IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
JAMES D. CHRISTIE and BEN F. PETERSON,
Appellant,
VS.
ROLSCREEN CO., Appellee.
No. 350/88-1598
Filed November 22,1989
Appeal from the Iowa
District Court for Scott County, James E. Kelley, Judge.
Appeal from directed verdict
ruling in age discrimination cases. AFFIRMED.
Ted Breckenfelder and W.
Michael Shinkle, Davenport, for appellants.
Mark J. Wiedenfeld of Grefe
& Sidney, Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Schiltz, P.J., and Carter, Lavorato, Snell, and Andreasen, JJ.
LAVORATO, J.
In this age discrimination
suit, the defendant moved for a directed verdict at the close
of the plaintiffs' evidence on three grounds: (1) the district
court lacked subject matter jursidiction of the cases because
Illinois rather than Iowa law applied; (2) the plaintiffs had
not filed their discrimination complaints with the Iowa Civil
Rights Commission within the statutory period; and (3) the plaintiffs
failed to prove prima facie cases of discrimination. The district
court granted the motion as to the jurisdictional and statute
of limitations grounds but found that the plaintiffs had established
their prima facie cases.
On appeal the plaintiffs
contend the district court erred in granting the motion, arguing
that the district court had jurisdiction because the Iowa civil
rights statute did apply and that the complaints were filed in
time.
The defendant argues that
the district court correctly decided both issues. However, if
we find otherwise, the defendant urges us to uphold the district
court's order sustaining the motion for directed verdict. In support
of its request the defendant argues that, contrary to the district
court's finding, the plaintiffs failed to establish their prima
facie cases of discrimination.
We conclude the district
court did not have authority to hear the plaintiffs' cases because
the plaintiffs did not file them in the judicial district where
the alleged discriminatory practice occurred. Accordingly, we
affirm.
The two plaintiffs, James
D. Christie and Ben F. Peterson, were employees of Pella Window,
Co., Inc., (Pella) an Iowa corporation with its principal place
of business in Rock Island, Illinois. Edgar A. Harrell owned the
company, which distributed products manufactured by the defendant
RoIscreen Co. (RoIscreen). Harrell operated the distributorship
as a sole proprietorship until 1971 when the business was incorporated.
RoIscreen is an Iowa corporation
with its principal place of business in Pella, Iowa. RoIscreen
manufactures specialty construction products including windows,
sunroofs, skylights, sliding glass doors, and folding doors. RoIscreen
sells the products to its distributors under the trade name "Pella."
Christie, an Illinois resident,
began working for Harrell in March 1963 as office manager and
bookkeeper. As the business expanded, Christie's responsibilities
grew until he became the secretary and controller of the company.
Christie's responsibilities included collections, accounts payable
and receivable, payroll, financial reports, tax returns, licenses,
and insurance.
Peterson began working for
Pella in May 1976. He is an Iowa resident who lives in Davenport.
Peterson was responsible for the commercial sales of the entire
RoIscreen territory serviced by Pella. This territory included
eastern Iowa and western Illinois. Peterson's duties included
preparing figures and estimates, shop drawings, and commercial
sales contracts.
Two other individuals figured
prominently in the events that triggered this lawsuit: Theresa
Crowe and Terry Miller. Crowe was an assistant to Christie and
Miller was an assistant to Peterson.
For several years Harrell
had tried to sell Pella. Eventually he convinced RoIscreen to
buy it. The purchase took place on December 27, 1985.
RoIscreen formed a subsidiary
corporation, The New Pella Window Company (New Pella), to take
over the assets of Pella and to operate the buiness as a going
concern until RoIscreen could sell it. RoIscreen planned to divide
the territory covered by Pella into smaller, more manageable ones.
After the events that triggered
this lawsuit, RoIscreen succeeded in transferring the northwestern
portion of the territory, consisting of counties in northeastern
Iowa and southwestern Wisconsin, to another RoIscreen distributor
operating out of Waterloo. In addition, RoIscreen transferred
the southeastern portion to a Springfield, Illinois, distributor.
The remaining portion, consisting of seven eastern Iowa counties
and sixteen counties in west central Illinois, were transferred
to New Pella. New Pella continued to operate out of Rock Island.
