Scale, 6, 7, 8, 13
Birkby, Evelyn, book by, reviewed, 189–90
Birkner, Michael J., book edited by, reviewed, 302–4
Birmingham, Robert A., book by, reviewed, 171–72
birth control, 205, 247
Blanck, Dag, book review by, 396–98
Blanke, David, book review by, 192–94
Blight, David W., book by, reviewed, 71–73
blind education, 91–121
Bloomfield, Clair, 344
Board of Trade and Commercial Club, Waterloo, 323
Bohlen, Charles, 33, 34
Bonds of Alliance: Indigenous and Atlantic Slaveries in New France, reviewed, 166–67
Bottorff, Helen, 255, 261
Bovee Grinder and Furnace Works, 338, 346
Bradley University, 149–50, 152
Braille, 106, 119
Brenchler, Paul, 127, 142, 144, 146, 156
Brewer, C. L., 132–33
Bridgeway Project, 372–73, 376–77
Bridgman, Laura, 97–99, 103, 105, 107
Bright, Johnny, 122–31, 139–40, 145–46, 148, 150–52; photo of, 123
Brinkley, Homer L., 39
Brown, Peggy Ann, article by, 31–62
Buckley, Jay H. See Harris, Matthew
Buenker, John D., book review by, 181–82
Buffalo Bill from Prairie to Palace, reviewed, 295–97
Burke, John M., book by, reviewed, 295–97
Burroughs, John, 156
busing, school, to achieve desegregation, 356, 375, 383
Butler, Anne M., book by, reviewed, 284–86
Butz, Earl, 53
Byrne, Kevin, book review by, 308
Callaway, Graham A., and W. Raymond Wood, portfolio compiled by, reviewed, 389–90
Cardinal Guild, 135–36
Carter, Jesse, 232
Carter, Jimmy, 240
Carter, Rosalynn, 245; photo of, 245
Catholic Conference, U.S., 252
Cedar Rapids Gazette, 36, 37
Centerville: A Mid-American Saga, reviewed, 386–87
Central High School, Waterloo, 377
Central Labor Union, Waterloo, 322, 335, 343, 347, 348, 349
Child Welfare Research Station, Iowa, 14–22, 24; photo of preschool at, 16
civil rights, 224–25, 353–85
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 355
Civil Rights Commission, Iowa, 360
The Civil War in the West: Victory and Defeat from the Appalachians to the Mississippi, reviewed, 70–71
Clark, Asa V., 39; photo of, 41
Clark, Betty Jean “Beje,” 255
Clark v. The Board of Directors, 224–25, 359
Clausen, Leon, 327, 331–33, 348, 350
Clean and Green, 266–67
Clemson University, 158
Clinton, Iowa, 325
Cody, William F., books by, reviewed, 295–97
Coffman, Lotus D., 131
Coger, Emma, 225
Coger v. The North Western Union Packet Co., 225
collective bargaining, right of, 324, 326, 327, 330, 332, 340, 343
Communism and anti-Communism, 32, 37–38, 55, 58
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), 240, 244, 255, 266, 267
Conard, Rebecca, book review by, 190–91
Conlin, Roxanne, 260
consortium, loss of, 201–37
Corn Palaces and Butter Queens: A History of Crop Art and Dairy Sculpture, reviewed, 297–99
counseling, mental health, 262
Coupee, Al, 151
couverture, 203–4, 216, 227–28, 235, 248
Creating Consumers: Home Economists in Twentieth-Century America, reviewed, 186–88
Cross, George Lynn, 134–35, 137
Cultivating Regionalism: Higher Education and the Making of the American Midwest, reviewed, 64–66
Curtis, Christopher Michael, book review by, 292–93
Cutcher, Kathryn, 259

Dakota: The Story of the Northern Plains, reviewed, 394–96
“"A Dangerous Man": Lewis Terman and George Stoddard, their Debates on Intelligence Testing, and the Legacy of the Iowa Child Welfare Research Station,” 1–30
Davis, Earle, 138
Davis, Horace J., 44, 48, 60
day, Charles, 110
deaf-blind education, 91–121
The Death and Life of Main Street: Small Towns in American Memory, Space, and Community, reviewed, 184–86
Deere & Co., 322, 327, 331–33, 341–42, 346, 349–52
Defining Deviance: Sex, Science, and Delinquent Girls, 1890–1960, reviewed, 299–301
Delahunt, Don, 136
depression, 1930s, 206–7, 208, 246

