CELESTE HALL, Complainant,

VS.

RICHARD P. GERDNER, Respondent.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The complaint by Celeste Hall against Richard P. Gerdner was timely filed, processed and the issues in the complaint are properly before the Hearing Officer and ultimately before the Commission.

ISSUE I - Did Gerdner discriminate against Hall on the basis of race when he failed to rent her the house at 1204 South 14th Street in Burlington, Iowa?

1. Richard P. Gerdner is the owner of the property at 1204 South 14th Street, Burlington, Iowa, and is, therefore, subject to Iowa Code §60 1A. 8, 1985, which provides in pertinent part as follows:

It shall be an unfair or discriminatory practice for any owner...

1 . To refuse to ... rent ... any real property or housing accommodation ... to any person because of the race ... of such person.

2. To discriminate against any person because of .. race ... in the terms, conditions or privileges of the ... rental ... of any real property or housing accommodation or any part, portion or interest therein.

2. Case law concerning the proper allocation of burden of production and persuasion in the housing discrimination area is still not highly developed in Iowa. Federal cases have used by analogy the analysis applied in individual employment discrimination cases under McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this analysis a complainant is required, initially, to establish a prima facie case as follows: (1) complainant is a member of a protected class, (2) complainant applied and was qualified for an available rental unit, (3) complainant was rejected, (4)the unit was rented to a member of a nonprotected class. The purpose of establishing a prima facie case is the elimination of the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for a complainant's rejection. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). A showing of a prima facie case raises a presumption that the complainant was discriminated against.

3. In the case at issue, Hall is a black person and her family is black. She is, therefore, a member of a protected class. She asked to view a rental unit, expressed interest in renting that unit as soon as the contract of sale was signed making Gerdner owner of the house, and Hall was qualified to rent that house. Gerdner did not rent. her the house. Gerdner rented the house to a white family. She has, therefore, established a prima facie case of discrimination.

4. In order to rebut the presumption of discrimination raised by Hall's showing of a prima facie case, Gerdner must "produce evidence allowing some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action. See Iowa State Fairgrounds Security v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 322 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 1982).

5. Gerdner stated that he looks for tenants who are interested in staying, taking care of the place, and who pay their bills. Gerdner chose the Riffels, a white family, based on the questions they asked, their willingness to paint some of the rooms, their desire to replace a ceiling fixture and their expression of interest in the property.

6. The burden of proof remains on Complainant Hall and she must now be given an opportunity to prove that Gerdner's proffered reason was not the true reason for the rental decision. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. This burden may be met "either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated [Gerdner] or indirectly by showing that [Gerdner's] proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.

7. Both the Halls and the Riffels called Gerdner for an appointment to see the rental house. Both were told over the phone that the rent would be $300.00 a month. Both families were shown the house - the Halls on July 30th and the Riffels on August 5th or 6th. Both were told that there was a problem with actually renting the house until the seller signed the real estate contract. Both were told Gerdner would call them when the contract was signed. The contract could not have been signed prior to August 6th. Gerdner said he received it on August 9th, the same day he rented the house to the Riffels. Gerdner did not call the Halls when the contract was signed. He chose to rent to the Riffels. Gerdner asked Riffel about his employment and his present landlord. Gerdner did not ask the Halls about their employment or their landlord. The Halls were the first persons to view the house. They believed that they would be moving in as soon as the contract was signed. The Riffels expressed an interest, but said they had some things to check out first. They did not believe they would be moving in but hoped that they would be called to discuss rental when Gerdner received the contract. Although the usual procedure in renting units is to take a deposit, Gerdner was not in a legal position to do so prior to the signing of the sales contract by the seller.

Subjective qualifications in a housing case, although appropriate if applied equally, are not appropriate if they are the only qualifications. Objective qualifications, such as the ability to pay the rent, are appropriate. References from current or prior landlords are appropriate. Stability on a job is appropriate. In the case at issue, Gerdner did not consider Hall's ability to pay. She was currently paying a higher rate of rent than he was asking for this rental unit. He did not consider her job and how long she had worked there. He did consider Riffel's job, but the evidence does not indicate he considered how long he had held that job. His reasons for choosing the Riffels, a white family, over the Halls, a black family, were all subjective. Gerdner did not evaluate the two families in a similar manner. He treated them differently. It is concluded that Gerdner's reasons were more than likely based on discriminatory motivation and, therefore, a violation of Iowa Code §601A.8.

ISSUE 2 - If Gerdner did discriminate against Hall, what is the appropriate remedy?

1. When an unfair or discriminatory practice is determined, Iowa Code §601A.15(8)(1985) requires an order that the respondent cease and desist from the discriminatory or unfair practice. It should be so ordered.

2. Iowa Code §601A.15(8)(1985) further requires a respondent to take remedial action necessary to carry out the purposes of Iowa Code chapter 601A.

3. Remedial action under Iowa Code chapter 601A provides "or making whole a victim of discrimination and for carrying out the policies of Chapter 601A. See Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 318 N.W.2d 162, 171 (Iowa 1982).

4. Hall was paying $370.00 rent when her application to rent Gerdner's rental unit was made. Her rent was raised to $385.00 in May 1986. The difference in rent for the 22 days of August 1985 was $96.26 (370 - 30 x 22 = 271.26 - 175.00); the difference for 8 months based on $370.00 less $325.00 = 2960 2600 or $360.00; the difference for 10 months based on $385.00 less $325.00 = $600.00; for a total difference of $1056.26. Hall should be reimbursed for this difference in rent.

5. The only evidence of emotional distress was by Hall's own testimony that she was upset and hurt. It has been found that "humiliation can be inferred from the circumstances as well as established by testimony. " Seaton v. Sky Really Co., 491 F.2d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 1974). Under the circumstances of this case, it is concluded that Hall should be awarded $2500.00 for emotional distress.