The purchase agreement called
for Pella to terminate its operations and the employment of all
its employees on December 31, 1985. The agreement contemplated
that RoIscreen would then continue to operate the business as
the New Pella Window Company, starting January 2, 1986.
Christie and Peterson were
told on December 31, at the offices of Pella in Rock Island, that
RoIscreen would not hire them. Instead, RoIscreen hired Crowe
to do Christie's job and Miller to do Peterson's job. Christie
and Peterson did not know this until after January 2. It was on
that date that Crowe and Miller knew what their duties would be
with the new company.
Both Crowe and Miller were
younger than Christie and Peterson; Crowe was thirty-eight years
old, Miller was twenty- four years old. Christie and Peterson
were in their early fifties.
At the time that Pella terminated
its operations, Crowe and Miller were making considerably less
than their predecessors. RoIscreen hired Crowe and Miller at the
same salaries they were receiving from Pella.
Christie and Peterson filed
age discrimination complaints with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission
on July 1, 1986. See Iowa Code § 601A.15(l) (1985). On December
17, 1986, Peterson received an administrative release (letter
of right to sue) from the commission. See Iowa Code § 601A.16(2).
And Christie received his administrative release on January 6,
1987.
On March 16, 1987, Christie
and Peterson filed a combined petition against Pella and RoIscreen
in Scott County district court. They alleged, among other things,
employment discrimination based on age. Before trial, the two
dismissed Pella with prejudice and proceeded to trial against
RoIscreen only.
I. The district court treated the first ground raised in Rolscreen's motion for directed verdict as a "choice of law" issue and applied our "most significant relationship" test. Under the "most significant relationship" test,
the local law of the state having the most significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties controls their rights, obligations and liabilities in tort. Considerations inIclude: place of injury, place of conduct leading to the injury, domicile of the parties, and the place where any relationship between the parties is centered.
Zeman v. Canton State Bank, 211 N.W.2d 346, 349
(Iowa 1973). After weighing these various considerations, the
district court found, as a matter of law, that Illinois had more
significant contacts than Iowa. The court concluded, therefore,
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction of the two cases.
The issue here is not whether
the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Rather
the issue is whether the court lacked authority to hear the two
cases. Subject matter jurisdiction refers to "the authority
of a court to hear and determine cases of the general class to
which the proceedings in question belong, not merely the particular
case then occupying the court's attention." Wederath v.
Brant, 287 N.W.2d591, 594 (Iowa 1980). Clearly, here, the
district court had subject matter jurisdiction because Iowa Code
section 601A.16(l) gave it such jurisdiction. Iowa Code §
601A.16(l) ("A complainant after the proper filing of a complaint
with the commission, may subsequently commence an action for relief
in the district court . . .").
A court may have subject
matter jurisdiction but for one reason or another may not be able
to entertain the particular case. In such a situation we say the
court lacks authority to hear that particular case. Sometimes
we have referred to "lack of authority to hear the particular
case" as lack of jurisdiction of the case. See, e.g.,
City of Des Moines, v. Des Moines Police Bargaining Unit,
360 N.W.2d 729, 730 (Iowa 1985) ("The issue is technically
not one of subject matter jurisdiction. A district court obviously
has jurisdiction to entertain declaratory judgment actions. The
issue is one of jurisdiction of the particular case. This is because
a court lacks authority to entertain particular declaratory judgment
suits in which its jurisdiction has not been properly invoked.").
A statute, like chapter
601 A, that creates a cause of action and establishes procedures
for enforcing that action provides an excellent example of how
a court may have subject matter jurisdiction, yet lack the authority
to hear a particular case. Such a statute gives the district court
subject matter jurisdiction over the type of action the statute
creates. By following the statutory procedures a party properly
invokes the authority of the court to hear the case. A party who
ignores one or more of the procedures does not invoke such authority.
See, eg., Tombergs v. City of Eldridge, 433
N.W.2d 731, 733-34 (Iowa 1988); see also Iowa Const., art.
V, § 6 (giving district courts subject matter jurisdiction
of civil and criminal matters subject to the legislature's authority
to regulate how that jurisdiction is to be employed).
