IN THE IOWA DISTRICT
COURT FOR SCOTT COUNTY
FISHERCREST APARTMENTS,
Petitioner,
VS.
IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION,
Respondent.
No.75450
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
This matter comes on before
the Court for judicial review of a final order of the Iowa Civil
Rights Commission, wherein the petitioner was found to be in violation
of Iowa Code Section 601 A.8 (1987) in discriminating against
one Otis Payton on the basis of race in the rental of apartments
of the petitioner. Among other things, the Iowa Civil Rights Commission
ordered the petitioner herein to pay to the complainant before
the Commission the amount of $5,000, plus ten percent interest
per annum from March 23, 1987. The final order was filed September
14, 1988, and the petition for judicial review was filed October
13, 1988, and for reasons unknown to the Court, submission there
of was delayed until April 19, 1990.
The petitioner complains
that the respondent agency was in error in determining that the
testimony of the petitioner was not credible and failing to give
any reason for that determination, in deterimining the nature
and extent of the injuries which the complainant sustained, and
in finding that anything that the petitioner did was the proximate
cause of any injuries sustained by the complainant. There was
further complaint that the commission erred by failing to require
the complainant to mitigate damages by moving out of the Fishercrest
Apartments, that all the damages were excessive under the circumstances
and were punitive in nature rather than compensatory. All of these
things, it is claimed, violate Iowa laws, are unsupported by substantial
evidence in the record, and are unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious
or characterized by an abuse of discretion or a clearly unwarranted
exercise of descretion.
The underlying case involves
an attempt on the part of a black couple to rent an apartment
from the petitioner. The complainant had seen a vacancy sign at
the apartment complex, and his daughter called to ask about the
vacancy. The daughter was told there was a two-bedroom apartment
open, and, on the next day, the complainants went to see the apartment.
They were shown an apartment and were told that the rental agent
was out of town and they'd have to talk to him the next day. The
next day, the complainants called the rental agent and were told
that the rental agent had received a deposit from a Chinese couple
the night before. The complainants suspected they were being discriminated
against because of race, and had their daughter-in-law, who was
white, go see about renting an apartment, and she was told that
an apartment was open and available. There was evidence from the
record viewed as a whole that there never was a Chinese couple
interested in renting the apartment, and that it was their purpose
of the rental agent to keep any more black people from renting
apartments in the complex. Through the subterfuge of having their
white daughter-in-law make the deposit and secure the availability
of the apartment, the complainants were able to execute a one-year
lease and did actually move into the apartment complex.
The complainants testified
at length concerning the emotional distress caused to them by
this act of discrimination. The Court finds from the record viewed
as a whole that the award of damages for this emotional distress
was well supported by the evidence and is not an abuse of descretion,
nor is it the imposition of a penalty, even though there were
no other compensatory damages claimed by the complainants.
With respect to the contention
that the complainant should have moved out, the Court does not
understatnd any reason for imposing this burden on a black man.
It was through subterfuge that he got the apartment in the first
place, which he had been denied because of racial discrimination,
and the Court finds no lawful or factual basis for requiring him
to move out because he wasn't wanted.
The Court finds error in
the award of interest at the rate of ten percent. The Commission
has authority to award compensatory damages. The award of ten
percent interest is out of line. The Commission is not governed
by section 535.3 of the Iowa Code, since that section refers to
judgments and decrees of a court. Interest is for the use of money
and can properly be considered by an administrative agency in
awarding damages. However, the Court cannot find any authority
for permitting an administrative agency of the state government
to violate Iowa's usury laws. The Commission, in filing an additional
brief in response to the Court's request, has claimed authority
to add interest under the theory that it is for the use of money
due, that is the damages were due for the injury done to the complainants
at the time of the acts complained of, and therefore the complainant
was entitled to interest. This brings the case then squarely under
Section 535.2(l )(b) and limits the rate of interest to five percent.
It was an unliquidated indebtedness,
and by case law of long standing, unliquidated indebtedness does
not bear interest until it was fixed. It appears to the Court
that the final order of the Commission, which fixed the amount
of damages for the mental and emotional distress, can only charge
interest from that date, and then only at the rate of five percent
per annum, from September 14, 1988, the date of the final order.
Neither does the Court believe
that the petition for judicial review changes the situation, and
raises the interest rate to the statutory rate now established
under Section 535.3. This Court has no authority to enter any
independent judgment based upon the proceedings below.
The Court concludes then
that the Iowa Civil Rights Commission has exceeded its authority
under the law and has imposed an illegal interest rate in this
case, and that it should modify its final Judgment to provide
interest at the rate of five percent annum. The Court further
concludes that the commission cannot have the interest retroactive
to any time prior to its final order, inasmuch as it is only the
final order that liquidated the amount of damages for mental and
emotional distress.
NOW THEREFORE, this case is remanded to the Commission for modification of its order according to this opinion. In all respects other than the rate of interest and the time of its imposition, the final order of the Commission is affirmed.
JUDGE, SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT