IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
DAYLIS L. SMITH,
Appellant,
VS.
ADM FEED CORPORATION,
Appellee.
No. 47 / 89-519
Filed May 23,1990
Appeal from the Iowa District
Court for Jasper County, Michael S. Streit, Judge.
Disabled employee contests district court ruling in employer's favor in disability discrimination action.
AFFIRMED.
R. Ronald Pogge of Hopkins
& Huebner, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Diane M. Stahle and Gene R. La Suer of Davis, Hockenberg, Wine, Brown, Koehn & Shors, Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered en banc.
SCHULTZ, J.
Plaintiff Daylis Smith appeals
a judgment in favor of his past employer, ADM Feed Corporation
(ADM), in a disability discrimination claim filed under the Iowa
Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code chapter 601 A (1987). We affirm.
Plaintiff began working
as a truck driver for a feed mill in Baxter, Iowa, in 1969. In
1973 defendant ADM purchased the mill and retained plaintiff as
a truck driver. Plaintiff primarily drove a hopper-bottom grain
truck, one of three trucks then used by ADM in its farm feed business.
He was responsible for driving the truck and for loading and unloading
sacks of grain. This truck's design made it possible for the driver
to load and unload without any heavy lifting or stooping. He was
also occasionally needed to drive one of the other trucks owned
by defendant. In addition, when he was not driving a truck, he
helped out in the feed mill and in the warehouse.
In January 1986 plaintiff
had back surgery to fuse two of his lumbar vertebrae, a procedure
necessitated by an April 1984 work injury which had damaged his
lower back. He was given a final release to return to his employment
at ADM by his doctor in January 1987. In the release the doctor
noted that plaintiff had been driving a truck since his surgery
and stated: "As long as [plaintiff] does work that does not
entail heavy lifting with his back or repetitive bending or stooping,
then he could return to work." Had this letter been interpreted
by ADM as a complete or full medical release, plaintiff would
have had enough seniority to return to his previous position.
Defendant believed, however, that plaintiff did not have a release
to do the type of work he had been doing before
his surgery and notified
him that it would be unable to rehire him.
In January 1988 plaintiff
received an administrative release from the Iowa Civil Rights
Commission (commission), issued pursuant to Iowa Code section
601 A. 16(2), and subsequently filed a petition at law against
ADM. He alleged that defendant refused to reemploy him because
of his disability and refused to reasonably alter the job to accommodate
that disability in violation of Iowa Code section 601A.6(l)(a).
Defendant's motion to strike plaintiff's demand for a jury trial
was sustained.
Following a bench trial,
the court dismissed the action, holding that defendant had established
a legitimate business reason to terminate plaintiff and could
not have reasonably accommodated his disability without incurring
more than a de minimus cost. On appeal plaintiff
contends: (1) He was entitled to a jury trial on his civil rights
claim; (2) if he was not entitled to a jury trial, then the court's
review of this "equity" proceeding should be de novo;
(3) the court should have found that he spent at least eighty
percent of his time driving the hopper-bottom grain truck; (4)
the court should not have considered changes in the work environment
made subsequent to his failure to be rehired; and (5) defendant
could have reasonably accommodated his disability.
I. Right to a jury trial.
Plaintiff urges that we find that there is a right to a jury trial
for causes of action which arise under Iowa Code chapter 601 A.
He claims that the legislature intended to provide a jury trial
for civil rights cases tried in the district court and that to
prohibit a jury trial is a violation of Article 1, section 9 of
the Iowa Constitution.
A. Statutory Right.
The question of whether there is a right to a jury trial is an
issue of first impression for our court.1
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Iowa, sitting in diversity, has judicially estimated, by looking
at both Iowa case law and relevant federal decisions, that we
would conclude there is no right to a jury trial in chapter 601
A claim. Gray v. Nash Finch Co., 701 F. Supp. 704, 707,
709 (N. D. Iowa 1988). While we provide the ultimate interpretation
of Iowa law, we agree with the district court's conclusion.
Defendant correctly asserts
that the language of chapter 601 A is silent on the issue of whether
there is a right to a jury trial. We believe that the purpose
of the chapter is inconsistent with an intent to provide a jury
trial, however. It is the stated legislative purpose of chapter
601A, however, that "every complaint be at least preliminarily
screened during the first one hundred twenty days." Iowa
Code § 601A.16(6). A district court has no jurisdiction over
a plaintiff in a civil rights action unless he first exhausts
his administrative remedies. See Iowa Code § 601 A.1 6; Northrup
v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 372 N.W.2d 193,197 (Iowa 1985).