The Depression Dilemmas of Rural Iowa, 1929–1933, reviewed, 182–84
Derden, Charles, 362, 365–66
Des Moines Register, 33, 34, 36, 40, 58, 122
Deshotel v. Atchison, 232
Devine, Jenny Barker, book reviews by, 309–10, 405–7
Dewey, John, 10
Dickens, Charles, 98
dielstemeier, George, 378, 384
Diffley, Atina, book by, reviewed, 78–79
Dilly, Barbara, book review by, 78–79
diplomacy, 31–62
disability, 91–121, 211, 231
discrimination, racial, 122–60, 252, 353–85
Displaced Homemakers Network, 241, 246
divorce, no-fault, 249–50
Dixon, Chris, book edited by, reviewed, 295–97
Doderer, Minnette, 250
doerfler, Jill. See Vizenor, Gerald
domestic arts, 106–7
Donald, Dora, 91, 94–97, 100–121; photos of, 95, 118
Donovan, Matthew, book review by, 281–82
The Door Opener (Mason City), 239–46, 255–73
douglas, Bill R., book review by, 388–89
Doyle, Joseph, 377–78
Drahrn, Glenn, 140–41
drake University, 122–31, 138–40, 145–57; law school, 203
duffe, Anne, 272
dulles, John Foster, 32, 33, 37, 59
East High School, Waterloo, 353, 354, 360–70, 373, 374, 377, 384
Economic Opportunity, Office of, 252
education: deaf-blind, 91–121; public, 353–85; secondary, 25
“The Education of Linnie Haguewood,” 91–121
Eisenhower, Dwight, 31, 33–34, 37, 59
Elder, Donald C., III, book review by, 288–90
Elliott, Kate, book review by, 294–95
Emerson, Jason, book by, reviewed, 74–75
employment training and counseling, 262
Engelhardt, Carroll, book by, reviewed, 161–65
entrepreneurship, 266–70
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), 259, 260, 271
Fair housing law, Iowa, 359–60
Faldet, David, book review by, 195
A Family Farm: Life on an Illinois Dairy Farm, reviewed, 161–65
The Farm at Holstein Dip: An Iowa Boyhood, reviewed, 161–65
Farm Bureau women, 260
farm crisis (1980s), 242, 269
farm women, 264, 267
The Farmers’ Game: Baseball in Rural America, reviewed, 403–5
farms, collective, 44–50
Federation of Labor: American, 322; Cedar Rapids, 347; Iowa State, 322, 332, 337, 348
The Feminine Mystique, 250
feminism, 259–61, 266
Flaming, Anna L. Bostwick, article by, 238–73
Florida State University, 149–50
F. M. Michael Paint Co., 332
For the Love of Pete: An Orphan Train Story, reviewed, 293–94
Foster, Euphesenia, 261
Foster, James H., 129–30
Foundry Employees Union, International Brotherhood of, No. 113, 329
Frances Grout Elementary School, Waterloo, 374
French, William DeCoursey, 92
Frese, Millie K., book review by, 293–94
Friley, Charles E., 135, 136–37
From America to Norway: Norwegian-American Immigrant Letters, 1838–1914, vol. 1, 1838–1870, reviewed, 283–84
Full, Jan Olive, book review by, 184
Furgerson, Betty Jean, 366
Gallagher, Marsha V. See Witte, Stephen S.
Gallagher, Mary Kevin, book edited by, reviewed, 388–89
Galton, Sir Francis, 6
Gantt, Harvey, 158
Gardner, Frank, 122, 125, 127, 139–40, 148, 150–52, 154, 160
Garland in His Own Time: A Biographical Chronicle of His Life, reviewed, 402
Garlock, Clarence, 360–61, 363
Garrity, Margaret, 239, 252–55, 256, 262, 272; photos of, 253, 257
Garst, Roswell, 60
Getty, Harold, 380
Giant in the Shadows: The Life of Robert T. Lincoln, reviewed, 74–75
Gibbon, Guy, book by, reviewed, 281–82
Gillespie, Helen, 113–14
Gittens, Joan, book review by, 299–301
Glischinski, Steve, book by, reviewed, 308
God’s Almost Chosen Peoples: A Religious History of the American Civil War, reviewed, 66–68
Goddard, Henry, 7
Goldstein, Carolyn, book by, reviewed, 186–88
