IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR POLK COUNTY

RONALD E. NICOL, PETITIONER,

V.



IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, RESPONDENT.

CASE NO. AA 1711

DECISION ON ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL

The above-captioned Chapter 17A of the Code administrative appeal came on for hearing before the undersigned on the 12th day of April, 1991. Petitioner was represented by David Goldman, and Respondent, Iowa Civil Rights Commission (hereafter "Commission"), was represented by Assistant Attorney General Rick Autry.

After giving due consideration to the record and the briefs and arguments of counsel, the Court is now prepared to enter its Decision on Administrative Appeal.

The final decision and order was entered by the Commission on July 23, 1990, on a complaint filed by Petitioner. Rehearing was denied on August 21, 1990. This Petition for Judicial Review was filed on September 18, 1990. This petition was filed within 30 days of the denial of rehearing and is, therefore, timely filed per section 17A.1 9(3) of the Code.

The court finds it has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter herein.

Petitioner began these proceedings by filing a charge of discrimination with the Commission on October 18, 1985 (Exhibit 1). He filed an amendment to it on October 13, 1986 (Exhibit 2). The original charge was for physical disability discrimination, and the amendment added age discrimination. Petitioner had been an employee of the Buchanan County Sheriff's Department since 1972. He was approximately 38 years of age when he started with the department.

A newly elected sheriff took office in early January of 1985. Petitioner claims his problems began around mid-January 1985 up to and including September 1985 when he resigned.

Since 1980 Petitioner has been diagnosed as having multiple sclerosis. He walks with a limp and wears a brace on his left leg. He cannot lift over 15 pounds, cannot run, has trouble with steps and cannot walk long distances (one-half to one block at a time). In 1986 he was 51 years old and the oldest deputy in the department.

In the fall of 1984, Petitioner was doing the majority of the civil work (like serving notices and other papers, etc.), supervising records (in his office), some minimal jail work and no routine patrol work. It is obvious that his then employer, former Sheriff Joel Dryer, was accommodating Petitioner's condition of health in assigning work to him that was not so physically demanding of him.

The history of Petitioner's disability was that there would be periodic exacerbations characterized by physical symptoms, such as an increased limp, occasional loss of balance and confused speech and thought. Following such exacerbations, the lasting effect of his multiple sclerosis would be worsened and would not get better His condition could be described as progressive deterioration.

In his complaint and amended complaint, Petitioner sets forth seven enumerated situations supportive of his position that he was the subject of disability and age discrimination. Some of these reasons are duplicitous or overlapped with others.

MEDICAL REPORT

Petitioner states that Sheriff Davis was not aware of Petitioner's condition. After he was informed by Petitioner, the sheriff requested Petitioner to get a physical report indicating what work he could and could not do. Petitioner got such a report from his physician, Dr. H. C. Halberg (Exhibit 7) on February 5, 1985. Petitioner gave the report to the sheriff, who said....... it was not worth the paper it was written on."

If that was the sheriff's statement in context, it certainly was not diplomatic or sensitive. The Court has examined Exhibit 7. The impression the Court gets in reading Exhibit 7 was that it was a letter from a friend in behalf of a friend.

It reads like a letter of recommendation, highlighting the position urged by Petitioner, such as his not wanting to wear a uniform at work and why. It asserts that Petitioner has been a long time and valuable asset to the department. It lists the kinds of things Petitioner wants to do and lists the things the Petitioner does not want to do. Perhaps the letter did not deserve the response given to it by the sheriff, but one can see its deficiencies and how it really failed to give the sheriff the kind of information he was seeking.

After the letter was rejected, it was agreed that Petitioner would obtain a report from his original diagnosing doctor in Iowa City. Two such documents were received by the sheriff, but by that time (March 22, 1085), Petitioner was already on sick leave and never did return to work.

The Commission determined that this one incident was not so pervasive as to alter conditions of employment and to create an intolerable working environment. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d. at 904.