The option of seeking relief in the district court following a
screening by the commission was added to relieve the backlog of cases
before the commission. See Note, Implications of the
Right- to-Sue Amendment to Iowa's Civil Rights Law, 65 Iowa
L. Rev. 720, 725-36 (1980). The district court sits as the commission
and is empowered to grant only that relief authorized by section
601A.15. See Iowa Code § 601 A. 16(5).
A claimant has no right
to a jury trial in an administrative proceeding "where jury
trials would be incompatible with the whole concept of administrative
adjudication." Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194,
94 S. Ct. 1005, 1008, 39 L. Ed. 2d 260, 266 (1974) (citing NLRB
v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S. Ct.
615, 81 L. Ed. 893 (1937)). Permitting a jury trial in district
court would substantially interfere with a statutory scheme which
delegates to the court only that limited power held by the commission.
Not only would the procedure change radically, but we believe
that a greater emphasis would be placed on a money recovery over
other available relief. We conclude that if the legislature intended
to provide a different procedure when a case was removed from
an administrative hearing it would have done so.
When faced with the same
question of whether jury trials are permitted under a civil rights
statute with language also creating an option to proceed before
the commission or in district court, the New Jersey Supreme Court
stated:
A jury trial with its attendant delays and the inherent limitations of the scope of jury verdicts could be counterproductive in terms of fulfilling the explicit legislative goal ... that was to reduce the agency backlog congestion and at the same time provide a judicial alternative that would be comparable to the administrative action so that the society's war against discrimination would not slacken.
... It is reasonable to believe that if the Legislature intended to confer the right to a jury trial when ... it authorized a complainant to bring an action in Superior Court, it would have expressly so provided ....
Shaner v. Horizon Bancorp., 116 N.J. 433, 442-43, 561 A.2d
1130,1135 (1989); see also Murphy V. Cortex Corp., 377
Pa. Super. 181, 194, 546 A.2d 1217, 1223 (1988) (no right to jury
trial found in statute where no specific language or legislative
history indicates intent to provide for materially different proceeding
in court than before agency). We therefore conclude that the legislature
did not intend for civil rights claimants to have a statutory
right to a jury trial in district court under chapter 601 A.
This is in contradistinction
to civil damage actions brought pursuant to a violation of our
old civil rights statute, Iowa Code section 5008, which made it
a misdemeanor to deny any person the full and equal enjoyment
of certain public accommodations. These suits were tort actions
for damages caused by the violation of a penal statute and as
such were considered actions at law triable to juries. See
Hall v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 252 N.W.2d 421, 423 (Iowa
1977); Brown v. J.H. Bell Co., 146 Iowa 89, 123 N. 231
(1910); Humburd V. Crawford, 128 Iowa 743, 105 N.W. 330
(1905).
We do not agree with the dissent's observation that the ruling would come as a surprise to the legislature. On the contrary, a different result would be a greater surprise. In enacting section 601A.15(8) the legislature gave the court power to provide a wide variety of relief, most of which is equitable in nature. There is no indication in chapter 601A that a claim for money damages is to be treated as an ordinary civil action. Neither do we agree that inaction on the part of the legislature since the enactment of section 601 A. 16 indicates its tacit approval of jury trials. We have had both jury and equitable appeals since its enactment and suggest that the inaction perhaps indicates nothing more than apathy.
B. Constitutional Right.2 The
plaintiff claims that prohibiting a jury trial in district court
violates article 1, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution. This provision
of our Bill of Rights provides that "[t]he right of trial
by jury shall remain inviolate." However, the right to a
jury trial is not a fundamental right in proceedings created by
statute. State ex rel. Bishop v. Travis, 306 N.W.2d 733,
734 (Iowa 1981). We look to the common law and not to present
statutes to determine when the constitutional right to a jury
applies. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 305 N.W.2d
724, 726-28 (Iowa 1981). The right to a jury trial
that is preserved by the constitution if the right that existed
at common law. Id. at 728. The common law distinguishes
between cases at-law where juries were allowed and cases tried
in equity without a jury. Ld. at 727. We have determined that
there is no right to trial by jury in special proceedings under
our constitution. See e.g., State ex
rel. Rake v. Ohden, 346 N.W.2d 826, 829 (lowa 1984); Bishop,
306 N.W.2d at 736; Greenstreet v. Clark, 239 N.W.2d 143,148
(Iowa 1976). Guided by these principles
we analyze whether claims under section 601 A. 15 trigger the
constitutional right to a jury trial.