Goodenough, Florence, 24
Government Contracts, President’s Committee on, 252–53
Grange, Red, 28
Grant Elementary School, Waterloo, 372–73, 376–77; class photo, 373
Grant, H. Roger, book by, reviewed, 398–400
Great Society programs, 240
Griffith, John L., 132
Griswold v. Connecticut, 247
Gudrun’s Kitchen: Recipes from a Norwegian Family, reviewed, 306–8
Gumm, Angie, book review by, 79–80
Hackemer, Kurt, book review by, 290–92
Haguewood, Emma Hefner, 92
Haguewood, George, 92
Haguewood, Linnie, 91–121; photos of, 93, 95, 102, 114, 118
Hall, G. Stanley, 13
Hancher, Virgil M., 128, 142, 143–44, 146
Harding, Paul, 142
Harding, William L., 341
Harmon, Henry, 148–49, 151–52, 154, 160
Harper, William Rainey, 213
Harris, Matthew L., and Jay H. Buckley, book edited by, reviewed, 169–71
Harris, Perry, 138
Harvest the Wind: America’s Journey to Jobs, Energy Independence, and Climate Stability, reviewed, 79–80
Harvey, Dr. Robert, 372, 376, 377, 378
Hawkeye Oil Co., 336
Hawthorne Elementary School, Waterloo, 374
Hayes, Alice, 377–78
Haynes, Abner, 155
Hays, Norman R., 221–23, 227–28
Head, Allen, 346; photo of, 346
Headford Foundry, Waterloo, 346
Hearst, Charles J., 39, 40, 51, 53, 55; photos of, 41, 56
Heath, George, 215, 229
Heefner, Gretchen, book by, reviewed, 405–7
Henderson, David B. (Waterloo sheriff), 329, 334, 335, 338
Henry, Robin C., book review by, 407–8
hereditarians, 3, 8, 15, 20, 22–23
Hess, Earl J., book by, reviewed, 70–71
Hoey, Kate, and Joy Smith, article by, 201–37
Hohl, George, 364
Hollingworth, Leta, 24
Holmes, Wendell, 203
homemakers, displaced, 238–73
homemaking, 246–47, 259–60, 266
Howe, Samuel Gridley, 97–98, 105, 111
Hughes, R. Bruce, 215, 227, 228
Humbert, LeRoy August, 121
Hurt, R. Douglas, book by, reviewed, 304–6
Iba, Henry, 157
Icaria, 95
Ida Grove, Iowa, 92
Illinois Central Railroad workers, 347, 349
immigrants and immigration, 8
The Indianization of Lewis and Clark, reviewed, 167–69
intelligence quotient (IQ), 6–7. See also IQ tests
Intelligence testing, 1–30
interactionists, 6, 24
Interstate Foundry, Waterloo, 346
Iowa Bystander, 143
Iowa City, Iowa, 19
Iowa College for the Blind, 93–97, 103–8, 116; photo of, 94
“Iowa Corn Song,” 46, 51
Iowa Dairy Separator Co., 322, 326, 328, 336, 340, 344
Iowa Lakes Community College, 267, 271
The Iowa Lakeside Laboratory: A Century of Discovering the Nature of Nature, reviewed, 190–91
Iowa Placement Tests, 13–15
Iowa School for the Deaf, 109
Iowa State College. See Iowa State University
The Iowa State Constitution, reviewed, 173–74
Iowa State Normal School, 116–17
Iowa State Teachers College, 213
Iowa State University, 34, 39, 41–42, 51, 131–37, 146, 155, 156–58
IQ tests, 6–11, 16–26
Ivy, Andrew C., 28–29
Jack, Zachary Michael, book by, reviewed, 309–10
Jacobs, John M., 39, 42; photo of, 41
Jessup, Walter, 16
Jeter, Bob, 156
Jim Crow, 122–60
Johnson, D. Gale, 39, 42, 48, 53, 61; photos of, 41, 49
Johnson, John E., 327, 329, 334–35, 339, 343, 346, 350; photo of, 346
Jordan, J. E., 339, 344
Kansas State University, 134, 136, 139
Kay, Gwen, book review by, 186–88
Kazakhstan, 33, 49
Keller, Helen, 91, 97, 99–100, 103, 105, 106, 107, 111, 116
Kerner Commission, 354
Khrushchev, Nikita, 31, 33, 43, 59
King, Betsy, 268
King, Leon, 155
Kleiner, J. M., 39; photo of, 41
Knock, Michael, book review by, 177–78
Knopp, Lisa, book by, reviewed, 194–95
Kraft, Walter, 134–35, 137
Krebiozen, 28–29
