BEFORE THE IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION

ALICE J. PEYTON, Complainant, and IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION,

vs.

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF BUCHANAN COUNTY, Respondent.

CP # 01-90-19528

SUMMARY*

This matter came before the Iowa Civil Rights Commission on the Complaint, alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of sex, filed by Alice Peyton against the Respondent Board of Supervisors of Buchanan County.

Complainant Peyton alleges that the Respondent failed to provide her with equal pay because of her sex. Through her complaint, she alleges that she was subjected to different treatment on the basis of her sex as both the male who preceded her in the position of jail administrator, and the male who succeeded her in that position, were paid more than she was.

A public hearing on this complaint was held on March 12-13, 1992 before the Honorable Donald W. Bohlken, Administrative Law Judge, at the Buchanan County Courthouse in Independence, Iowa. The Respondent was represented by Allan W. Vander Hart, Buchanan County Attorney. The Iowa Civil Rights Commission was represented by Teresa Baustian. Assistant Attorney General. The Complainant, Alice Peyton, was not represented by counsel.

The Respondent's Brief and Commission's Brief were received on June 1, 1992.

Respondent raised two procedural and jurisdictional issues: (1) Whether the complaint was timely filed? (2) Whether the Respondent was Complainant Peyton's employer? Both issues are resolved in the affirmative. See Findings of Fact Nos. 2-20. See Conclusions of Law Nos. 2-23.

Complainant Peyton proved her allegation of discrimination in pay because of her sex under the disparate treatment theory.

The Complainant established prima facie cases of discrimination of disparate treatment by establishing that her predecessor and successor, both males, in the position were paid more for doing work which was substantially equal in terms of skill, effort, and responsibility and which was performed under similar working conditions. Proof of these facts with regard to either her predecessor or successor would have been sufficient to establish a prima facie case. See Findings of Fact Nos. 30-35, 36-97. See Conclusions of Law Nos. 31-33.

The employer set forth a number of reasons on brief for the unequal pay. Several of these reasons either (a) were not legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, or (b) were not articulated through the production of evidence which was specific and clear enough for the complainant to address. See Findings of Fact Nos. 100-01, 112-15. See Conclusions of Law Nos. 53-58.

Those legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons which were articulated through the production of evidence were shown to be pretexts for discrimination. See Findings of Fact Nos. 102-08, 116-120. See Conclusions of Law Nos. 59-63. (If the reasons relating to either her predecessor or successor's position were shown to be pretextual, that would have been sufficient to establish the case.) See Conclusion of Law No. 33, 63. Reasons that addressed the elements of the prima facie case were considered in the discussion of the prima facie case. See Findings of Fact Nos. 58-79, 84- 96. See Conclusions of Law Nos. 31-47.

Remedies awarded include $23134.37 in back pay, $2000.00 in damages for emotional distress, and interest. Injunctive relief includes a cease and desist order and the development of written policies to ensure that sex discrimination in pay is corrected.

* This summary is provided as an aid to understanding the decision. It is not part of the findings of fact or conclusions of law.