We have stated that since
chapter 601A is patterned after Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Equal Employment Opportunities Act), codified at
42 U.S.C. section 2000e et seq., "[i]nterpretations of the
federal act are instructive" in our analysis of the Iowa
law. Annear v. State, 419 N. W. 2d 377, 379, (Iowa 1988);
accord Foods-, Inc. v. Iowa Civil rights Comm'n, 318 N.W.2d
162, 172 (Iowa 1982). Title VII provides for any equitable relief
that the court deems appropriate for victims of intentional, unlawful
employment practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 20OOe5(q). The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that there is neither
a statutory nor constitutional right to a jury trial in Title
VII actions. Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205,
1209 n.3 (8th Cir. 1985) (citing Harmon v. May Broadcasting
Co., 583 F.2d 410, 410 (8th Cir. 1978)), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1058, 106 S. Ct. 1285, 89 L.Ed. 2d 592 (1986). The Supreme
Court has not ruled on this question. Lytle v. Household Mfg.,
Inc., ___ U.S. ___ n. 1 (1990).
Plaintiff alleges that the district court's and our prior reliance on Title VII cases is misplaced. He asserts that a comparison of chapter 601A with Title VIII of the Civil Right Act of 1964 (Fair Housing Act), codified at 42 U.S.C. section 3601 et seq., is more appropriate. The relevant enforcement provision of Title VIII, now codified at section 3613(c) (1988), provides that the court may award "actual and punitive damages" and "any permanent or temporary injunction , temporary restraining order, or other order" it deems appropriate. Section 601 A. 1 5(8)(a)(8) permits:
Payment to the complainant of damage for an injury caused by the discriminatory or unfair practice which damages shall include but are not limited to actual damages, court costs and reasonable attorney fees.
Plaintiff asserts this empowers
the court to fashion relief more similar to that allowed under
Title VIII than Title VII. We disagree.
Plaintiff points to the
language of section 601A.15(8)(a)(8) which permits the award of
actual damages and asserts that the Supreme Court has held that
"actual and punitive damages is the traditional form of relief
offered in the courts of law." See Curtis, 415 U.S.at
196, 94 S. Ct. at 1009, 39 L.Ed. 2d at 267. However, in that Title
VIII claim, the Court noted the difference between Title VIII's
"simple authorization of an action for actual and punitive
damages" and Title VII's equitable remedies. Id. at 197,
94 S. Ct. at 1009-10, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 268. Similar to Title VI
I, section 601 A.1 5(8) contains a long list of available equitable
remedies.
Section 601A.15(8) orders
the commission, following a finding of a discriminatory practice,
to "issue an order requiring the respondent to cease and
desist from [that] practice and to take the necessary remedial
action as in the judgment of the commission will carry out the
purposes of this chapter." Sections 601A.15(8)(a)(l)-(8)
provide a nonexclusive list of what the legislature considers
to be remedial action. These include such equitable remedies as
reinstatement, hiring, and admission to training programs. Section
601A.15(8)(b) provides the commission with the power to issue
cease and desist orders and take affirmative action against respondents
operating with state licenses or performing contracts with the
state or political subdivisions.
The remedies available under
this section are similar to the equitable remedies recognized
by the federal courts in Title VII actions. see, eg.,
Harmon, 583 F.2d at 411; Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d
1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 1975); EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co.,
515 F. 2d 301, 308-09 (6th Cir. 1975); Robinson v. Lorillard
Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th Cir. 1971); Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969);
Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 296 F. Supp. 1232,1239
(N.D. Ga. 1969) rev'd on other grounds, 421 F.2d 888 (5th
Cir. 1970).
