BEFORE THE IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION
DARRELL HARVEY, Complainant, and IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION,
vs.
SANDY CALDWELL, Respondent.
RULING ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT:
1. At the close of the Commission's and Complainant's evidence, the Respondent made a motion for directed verdict based on the proposition that the Complainant and the Commission had not presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. (Tr. at 164). The Commission resisted the motion. (Tr. at 165). As indicated during the hearing, the practice of the Administrative Law Judge is to rule on such motions in the proposed decision. (Tr. at 164-65). The motion is overruled for both procedural and substantive reasons.
Procedural Reasons:
2. First, motions for directed verdict challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to generate a jury question. In re Will of Pritchard, 443 N.W.2d 95, 97 (Iowa App. 1989). The motion contemplates a proceeding, such as a jury trial, where the functions of lawgiver and factfinder are separated. See Id. This is not the case in contested case proceedings where the administrative law judge serves as both factfinder and lawgiver.
3. Second, the motion contemplates a final resolution of the case through the entry of judgment in accordance with the directed verdict. See id. (quoting Iowa R. Civ. P. 243(b)). If granted at the close of the plaintiff's case, it would avoid the necessity for the defense put on its case. Although any district court judgment is final upon entry, Vennerberg Farms, Inc. v. IGF Insurance, 405 N.W.2d 810, 814 (Iowa 1987), this principle has no application to a decision by an administrative law judge. See id. at 813-14. In a contested case proceeding before the Iowa Civil Rights Commission, or any other administrative agency, the administrative law judge has the authority, after a full hearing, to issue only a proposed decision. Iowa Code S 17A.15(2) (1993); 161 Iowa Admin. Code S 4.6(1). See Vennerberg Farms, Inc. v. IGF Insurance, 405 N.W.2d 810, 813 (Iowa 1987).
4. The most a moveant for directed verdict in an administrative contested case could expect, therefore, is a proposed directed verdict, which would not yield the final resolution and avoidance of the necessity for the defense to present its case which is contemplated by the motion. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that a motion for directed verdict is inappropriate in a contested case hearing and should be overruled.
Substantive Reasons:
5. Assuming for the sake of argument that such motions are appropriate in the administrative context, the question which must be addressed is whether the Complainant and the Commission presented evidence which, when viewed in the light most favorable to them, generates a genuine issue of material fact on the question of discrimination. See In re Will of Pritchard, 443 N.W.2d 95, 97 (Iowa App. 1989). In determining this question, the adjudicator:
views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was made regardless of whether such evidence is contradicted and every legitimate inference which may be reasonably deduced therefrom must be carried to the aid of the evidence and if reasonable minds can differ on the issue, it is for the [factfinder, i.e. the motion should be denied].
Id.
6. Under these standards, there is no doubt that the Complainant and the Commission presented sufficient evidence, which, if viewed in a light most favorable to them, regardless of contradiction, while allowing every legitimate inference which could be drawn in their favor, would permit reasonable minds to differ on the issue of discrimination. Therefore the motion for directed verdict is overruled.