DOROTHY A. ABBAS, Complainant,
and
IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION
vs.
CITY OF HAMPTON, Respondent.
Conclusions of Law
Retaliatory Harassment:
43. To establish a valid claim of harassment on the basis of having filed a discrimination complaint, the Complainant must prove:
1) She is a member of a protected class, [i.e. she filed a complaint].
2) She was subjected to harassment, i.e. adverse conduct regarded by her as unwelcome and reasonably considered to be undesirable or offensive.
3) The harassment was based upon her protected class status, [i.e. on the filing of the complaint].
4) The harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment, [e.g. her working environment];
5) The employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt and appropriate remedial action.
See Vaughn v. Ag Processing, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 627, 632 (Iowa 1990)(requirements for religious harassment case); Lynch v. City of Des Moines, 454 N.W.2d 827, 833, 834 (Iowa 1990)(sexual harassment); Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local Union No. 238 v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 394 N.W.2d 375, 378 (Iowa 1986)(racial harassment); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (11th Cir. 1982).
Participation In Harassment By Corporate Officer:
44. The fifth element need not be proven "where a proprietor, partner or corporate officer participates personally in the harassing behavior." Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1983). Corporate officers include not only "[t]hose persons who fill the offices which are provided for in the charter such as president, treasurer etc., [but also] in a broader sense the term includes vice presidents, general manager, and other officials of the corporation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 307 (5th ed. 1979). In light of his position and authority, it is clear that Ken Herwig was an officer of Respondent City of Hampton who participated personally in the harassment. See Finding of Fact No. 7. Also, Respondent City of Hampton agreed to not contest liability for the actions of Mr. Herwig. See Finding of Fact No. 3.
Proper Order and Allocation of Proof:
45. "It is questionable whether the traditional burden-shifting analysis is appropriate or necessary in hostile work environment cases where the alleged discrimination does not involve deprivation of a tangible job benefit." Lynch v. City of Des Moines, 454 N.W.2d 827, 834 n.6 (Iowa 1990)(citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d at 905 n.11 and Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d at 255-56). This is so because the burden shifting analysis, utilized in disparate treatment cases relying primarily on circumstantial evidence as the means of proof, "serves to 'progressively sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination,' . . . in . . . case[s] where prohibited criteria and legitimate job related criteria often blend in the employment decision." Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d at 905 n.11. In a case involving repeated threats to sue the complainant because of what she said in her complaint and the express reduction of her hours due to "the civil rights mess" the question of intentional discrimination is not at all elusive. Cf. Id. (sexual harassment creating offensive environment does not present elusive factual question of intentional discrimination).
Term, Condition or Privilege of Employment:
46. The requirement that a term, condition or privilege of employment be affected by the harassment does not require that the harassment result in "the loss of a tangible job benefit." Lynch v. City of Des Moines, 454 N.W.2d 827, 834 (Iowa 1990). "Where [retaliatory] harassment in the workplace is so pervasive and severe that it creates a hostile or abusive work environment, so that the [complainant] must endure an unreasonably offensive environment or quit working, the [retaliatory] harassment affects a condition of employment." See Id.
Existence of A Hostile Working Environment:
47. The determination that a hostile or abusive working environment existed at Respondent was based on application of the following principles:
The existence of hostile or abusive working environment must be established by the totality of the circumstances. . . . Whether . . . use of [retaliatory threats and acts] is continuous, severe and pervasive enough to rise to a violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act is a question of fact.
. . .
[T]he determination of whether defendant's conduct is sufficiently severe and pervasive to constitute [retaliatory] harassment does not turn solely on the number of incidents alleged by plaintiff. . . . The totality of the circumstances requires the factfinder to examine the severity, as well as the number, of the incidents of harassment. . . . In some situations the severity of the offensive conduct may lessen the need for sustained exposure. . . . "The prima facie showing in a hostile environment case is likely to consist of evidence of many or very few acts or statements by the defendant which, taken together, constitute harassment."
Vaughn v. Ag Processing, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 627, 633-34 (Iowa 1990)(citations omitted). See Finding of Fact No. 49.
Credibility and Testimony:
48. In addition to the factors mentioned in the section entitled "Course of Proceedings" and in the findings on credibility in the Findings of Fact, the Administrative Law Judge has been guided by the following principles: First, "[w]hen the trier of fact . . . finds that any witness has willfully testified falsely to any material matter, it should take that fact into consideration in determining what credit, if any, is to be given to the rest of his testimony." Arthur Elevator Company v. Grove, 236 N.W.2d 383, 388 (Iowa 1975). "[I]n the determination of litigated facts, the testimony of one who has been found unreliable as to one issue may properly be accorded little weight as to the next." NLRB. v. Pittsburgh Steamship Company, 337 U.S. 656, 659 (1949) (rejecting proposition that consistently crediting witnesses of one party and discrediting those of the other indicates bias). Second, "[t]he trier of facts may not totally disregard evidence but it has the duty to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses. Stated otherwise, the trier of facts . . . is not bound to accept testimony as true because it is not contradicted. In Re Boyd, 200 N.W.2d 845, 851-52 (Iowa 1972).