Unlike Title VIII, chapter
601A does not permit an administrative agency, or the district
court under section 601A.16(5), to award punitive damages. Chauffeurs,
Teamsters and Helpers, Local Union No. 238 v. Iowa Civil
Rights Comm'n, 394
N.W.2d 375, 384 (Iowa 1986). In Chauffeurs, we noted the
general rule that an agency cannot award punitive damages absent
express statutory language and concluded that the language "but
not limited to actual damages" in section 601 A. 1 5(8)(a)(8)
does not necessarily imply that punitive damages are available.
Id. (citing High v. Sperry Corp., 581 F. Supp. 1246, 1247
(S.D. Iowa 1984)); accord EEOC, 515 F.2d at 308-09.
The Court in Curtis
also noted that the decision to award certain equitable relief
in Title VII cases is committed to the discretion of the trial
judge and is in contrast to a plaintiff's entitlement to actual
damages should he prove unlawful discrimination in a Title VIII
action. Id. at 197, 94 S. Ct. at 1009- 10, 39 L. Ed. 2d
at 268. We have viewed the award of actual damages, such as those
for emotional distress, as being consistent with the commission's
discretion in fashioning an appropriate remedy under section 601
A. 15(8). See Chauffeurs, 394 N.W.2d at 383; Foods, 318
N.W.2d at 171; accord Gray, 701 F. Supp. at 708.
Thus the plaintiff's claim for damages in this case, made pursuant
to section 601 A. 15(8), is discretionary and not a matter of
right.
Relying heavily upon Curtis,
plaintiff urges that the relief requested plus the remedy of damages
provided by the legislature require that he be allowed a jury
trial. It is true that the Supreme Court's decision in Curtis
concentrated on the relief sought. We believe that it is appropriate
to look at the essential nature of the cause of action, however,
rather than solely at the remedy, to determine the right to a
jury under our constitution.
In analyzing the constitutional right to a jury in light of similar statutory provisions, the New Jersey court stated:
We consider the nature of the underlying controversy as well as the remedial relief sought in determining whether the cause of action has been historically primarily equitable or legal in nature.
Shaner, 116 N.J. at 450-51, 561 A.2d at
1139. In Greenstreet, 239 N.W.2d at 147-48, we determined
that a jury was not constitutionally required in a paternity proceeding
under Iowa Code Chapter 252A (Uniform support of Dependents Law),
because it was a special proceeding with equitable issues. We
looked to the nature of the action as encompassed by the entire
statutory scheme and concluded that the common law afforded no
effective remedy similar to the one provided by statute. Id. at
147; see also Bishop, 306 N.W. at 735-36 (to determine
whether right to jury trial was violated, we examined procedural
and substantive provisions of two sections of Iowa Code addressing
family support obligations); Iowa Nat'l, 305 N.W. at 727-28
(we examined statute to determine whether jury trials were historically
required in small claims actions under common law). Consequently,
we will look to the nature of the claim to determine whether the
civil rights action has distinctive substantive and procedural
standards not present in actions where a jury was required under
the common law.
As noted previously, chapter
601A remedies and procedures provide a wide range of latitude
to the court. As applied to employees, it provides distinctive
procedures and remedies not present in the common law tort of
wrongful discharge or in breach of contract actions. We conclude
that the legislature in enacting this chapter provided a new special
proceeding, equitable in nature, that was unknown at common law.
For this reason we hold that no jury is required under our constitution.
Other jurisdictions have
arrived at the same conclusion. See Smith v. Milliken &
Co., 189 Ga. App. 897, 377 S.E.2d 916, 918 (1989);
Shaner, 116 N.J. at 456-57, 561 A.2d at 1141; South
v. Toledo Edison Co., 32 Ohio App. 3d 24, 513 N.E.2d 800,
803 (1986); Murphy v. Cartex Corp., 377 Pa. Super. at 195,
546 A.2d at 1224; but see Schafke v. Chrysler Corp., 147
Mich. App. 751, 753, 383 N.W.2d 141, 143 (1985). We believe that
the reasoning in those jurisdictions denying the right to a jury
under their state constitutions is sound.
II. Scope of Review.
Plaintiff claims that if his claim was properly tried without
a jury, then it was tried in equity and our review on appeal should
be de novo. This case was not tried in equity; the court ruled
on objections, a practice ordinarily not followed in cases heard
in equity. See Conkling v. Conkling, 185 N.W.2d 777, 782
(Iowa 1971).
