KATHRINE S. MARTIN, Complainant,
and
IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION,
vs.
NORTHEAST IOWA MENTAL HEALTH CENTER AND J. DES MCIVOR, EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR. Respondents.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Jurisdiction and Procedure:
A. Timeliness and Other Statutory Prerequisites:
1. All the statutory prerequisites for hearing have been met, i.e. timely filing, investigation, finding of probable cause, attempted conciliation, and issuance of Notice of Hearing. Iowa Code S 601A.15 (now 216.15). See Findings of Fact Nos. 1, 3-4..
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction:
2. Subject matter jurisdiction ordinarily means the authority of a tribunal to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong. Tombergs v. City of Eldridge, 433 N.W.2d 731, 733 (Iowa 1988). Ms. Martin's complaint is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Commission as the allegation that the Respondents discharged her because of her perceived disability falls within the statutory prohibition against unfair employment practices which the Commission has the power to hear and determine. Iowa Code SS 601A.6, .15 (now SS 216.6, .15). See Conclusions of Law Nos. 5-12.
II. Stipulations:
3. There are stipulations of fact in this case. A "stipulation" is a "voluntary agreement between opposing counsel concerning disposition of some relevant point so as to obviate [the] need for proof." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1269 (5th ed. 1979). Stipulations as to fact are binding on a court, commission or other adjudicative body when, as in this case, there is an absence of proof that the stipulation was the result of fraud, wrongdoing, misrepresentation or was not in accord with the intent of the parties. In Re Clark's Estate, 131 N.W.2d 138, 142 (Iowa 1970); Burnett v. Poage, 239 Iowa 31, 38, 29 N.W.2d 431 (1948).
III. The Persuasive Value of Opinions From Other Jurisdictions
Should Be Determined In Light of Requirements For Liberal Construction
and Interpretation of the Statute and Rules In Order to Effectuate
Their Purpose:
4. In determining the persuasive effect of legal authorities cited by the parties, the following principles were applied:
a.. Federal court decisions applying Federal anti-discrimination laws are not controlling or governing authority in cases arising under the Iowa Civil Rights Act. E.g. Franklin Manufacturing Co. v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 270 N.W.2d 829, 831 (Iowa 1978). Nonetheless, they are often relied on as persuasive authority in these cases. E.g. Iowa State Fairgrounds Security v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 322 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 1982). Although even decisions of the United States Supreme Court have been rejected as persuasive authority when their reasoning is inconsistent with the broad remedial purposes of the Act, Franklin Manufacturing Co. v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 270 N.W.2d at 831; Quaker Oats Company v. Cedar Rapids Human Rights Commission, 268 N.W.2d 862, 866-67 (Iowa 1978), its opinions are often entitled to great deference. Quaker Oats Company v. Cedar Rapids Human Rights Commission at 866.
b. In determining the persuasive value of any Federal decision, or decision of another state, or other legal authority, it must be borne in mind that the Act is a "manifestation of a massive national drive to right wrongs prevailing in our social and economic structures of our country," Iron Workers Local No. 67 v.Hart, 191 N.W.2d 758, 765 (Iowa 1971).
c. Decisions from other jurisdictions should be rejected as persuasive authority when violative of the controlling authority requiring liberal interpretation and construction of the Iowa Civil Rights Act. When determining the sense and meaning of the written text of a statute providing regulations conducive to public good or welfare, the statute is liberally interpreted. State ex. rel. Turner v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 624, 629 (Iowa 1971). When determining the legal effect of its provisions, the Iowa Civil Rights Act "shall be broadly construed to effectuate its purposes," Iowa Code S 601A.18 (1991), and "liberally construed with a view to promote its objects and assist the parties in obtaining justice." Iowa Code S 4.2. "Logic requires that this principle of construction also be applied to [the Commission's] administrative rules." Foods Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 318 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Iowa 1982). "In construing a statute, the court must look to the object to be accomplished, the evils and mischief sought to be remedied, or the purpose to be subserved, and place on it a reasonable or liberal construction which will best effect its purpose rather than one which will defeat it." Monroe Community School District v. Marion County Board of Education, 251 Iowa 992, 998, 103 N.W.2d 746 (1960); Franklin Manufacturing Co. v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 270 N.W.2d 829, 832 (Iowa 1978). Therefore, constructions of the statute or rules which "effectively defeat the remedial purpose of Chapter 601A [the Iowa Civil Rights Act]" should be rejected. See Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 318 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Iowa 1982).