49. Furthermore, the ultimate determination of the finder of fact "is not dependent on the number of witnesses. The weight of the testimony is the important factor." Wiese v. Hoffman, 249 Iowa 416, 424, 86 N.W.2d 861, 867 (1957). In determining the credibility of a witness and what weight is to be given to testimony, the factfinder may consider the witness' "conduct and demeanor. . . [including] the frankness, or lack thereof, and the general demeanor of witnesses," In Re Moffatt, 279 N.W.2d 15, 17-18 (Iowa 1979); Wiese v. Hoffman, 249 Iowa 416, 424, 86 N.W.2d 861, 867 (1957), as well as "the plausibility of the evidence. The [factfinder] may use its good judgment as to the details of the occurrence . . . and all proper and reasonable deductions to be drawn from the evidence." Wiese v. Hoffman, 249 Iowa 416, 424-25, 86 N.W.2d 861 (1957).
50.
Evidence on an issue of fact is not necessarily in equilibrium because the witnesses who testify to the existence of the fact are directly contradicted by the same number of witnesses, even though there is but a single witness on each side and their testimony is in direct conflict.
. . .
Numerical preponderance of the witnesses does not necessarily constitute a preponderance of the evidence so as to require a contested question of fact to be decided in accordance therewith. . . . [T]he intelligence, fairness, and means of observation of the witnesses, and various other recognized factors in determining the weight of the evidence . . . should be taken into consideration. . . . It is, of course, well recognized that the preponderance of the evidence does not depend upon the number of witnesses.
Id., 249 Iowa at 425, 86 N.W.2d 861.
Remedies:
51. Violation of Iowa Code section 601A.11 having been established the Commission has the duty to carry out other necessary remedial action. Iowa Code § 601A.15(8) (1989). In formulating these measures, the Commission does not merely provide a remedy for this specific dispute, but corrects broader patterns of behavior which constitute the practice of discrimination. Iron Workers Local No. 67 v. Hart, 191 N.W.2d 758, 770 (Iowa 1971). "An appropriate remedial order should close off 'untraveled roads' to the illicit end and not 'only the worn one.'" Id. at 771.
Reinstatement and Compensation:
52. The Commission has the authority to require "reinstatement or upgrading of employees with . . . pay." Iowa Code S 601A.15(8)(a)(1) (1991). In making such awards, interim earnings and unemployment compensation received during the backpay period are to be deducted. Id.
The Complainant bears the burden of proof in establishing his or her damages. Diane Humburd, 10 Iowa Civil Rights Commission Case Rpts. 1, 9 (1989)(citing Poulsen v. Russell, 300 N.W.2d 289, 295 (Iowa 1981)). See Children's Home v. Cedar Rapids Civil Rights Commission, 464 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). The Complainant may meet that burden of proof by establishing the gross backpay due for the period for which backpay is sought. Diane Humburd at 10 (citing e.g. EEOC v. Kallir, Phillips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919, 924 (S.D. N.Y. 1976), aff'd mem., 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977)). This the Complainant has done. See Findings of Fact Nos. 94. Backpay may include compensation for health and disability insurance. R. Belton, Remedies in Employment Discrimination Law 338-40 (1992); Schlei & Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law: Five Year Cumulative Supplement 536 (2nd ed. 1989). Even if a complainant does not obtain other insurance to replace that paid for by her employer, she is entitled to the amount of premiums paid by her employer. R. Belton, Remedies in Employment Discrimination Law 338-40 (1992).
53. The burden of proof for establishing the interim earnings, including unemployment insurance payments, of the Complainant rests with the Respondent. Diane Humburd at 10 (citing Stauter v. Walnut Grove Products, 188 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Iowa 1973); EEOC v. Kallir, Phillips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. at 924)). The Respondent also bears the burden of proof for establishing any failure of the Complainant to mitigate damages. Children's Home of Cedar Rapids v. Cedar Rapids Civil Rights Commission, 464 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). The Complainant may, as Complainant Abbas has done here, choose to provide evidence of interim earnings she is willing to concede. Diane Humburd at 10. See Finding of Fact No. 94.
54. The award of backpay in employment discrimination cases serves two purposes. First, "the reasonably certain prospect of a backpay award . . . provide[s] the spur or catalyst which causes employers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate [employment discrimination]." Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-19, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2371-72, 45 L. Ed. 2d 280 (1975). Second, backpay serves to "make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination." Id. 422 U.S. at 419, 95 S.Ct. at 2372. Both of these purposes would be served by an award of backpay in the present case.
55. "Iowa Code section 601A.15(8) gives the Commissionconsiderable discretion in fashioning an appropriate remedy that will accomplish the purposes of chapter 601A." Hy Vee Food Stores, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 453 N.W.2d 512, 531 (Iowa 1990). The Iowa Supreme Court has approved two basic principles to be followed in computing awards in discrimination cases: "First, an unrealistic exactitude is not required. Second, uncertainties in determining what an employee would have earned before the discrimination should be resolved against the employer." Id. at 530-531. "It suffices for the [agency] to determine the amount of back wages as a matter of just and reasonable inferences. Difficulty of ascertainment is no longer confused with right of recovery." Id. at 531 (Quoting with approval Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235, 242 (5th Cir. 1973)).