We hold that this case was
properly tried as a law action. As we indicated in the previous
division, we believe that an action tried under section 601A.16
is a special proceeding. While much of the relief provided in
section 601A.15(8) is equitable in nature, the legislature did
not label the proceeding as equitable. Consequently, we must look
elsewhere to determine whether the action is ordinary or equitable.
We believe that the legislative
definition of forms of actions in Iowa Code chapter 611 (1987)
provides us that answer. The legislative remedy provided in chapter
601 A for civil rights violations was unknown at common law. Thus,
claims filed pursuant to chapter 601 A do not fall within the
ambit of section 611.4 which allows the prosecution of an equitable
proceeding "where courts of equity, before the adoption of
this Code, had jurisdiction." Iowa Code § 611.4. Rather,
such claims fall within the definition of an ordinary action:
"In all other cases, unless otherwise provided, the plaintiff
must prosecute an action by ordinary proceedings." Iowa Code
§ 611.6.
Additionally, our case law
has also indicated that special proceedings are reviewable at
law rather than de novo. Lawrence v. Thomas, 84 Iowa 362,
363-64, 51 N.W. 11, 11 - 12 (1892); see Santee V. Uhlenhopp,
184 Iowa 1131, 1133, 169 N.W. 321, 321 (1918); Union Bldg.
& Sav. Assoc. v. Soderquist, 115 Iowa 695, 699, 87 N.W.
433, 435 (1901). We also note that the Ohio court in South
conducted a review at law of an age discrimination proceeding
rather than a de novo examination. 513 N.E.2d at 805.
We hold that our review
on appeal is at law. We are therefore bound by the trial court's
findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence.
Iowa R. App. P. 14(f)(1).
III. Findings of Fact.
Plaintiff challenges two findings of fact made by the trial court.
While we address these contentions, we believe that these factual
determinations, even if correct, are immaterial in light of the
court's holding.
Plaintiff first alleges
that the court erred in concluding that only half of his time
was spent driving the hopperbottom truck. Both plaintiff and the
assistant plant manager agreed that plaintiff spent about eighty
percent of his time driving a truck and the remaining twenty percent
working in the mill. Plaintiff also stated that he drove the flat-bottom
truck three or four times a month. This concurs with the manager's
conclusion that plaintiff probably spent sixty percent of his
time driving the hopper-bottom truck and the other forty percent
driving the other truck or working in the mill. While the manager
conceded that these percentages were "guesstimates."
they appear to be reasonable in light of plaintiff's own statements
and those of another other truck driver. This truck driver testified
that when he was performing plaintiff's job, he drove the hopper-bottom
truckabout seventy to seventy-five percent of the time. The record
indicates that plaintiff's job entailed driving the hopper-bottom
truck between sixty and seventy-five percent of the time. There
is therefore substantial evidence to support the trial court's
conclusion that plaintiff spent sixty percent of his time driving
the truck which did not require any heavy lifting to load or unload.
Plaintiff also claims that
the trial court erroneously considered the fact that defendant
stopped using the hopper- bottom truck in its operation six months
after decision was made not to rehire him. While the trial court
did note in its conclusions of law that the work plaintiff could
do would be substantially reduced with the discontinued use of
the hopper- bottom truck, it did not rely upon this fact in its
ultimate conclusion that defendant would incur more than a de
minimus cost if it rehired plaintiff. The court stated:
In this case, to accommodate Smith, ADM would be required to hire another employee to travel with Smith when driving the flat-bottom truck, which could occupy as much as 40% of his time, even if they still operated the hopper-bottom truck. Plaintiff's working in the mill would require substantial change in business operations. At present, employees rotate jobs in the mill to relieve the monotony of the work and reduce the risk of injury. Any accommodation would inpinge on the rights of other employees. Further, if Smith were unable to work in the mill for 20% of his time , the employer may be forced to hire other part-time persons or incur overtime expense. The cost of extra persons would be more than a de minimus cost to the employer. No such accommodation could be made based upon the operations of the facility.
(Emphasis added.)
It is clear that even if
the court had concluded that plaintiff drove tha hopper-bottom
truck eighty percent of his time at work, as he claims, the court
still would have concluded that defendant could not have reasonably
accommodated his disability.
