PATRICIA HARRIS, Complainant,

vs.

ALCOA ALUMINUM CO. OF AMER., DAVENPORT, IOWA and PITTSBURGH, PA., Respondent.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The complaint was timely filed, processed and the issues in the complaint are properly before the Hearing Officer and ultimately before the Commission.

2. Alcoa Aluminum Company of America are "persons" and .employer" as defined in Iowa Code section 601A.2(2) and (5), and are therefore subject to Iowa Code section 601A.6 and do not fall under any of the exceptions of §601A.6(5).

3. The applicable statutory provision is as follows:

1. It shall be an unfair or discriminatory practice for any:

a. Person to ... discharge any employee, or to otherwise discriminate in employment against any... employee because of the ... race ... sex ... of such applicant or employee, unless based upon the nature of the occupation...

4. The United States Supreme Court set out the basic allocation of burden and order of presentation of proof in a case alleging discriminatory treatment in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed. 2d 207, 215 (1981), the Court summarized that burden and order from McDonnell as follows:

First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." Id. at 802, 5 FEP Cases, at 969. Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804, 5 FEP Cases at 907.

This basic allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof was adopted by the Iowa Supreme Court in Linn Cooperative Oil Co. v. Quigley, 305 N.W. 2d 729, 733 (Iowa 1981).

5. The complainant carries the initial burden of offering evidence adequate to create an inference that actions by a respondent were based on a discriminatory criterion which is illegal under the law, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1843 (1977). In evaluating the evidence to determine whether the complainant has succeeded in establishing that inference, which is referred to as a "prima facie" case, the Commission and the Iowa Court have relied on McDonnell Douglas. The criteria established in McDonnell Douglas, however, were specific to a qualified applicant of a protected class who applied for a job and was rejected despite the qualification. Since then the Supreme Court has made it clear that the McDonnell Douglas criteria were to be neither "rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic." Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 98 S.Ct. 2943 (1978). Courts have been flexible in adopting the criteria to other types of cases.

6. In order to establish a prima facie case Complainant must meet the initial burden of proving that she was a member of a protected class, that she was discharged, and also produce evidence of disparate treatment from which may be inferred a causal connection between the basis and the discharge. The record is clear that Patricia Harris was a Black female and therefore a member of protected classes. She was discharged. Was evidence of disparate treatment produced which would infer a causal connection between the discharge and the fact that Harris is Black and a female? There is minimal evidence that a white person or a male was treated differently. As a matter of
fact there was evidence that a white male was treated similarly. One difference between the two situations was that Labath recorded the content of his warning talk with Asleson
(Respondent's Exhibit 11) and there was only a notation that a talk occurred with Harris (page 2, Respondent's Exhibit 5). Different persons, Labath with Asleson and Hillard and Sprung
with Harris, held the warning sessions and recorded the events. Another difference was the length of time Asleson was given for improvement (9-6-84 to 10-29-84) prior to termination whereas
Harris was given only from 10-18-84 to 10-31-84. Whether or not this time element had any effect is not in evidence.

7. The testimony of coworkers that Harris was doing a good job and that she was not given adequate help on the saws plus comparison of 56 "good" and only 6 "fair" ratings, and no "poor" ratings would indicate that she was doing a good job and raise an inference that she was discharged for reasons other than her work performance. The Supreme Court in Burdine held: "The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous." The purpose of the prima facie case is to give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. 450 U.S. at 253, 25 FEP at 115. It is concluded that Harris has established a prima facie case of discrimination.

8. If a complainant succeeds in proving a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the respondent to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the employee's rejection." McDonnell, at 802, 5 FEP at 969. In addition to the data on a similarly situated white male (AsIeson) mentioned in Item 6 above, Respondent submitted documentation and testimony regarding their pattern and practice of hiring/discharging females, males, white/Black persons. However, the role of statistics in a
disparate treatment discharge case is quite limited. In some cases a bad overall company record may help an employee to prevail and a good overall record may help the employer to prevail. B. Schlei & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law, 598 (2d ed. 1983). The Court has cautioned that regardless of how devastating and reliable the statistics may look, the issue remains in these cases whether a particular isolated event was discriminatory. Ward v. Westland Plastics, Inc., 651 F.2d 1266, 1270, 23 FEP 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1980).

9. Sprung, the unit supervisor over Harris for 12 out of the 73 days, testified that Harris was not working in a safe manner and that she helped her but Harris continued to do the job unsatisfactorily. Strefling, another unit supervisor over Harris for been flexible in adopting the criteria to other types of cases. 3 days testified that Harris was satisfactory on two of the days and "fair" on the other day.

It is concluded that Alcoa has provided legitimate business reasons for its action in discharging Harris.

10. The Complainant has the ultimate burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the employer were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.

11. The Hearing Officer is convinced that Patricia Harris was treated unfairly, particularly by Dorothy Sprung. Basically an employer has the right to discharge an employee for good reasons, bad reasons, or no reason at all if there is no intent to discriminate against a protected class in the discharge. The result is a wrong without a remedy. Unless an unfair discharge is connected to a prohibited act it is not illegal. There is not a preponderance of the evidence that Alcoa intentionally discriminated against Patricia Harris on either the basis of race or sex. This case should be dismissed.