Knapp, Joyce, 241, 261
Labor Standards, Bureau of, 253
labor unions, 321–52
Lafayette Elementary School, Waterloo, 383
Lagerquist, L. DeAne, book review by, 283–84
Lambert, W. V., 39, 40, 42, 43, 46, 53, 54; photos of, 41, 45, 47
Land of 10,000 Loves: A History of Queer Minnesota, reviewed, 407–8
Land of Promise, Land of Tears, reviewed, 75–76
Lane, Laura, 268
Lannoo, Michael J., book by, reviewed, 190–91
Larson, Robert L., 222–23, 224, 229
Lauck, Jon K., book review by, 394–96
law school curriculum, 213–14
Lay, J. Celeste, book by, reviewed, 310–12
League of Women Voters, 250, 376, 383
Leeper, T. E., 347
legal history, 201–37
Leonard, Elizabeth D., book by, reviewed, 292–93
Levine, Irving R., 43, 60
Lewis, Bonnie Sue, book review by, 282–83
Lewis, Dan, book review by, 71–73
Lieutenant G. K. Warren’s 1855 and 1856 Manuscript Maps of the Missouri River, reviewed, 389–90
Life, Death, and Archaeology at Fort Blue Mounds: A Settlers’ Fortification of the Black Hawk War, reviewed, 171–72
The Life of Hon. William F. Cody, Known as Buffalo Bill, reviewed, 295–97
Light on the Prairie: Solomon D. Butcher, Photographer of Nebraska’s Pioneer Days, reviewed, 294–95
Lighty, S. Chandler, book review by, 74–75
Lincoln’s Forgotten Ally: Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt of Kentucky, reviewed, 292–93
Lindell, Lisa K., article by, 91–121
Link, Leon, 323
Lippmann, Walter, 10–11
Litchfield Manufacturing Co., 339
Logan Junior High School, Waterloo, 374
Longfellow Elementary School, Waterloo, 374
loss of consortium, 201–37
Lyftogt, Kenneth L., book review by, 176–77
Lysenko, Trofim, 46
Machinists, International Association of, 322, 324, 325, 328, 329, 332, 344, 345, 346, 348, 349, 351
Main Street Public Library: Community Places and Reading Spaces in the Rural Heartland, 1876–1956, reviewed, 76–78
Mallea, Amahia, book review by, 304–6
Mansfield, Arabella A., 225
manualism, 111
Marquette University, 150
marriage, 201–37, 246–50
married women’s property acts, 205, 215–16, 227
Marshall, Verne, 36
Martin, Bonnie, book review by, 166–67
Mason City, Iowa, 238–73
Matskevich, Vladimir, M., 51, 52, 60
McCarty, Joseph, 32
McCarty, Fran, 267
McClelland, Jack, 147, 148, 149, 154
McCune, Thomas F., 93, 94, 96, 104
McKee, Rose, 208
McKee, William, 208
McKinley, William, 119
McMurry, Enfys, book by, reviewed, 386–87
McNutt, Steve, article by, 1–30
McWhirter, Christian, book by, reviewed, 68–69
The Meaning of Intelligence, 26
The Measurement of Intelligence, 7, 11
Medina, Mariana, book review by, 310–12
Menze, Louis, 136
Mexican Americans, 253
The Midwest Farmer’s Daughter: In Search of an American Icon, reviewed, 309–10
A Midwestern Mosaic: Immigration and Political Socialization in Rural America, reviewed, 310–12
Migrant Action Project, 252
migrant farmworkers, 252
Mikós, Susan Gibson, book by, reviewed, 181–82
Miller, Brian Craig: book edited by, reviewed, 288–90; book review by, 390–93
Miller, Lee, book by, reviewed, 176–77
Miller, Patti, 160
Milken’s Bend: A Civil War Battle in History and Memory, reviewed, 390–93
Milnes, C. H., 348
Minnesota Railroads: A Photographic History, 1940–2012, reviewed, 308
The Missile Next Door: The Minuteman in the American Heartland, reviewed, 405–7
Missouri Valley Conference, 124, 130, 137–40, 147–55
Mobile Agricultural Company Services Corp., 267–68
Model Laundry, Waterloo, 332, 339
Molders’ Union, International, No. 459, 329