IV. Reasonable accommodation.
Plaintiff claims that the defendant could have reasonably accommodated
his physical disability and retained him as an employee. Plaintiff
has the burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination
by a preponderance of the evidence. See e.g., Frank
v. American Freight Sys., Inc., 398 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Iowa
1987); King v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm's, 334 N.W.2d 598,
601-03 (Iowa 1983); Iowa State Fairgrounds Sec. v. Iowa Civil
Rights Comm'r, 322 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 1982). The court
correctly found that plaintiff has made out a prima facie case
of discrimination based on his disability. Once this has been
established, defendant may rebut the allegation with evidence
of a "legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" for the
challenged actions. Frank, 398 N.W.2d at 800; King,
334 N.W.2d at 601-03; Fairgrounds, 322 N.W.2d at 293.
In disability cases an employer may rebut this evidence under the "nature of the occupation" exception outlined in Iowa Code section 601A.6(l)(a) ("It shall be unfair or discriminatory practice ... to discriminate in employment . . , because of disability . . . unless based upon the nature of the occupation."). See Frank, 398 N.W.2d at 801. In such cases "individualized consideration must be given to . . . [t]he nature and extent of a disability, the needs of a particular job and the impact of disability on a person's ability to perform that job." Id. In light of the evidence in the record regarding the variety of duties which the truck drivers were required to perform in this small business and plaintiff's physical restrictions, the trial court was correct in holding that defendant established its nature of the occupation defense.
Despite defendant's successful rebuttal of plaintiff's case, it
is still required to reasonably accommodate his disability, unless
it would be an undue hardship to do
so. Frank, 398 N.W 2d at 802; Foods, 318 N.W.2d
at 168; 240 Iowa Admin. Code §§ 6.2(6), 6.3 (1987) (now
codified at 161 Iowa Admin. Code §§ 8.27(6)(c), 8.28
(1988)). We believe that there is substantial evidence to support
the trial court's conclusion that no reasonable accommodation
could be made. In a factually similar disability discrimination
case, we held that an " accommodation must be made by an
employer only if it does not substantially impinge on the rights
of other employees or incur more than a de minimus cost to the
employer." Franks, 398 N.W.2d at 803. In Franks,
we
concluded that the employer could not reasonably accommodate a
truck driver with a back injury who might not be able to load
or uunload the trucks at some time in the future. Id.
We noted that his disability would certainly slow the loading
and unloading process and would require the employer to
hire outside employees to do that work.
Id.
The cost to the employer
and the other ADM employees is less attenuated in plaintiff's
case. His doctor has testified that he cannot now do any heavy
lifting, repetitive bending or stooping. Whether plaintiff spent
sixty or seventy-five percent of his time driving the hopper-bottom
truck is irrelevant in light of the fact that his job still required
him to spend at least twenty percent of his time driving the other
trucks or helping out in the mill or warehouse. His disability
would prevent him from performing those tasks, and the burden
of covering for him would fall on the other employees or force
defendant to hire a part-time worker. We agree with the trial
court that this would be more than a de minimus cost to
defendant.
V. Summary. We conclude that the trial court did not err in striking plaintiff's demand for a jury trial and in holding that defendant could not reasonably accommodate defendant's disability at their facility.
AFFIRMED.
CARTER, J. (dissenting).
I dissent.
The majority concludes that
jury trials are not available in chapter 601A civil rights actions
brought in the district court pursuant to a "release to sue."
The arguments which the opinion advances in support of that conclusion
are not persuasive and fly in the face of the general legislative
classification of civil actions and the consequences which attend
that classification. This supposed exercise in statutory interpretation
is really a case of the majority expressing why it would not have
permitted jury trials had it been the legislature.
Actions in the district
court are classified by Iowa Code section 611.2 (1989) as being
of two types: civil and special. That statute provides:
A civil action is a proceeding in a court of justice in which one party, known as the plaintiff, demands against another party, known as the defendant, the enforcement or protection of a private right, or the prevention or redress of a private wrong. It may also be brought for the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture.
Every other proceeding in a civil case is a special action.
Id. The language of Iowa Code section 601 A.1 6(2)
(1989) simply provides:
Upon a request by the complainant, and after the expiration of one hundred twenty days from the timely filing of a complaint with the commission, the commission shall issue to the complainant a release stating that the complainant has a right to commence an action in the district court.
