IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF IOWA
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY AND JOHN CRIST,
Petitioners-Appellees,
VS.
IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION,
Respondent-Appellant.
No. 9-466/89-143
Appeal from the Iowa District
Court for Des Moines County, William S. Cahill, Judge.
Appellant challenges the
district court's reversal of the agency's finding that appellees
had discriminated against Cheryl Levitt on the basis of her sex
(pregnancy) when General Electric failed to employ her for a temporary
factory job. AFFIRMED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney
General, and Teresa Baustian, Assistant Attorney General, for
appellant.
Robert A. Engberg of Aspelmeier, Fisch, Power, Warner & Engberg, Burlington, for appellees.
Heard by Schlegel, P.J., and Hayden and Sackett, JJ.
SCHLEGEL, P.J.
Appellant challenges the
district court's reversal of the agency's finding that appellees
had discriminated against Cheryl Levitt on the basis of her sex
(pregnancy). She argues the district court erred by making its
own findings of fact and by not applying the limited standard
of review applicable to Iowa Code section 17A. 19 cases. We affirm
the district court.
In the latter part of 1985,
General Electric G.E. was undergoing massive changes in its product
line at its Burlington, Iowa, plant. G.E. hired numerous temporary
employees for temporary jobs of three to four month's duration.
Cheryl Levitt, who had previously
worked for G.E. as utility operator from October 1980 through
July 1982, applied for one of the temporary positions. On August
19, John Crist, and employee relations specialist, scheduled a
preemployment exam for Levitt with the company nurse and scheduled
Levitt's exam with the company doctor for the following day. The
company nurse asked several questions about Levitt"s pregnancy.
Levitt expected to be unavailable for approximately six to eight
weeks following the birth of her child whose anticipated delivery
date was October 12, 1985.
Following the nurse's exam,
John Crist telephoned and allegedly informed Levitt that he "had
not realized that [Levitt] was pregnant, but if [Crist] had known
before, [he] wouldn't have offered [her] the position, and there
was no
point in having the physical since [she] couldn't come back to
work."
On September 3, 1985, Levitt
filed her complaint with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission (Commission)
alleging discrimination on the basis of sex in the decision not
to hire her. Before the agency, G.E. took the position that Levitt
was not hired because she would have been unavailable to work
approximately one-half of the temporary employment period and
all applicants for the temporary jobs were required to assure
their continued availability.
After a hearing and an appeal,
the Commission held for Levitt and awarded her backpay and attorney's
fees. G.E. filed a petition for judicial review.
In reviewing the agency's
action, the district court found that the agency's action was
not supported by substantial evidence when that record was viewed
as a whole. The court felt that the reason G.E. did not hire Levitt
was because she was not going to be available for the entire period
of employment; not because she was pregnant at the time she applied.
The court believed that had Levitt stated she anticipated being
unavailable because she was going to undergo surgery, or because
she was going on vacation, or because of any other reason, she
likewise would not have been hired. In support of its ruling,
the court cited examples in the record where John Crist had expressed
his specific concerns about applicants being able to work the
entire temporary work period.
On judicial review of contested
cases, we determine whether the agency's decision is supported
by substantial evidence in the record. Dubuque Community School
Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Board, 424 N.W.2d 427,
431 (Iowa 1988). Our scope of appellate review is limited to the
question of whether the district court correctly applied the law.
Id.
Appellant contends the district
court failed to apply the proper scope of review. As far as the
record shows, the district court cited the correct authority and
applied the proper scope of review. The only question that can
be determined by this court is whether the district court correctly
applied the scope of review referred to in its order.
There is no question that
both the agency and the district court correctly applied the law.
However, it is not clear whether the agency's conclusion that
appellant was refused work due to her pregnancy was supported
by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that which a
reasonable mind would accept as adequate to reach a given conclusion,
even if a reviewing court would have drawn a contrary inference
from the evidence. Norland v. Iowa Dept. of Job Service,
412 N.W.2d 904, 908 (Iowa 1987). There is no contrary inference
to be drawn from these facts. The only inference that can be drawn
is that the appellant was not hired due to her inability to work
the entire period. The appellant does not claim that appellee
has a policy of not hiring pregnant workers. The claim of discrimination
relates to this one instance.
The facts surrounding this particular "job" prevent a finding of discrimination. The job was only for three or four months, The appellee made it clear to each applicant that in order to be considered for the position, he or she must be available for the entire period. The fact that appellee did not cross- examine each applicant to smoke out every possible interference with the employement does not mean that appellant was treated any differently due to her condition. The appellant admitted at the time of her interview that she would have to miss six to eight weeks of the employment period to have her child. There is no evidence that John Crist was unaware appellant's pregnancy would require this absence when he told her not to come back to work. This is not the case of a pregnant woman who is not hired even though the pregnancy will not interfere with the work. The pregnancy would clearly and substantially interfere with the required work. There is no question appellant was not hired only because she could not work the entire period and not because she was pregnant. We agree with the district court's conclusion that the agency's findings were not supported by substantial evidence.
AFFIRMED.