Morris, James B., 143–46
Mozer, Harold, 136
Mrs. Dred Scott: A Life on Slavery’s Frontier, reviewed, 175–76
Ms. Magazine, 246
Mulholland, F. H., 345, 346
Murphy, Bernard, 100–103, 116, 117
Murphy, Franklin, 157
Murphy, J. Thomas, book review by, 295–97
Murtagh, J. C., 344–45
The Music Man, 241
Music Man Square, 241
Musmanno, Michael, 233–34
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 362, 368, 374–75, 379
National Association of Manufacturers, 324
National Organization for Women (NOW), 239
nature vs. nurture, 22
Nebraska Institute for the Deaf and Dumb, 109
Neighborhood Schools Association, Waterloo, 375, 379–80, 383
Neuberg v. Bobowicz, 233–34
Newlin, Keith, book edited by, reviewed, 402
Newsome, Hershel, 53
Nichol, Todd W., book edited by, reviewed, 396–98
Nixon, Richard, 253
Noe, Marcia, book review by, 402
Non-Sexist Vocational Acquaintance Project, 268–69
The North American Journals of Prince Maximilian of Wied, vol. 3, September 1833–August 1834, reviewed, 63
North Texas State University, 155
Norwegian-American Studies, vol. 36, reviewed, 396–98
Nunnally, Patrick, book review by, 194–95
Nussel, Jill, book reviews by, 188–89, 306–8
Oakland, CA, 239–40, 242
Oden, Derek, book review by, 386–87
The Ojibwe Journals of Edmund F. Ely, 1833–1849, reviewed, 282–83
Oklahoma A & M University, 122–31, 137–40, 148, 150–51, 154, 156–57
Older Women’s League, 272
Olsen, Ralph Ainslee, 39, 40, 53, 55; photos of, 41, 56
Olson, Greg, book by, reviewed, 402–3
open shop, 324, 335, 343
oralism, 110–12
Orange High School, Waterloo, 373
Orvell, Miles, book by, reviewed, 184–86
Ossian, Lisa L., book by, reviewed, 182–84
Øverland, Orm, book edited by, reviewed, 283–84
Owen, Ferris, 39; photo of, 41
Pagnamenta, Peter, book by, reviewed, 179–80
Paradise, L. A., photo of, 346
Pearson, Kathy, 360–61
Pearson, Terri, 360–61, 367–68
Penn State University, 12
Perkins Institution for the Blind, 97–101, 103
Peterson, Henry, 228
Peterson, Jim, 150
Philmon, Hank, 146
phrenology, 1–2
Picturing Illinois: Twentieth-Century Postcard Art from Chicago to Cairo, reviewed, 301–2
Pike, Herbert W., 31, 39, 41–42, 53, 56–57, 61; photos of, 41, 56, 57
Plain, Nancy, book by, reviewed, 294–95
Plambeck, Herbert, 43, 59
Poles in Wisconsin, reviewed, 181–82
police brutality, 368
“The Politics of Youth: Civil Rights Reform in the Waterloo Public Schools,” 353–85
Port Huron Statement, 360–61
Porter, Jimmie, 364, 366–67; photo of, 367
Porter, “Lou,” photo of, 367
Potter, James E., book by, reviewed, 290–92
Potts, Harold, 146
poverty, feminization of, 241, 258
Poverty, War on, 240, 252, 256
Prairie Fever: British Aristocrats in the American West, 1830–1890, reviewed, 179–80
Preer, Jean, book review by, 76–78
Prosperity Far Distant: The Journal of an American Farmer, 1933–1934, reviewed, 302–4
psychology, 1–30
Public Instruction, Iowa Department of, 374, 375
A Punishment on the Nation: An Iowa Soldier Endures the Civil War, reviewed, 288–90
Rable, George C., book by, reviewed, 66–68
race relations, 122–60, 353–85
racial discrimination, 122–60, 252, 353–85
Rader, Benjamin G., book review by, 403–5
Raffensperger, Leonard, 142
railroad workers, 347, 349
Railroads and the American People, reviewed, 398–400
Ralph (plaintiff in In Re the Matter of Ralph), 224
Randolph, Scott E., book review by, 398–400
Rasmussen, Chris, book review by, 297–99
Rath Packing Co., 212–13, 347, 349
Index