Subject matter jurisdiction
can be raised at any time. Richards v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue,
414 N.W.2d 344, 349 (Iowa 1987). The basis for extending the
"at any time" rule to cases in which the court has subject
matter jurisdiction but lacks authority to hear the particular
case might be subject to question. But up to now our cases have
so extended it. See City of Des Moines, 360 N.W.2d at 730.
But see, Superior/Ideal v. Oskaloosa Bd. of Revenue,
419 N.W.2d 405, 409 (Iowa 1988) (Carter, J., concurring specially)
(suggesting that technical infirmities that would otherwise deprive
the district court of authority to hear the case should be considered
waived unless timely raised).
II. As we said, our civil
rights statute-Iowa Code chapter 601 A-provides a cause of action
for discriminatory practices. So the statute gives the district
court subject matter jurisdiction of such actions. Here the discriminatory
practice alleged is the refusal to hire because of age. See
Iowa Code §§ 601A.17(1)(a), 601A.16(1).
The legislature, however,
has established certain procedures complainants must follow before
they can properly invoke the authority fo the district court to
hear their cases. Several of these procedures are set out in section
601A.16:
1. A person claiming to
be aggrieved by an unfair discriminatory practice must initially
seek an administrative relief by filing a complaint with the commission
.... A complainant after the proper filing of a complaint with
the commission, may subsequently commence an action for relief
in the district court if all of the following conditions have
been satisfied:
a. The complainant has timely
filed the complaint with the commission as provided in section
601A.15, subsection 12 [within one hundred eighty days after the
alleged discriminatory or unfair practice occurred]; and
b. The complaint has been
on file with the commission for at least one hundred twenty days
and the commission has issued a release to the complainant ....
We think another of these procedures is implicit in the definition of "court" in section 601 A.2(1 ). That provision defines "court" as
the district court in and for the judicial district of the state of Iowa in which the alleged unfair or discriminatory practice occurred or any judge of said court if the court is not in session at that time.
Iowa Code § 601A.2(l).
Reading section 601A.16(l) in light of this definition, we think
a complainant must "commence an action for relief" in
any one of the counties of the judicial district where the alleged
discriminatory practice occurred.
Chapter 601 A also has its own venue provision, which is found in section 601 A. 16(4). This section provides:
Venue for an action shall be in the county in which the respondent resides or has its principal place of business, or in the county in which the alleged unfair or discriminatory practice occurred.
At first blush, there is
an apparent inconsistency between this section and the definition
of court in section 601 A.2(1).
We think, however, there
is a reasonable and logical way to harmonize these two provisions.
Section 601A.16(4) is a special venue provision for the judicial
district where the alleged discriminatory practice occurred. For
example, if such a practice occurred in the seventh judicial district,
venue would be proper in any county of that district in which
the respondent resides or has its principal place of business,
or where the alleged discriminatory practice occurred.
Because section 601A.16(4)
is a venue provision it is subject to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure
175. Under rule 175 an infirmity in venue is waived unless the
defendant, before answer, moves to transfer the case to the proper
county. Iowa R. Civ. P. 175(a). So if a civil rights action is
filed in the right district but in the wrong county, the plaintiff
can still prosecute the action there unless the defendant, before
answer, moves to transfer the case.
Here, however, venue is
not the issue. The evidence suggests, at most, that the alleged
discriminatory act occurred either in Pella, Iowa or in Rock Island,
Illinois. Neither place, of course, is in the seventh judicial
district. The seventh judicial district-where Peterson resides
and where the petition was filed-has no connection whatsoever
with the case in terms of either section 601A.2(l) (definition
of court) or section 601A.16(14) (venue).
Consequently, when Christie
and Peterson filed their petition in Scott County they did not
properly invoke the authority of the district court to hear their
cases. The district court correctly sustained RoIscreen's motion
for directed verdict, not because the court lacked subject matter
jursidiction but because if lacked authority to hear the cases.
III. In view of the result we reach in division 11 there is no need for us to consider the statute of limitations issue. Nor do we need to consider Rolscreen's contention that Christie and Peterson failed to prove their prima facie cases of discrimination.
AFFIRMED.