IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF IOWA
MARLA G. OBEREMBT, Appellant
VS.
BANKERS LIFE COMPANY, Appellee.
Filed February 17, 1988
Appeal from the Iowa District
Court for Polk County, Harry Perkins, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals trial
court's ruling which sustained defendant's special appearance.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Randy V. Hefner of Van Werden,
Hulse & Hefner, Adel, for appellant.
James R. Swanger and Wendy
Everett Ogden of Rogers, Phillips & Swanger, Des Moines, for
appellee.
Considered by McGiverin, C.J., and Harris, Lavorato, Snell, and Andreasen, JJ.
ANDREASEN, J.
This appeal involves a question
of subject matter jurisdiction. On August 15, 1986, the plaintiff,
Marla G. Oberembt, filed her petition at law in the district court
claiming the defendant Bankers Life Company, had breached an oral
settlement agreement. The defendant filed a special appearance
stating Oberembt's petition was an employment discrimination claim
governed by the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code chapter 601A.
The defendant asserted that because the plaintiff had not exhausted
her administrative remedies the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction. The district court sustained defendant's
special appearance. We reverse the court's order and remand the
case for further proceedings.
On review of a special appearance
we accept as true the allegations in the petition and the contents
of uncontroverted affidavits. Cross v. Lightolier Inc., 395
N.W.2d 844, 846 (Iowa 1986).
On June 3, 1983, Bankers
Life terminated Oberembt's employment. She then filed a complaint
with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission (ICRC) alleging the defendant
had terminated her employment because she had multiple sclerosis
and was pregnant. On May 13, 1986, the ICRC found no probable
cause and issued a final order that dismissed her complaint. The
plaintiff did not file a petition for the judicial review of the
commission's order.
The plaintiff alleged in
her petition that after the complaint was filed with the ICRC
she entered into an oral compromise agreement with the defendant.
This oral agreement provided Bankers Life would reinstate her
at a wage comparable to that paid to her prior to her termination.
Under the agreement terms, she was to provide medical evidence
that she suffered from multiple sclerosis and that she would forego
remedies available to her under Iowa Code chapter 601A. She alleged
Bankers Life failed to reinstate her after she complied with the
terms of the oral agreement. She asked for both compensatory and
punitive damages. Neither party claims a conciliation agreement
under the provisions of Iowa Code section 601A. 15 had been reached.
The defendant, in support
of its jurisdictional challenge, cites Northrup v. Farmland
Industries. Inc., 372 N.W.2d 193 (Iowa 1985). In Northrup
the plaintiff filed a claim with the ICRC contending his termination
was a result of his alcohol disability. Although the commission
had issued a right-to-sue letter, the plaintiff's petition in
district court was not timely. We found the procedures under the
Iowa Civil Rights Act were exclusive and the remedies to which
Northrup could be entitled would lie solely under Iowa Code chapter
601A. We held a claimant asserting that his employer committed
a discriminatory practice must pursue the remedy provided under
the provisions of the Iowa Civil Rights Act. The plaintiff s independent
common-law action for wrongful discharge could not be recognized.
The plaintiff, in response to the jurisdictional challenge, cites Jew v. University of Iowa, 398 N.W.2d 861 (Iowa 1987). In Jew the plaintiff brought an action in district court after the ICRC had issued a right-to-sue letter pursuant to Iowa Code section 601A.16. Count One of the petition was an original civil rights action based upon alleged sex discrimination. Count Two alleged a breach by defendants of the plaintiff's contract of employment. The district court sustained defendants' special appearance with respect to both Count One and Count Two. On appeal, we reversed as to Count One. The issue of whether breach of the employment contract was an action independent of the discrimination claim brought before the ICRC was not raised on appeal and therefore was not considered by this court.
The defendant urges that the plaintiff's attempt to characterize
her discrimination suit as a breach of contract action should
be rejected as an attempt to circumvent the exclusive procedures
and remedies provided in Iowa Code chapter 601A. The defendant
cites both Blank v. Donovan, 780 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1986)
and Parsons v. Yellow Freight Systems. Inc., 741 F.2d 871
(6th Cir. 1984), as federal cases where the court dismissed claims
based upon settlement agreements resulting from Tide VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.
In Parsons the plaintiff
filed a discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunities
Commission (EEOC) pursuant to Title VII and then reached a settlement
agreement that was later allegedly breached. The suit was dismissed
by the federal court because the plaintiff had not exhausted her
administrative remedies. The settlement agreement was arrived
at through the conciliation powers of EEOC and the EEOC was a
signatory party. In Blank the court found the action stemmed
from a negotiated settlement of an employment discrimination.
complaint and dismissed the suit on facts similar to those found
in Parsons.
The plaintiff's petition
does not claim damages arising from the defendant's termination
of her employment or from employment discrimination. The dispute
concerns an alleged settlement agreement made after the filing
of a complaint with the ICRC. This dispute is a separate and independent
contract claim not subject to the procedures and remedies provided
by the Iowa Civil Rights Act.
Bankers Life asserts that
Oberembt's selection of an administrative remedy estopped her
from seeking damages for breach of the agreement. The selection
of remedies by a party does not determine whether the district
court has subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute. As this
court stated In re Marriage of Helm, 271 N.W.2d 725, 727
(Iowa 1978), subject matter jurisdiction is the power to decide
"cases of the general class to which the proceeding belongs.
It can be neither conferred on a court nor denied to a court by
acts of the parties or the procedures they employ." Id.
While this court recognizes the doctrine of election of remedies,
see Gourley v. Nielson, 318 N.W.2d 160, 160-61 (Iowa 1982),
it cannot be used as a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction.
The district court erred in ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The order sustaining the defendant's special appearance is reversed and this case is remanded to the district court.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
MARLA G. OBEREMEBT, Appellant
VS.
BANKERS LIFE COMPANY, Appellee
Filed March 17, 1988
No. 86-1730
CORRECTION NOTICE
Pursuant to Iowa Supreme Court Rule 8.1 providing for the
correction of grammatical errors, the opinion in the above- captioned
case filed February 17, 1988, is corrected as follows:
1. On page four, the seventh line from the bottom, the words "exclusion
procedures and remedies" are changed to read "exclusive
procedures and remedies".
Dated this 17th day of March, 1988.
THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
James H. Andreasen, Justice
Copies to:
Hon. Harry Perkins
Polk County Courthouse
Des Moines, IA 50309
Randy V. Hefner
Van Werden, Hulse & Hefner
1009 Main Street
P.O. Box 197
Adel, IA 50003
James R. Swanger
Wendy Everett Ogden
Rogers, Phillips & Swanger
1100 Two Ruan Center
Des Moines, IA 50309-3749
Iowa State Bar Association
1101 Fleming Building
Des Moines, IA 50309
Mead Data Central
P.O. Box 933
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Assistant Managing Editor
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