IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
EDWARD J. HOLLINRAKE, Appellee,
VS.
MONROE COUNTY, IOWA; MONROE COUNTY, IOWA CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION;
and JACK BAKER, in his Official Capacity as Monroe County Sheriff,
Defendants
and
IOWA LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY, Appellant.
Filed December 21, 1988
Appeal from the
Iowa District Court for Monroe County, James P. Rielly and Richard
J. Vogel, Judges.
Iowa Law Enforcement Academy appeals from a verdict for plaintiff
in a civil rights action. REVERSED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Gary L. Hayward, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellant.
John A. Pabst of Clements, Pothoven, Pabst & Stravers, Albia,
for appellee.
Considered by McGiverin, C.J., and Larson, Schultz, Lavorato,
and Snell, JJ.
SCHULTZ, J.
The Iowa Law enforcement
Academy (academy) refused to train and certify a Monroe County
Deputy Sheriff, plaintiff Edward J. Hollinrake, because his vision
did not meet the academy's standards for a peace officer. Plaintiff
filed an action in district court against the academy and others
not involved in this appeal, alleging a civil rights violation
by the academy of employment discrimination based on disability.
A jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. He received
relief through a court order requiring the academy to train him
in the basic program and, upon successful completion of
the course, to certify him as a peace officer. He also received
attorney fees under Iowa Code section 601A. 15(8) (a).' The academy
appeals from this judgment.
The academy urges that the
district court did not have authority to hear and decide this
case. It contends that plaintiffs remedy is governed by the Administrative
Procedure Act, Iowa Code Chapter 17A, rather than by a civil rights
action. As we agree with this contention, we reverse.
The Monroe County Sheriff
selected plaintiff as a deputy from the seven candidates referred
by the local civil service commission. The academy, an agency
of the state, trains and sets standards for law enforcement service.
Iowa Code § 80B.3. After nine months of service as a deputy
sheriff, plaintiff attended the academy's school but was released
because his vision did not meet the hiring standards set by the
academy's rules.
Plaintiff presented evidence
of his competence as an officer, including his ability to see
and function with glasses, his performance with firearms and the
sheriff's opinion of his abilities as a deputy sheriff.
In his action, plaintiff
alleges that the academy's administrative rules regarding the
vision requirements for peace officers enrolled in its training
program violate Iowa Code section 601A.6(l)(a), a provision concerning
unfair employment practice. Plaintiff maintains that these rules
are unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious because they do not
provide for a waiver based upon the demonstrated ability or practical
testing of the applicant peace office. He asserts that he is fully
qualified to perform the duties of a deputy sheriff but for the
defined disability. Plaintiff has secured an administrative release
from Iowa Civil Rights Commission pursuant to Iowa Code 60 1A.
16' allowing him to commence his action is district court.
The academy moved to dismiss
the action, maintaining that plaintiffs failure to comply with
the requirements of chapter 17A denies the court authority to
hear the suit. District Judge Richard J. Vogel overruled this
motion, indicating that the pleadings properly stated a claim
for relief under a civil rights violation. At the jury trial with
District Judge James P. Rielly presiding, a verdict for the plaintiff
was returned. On appeal, the academy claims that Judge Vogel's
ruling improperly alters the proceedings from a judicial review
of agency action to a civil rights action.
We recognize that the procedures
and remedies provided the district court in judicial review of
agency action differ substantially from those authorized in a
civil rights action. in judicial review of agency action under
section 17A. 19, the district court generally acts in an appellate
capacity as opposed to the original factfinding mission present
in adjudicating a civil rights complaint pursuant to Iowa Code
601A. 17(5) and 601A. 15 (8).
The practical result of
allowing the commission or the court ' aided by a jury in this
case, to determine this controversy as a civil rights complaint
is to transfer in part to the civil rights factfinder, the academy's
authority to set minimum hiring standards for law enforcement
officers. Furthermore, were we to decide that this was the legislative
intent, all qualifications standards adopted by the academy would
be subject to a case-by-case scrutiny by the civil rights factfinder
under chapter 601A procedures. 17A.2(3), and the grant or denial
of a license is agency action. Iowa Code § 17A.2(4).