Ray, Robert, 255
Reagan, Ronald, 240, 271
Red State Religion: Faith and Politics in America's Heartland, reviewed, 274–80
Reed, Harry M., 339, 344
Reed, William E., 42; photo of, 41
Remaking the Heartland: Middle America since the 1950s, reviewed, 274–80
Rembis, Michael A., book by, reviewed, 299–301
Renville, Mary Butler, book by, reviewed, 177–78
Representation and Inequality in Late Nineteenth-Century America: The Politics of Apportionment, reviewed, 400–2
Rethinking Shiloh: Myth and Memory, reviewed, 390–93
Riney-Kehlberg, Pamela: book review by, 302–4; review essay by, 161–65
Risjord, Norman K., book by, reviewed, 394–96
Roberts, Brian, book review by, 68–69
Robinson, Harold, 139
Robinson, John, 122, 124, 125; photo by, 123
Roosevelt Elementary School, Waterloo, 374
Ruch, G. M., 13
Ruck, Fred, 140–41
Rushforth, Brett, book by, reviewed, 166–67
Russell, J. Stuart, 39
Sage, James, 379, 384
St. Francis Hospital, Waterloo, 231
Salisbury, Harrison, 51
Sallis, Eddie Wallace, 368
Salvation Army, 201–2, 209, 210, 347
Sandvold, Edward O. See Baugh, Ingeborg Hydle
Sandvold, Irene O. See Baugh, Ingeborg Hydle
Sandvold, Quinn E. See Baugh, Ingeborg Hydle
Santa Claus Industries, 212, 230
Saunders, Howard Calvin, 368
Sawyer, William M., 93
Scarcella, Wendy, 238
Schenck, Theresa M., book edited by, reviewed, 282–83
Scherer, Mark R., book review by, 408–9
Schmidt, Harry, 132
Schmit, Raymond, 201
Schumaker, Kathryn A., article by, 353–85
Sculle, Keith A. See Jakle, John A.
Seashore, Carol, 16
Seed/Harvest: A History of the Archdiocese of Dubuque, reviewed, 388–89
segregation, racial, 360, 370–85
sewing, 106–7
Shaw, Leslie, 113
Shirky, Sam, 134
Siberia, 33, 49–50
Sibert Laundry, Waterloo, 339
Siddali, Silvana R., book review by, 173–74
sign language, 111
Simmons, Oze, 131, 145
Simon, Theodore, 6, 12
Simonsen, Jane, book review by, 301–2
Simpson, James, 110
Simpson, Pamela H., book by, reviewed, 297–99
Sioux City, Iowa, 31
Skeels, Howard, 16
Skodak, Marie, 16
Slind, Marvin G., book review by, 75–76
Small Business Employers, Iowa, 270
Smith, George, 150
Smith, Joy. See Hoey, Kate
Smith, Timothy B., book by, reviewed, 390–93
Smith, Victoria, book review by, 402–3
Smith, Willbanks, 122–31, 148–49, 151–52; photo of, 123
Social Security, 248–49, 272
Social Services, Iowa Department of, 244, 271
Soldiers’ Orphans’ Home, Iowa, 17–20, 24; photo of, 18
Solem, Ossie, 131
Somerville, Lee, book by, reviewed, 188–89
Sommers, Letitia "Tish," 239
Soth, Lauren, 33, 36, 37, 39, 40, 43, 48, 50, 58; photos of, 41, 49
South Dakota School for Deaf Mutes, 109, 115, 121
South Dakota School for the Blind, 117–19, 121
Soviet Union, 31–62
Stalin, Josef, 31
Standing Firmly by the Flag: Nebraska Territory and the Civil War, 1861–1867, reviewed, 290–92
Stanford-Binet test, 23, 24
Stare decisis, 229
Stark, Jack, book by, reviewed, 173–74
Start on Success program, 269–70
Stauffer, John, and Zoe Trodd, book edited by, reviewed, 286–88
Stearns, Robert, 137
Steddom, John Marion, 39, 41, 54, 60–61; photos of, 41, 49
steelworkers' strike of 1919, 321, 324
Steigh, Leslie, article by, 321–52
Stephens, Abby, book review by, 189–90
sterilization, 15
Stern, Wilhelm, 6–7
Stock, Catherine McNicol, book review by, 182–84
Stoddard, George, 3–6, 12–23, 26–30; photo of, 5
strikes and lockouts, 321–52
student protest, 353–70
Students for a Democratic Society, 360
Stufflebeam, T. N., 322, 348–49
Sullivan, Anne, 99–100, 103, 105
Summers, Mark Wahlgren, book review by, 400–2
Supreme Court: California, 232; Iowa, 203, 215, 220–31, 236, 359; North Carolina, 218–19; Pennsylvania, 233–34
Swagerty, William R., book by, reviewed, 167–69
Swift, Earl, book by, reviewed, 192–94
Switzer, Robert L., book by, reviewed, 161–65
Taylor, Richard S., book review by, 64–66
teamsters, 340
Terman, Lewis, 1–3, 7–12, 20–26; photo of, 3
Texas Christian University, 156
Thackrey, Russell L., 39
Thiessen, Thomas D., book reviews by, 63, 167–69
