IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR JOHNSON COUNTY



METRO PAVERS, INC., Petitioner,

VS.

IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION and FRANK ROBINSON, Respondents.



LA 53445

RULING.

On January 17,1992, the court heard oral arguments on Metro Pavers' petition for judicial review. The court considers counsel's arguments, court file documents, and the record made before the administrative law judge.

Frank Robinson filed a complaint with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission alleging racial discrimination by Metro Pavers during his period of employment with it. A trial was held before an administrative law judge and a decision was reached by the Iowa Civil Rights Commission that Metro Pavers was guilty of discriminatory conduct, and, as a result, Robinson, was constructively discharged from his employment. At the trial before the agency, Robinson testified to the racial slurs and epithets which were part of his working environment while employed by Metro Pavers. One other former employee corroborated his claim. Management personnel from Metro Pavers, as well as several employees (both past and present), testified that there was no such abuse at Metro Pavers' job sites. Statements or incidents about which Robinson testified where Metro Pavers' management personnel or employees were present were categorically denied. Thus, the administrative law judge had to determine credibility of the witnesses in order to reach his decision. He found Robinson's testimony to be credible-and held in his favor. The administrative law judge's decision carefully set out his reasons for crediting the testimony of some witnesses and discrediting testimony of others.

To establish a claim of racial harassment, the Complainant must show: (1) the employee belongs to a protected class; (2) the employee was subjected to unwelcome racial harassment; (3) the harassment was based upon race; (4) the harassment affected a term or condition of employment, and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local Union NO. 238 v Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 394 N.W. 2d 375, 378 (Iowa 1986). Robinson, an Afro American, proved each of these elements, and Metro Pavers acknowledges that, if his testimony is true, the decision of the Civil Rights Commission was appropriate.

The sole issue for review is whether or not the inconsistent testimony of the two parties rises to a level whereby it can be said that there is no substantial evidence to support the agency's decision. When the parties were presenting their arguments to the court on January 17th, 1992, the court commented to Metro Pavers' counsel that his was an uphill battle. This was in light of the court's familiarity with Iowa Supreme Court decisions emphasizing that the district court and appellate court are not permitted to and should not review de novo the record made before the agency. After reading the transcript of the proceedings before the administrative law judge, the court notes that its comment was well taken. Robinson's testimony and his witness, Stastny's, testimony, if believed, clearly provide substantial evidence upon which the agency can find racial discrimination in the work place. Do the inconsistencies in the record require a reversal of the agency decision? The answer is no. Two recent decisions by the Iowa Supreme Court are helpful in analyzing the employer's appeal in this case. The Court has stated:

Administrative law's most fundamental tenet, codified in Iowa Code section 17A.19(8)(1991), is that administrative decisions are to be made by the agencies, not the courts. Although we are frequently called upon to consider appeals from judicial review decisions under Iowa Code section 17A.20, court interference with any agency determination is extremely rare. We have said:

under the administrative law scheme nearly all disputes are won or lost at the agency level. Our review of agency action under Iowa Code section 17A.20 is carefully confined to the correction of errors of law. We apply the standards outlined in Iowa Code section 17A.19(8). The burden rests squarely on the challenger to show that an agency's policy choices were unreasonable; we defer readily to the agency's expertise.

Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. v. Iowa State Commerce
Comm'n, 412 N.W. 2d 600,604 (Iowa 1987).

Court interference with agency action is warranted only under the limited grounds specified in Iowa Code section 17A.19(8) (violating statute or constitution, exceeding agency's statutory authority, violating agency rule, unlawful procedure, error of law, finding facts unsupported by substantial evidence, acting arbitrarily, capriciously, or abusing discretion). Because these statutory grounds mark the parameters of a reviewing court's authority to interfere with agency action, challenges on judicial review are necessarily couched in the words of section 17A.19(8). A survey of our many cases will however disclose that the contentions usually do not amount to a statutory ground. An assertion of a statutory violation is nearly always a disagreement on the merits.

Administrative tribunals were established in order to transfer from the courts to an agency the authority to resolve disputes in an area in which the agency is presumed to have expertise superior to the court's. The "hands off" policy of the courts in reviewing agency determinations recognizes that judicial second-guessing of agency wisdom would destroy the fabric of administrative law and render its operation largely meaningless and therefore an extravagant waste of both public and private funds.

These elementary fundamentals should be borne in mind in cases, such as the present one, where feelings on the merits of administrative controversies are so strong that they tend to blur the line between the merits of a dispute and the legality of an agency decision resolving them.

Leonard v Iowa State Bd. of Educ., 471 N.W. 2d 815 (Iowa 1991).

Just recently, the Court has discussed the importance of allowing the fact finder to make crucial decisions on credibility. It stated:

As is true of judicial review of agency actions in general, this deference "is warranted by the presumably greater expertise an agency has over matters within its purview". Noriand v Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 412 N.W. 2d 904, 908 (Iowa 1987). This posture of deference is especially appropos to the case at hand since the board is uniquely situated to pass on the credibility of the various witnesses at the hearing. See Iowa Code section 279.18 ("especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, the court shall give weight to the fact findings of the board"); Libe v Board of Educ., 350 N.W. 2d 748,750 (Iowa 1984) (board is in best position to adjudge credibility); see also Capitol Sav. & Loan Ass'n v First Financial Sav. of Loan Ass'n, 364 N.W. 2d 267, 271 (Iowa App. 1984) ("[Factual disputes depending heavily on the credibility of witnesses are best resolved by the trial court which has a better opportunity to evaluate credibility...... ); In Re Marriage of Moffatt, 279 N.W. 2d 15, 17-18 (Iowa 1979) (noting that the factors bearing on credibility include frankness and demeanor).

Fairfield Corn. School Dist. v. Justmann, 476 N.W. 2d 335, 338 (Iowa 1991). In a nutshell, the court concludes there is substantial evidence in the record to support the agency decision and that the conflicts in the evidence are typical of the decisions which juries and judges must decide each and every day. The record does not support Metro Pavers' assertion that the administrative lawjudge was biased or his conclusions were not supported by substantial evidence.

The decision of the Iowa Civil Rights Commission is affirmed. Unless an objection to the issue of attorney's fees is filed within 10 days following the filing of this decision, the statement for legal services submitted by Attorney Affeldt is approved and judgment will be entered against Metro Pavers, Inc. and in favor of James Affeldt for said amount ($1,050.33).

Dated this 28th day of January, 1992.


L. Vern Robinson, Judge
6th Judicial District