The medical report incident as decided by the Commission is supported by the evidence in this case. Neither disability or age discrimination has been proved.

CHANGE IN RANK

Two of Petitioner's complaints deal with questions raised concerning his rank. On February 15,1985, the sheriff told Petitioner that his position as captain was political and not pursuant to civil service classification. On February 28,1985, Petitioner received a letter from the sheriff stating that he was no longer a captain and was in fact a grade II deputy sheriff. When correct information was received by the sheriff, he reinstated Petitioner to the rank of captain.

There are two ways one can be a captain. An elected official has a right to appoint his first deputy and name him as a captain. This is a "political appointment" and is temporary. The position can be refilled by a new sheriff.

The other way to obtain the rank of captain is through civil service testing. This rank is not lost by the election of a new sheriff and is more permanent in nature. The fact is that Petitioner had received the rank of captain by this latter method, and his rank should not have been reduced as it was.

The further fact is that the sheriff did check with both the Civil Service Commission and with the Iowa Law Enforcement Academy and was erroneously (and incorrectly) notified that there was no record of Petitioner's promotional examinations.

There is no adequate proof that Petitioner was treated any differently than would be a non-disabled employee or a younger employee. The sheriff had a right to have a correct understanding of the rank of his employees. When correctly advised of Petitioner's rank as captain and how he obtained same, the rank was restored.

The change in rank incident and the way it was eventually handled by the department were considered by the Commission and decided against the Petitioner. It was determined that this claim of discrimination was unsupported by the evidence in the case and that neither disability or age discrimination have been proven.

UNIFORM USE

On February 28, 1985, Petitioner received a written reprimand for his failure to wear a required uniform. Around February 4, 1985, the sheriff had a meeting with the employees. All employees, with the exception of the investigator, would be required to wear the standard uniform, consisting of forest green trousers, taupe colored shirts and required badges and emblems.

After the meeting Petitioner continued to wear either civilian suits or a class A uniform. The latter is a gold blazer, brown pants, brown shoes and tie and a badge. There is no exposed gun as there is with the standard uniform.

Apparently Petitioner had told the prior sheriff that his exposed gun and holster presented a problem as his cane kept hitting the holster. This reason was not communicated to Sheriff Davis.

Petitioner relies in part on a statement in Exhibit 7 (the aforementioned letter from Petitioner's Dr. Hallberg). It states in part: "... has uniform but prefers to wear plain clothes as he has served lots of papers, and feels he can do this (wear a uniform), but feels civilian clothes would not embarrass these persons." We will discuss the "notice serving issue" later on.

This uniform requirement appears to be a reasonable across-the-board requirement of the new sheriff. With the exception of the investigator, he wanted his employees to be in a certain uniform. Just because Petitioner did not want to "embarrass persons being served with papers" was no excuse or justification for refusing to wear the prescribed uniform of the day. He (Petitioner) made a judgmental decision that was not his to make.

Petitioner was verbally reprimanded about the uniform requirement on February 14, 1985. The next day, February 15, 1985, he showed up for work in the class A uniform. He was sent home to get into the proper uniform.

On October 28, 1985, Petitioner received a written reprimand in regards to uniform use. The reprimand was justified. The sheriff had the correct impression that the Petitioner wanted to do things his own way. It was a battle of wills and the superior will was to prevail.

Nothing indicates that the Petitioner was treated any differently than would be a person who was not disabled or who was a younger employee.

The uniform incident was decided by the Commission is supported by the evidence in this case. Neither disability or age discrimination has been proved.

SERVICE OF PAPERS

As stated, on February 28, 1985, Petitioner received a written remand for his failure to properly serve papers. These failures were in regards to procedures which were to be followed in regards to how and when the papers were to be served.

Sheriff Davis testified to hearing complaints from office personnel that Petitioner was not serving papers as required by law. He would serve papers on a substitute person rather than personally on the named individual, as he had been requested to do. There was an unacceptable high number of errors in service, and that was in part the basis for the reprimand.

