SANDRA J. WHALEY, Complainant,
and
IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION,
vs.
CITY OF DES MOINES, Respondent.
SUMMARY*
This matter came before the Iowa Civil Rights Commission on
the Complaint, alleging discrimination in employment on the basis
of sex, filed by Sandra Whaley against the Respondent City of
Des Moines.
Complainant Whaley alleges that the Respondent failed to hire her for the position of Recreation Supervisor because of her sex.
A public hearing on this complaint was held on January 11-12, 1994 before the Honorable Donald W. Bohlken, Administrative Law Judge, at the offices of the Iowa Civil Rights Commission in Des Moines, Iowa. The Respondent was represented by Nelda Barrow Mickle, City Solicitor. The Iowa Civil Rights Commission was represented by Rick Autry, Assistant Attorney General. The Complainant, Sandra Whaley, was not represented by counsel.
The Respondent's Brief was received on April 21, 1994. The Commission's Brief was received on April 19, 1994.
Complainant Whaley and the Commission proved her allegations
of discrimination in employment because of her sex through direct
and circumstantial evidence of such discrimination. This evidence
was considered and rulings made under three different orders and
allocations of proof. Although discrimination need be established
under only one of these methods of proof, discrimination was established
by all three methods.
The first (direct evidence) was based on (a) the presence of
sufficient credible direct evidence in the record to establish
sex discrimination and (b) the failure of Respondent to actually
plead any affirmative defense responsive to such direct evidence.
The second (mixed motive) was based on (a) the presence of
sufficient credible direct evidence in the record to establish
that sex discrimination was a factor in the hiring process and
(b) the examination of evidence relating to Respondent's reasons
to ascertain if Respondent had proven by a preponderance of the
evidence that the Complainant would not have been hired even if
the hiring process had been non-discriminatory.
The third (circumstantial evidence) was based on (a) the complainant's
establishment of a prima facie case of sex discrimination, (b)
Respondent's production of evidence setting forth legitimate nondiscriminatory
reasons for its actions, and (c) proof that these reasons were
pretexts for discrimination through (1) the combination of (i)
the falsity of the articulated reasons and (ii) the inference
of discrimination remaining from the prima facie case and (2)
direct evidence that discrimination was the true motive for Respondent's
actions.
Remedies awarded include $18,789.72 in back pay, $5522.75 in
deferred compensation, $10,000 in emotional distress damages,
front pay and front deferred compensation.
* This summary is provided as an aid to understanding the decision. It is not part of the findings of fact and conclusions of law.