Id. (emphasis added). I submit that the "action
in the district court" which is authorized by the preceding
statute is an ordinary civil action. A plaintiff in such
an action demands relief against another party known as the defendant.
The only statutory classification of ordinary civil actions is
that contained in Iowa Code section 611.3 (1989) which provides
that therer are only two kinds; ordinary (or law
actions) and equitable actions. Under the statutory scheme which
antedated our rules of civil procedure, jury trials were mandated
in all ordinary actions unless waived. See Missildine v. Brightman,
234 Iowa 1339, 1344, 14 N.W.2d 700, 704 (1944); LaForge v.
Cooter, 220 Iowa 1258, 1260, 264 N.W. 26 (1935). The last
statute to so provide was Iowa Code section 11429 (1939), which
provided:
Issues of fact in an ordinary action must be tried by jury unless the same is waived.
(Emphasis added.) This statute
was superseded by Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 177 adopted in
1943. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1 (d) (1943) and Appendix I annexed
thereto. The only change in the former procedure which resulted
from the adoption of rule 177 was that now jury trials are mandated
in all ordinary actions where trial by jury is demanded. Whether
an action is an equitable action or an ordinary action has traditionally
been determined by the relief demanded by the plaintiff. The plaintiff
in the present case seeks only to recover money damages.
Although the practice just described probably received its impetus
from the provisions of article 1, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution
concerning the right of jury trial, the criteria for determining
that right developed by case decisions which paralleled the statutory
law of juries anteclating our rules of civil procedure and continued
with the force and effect of statute under those rules. Consequently,
these criteria have taken on legislative as well as constitutional
significance. A departute therefrom should therefore require some
express legislative directive. No such directive is to be found
in that legislation
which recognizes a right to bring a civil action after obtaining
a release from the civil rights commission.
It should not come as a great surprise to the legislature that
actions seeking traditionally legal relief for civil rights violations
are triable to a jury under established procedures. Jury trials
were available in civil rights actions brought under our earlier
statutory law. See Brown v. The J. H. Bell Co., 146 Iowa
69,123 N.W. 231 (1910); Humburd V. Crawford, 128 Iowa 743,
105 N.W. 330 (1905). Moreover, courts in other jurisdictions have
concluded there is a right to jury trial in civil rights actions
where traditionally legal relief is demanded. See Reiner v.
New Jersey, ___ F. Supp. ___ (D. N.J. 1990)
(seventh amendment right to jury -instate civil rights action
in federal court); Stewart v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc.,
702 F. Supp. 230 (E.D. Mo. 1988) (same); McMillan v. Lincoln
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 678 F. Supp 9 (D. N.J. 1988) (same);
Green v. American Broadcasting Co., 647 F. Supp. 1359 (D
D.C. 1986) (right to jury trial under D.C.
act and seventh amendment); Loomis Elec. Protection, Inc. v.
Schaefer, 549 P.2d 1341 (Ala. 1-9176) (right to jury under
state constitution); Broward County v. La Rosa,
505 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1987) (same); King v. General Motors
Corp., 136 Mich. App. 301, 356 N.W.2d 626 (1984) (same); Murphy
v. American Home Prods. Corp., 136 A.D.2d 229, 527 N.Y.S.
2d 1 (1988) (right to jury under rule declaring and enlarging
state constitutional right); Perilli v. Board of Educ. Monongalia
County, 387 S.E. 2d 315 (W. Va 1989) (right to jury under
state constitution).
The majority seeks to avoid
the path over which our established procedures travel by characterizing
jury trials as "incompatible with the whole concept of administrative
adjudication." In support of this claim, it states that the
district court sits as the administrative agency. This is clearly
not correct. The district court does not sit as a civil
rights commission; it does not screen cases as does the commission;
it does not investigate cases like the commission; nor does a
court hear cases under the commission's rules. When the legislature
sought to provide a partial answer to the backlog of undisposed
claims before the civil rights commission, it did so by providing
an alternative to the administrative proceeding in the
form of an ordinary civil action.
The analogy to Title VII
actions which the majority employs is not persuasive. Title VII
of the federal act, by its terms, contemplates only equitable
relief. A better analogy is found under Title VIII of the federal
act. The United States Supreme court has recognized that an action
under Title VIII is one to enforce a "legal right."
In Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 94 S. Ct. 1005, 39
L. Ed. 2d 260 (1974), the Court stated:
Whether doubt may have existed should now be dispelled. The Seventh Amendment does apply to actions enforcing statutory rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law.
...
We think it is clear that a damage action under [Title VIII] is an action to enforce "legal rights" within the meaning of our Seventh Amendment decisions. A damage action under the statute sounds basically in tort -- the statute merely defines a new legal duty, and authorizes the courts to compensate a plaintiff for the injury caused by the defendant's wrongful breach. As the Court of Appeal's noted, this cause of action is analogous to a number of tort actions recognized at common law. More important, the relief sought here -- actual and punitive damages -is the traditional form of relief offered in the courts of law.
Id. at 194-96, 94 S. Ct.
at 1008-09, 39 L.Ed 2d at 266-67 (citations omitted) (footnotes
omitted).
In an effort to avoid the
result which is dictated by the nature of the relief demanded
in the present case, the majority mischaracterizes "the essential
nature" of this plaintiff's suit. As the path of time leads
us farther away from the common law which existed in 1857, when
the Iowa Constitution was ratified, we must be careful not to
limit the right to a jury trial in statutorily based actions to
those instances where these statutes merely codify 1857 common
law. We should instead continue to apply the general statutory
classification of ordinary and equitable actions based on the
nature of the relief available under the newly created causes
of action. Judged by this standard, the nature of the injury and
the relief sought in the present case would have merited a jury
trial in 1857.
The majority also draws some inaccurate conclusions concerning the effect of its decision on the administration of civil rights cases. It states that a jury trial with its attendant delays would be counterproductive in fulfilling the explicit legislative goal. If this is true, the fault lies in the fact that the commission does not have the capacity to fulfill the legislature's goal. Consequently, the legislature has seen fit to provide an alternative. The fact that such an alternative has become necessary is the circumstance which frustrates the original legislative goal. This has very little to do, however, with the procedure which should be employed in the civil actions which have been made available as an alternative to administrative adjudication. I submit that, ideally, administrative agencies should function in the manner of administrative agencies, and courts should function in the manner of courts.
The majority opinion overlooks the fact that, in many types of
civil rights cases, and in employment-related cases in particular,
a civil rights claim will be only one theory of recovery in a
multifaceted claim for relief. In cases where the civil rights
claim is brought before the commission and remains for commission
consideration, the claimant must necessarily piecemeal the multifaceted
assault. Where there has been a release to sue, however, there
is a tremendous advantage for purposes of judicial administration
in permitting all counts of the multifaceted claim to be joined
in a single action and tried under a common procedure be it court
trial or jury trial. An example of a case in which that procedure
worked expeditiously is Annear v. State, ___ N.W.2d ___
(Iowa 1990), filed April 18, 1990.
As a final note, I would
point out the obvious fact that, since the enactment of the section
601A.16(2) right-to-sue clause, there have in fact been actions
brought pursuant thereto in which jury trials have been permitted.
More than one of these cases has reached this court with the right-to-
jury issue never being litigated. The first such case was Ayala
v. Center Line, Inc,. 415 N.W.2d 603 (Iowa 1987), filed November
25, 1987. The most recent civil rights jury case to reach this
court on appeal was Annear. Between the filing of Ayala
and the filing of Annear, the Seventy- Second General Assembly
(second session) and the Seventy-Third General Assembly (first
and second sessions) have convened and adjourned without noting
any displeasure with the jury trial procedure.
I am confident that the
legislature closely monitors the field of civil rights litigation
in order to determine whether its goals and expectations are being
realized. Given this circumstance, I can only conclude that the legislature
has been aware that courts have been permitting jury trials in
this type of litigation. The fact that it has taken no action
to disapprove the jury trial procedure is a strong indication
that the procedure is not contrary to that which the legislature
intended.
I would hold that the district
court erred in not granting plaintiff's request for jury trial,
and would reverse the judgment on that ground.
Lavorato, Neuman, and Andreasen, JJ., join this dissent.
1 We acknowledge that we have decided appeals arising from chapter 601A which tried in equity or at law with juries. Either error was not preserved or the issue of the right to a jury was not raised in those cases.
2 Other litigants in pending appeals presenting the same issue have requested that we consider their briefs. Although we do not intend to answer each and every point discussed, we have carefully considered all matters raised by this issue.