The other complaint had to do with time and manner of service. Davis made a change of procedures. He wanted the process servers (like Petitioner) to go out and serve papers from 7 a.m. until 9 a.m. in the morning, then bring the written materials to the office staff at about 9 a.m. He felt that the chance of successful service was better early in the morning than at 9 a.m. or later when the party to be served had left the house for work, etc. Call backs would be fewer. He asked Petitioner to follow that practice and gave him papers to be served immediately. (It was then about 7:30 a.m.) Petitioner did not leave the office until after 9 a.m. (which had been his practice before).

There was no evidence of other deputies failing to reasonably follow the directions in the service of papers or of multiple errors on their part in the service of papers. The complaints against the Petitioner and the reprimand that followed were not directed at the Petitioner because of his age or disability.

Any claim of age or disability discrimination concerning the paper serving process and the reprimand in regards to same is not supported by the evidence and has not been proven.


THE RETIREMENT ISSUE

Although not one of the seven particulars set forth in the initial complaint (Exhibit 1), Respondent did issue a complaint in the amended complaint (Exhibit 2) in regards to the retirement issue. Petitioner alleged age discrimination because the sheriff was urging him to rehire.

There is no denying that the sheriff did talk to Petitioner about his retiring. He asked Petitioner if he had ever checked out disability retirement possibilities with either social security or with IPERS. The sheriff offered to do whatever he could to help the Petitioner get such retirement. Sheriff Davis also testified that he was not trying to get rid of the Petitioner but rather he was trying to help him get his early retirement. Petitioner testified that he had made such inquiry and he was not eligible for such early retirement.

Considering Petitioner's physical condition and its deteriorating nature, the subject of disability retirement would not be unwarranted, and the offer of assistance (if taken in context) would not support or be evidence of age or disability discrimination. There is insufficient evidence to prove the alleged age or disability discrimination claims.

MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES

Other issues were discussed in the Order which was adopted by the Commission and which were not really enumerated in Petitioner's complaint or amended complaint. His responsibility for reviewing Records of the Emergency Operations Commission was discontinued. His duties were assigned to Deputy Straw. The removal of such responsibilities was not done by the sheriff but rather by the Board of Supervisors. There was no evidence to indicate that the change in duties was a form of either disability or age discrimination, and that alleged discrimination has not been proven.

Petitioner's jail responsibilities were also changed. They do not appear to have been substantial in any regard. The new sheriff took over some of these responsibilities because he had interest in becoming more familiar with jail operations. Any claim of age or disability discrimination in that regard has not been proven.

FAILURE TO ACCOMMODATE

A claim of disability discrimination based on a failure on the part of the sheriff to accommodate was urged by Petitioner. In its decision the Commission did not find a failure to accommodate or any discrimination based on such a claim.

The fact is that the decision is silent in that regard, with the exception of some statements of general laws contained in the Conclusions of Law in paragraphs 15-24.

DECISION

In summary the Court determines and finds that the Petitioner has failed to carry his burden and prove to the Court that the Commission in its decision failed to satisfactorily and legally decide and deal with the issues before it: that there was not sufficient evidence to support the decision when the record was considered as a whole: or that the decision should be reversed, modified or remanded per section 17A.19(8) of the Code.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Petition herein be and same is hereby dismissed at Petitioner's costs.


Dated this 18th day of June, 1991.



A. M. CRITELLI
JUDGE, FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT




Copy mailed or hand-delivered by the court to:

David H. Goldman
200 Liberty Building
418 Sixth Avenue
Des Moines, Iowa 50309

Rick Autry
Assistant Attorney General
Iowa Civil Rights Commission
211 East Maple, Second Floor
Des Moines, Iowa 50319

Iowa Civil Rights Commission
211 East Maple, Second Floor
Des Moines, Iowa 50319

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