IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 205/90-689
Filed June 19, 1991
HENKEL CORPORATION, Appellee,
VS.
IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, Appellant,
and
STANLEY DECK, Respondent.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lee County, David B. Hendrickson,
Judge.
Appeal from a dismissal of an employment discrimination complaint
based on disability under the Iowa Civil Rights Act. AFFIRMED.
Bonnie J. Campbell, Attorney General,
and Teresa Baustian, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Larry L. Shepler, Davenport, for appellee.
Considered by Harris, P.J., and Larson, Schultz, Neuman, and Andreasen,
JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The Iowa Civil Rights Commission appeals from a district court
ruling on petition for judicial review reversing the commission's
final decision and dismissing Stanley Deck's complaint under Iowa
code chapter 601A(1989). We affirm.
Stanley Deck was an employee of Henkel Corporation in Keokuk,
Iowa, from March 1980 until his discharge in January 1985. Deck
first worked for Henkel in the area of sanitation. He was subsequently
transferred to general plant work and then to the vitamin department.
In April 1983, Deck suffered a mental breakdown which led to
repeated hospitalizations and treatment during the remainder of
1983 and into 1984. Deck understood the diagnosis of his condition
to be mixed neurosis, anxiety, and depression. In August 1983,
Deck applied for, and eventually received, social security disability
benefits because of his condition. Deck remained absent from work
after his mental breakdown and did not return to work until sometime
in late August or early September 1984.
In June 1984, Henkel informed Deck that his employment would
be terminated because of his protracted absence from work. Deck
filed a grievance concerning his termination. An agreement was
eventually worked out between Henkel and Deck's union which set
forth a number of conditions governing Deck's return to work.
The parties agreed to accept a psychiatrist's opinion as to whether
Deck could be re-employed safely for an appropriate trial work
period. If Deck had a relapse or recurrence of illness during
the trial period, he would be terminated.
In August 1984, Deck reported to a psychiatrist pursuant to
the agreement. The psychiatrist recommended that Deck be returned
to his usual employment. Deck returned to work and began a clean-up
and supply job in the starch-gluten department. In September,
Deck broke his foot at work. Deck returned to work sometime in
November 1984.
On December 3, 1984, one week after he had been back on the
job, Deck was assigned to begin training for the assistant operator's
job, the next higher position in the starch-gluten department.
Under the terms of the union contract, all employees were required
to train so that they could handle at least the next two more
skilled positions in their department.
Before reaching the halfway point of his training period, Deck
approached his supervisor and expressed a desire to be transferred
out of the starch-gluten department. During this conversation
the supervisor encouraged Deck to stick with his training and
assured him that all necessary training would be provided. A written
request for transfer was prepared but no lateral moves were available
within the company.
Deck completed the formal training and on December 9, 1984,
was scheduled to perform the assistant operator's job on a solo
basis. Deck approached the foreman at mid-morning and reported
that he felt ill and requested permission to leave the plant and
go home. Deck was encouraged by the foreman to remain at the plant,
even if that meant doing some other work during the balance of
the shift. The supervisor also offered Deck additional time to
train and learn the job if that was necessary. Deck declined that
offer indicating that he would not be able to perform the job
and left the facility.
On December 10, 1984, Deck was suspended from his job. Henkel
claimed the suspension was based on safety concerns for other
employees and Deck's numerous statements that indicated he did
not believe he was capable of performing the assistant operator's
job. Through the course of a subsequent grievance procedure, the
suspension was converted to a termination. The union ultimately
denied Deck's grievance.
Unsuccessful in his attempts to grieve his suspension and termination,
Deck filed a complaint with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission in
May 1985 alleging that Henkel illegally discriminated against
him on the basis of mental disability in violation of Iowa Code
chapter 601 A.
Following a hearing, the administrative law judge issued a
proposed decision determining that Henkel did not commit an illegal
discriminatory act when it terminated Deck.
In April 1989, the Iowa Civil Rights Commission reversed the
administrative law judge. The commission found that Henkel discriminated
against Deck by suspending and terminating him because of his
disability in violation of Iowa Code section 601A.6. The commission
awarded Deck back pay and $5000 in compensatory damages for emotional
distress. Henkel filed a petition for judicial review.