"This affair is about something bigger than John Bright’: Iowans Confront the Jim Crow South, 1946–1951," 122–60
This Wicked Rebellion: Wisconsin Civil War Soldiers Write Home, reviewed, 393–94
Thomas, Sydney, 366
Thompson, R. C., 347
A Thrilling Narrative of Indian Captivity: Dispatches from the Dakota War, reviewed, 177–78
Time’s Shadow: Remembering a Family Farm in Kansas, reviewed, 161–65
Trans-Mississippi and International Exposition, Omaha, 113
Trans-Mississippi Educational Convention, Omaha, 113
Tredwell, Ada, 362
The Tribunal: Responses to John Brown and the Harpers Ferry Raid, reviewed, 286–88
Trice, Jack, 131–33; photo of, 133
Triumph and Tragedy: The Story of the 35th Iowa Volunteer Regiment in the Civil War, reviewed, 176–77
Troad, Zoe. See Stauffer, John
Turn Here, Sweet Corn: Organic Farming Works, reviewed, 78–79
Turner, Lloyd, 371
Tuthill, Judy, 257–58
Twedt, Jerry L., book by, reviewed, 75–76
Typographical Union, 349
Ukraine, 44–47
Ultang, Don, 122, 124, 125; photo by, 123
unions, labor, 321–52
University of Chicago, 213–14
University of Colorado, 135, 136, 137, 156
University of Illinois, 27–29
University of Iowa, 13–14, 16, 30, 127, 128, 129, 140–46, 155, 156, 159, 248, 365–66
University of Kansas, 134, 136, 157
University of Miami, 140–42
University of Minnesota, 131, 142
University of Missouri, 132–34, 136, 137, 139, 146, 156–57
University of Nebraska, 134, 136, 156
University of Nebraska. See Iowa State Normal School; Iowa State Teachers College
University of Oklahoma, 134, 136, 137, 156–57
University of Texas, 158
University of Tulsa, 138, 150
University of Wichita, 138
Updegraff, Ruth, 16
U.S.S.R., 31–62
Uzbekistan, 49
Van Cleve, Stewart, book by, reviewed, 407–8
VanderVelde, Lea, book by, reviewed, 175–76
Vaught, David, book by, reviewed, 403–5
Vee, Susan A., 272
Veterans Hospital, Iowa City, 211
Vintage Wisconsin Gardens: A History of Home Gardening, reviewed, 188–89
Vinton, Iowa, 93–97, 100–108
Vizenor, Gerald, and Jill Doerfler, book by, reviewed, 408–9
Voz articulation, 110–12
Volpe, Vernon L., book review by, 169–71
Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA), 244, 258
Voodoo Priests, Noble Savages, and Ozark Gypsies: The Life of Mary Alicia Owen, reviewed, 402–3
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 355
Wade, William, 106, 115, 116, 118, 119; photo of, 118
Walch, Timothy, book review by, 284–86
Walters, George W., 117
War Labor Board, National, 324
War on Poverty, 240, 252, 256
Warburg, Philip, book by, reviewed, 79–80
Warren, Audry, 267
Waterloo Club, 323
Waterloo Council of PTAs, 383
Waterloo Courier, 37
Waterloo Education Association, 375–76, 383
Waterloo Industrial Association, 323, 347
Waterloo Manufacturers’ Association, 323, 327, 328, 331–34, 338, 339, 340, 343, 345, 346, 347
Waterloo Steam Laundry, 332, 339
Waterloo Women’s Civic Club, 376
Waterloo, Iowa, 102, 208–13, 321–85
Weems, Anna Mae, 368
welfare, 258
welfare rights movement, 266
Wellman, Beth, 16, 24
West High School, Waterloo, 353, 360, 373, 377
West Junior High School, Waterloo, 377–78
What the River Carries: Encounters with the Mississippi, Missouri, and Platte, reviewed, 194–95
Wheeler, Kenneth H., book by, reviewed, 64–66
White, Frederick G., 202–3, 207–8, 212–15, 224–27, 228–30, 231; photo of, 214
The White Earth Nation: Ratification of a Native Democratic Constitution, reviewed, 408–9
Whittaker, William, book review by, 171–72
Whitworth, J. B., 123, 150–51
Wiegand, Wayne A., book by, reviewed, 76–78
The Wild West in England, reviewed, 295–97
William Galloway Co., 322, 326, 334
Wiltse, Charles M., book by, reviewed, 302–4
Witry, Lou B., 346; photo of, 346
Witte, Stephen S., and Marsha V. Gallagher, book edited by, reviewed, 63
Women, 238–73
Women, Iowa Commission on the Status of, 246
Women’s rights, 201–37, 246–50, 259–61, 266
Wood, W. Raymond. See Callaway, Graham A.
Woodhull, Victoria, 242
Wooster, Robert, book review by, 70–71