Damages for Emotional Distress:
56. In accordance with the statutory authority to award actual damages, the Iowa Civil Rights Commission has the power to award damages as compensation for emotional distress sustained as a result of discrimination. Chauffeurs Local Union 238 v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 394 N.W.2d 375, 383 (Iowa 1986)(interpreting Iowa Code § 601A.15(8)). The following principles were applied in determining whether an award of damages for emotional distress should be made and the amount of such award.
Proof of Emotional Distress:
57. "[A] civil rights complainant may recover compensable damages for emotional distress without a showing of physical injury, severe distress, or outrageous conduct." Hy Vee Food Stores, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 453 N.W.2d 512, 526 (Iowa 1990). "Humiliation can be inferred from the circumstances as well as established by the testimony." Seaton v. Sky Realty, 491 F.2d at 636 (quoted with approval in Blessum v. Howard County Board, 245 N.W.2d 836, 845 (Iowa 1980)).
58. Even slight testimony of emotional distress, when combined with evidence of circumstances which would be expected to result in emotional distress, can be sufficient to show the existence of distress. See Dickerson v. Young, 332 N.W.2d 93, 98-99 (Iowa 1983). Testimony of the complainant alone may be sufficient to prove emotional distress damages in discrimination cases. See Crumble v. Blumthal, 549 F.2d 462, 467 (7th Cir. 1977; Smith v. Anchor Building Corp., 536 F.2d 231, 236 (8th Cir. 1976); Phillips v. Butler, 3 Eq. Opp. Hous. Cas. § 15388 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
59. In discrimination cases, an award of damages for emotional distress can be made in the absence of "evidence of economic or financial loss, or medical evidence of mental or emotional impairment." Seaton v. Sky Realty, 491 F.2d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 1974). Nonetheless, such evidence in the record may be considered when assessing the existence or extent of emotional distress. See Fellows v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 236 N.W.2d 671, 676 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988).
Determining the Amount of Damages for Emotional Distress:
60.
Because compensatory damage awards for mental distress are designed to compensate a victim of discrimination for an intangible injury, determining the amount to be awarded for that injury is a difficult task. As one court has suggested, "compensation for damages on account of injuries of this nature is, of course, incapable of yardstick measurement. It is impossible to lay down any definite rule for measuring such damages."
. . .
Computing the dollar amount to be awarded is a function of the finder of fact. Juries and judges have been making such decisions for years without minimums or maximums, based on the facts of the case [and] the evidence presented on the issue of mental distress.
2 Kentucky Commission on Human Rights, Damages for Embarrassment and Humiliation in Discrimination Cases 24-29 (1982)(quoting Randall v. Cowlitz Amusements, 76 P.2d 1017 (Wash. 1938)).
61. The two primary determinants of the amount awarded for damages for emotional distress are the severity of the distress and the duration of the distress. Bean v. Best, 93 N.W.2d 403, 408 (S.D. 1958)(citing Restatement of Torts § 905). "'In determining this, all relevant circumstances are considered, including sex, age, condition of life, and any other fact indicating the susceptibility of the injured person to this type of harm.' And continuing 'The extent and duration of emotional distress produced by the tortious conduct depend upon the sensitiveness of the injured person.'" Id. (quoting Restatement of Torts § 905). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 905 (comment i).
Interest:
Pre-Judgment Interest:
62. The Iowa Civil Rights Act allows an award of actual damages to persons injured by discriminatory practices. Iowa Code § 601A.15(8)(a)(8). Pre-judgment interest is a form of damages. Dobbs, Hornbook on Remedies 164 (1973). It "is allowed to repay the lost value of the use of the money awarded and to prevent persons obligated to pay money to another from profiting through delay in litigation." Landals v. Rolfes Company, 454 N.W.2d 891, 898 (Iowa 1990). Pre- judgment interest is properly awarded on an ascertainable claim. Dobbs, Hornbook on Remedies 166-67 (1973). Because the amount of back pay due Complainants at any given time has been an ascertainable claim since the time their employment ended, pre-judgment interest should be awarded on the back pay. Such interest should run from the date on which back pay would have been paid if there were no discrimination. Hunter v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1425-26 (7th Cir. 1986)(common law rule). The method of computing pre- judgment interest is left to the reasonable discretion of the Commission. Schei & Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law: Five Year Cumulative Supplement 543 (2nd ed. 1989). No pre- judgment interest is awarded on emotional distress damages because these are not ascertainable before a final judgment. See Dobbs, Hornbook on Remedies 165 (1973).
Post-Judgment Interest:
63. Post-judgment interest is usually awarded upon almost all money judgments, including judgments for emotional distress damages. Dobbs, Hornbook on Remedies 164 (1973).