Upon judicial review, the district court reversed the commission,
determining that Deck was neither a disabled person subject to
protection under Iowa Code section 601A.6 nor qualified for the
job from which he was discharged. The Iowa Civil Rights Commission
has filed this appeal.
1. Our review of the district court's disposition of this case
is clearly limited to the correction of legal errors. See, e.g.,
Cerro Gordo County Care Facility v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n,
401 N.W.2d 192, 196 (Iowa 1987). In deciding whether the district
court correctly applied the law, we examine the record before
the agency and look to the standards of Iowa Code section 17A.19(8)
to determine whether our conclusions are the same as the district
court. E.g., Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 337 N.W.2d 470,
472 (Iowa 1983).
Iowa Code section 601A.6 prohibits, as an unfair and discriminatory
practice, the discharge of any employee because of the employee's
disability, unless the discharge was based upon the nature of
the occupation. To establish a claim for disability discrimination,
the aggrieved employee must first establish a prima facie case
of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Woodbury
County v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 335 N.W.2d 161,165 (Iowa 1983).
To do this, the employee must establish:
1) that be belonged to a group protected by Iowa Code Chapter 601A (that he had a disability within the meaning of Iowa Code Sections 601A.6(l)(a) AND 601A.2(4);
2) that he was qualified for the job from which he was discharged;
3) that, despite his qualifications he was terminated; and
4) that, after his termination, the employer hired a person not in the employee's protected class or retained persons with comparable or lesser qualifications who are not in a protected group.
Trobaugh v. Hy-Vee Stores, Inc., 392 N.W.2d 154,156 (Iowa 1986).
Once the employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden
of going forward with evidence shifts to the employer to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action.
If this burden is carried, the presumption of discrimination drops
and the employee must then show that the employer's justification
for action was pretextual and that a discriminatory reason more
likely motivated the employer. Wing v. Iowa Lutheran Hosp., 426
N.W.2d 175, 178 (Iowa App. 1988). The employee bears the ultimate
burden of persuasion of intentional discrimination and that burden
never shifts to the employer. Id. at 178.
11. The threshold inquiry is whether Deck is a disabled person
subject to the protection of the Iowa Civil Rights Act. Iowa Code
section 601A.2(4) defines "disability" as "the
physical or mental condition of a person which constitutes a substantial
handicap, . . . . 11 Further content is given to this definition
by administrative rules. Iowa Administrative Code section
161-8.26(l) defines a "substantially handicapped person",
in part, as "any person who has a ... mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more major life activities, (or) has
a record of such an impairment, . . . ." Section 161-8.26(3)
of the administrative code defines "major life activities"
as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, learning, and
working."
In determining that Deck was not a disabled person subject
to the protections of the act, the district court relied heavily
on our decision in Probasco v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 420
N.W.2d 432 (Iowa 1988). In Probasco, this court concluded that
an employee who had a chronic susceptibility to bronchitis based
on work conditions the employer could not reasonably change was
not a "disabled" person under the Civil Rights Act.
The court emphasized the fact that Probasco could identify only
a few jobs where her condition might prevent or restrict her employment.
Id. at 436-37. Probasco's impairment was not considered a substantial
handicap since it "[did] not significantly decrease [her]
ability to obtain satisfactory employment otherwise. . . ."
Id. at 436.
Relying on this "employability" standard, the district
concluded that Deck was not "disabled" under the Civil
Rights Act. The court found that Deck did not have a substantial
handicap since he had been released to work by a psychiatrist
and was able to do the clean up and supply job in the starch-gluten
department. We, however, disagree with the district court's interpretation
of our decision in Probasco and its conclusion that Deck was not
disabled.
We believe the record supports the Iowa Civil Rights Commission's
finding that Deck was disabled within the meaning of the Iowa
Civil Rights Act. The record establishes that Deck was initially
diagnosed in 1983 as suffering from depression. In fact, the district
court conceded that the record suggests that two of Deck's major
life activities, work and learning, were affected by his condition.