World War II, 206–7, 212, 247, 263
Wundt, Wilhelm, 13
Wuthnow, Robert, books by, reviewed, 274–80
Wynn, Francis, 115

Young, Ralph, 36–37
Youth, 353–85

Zabelle Derounian-Stodola, Kathryn. See Zeman, Carrie Rever
Zebulon Pike, Thomas Jefferson, and the Opening of the American West, reviewed, 169–71
Zeman, Carrie Rever, and Kathryn Zabelle Derounian-Stodola, book edited by, reviewed, 177–78
Zimm, John, book edited by, reviewed, 393–94
Contributors

KATHRYN SCHUMAKER is a lecturer in the Institute for the American Constitutional Heritage at the University of Oklahoma, where she teaches American constitutional and civil rights history. She received her Ph.D. in history from the University of Chicago in 2013. Her research interests include legal, urban, and African American history.

LESLIE J. STEGH earned degrees from Kent State University and Ohio State University. Along with some teaching in Columbus and at Kent State and Augustana College, he spent most of his working life in the archives at Kent State and Deere & Company. He has contributed articles to the Biographical Dictionary of the Union, Ohio History, Illinois Historical Journal, and Antique Automobile. A John Deere pensioner, he retired as manager, Global Corporate Records Management.
The State Historical Society of Iowa

The Annals of Iowa is published quarterly by the State Historical Society of Iowa, the Historical Division of the Department of Cultural Affairs of the State of Iowa. The society operates from two centers, Des Moines and Iowa City. A museum, research library, state archives, special collections, community programming, historic preservation, and membership programs are located at 600 East Locust Street, Des Moines, IA 50319, phone 515-281-5111. Publications, a research library, and special collections are located at 402 Iowa Avenue, Iowa City, IA 52240, phone 319-335-3916. The society also operates several historic sites across the state.

Subscriptions

Subscriptions to The Annals of Iowa are $24.95 per year; single copies are $7. Contact Publications, State Historical Society of Iowa, 402 Iowa Avenue, Iowa City, Iowa 52240.

The Annals is available on microfilm from Xerox University Microfilms, 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106.

Submissions

The Annals of Iowa invites the submission of articles on Iowa history and on subjects concerning the nation and the Midwest with an Iowa focus. State, local, and regional studies of political, economic, social, cultural, intellectual, institutional, ethnic, religious, material culture, archeological, and architectural history are welcome. The Annals also reviews significant books on related topics. A detailed set of editorial guidelines is available on request. All correspondence concerning editorial matters should be addressed to:

Marvin Bergman, editor
The Annals of Iowa
State Historical Society of Iowa
402 Iowa Avenue
Iowa City IA 52240

The Annals of Iowa is a participating member of the Conference of Historical Journals.

Printed on Recycled Paper

The acid-free paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Services—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z739.48B1984.