The legislature has provided
that unless another statute states otherwise, "the judicial
review provisions of this chapter (17A) shall be the exclusive
means by which a person or party who is aggrieved or adversely
affected by agency action may seek judicial review of such
agency action." § 17A. 19. Also See Iowa Code § 17A. 1 (*This chapter is meant
to apply to all rulemaking and . . . an suits for judicial review
of agency action that are not specifically excluded from this
chapter or some portion thereof by its express terms or by the
express terms of another chapter.*); § 17A.23 ([T]his chapter
shall take precedence unless the other statute expressly provides
that it shall take precedence . . . "). We find no express
language in any section of the civil rights statutes, Iowa Code
chapter 601A, which negates the applicability of judicial review
pursuant to section 17A.19.
Plaintiff urges, however,
that agency actions which result in a violation of civil rights
are matters not under the exclusive review of section 17A. 19.
When a civil rights claim is asserted, he maintains the civil
rights commission, rather than the academy, has primary jurisdiction.
While he concedes that the academy has authority to enact rule
2. 1 setting vision standards, plaintiff urges that the adjudicator
under chapter 601A has primary jurisdiction and determines whether
the rules are discriminatory to a disabled person or applied in
a discriminatory manner. In analyzing this issue, we must examine
the legislative provisions.
The academy is required
to promulgate rules for minimum physical fitness of law enforcement
officers by Iowa Code section 80B. 11 as follows:
The director of the academy, subject to the approval of the academy, subject to the approval of the council, shall promulgate rules in accordance with the provisions of this chapter and chapter 17A, giving due consideration to varying factors and special requirements of law enforcement agencies relative to the following: ...
4. Minimum standards of physical . . . fitness which shall govern the recruitment, selection and appointment of law enforcement officers.
(Emphasis added). Accordingly, the academy enacted the current rule, 501 Iowa Administrative Code section 2.1 which, prior to March 11, 1987, was designated as 550 Iowa Administrative Code section 2. 1. It provides in part:
In no case shall any person hereafter be selected or appointed as a law enforcement officer unless the person:
...
2.1(9) Has an uncorrected vision of not less than 20/100 in both eyes, correct to 20/20 ......
We believe that the legislature
has clearly indicated that the academy's actions of rule-making
and enforcing its physical fitness standards are agency actions
under chapter 17A. Section 80B.11 states that its rules are to
be promulgated in accordance with chapter 17A. Rule- making is
a form of "agency action% Iowa Code § 17A.2(9). The
academy is required to regulate the training of peace officers
and may issue certificates of graduation to successful trainees.
Iowa Code §§ 80B.11, 80B.13(3). This certificate defines
as a "license", Iowa Code § 17A.2(3), and grant
or denial of a license is agency action. Iowa Code § 17A.2(4).
The legislature has provided
that unless another statute states otherwise, "the judicial
review provisions of this chapter (17A) shall be exclusive means
by which a person or party who is aggrieved or adversely affected
by agency action may seek judicial review of such agency action."
§ 17A. 19 Also see Iowa Code § 17A. 1 ("This
chapter is meant to apply to all rule-making and ... all suits
for judicial review of agency action that are not specifically
excluded from this chapter or some portion thereof by its express
terms or by the express terms of another chapter.*); § 17A.23
([T]his chapter shall take precedence unless the other statute
expressly provides that it shall take precedence . . . ").
We find no express language in any sections of the civil rights
statutes, Iowa Code chapter 601A, which negates the applicability
of judicial review pursuant to section 17A. 19.
Plaintiff urges, however,
that agency actions which result in a violation of civil rights
are matters not under the exclusive review of section 17A. 19.
When a civil rights claim is asserted, he maintains the civil
rights commission, rather than the academy, has primary jurisdiction.
While he concedes that the academy has authority to enact rule
2.1 setting vision standards, plaintiff urges that the adjudicator
under chapter 601A has primary jurisdiction to a disabled person
or are applied in a discriminatory manner.