Deck became eligible for social security disability benefits based
on his mental impairment and that entitlement continued as of
the date of Deck's termination from Henkel. Although Deck was
eventually cleared to return to work, the psychiatrist's report
stated that "his continued psychiatric care with clear and
immediate objective would be indicated." In January 1985,
Deck's psychiatrist indicated that Deck still required medication
for his condition. We believe the evidence supports the commission's
conclusion that Deck's mental condition substantially limited
his ability to work and learn. We reject the implication from
Probasco that one must be almost unemployable because of one's
impairment to be considered disabled. The mere fact that Deck
was cleared to work his entry level supply job does not establish
that his overall ability to work or learn were still not substantially
limited by his condition. Unlike Probasco, Deck's mental condition
was generally debilitating and would affect him regardless of
the job he might hold.. Therefore, we find substantial evidence
to support the Iowa Civil Rights Commission's conclusion that
Deck was disabled and subject to the protections of Iowa Code
chapter 601A.
111. The next inquiry concerns whether
Deck established that be was qualified for the job from which
he was fired. Trobaugh, 392 N.W.2d at 156. In assessing an employee's
qualifications, we must consider the individual's ability to perform
the job in a reasonably competent and satisfactory manner given
reasonable accommodation by the employer. 161 Iowa Admin. Code
§ 8.27(6); Cerro Gordo County Care Facility v. Iowa Civil
Rights Comm'n, 401 N.W.2d 192 (Iowa 1987).
After examination of the record in this case, the district
court reversed the commission's finding of discrimination due
to disability. The district court concluded that the evidence
did not support the commission's finding that Deck was qualified
to perform his job and that Henkel failed to reasonably accommodate
his disability. We agree and therefore affirm the judgment of
the district court.
Henkel's plant in Keokuk was a fairly sophisticated operation,
requiring only six people per shift to operate the entire plant.
As a result, the terms of the union contract in effect at the
plant required all employees to train so that they could handle
at least the next two more skilled positions in their department.
The purpose of this requirement was to insure that trained people
would be immediately available to provide relief and to run the
plant in the event of illness or vacation by another employee.
Although Deck may not have been required to fill one of the next
two higher positions often, we find that completion of the training
for those positions was a contractually required aspect of his
job that was essential based on the economic realities faced by
the employer. Halsey v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. 410 NW.2d 250,
253 (Iowa 1987). Since Deck failed to qualify for the assistant
operator job, the next most skilled position, we must determine
whether Henkel attempted to reasonably accommodate Deck's disability
before terminating his job based on this failure. We recognize
that an employer is not required to change the essential nature
of the job in order to accommodate an employee; the employer is
only obligated to reasonably accommodate the employee's impairment
based on the essential requirements of the job.
Here, Henkel refrained, albeit reluctantly, from terminating
Deck while he was undergoing treatment for his mental condition
and was unable to work for well over a year. During his training
for the assistant operator's job, Deck was permitted to request
a transfer out of the starch-gluten department. A request was
prepared but no lateral moves within the company were available.
Following training, Deck attempted to perform the assistant operator
job on a solo basis. When Deck indicated he could not handle the
job on a solo basis and desired to go home, Deck was encouraged
to remain at the plant doing some other work
and was offered additional time to complete the training. Deck
refused both offers and went home, indicating that he could not
perform the job. During a meeting the next day, Deck again indicated
that he did not believe he was capable of performing the assistant
operator's job. By rejecting additional training, Deck refused
Henkel's reasonable efforts to accommodate him. Deck's desire
and ability to do only the supply job in the starch-gluten department
is insufficient to establish that he was otherwise qualified to
do the job. We agree with the district court that the evidence
fails to support the commission's conclusion that Deck's termination
was based on his disability and not on his inability to perform
the necessary tasks of his job.
IV. We uphold the Iowa Civil Rights Commission's finding that
Deck was a disabled person subject to the protection of the Iowa
Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code chapter 601A. However, we agree with
the district court that there was insufficient evidence to support
the commission's finding that Deck met his burden of proving disability
discrimination. Deck was not qualified for his job despite Henkel's
efforts to reasonably accommodate his mental impairment. Accordingly,
we affirm the district court's decision dismissing Stanley Deck's
complaint.
AFFIRMED.
This opinion shall be published.