As authority for his primary jurisdiction claim, plaintiff cites Iowa Code section 601A.5(2) which gives the commission the power "[t]o receive, investigate, and finally determine the merits of complaints alleging unfair or discriminatory practices." For his claim of disability discrimination, he cites the unfair employment practices statute, Iowa Code section 601A.6 , which prohibits an employer from unfair or discriminatory practices based on the disability of the employee or applicant. He points to the specific language as follows:
If a disabled person is qualified to perform a particular occupation by reason of training or experience, the nature of that occupation shall not be the basis for exception to the unfair or discriminating practices prohibited by this subsection.
§ 601A.6(l)(c). The
academy urges that this section is inapplicable because it is
not an employer of peace officers. We find it unnecessary to pass
on this point, however. With these contentions in mind, we now
examine our previous holdings.
Our earlier cases have generally
held that the judicial review provisions of section 17A.19 provide
the exclusive means for challenging agency action. Dougherty
v. State, 323 N.W.2d 249, 250 (Iowa 1982); Salsbury Laboratories
v. Iowa Dept. o Envtl. Quality, 276 N.W.2d 830, 835 (Iowa
1979); Kerr v. Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 274 N.W.2d 283, 287
(Iowa 1979). In a recent case involving a state employee's sex
discrimination claim against a state agency employer, we recognized
that all challenges to agency action are not necessarily exclusively
within the agency. Jew v. Univ. of Iowa, 398 N.W.2d 861
(Iowa 1987). We concluded that "the exclusivity of the judicial
review procedures of section 17A.19, as a means of assailing acts
or omissions of administrative agencies, must necessarily vary,
based on the context of the transaction. " Id. at
864. We further noted that the lines of exclusivity are not as
rigidly drawn in respect to "other agency action". Id.
We believe that the holding
in Jew is of no aid to plaintiff. In Jew's action
against the agency, she alleged sex discrimination in her discharge
from employment. We distinguished her situation from those cases
in which "the action challenged was the very decision which
the agency's mandate directed it to make." Id. at
865. We concluded that the claim of sexual harassment in her termination
had little connection with the mandate of the agency or its governing
body. Id. The holding in Jew would be more applicable
to a discrimination claim against the officer or department who
exercises discretion in the hiring and firing of peace officers.
In contrast to a discretionary
individual employment decision, the gist of plaintiffs complaint
is directed at the alleged discriminatory nature of the physical
fitness rule. Although he complains of the application of the
rule, he does so solely on the basis that the enforcement of the
rule results in discrimination due to his disability. Stated otherwise,
plaintiffs only complaint is based on the substance of the rule.
Unlike the complaint in Jew grounded on the agency's employment
termination practiced, plaintiffs challenge is directed at the
agency's action in carrying out its statutory duty to enact a
rule.
We conclude that plaintiff's
action is subject to the exclusivity of the judicial review provision
of section 17A. 19. The academy stands in a position similar to the
agencies in Dougherty, Salsbury and Kerr. In each
of these cases, the agency acted on legislatively prescribed authority,
and we applied the rule that section 17A. 19 was the exclusive
judicial remedy available.
Finally, plaintiff argues
that the agency rules neither afforded him a hearing nor did they
provide any authority to grant the relief he sought. This again
is a direct attack on the agency rules. Plaintiff can contest
the validity of the agency rules either in a contested case before
the agency or based on rule-making infractions by petition for
judicial review in district court. Lundy v. Iowa Dept. of Human
Serv., 376 N.W.2d 893, 895 (Iowa 1985). Our ruling does not
deprive him of a remedy for challenging invalid rules.
In reaching this result,
we are mindful of the power of the civil rights commission to
investigate and determine the validity of civil rights complaints.
As indicated in Jew, this authority may extend in limited
fashion; into the actions of other agencies or to their employees'
acts. This power does not extend into the legislatively mandated
rule-making powers of another agency, however. Discrimination
claims attributed to such rules must be made to the enacting agency,
and the court review must be sought under section 17A.19.
We conclude that section 17A.19 provides the exclusive means for challenging the academy's action in this case. The district court was without authority to entertain this matter as a civil rights action. We hold that the district court erred in failing to sustain the academy's motion to dismiss. We need not answer the other matters presented by the parties.
REVERSED.
' All statutory reference
are to the Iowa Code 1985.
2 Under this section an aggrieved party must initially seek administrative relief with the commission. Under certain conditions the commission, however, may issue a release allowing the complainant a right to commence the action in the district court.